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Faction Detected,

BY THE

EVIDENCE

OF

FACTS.

CONTAINING

An Impartial VIEW of PARTIES at Home, and AFFAIRS Abroad.

Quo quò ſceleſti ruitis? Aut cur dexteris
Aptantur enſes conditi?
Non ut ſuperbas invidæ Carthaginis
Romanus arces ureret:
Sed ut, ſecundum vota Parthorum, ſuâ
Urbs hæc periret dexterâ.
Neque hic lupis mos, nec fuit leonibus
Unquam niſi in diſpar feris.
Furorne cæcus, an rapit vis acrior:
An culpa? Reſponſum date.
Tacent, & ora pallor albus inficit,
Menteſque perculſæ ſtupent.

Hor. Epod. Od. VII.

The THIRD EDITION.

LONDON:

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Faction Detected,

BY THE

EVIDENCE of FACTS.

OPPOSITION to the Measures of Government, whether good or bad, is no new thing in this or any other Country, where the People have any Share in the Legislature. For wherever that Circumstance is found, the Materials for the Advancement of private Views abundantly occur: And in proportion to the Importance of such a Country, Subjects ambitious of Preferment have more Incentives to urge them on to Pursuits of this Nature, more Instruments to assist them in their Undertaking, and more Pretexts to delude and to impose upon the Multitude. The Employments in such a Country must of Necessity be numerous and lucrative, the Engagements of the Publick frequent and expensive, the Dangers from its Neighbours greater, their Jealousy and Ill-will more to be apprehended, and consequently with more Privacy and Caution counteracted. This enables artful Men to raise Murmurs against the most necessary Charges of the State, and to quarrel with the best Means of Publick Security with a manifest Advantage, because it is easy to dispute the Wisdom of Measures, which can never be intirely disclosed, till they are fully executed; and the Poison infused into the People has performed its Operation before the Nature of the thing can possibly admit a Detection of the Falsities and Misrepresentations employed against them; while the Publick, already prejudiced, never give themselves the Trouble to examine what is past; either taking more Delight in the Discovery of Error, than in the Pursuit of Truth; or not having the Means furnished with equal Industry, or being diverted by some fresh Objection, started to some new Conduct.

In proportion to the Riches of any Country, Poverty becomes more pressing upon many by a natural Contrast. In all such Countries the Wretched are certainly more wretched than in others which flourish less; because the Necessaries of Life are dear, and not to be had without that Industry, which

Numbers

Numbers will be found to want, in all Places, however opportune the Means of Employment may be; and Men of this kind may be induſtrious in a Faction, which is carried on by Noiſe, Drunkenneſs and Riot, when they can be ſo in nothing elſe. In all trading Countries the Proſpect of Gain allures many to adventurous Undertakings above their Abilities, by which ſome muſt be undone, and theſe never fail to attribute to Miſmanagements of Government, thoſe Evils which ariſe from their own Sloth, Incapacity or Avarice.——Again, in ſuch Countries, the Luxury of ſome induces others to follow them in the ſame Expence, to the Ruin of themſelves and of their Families, and the Generality of theſe unite in Views of a like Nature.——As in all populous Countries, from a Variety of Diſtreſs, ſuch Objects muſt be very numerous; ſo from the very Numbers of a People alone, Faction always derives a great Advantage, ſince from the Difference of Diſpoſitions, with which Men are born into the World, ſome will infallibly ariſe from time to time, framed by Nature itſelf of a reſtleſs and diſcontented Temper; form'd, whether they have Cauſe for it or not, to be as well a Torment to themſelves, as a Plague to the Society in which they live.——Nor can Oppoſition, right or wrong, want even Property to gild it over and to grace it; for Men ariſing from the loweſt Level of the People, and advancing into conſiderable and eaſy Fortunes, are by a natural Conſequence, too often led to conſpire againſt that very Felicity, Peace, Quiet and Proſperity, to which alone they have owed their Exiſtence.——Arrogance and Pride, without a more than common Share of Underſtanding, are the univerſal Product of all haſty Advancement. Theſe Men repine at what they never before had Leiſure to conſider; that there is ſtill a certain Difference between their Condition and that of another Rank, which they cannot remedy by all their Efforts to exceed them in Expence.——This ſomething, which they find ſtill wanting, ſours them with their own State, and inclines them to fall in with any popular Diſcontent; partly, to gratify their Vanity in inſulting thoſe above them; and partly, to create a Chaos, out of which they hope to emerge upon a Level with thoſe they envy.—From whence the Obſervation holds moſt true, That all Nations, in proportion to their Increaſe, grow turbulent and factious, and from this Quarter ariſe thoſe levelling Schemes, in the Contention for which, ſooner or later, Anarchy enſues; and in proceſs of time, the Loſs of that real Liberty, whoſe ſacred Name is ſo often ſpeciouſly prophaned by Malice and Ambition. Even Liberty itſelf, the more perfect it is, produces theſe Effects more ſtrongly;

for

for Wantonneſs and Licentiouſneſs, which are its evil Genii, tempt all depraved Tempers to abuſe it, and expoſe many to the Laſh of the Laws, and to the juſt Indignation of Power; which none, who feel, forgive, however they deſerve it. At the ſame time, the natural Tendancy in all Mankind to expect more Favour than they merit, provokes unjuſt Reſentments againſt Government, and a certain Infirmity (of which we all in ſome Degree partake) to be uneaſy with what we have, and to endeavour after more, inclines Multitudes, either out of Views of private Benefit to themſelves, or general Views of Encreaſe of Privilege to the Order in which they ſtand, to follow any Set of Men, who take the Lead in Oppoſition of any kind.——— All theſe move by a ſecret Principle to that Quarter where it erects its Standard, be it juſt or unjuſt, be it to ſave or to deſtroy their Country.

It is obvious from hence, and it is a Truth that cannot be diſputed, however it may affect the Credit of many pretended Patriots, that the *diſcontented Party* of all Denominations conſiſt *in general* of Men of no Principle, and of very unworthy Character. Its Root is always the ſame;—but indeed its Effects are very different. It becomes in ſome Conjunctures of very beneficial Conſequence, when it is led by Men of honeſt Views; and equally pernicious in others, when conducted by Men of a different Character.—In the firſt Caſe, it is an *Oppoſition*; in the ſecond it is a *Faction*.

Faction is of two kinds in this Country.——*Oppoſition led by Republicans*; and *Oppoſition led by Jacobites*;——Of the two great Parties into which this Nation has been long divided---the *Whigs* (though not *Republicans*) have formerly joined the firſt——the *Tories* (though not *Jacobites*) do conſtantly abet the laſt.——They who know the Nature of this Country, who are acquainted with our Hiſtory, need no Definition or Deſcription of theſe two Parties, and all who are capable of Obſervation and Reflection can eaſily trace the Reaſons of their reſpective Conduct. It is therefore ſufficient for us in this Place, that this is a Fact, which cannot be denied; and without a zealous Attachment of one or other of theſe two Parties, Faction is incapable of doing much Prejudice to *Britain*.

A Faction of the former kind once deſtroyed the Liberties and Conſtitution of this Nation. It grew up unobſerved with the great Improvements of its Commerce, and was nouriſhed in the uncommon Meaſure of Proſperity, which aroſe from a long Tranquillity, and a wonderful Encreaſe of Wealth after the Diſcovery of the *Weſt-Indies*, which diffuſed itſel

through the *Commons*, and gave them Ability to contend with a *Prince*, who, ignorant of this new acquired Vigour of the People, and vainly fond of Power, provoked it by avowed Attempts to introduce an abſolute Authority.

This Faction, by the Imprudence of that Prince, appeared at firſt no more than an honeſt Oppoſition. But abetted at length by the Majority of the Nation, (who neither perceived how dangerous it was, nor could have well avoided joining with it, if they had, to preſerve themſelves againſt the violent Attack then made upon their Freedom,) grew too ſtrong both for the Prince and for the Laws. The miſerable Conſequences that it brought upon us are related at large in the Hiſtories of *England* from 1642 to 1660.

Theſe Evils of Faction in a Republican Form, prevented its Revival again in the ſame Shape.—The People of *England* had (ſince the Union of the two Houſes of *York* and *Lancaſter*) never ſeen it in another.—They therefore feared it in no other. This gave it Opportunity to ſhew itſelf in a new Form, and Oppoſition became again a Faction in the Reign of the late King *William*, and a Faction of a much more dangerous Nature than the firſt.

For whereas the Republicans, who are the Leaders of the firſt Faction, are in this Country little more than Whigs overheated by Oppreſſion, and an extravagant Abuſe of Power; as in reality there is very little of that Principle exiſting among Men of Property and Fortune, and as it is chiefly confined to Men of an inferior Claſs; they may be eaſily brought to moderate their Views by what it is in the Power of every honeſt Government to apply: But the Leaders of the ſecond Faction ſet out with Expectations, that no Government, without being *felo de ſe*, can gratify. For they ſet out upon the View of changing the Prince upon the Throne, and in neceſſary Conſequence to transform the Conſtitution and Religion of the Kingdom.

In a word, a Jacobite Faction aſſumed the Shape of Oppoſition in that Reign; that is, the People under the Circumſtances I have mentioned, and the Diſcontented of all Denominations acted in a Party, directed either ſecretly or openly by Leaders, whoſe Views intended the Reſtoration of King *James* II. or of his Family.

Now that this Faction was more dangerous than that which had appeared before, is farther manifeſt from hence. That the *Republicans profeſſed a Principle*, and of a kind, which led them to do very great and glorious things. Their Zeal was indeed miſtaken, but it claſhed in its Purſuit, neither with the Honour nor the Independency of their Country, and the Strength of this

this Party lay in the Acceſſion of thoſe who had the greateſt Share of Senſe and Honeſty. — They were therefore ſteady in every Conjuncture to defend the Nation againſt its Enemies abroad, and particularly againſt its moſt dangerous Enemy of all the *French*; and unleſs in Times of extream and rare Neceſſity, were deſerted conſtantly by their *Auxiliaries the Whigs*, before they could bring their Scheme to any mature Effect.

But the *Jacobite Faction profeſſed no Principle at all*, or ſuch as deſerves the Name of none. They had indeed a View, but it was private Title, the Intereſt of one Man, and of one Family. An Object in itſelf unworthy any Party, and criminal too in the higheſt Degree, in this Inſtance, becauſe it was the private Title, and the Intereſt of a Man and Family, who by their Education and Religion were nouriſhed in a fatal Enmity to their Country.--Theſe Men therefore, from the indiſpenſible Nature of this their firſt View, could be animated with no good Sentiment for the Publick, and from the Circumſtances of their Caſe, were obliged to aſſiſt the Ambition, ſupport the Power, and abet the Views of *France*, by whoſe Force alone they could hope to bring their Point to bear. Their Oppoſition therefore tended in every Step to deſtroy the Honour and Independency of their own Country. The Strength of their Party lay in the Acceſſion of thoſe who were the weakeſt and moſt diſhoneſt Men; for who elſe could join in ſuch a View as this; and therefore as all who furniſhed them Aſſiſtance muſt be either tainted in their Principles to their Country, or wrong in their Heads before they could engage with them, their Conduct was conſtant, or wilful Error; and thus their *Auxiliaries the Tories*, if ever they ſeparated from their Faction, never did it till it was almoſt too late, and never ſaw that they were deceived, or that they blindly concurred to the Ruin of their Country, till that Ruin was at the very Gate.

It is viſible from hence, that there is much leſs Danger from a *Republican* than from a *Jacobite*; or in ſofter Terms, from a *Whig* than from a *Tory Oppoſition*. A Whig Oppoſition is therefore that alone with which the People for many Years have ventured to concur, and the only one with which they can *for a Moment* concur ſafely.

But even when they follow this, they are not *always* without Danger. For when Oppoſition under any Title riſes high, and becomes formidable, demanding ſuch Terms, as Government is honeſtly under equal and real Difficulty either to grant or to refuſe, the Symptoms are ſtrong, and the Suſpicion generally juſt, that ſuch an *Oppoſition* is converted into *Faction*. — Nor can the Generality of Men diſtinguiſh eaſily of what Species it may be; for both the *Republican Principles*, and

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the *Jacobite Views*, being long since sufficiently detected, and being therefore both become detestable to all honest Men; both the one and the other are extreamly careful not to avow their respective Pursuits.--When they take off the Mask with greatest Freedom, the *Republicans* denominate their Faction by no harsher Name than that of a *Whig*, nor the *Jacobites* than that of a *Tory Opposition*.--Nor would the *Whigs* be brought to support the one, nor the *Tories* to abet the other without this Artifice; and yet by this Delusion of Names, both Parties have been at different Times led on till they have very near destroyed the Constitution. In fact, every Faction will, without Scruple, assume any Appellation to impose upon Mankind; and the most inveterate Jacobite Faction, to carry its View, will profess to act upon a Whig Principle, when that becomes the favourite Principle, as it is at this Time. An Opposition therefore may become *Republican* or *Jacobite*, when the Vulgar little conceive it to be either. The Judgment must be formed not upon what Men call themselves, but upon what they do, upon what they act, upon what is the visible Tendency of their Measures and Pursuits.--Whether they are a Faction or not, or of what Species their Faction is, can be determined only by their Conduct, and may be infallibly determined by that means. Now the Criterion of a Whig Conduct, *is* (as may be collected from what we have already observed) *to resist and reduce the Power*, and the Criterion of a Jacobite or Tory Faction, *directly or indirectly, to assist, encourage, and support the Interests of* France.

This I have premised to give a general Idea of the Nature of Opposition, and of Faction in this Country, that I may with more Facility lay open to the Publick what I have to offer as to the Opposition of this Time---and which I think it my Duty to offer, because I will be bold to affirm, that they are grosly deceived in it, and that instead of pursuing a Whig Opposition, which they conceive it to be, they now abet and support *a Tory Opposition, and a Jacobite Faction, which from the Circumstances of this Time, and the Impudence of its proceeding, is become more dangerous than ever that Faction yet has been in this Nation.*

Had this been affected two Years ago, it would have met with nothing but Ridicule, and it would have been impossible to have induced the Majority of the People of *England* to have believed that the Jacobites could have ever given this Country any Uneasiness again. --- The Reason is very evident.

All the ill Humours of the Nation collected together had, for several Years last past, combined a very strong Opposition; but this Opposition was led by Whigs, by Men known to be of this Principle, and they had the Ascendant

both by their ſuperior Abilities and Experience, and by the Turn of the Nation, to ſuch a Degree, that they kept down all Efforts of the *Jacobites*. They directed the Means of Oppoſition; and the Tendency was therefore to Points wholly free from any Symptoms of that kind. The *Tories* and *Jacobites* ſullenly worked on under theſe Leaders, and could never attain any Degree of Influence over Men of better Parts, and better Principles; they knew not directly whither they were going, but they hoped towards Confuſion, and that they might have a Chance to work out ſomething if that Confuſion ſhould ariſe.—The People at the Beginning of that Oppoſition, which laſted near twenty Years, were living in great Numbers, who remembered the Conduct of this Faction in the Reign of King *William* and Queen *Anne*.—They remembered how, after King *William* was ſeated upon the Throne, and after being grown deteſtable by various Attempts of Plots and Aſſaſſinations, they had been obliged to ſoften their true Name into that of *Tory*; how under that Title they had diſclaimed their ſecret Tenet, and profeſſed only to maintain certain Opinions as to *Church and State*, which had been plauſibly introduced among the People in the great Rebellion by the Clergy, and inculcated from the Pulpit, to make a Party againſt the violent Doctrines of the Republicans of that Time.—The wrong Opinions of the one begot thoſe wrong Opinions of the other: And though the *Paſſion of the firſt* had been diſgraced by the Iſſue of that Rebellion, the *Nonſenſe of the other* had not yet diſgraced itſelf ſo far — The *Preſbyterians* had ruined both the Church and Monarchy; but the *High Churchmen* had not brought in Popery and arbitrary Power, they had even aſſiſted (at laſt) in ſome Degree at the Revolution to keep it out—The Publick in general were not able to judge but of what they ſaw; and they did not ſee how near they were to have done both before they had the Senſe to ſtop, nor how they were puzzled to reconcile their Nonſenſe with that Conduct. Theſe therefore were the favourite Party of that Time.---Of theſe the *Jacobites* laid hold :---All this the People, during the late Oppoſition, ſaw very clearly; (for many, as I have obſerved, were at the Commencement of it living, when the *Jacobites*, thus under the Name of *Tories*, led the Oppoſition of that Time;) how the People were deluded by it; whither they were carried, and what Pretences they had uſed.

They remembered that this Faction ſet out with a furious pretended Zeal for *Monarchy*, *Non-Reſiſtance*, and *Hereditary Right*; they remembered how they ſtirred up the People

with *imaginary Degrees about the Church*; they remembered above all the infamous Endeavours uſed to diſtreſs the Government in its Attempt *to reduce the Power of* France, and to prevent the Exertion of our own Weight to maintain the Ballance of *Europe*.--- The various Means exerciſed by different Perſons at the ſame time according to their different Capacities to effect this End, and according to the different Capacities of thoſe upon whom they practiſed--ſometimes pretending that we had nothing to do with Affairs upon the Continent---ſometimes that the View of reducing *France* was impracticable, that the Expence was not poſſible to be borne, that our Trade was ruined--ſometimes that *France* was really not dangerous---equally magnifying every Succeſs of that Power to terrify, equally miſrepreſenting every Defeat to betray their Countrymen into a falſe Security---ridiculing every Meaſure that was taken for that End---inſinuating, that the King was a *Dutchman*, and had only the Intereſt of *Holland* at Heart---that every Alliance was made for the Intereſt of the *Dutch* alone --- that the Nation was beggared for a Foreign View---that the King delighted in War, becauſe it afforded a Pretext to maintain great Armies---that *Holland* was not yet attacked, and the *French* King, whatever he propoſed, could never be raſh enough to attempt that---at leaſt that till he did attempt it, this Nation had no Reaſon to ſtir, nor any thing to fear.

They remembered this Conduct, and they remembered how by poiſoning the People by theſe and an Infinity of other falſe Inſinuations, and by Miſrepreſentations of the Expence which they themſelves rendered infinitely more grievous, by the Obſtruction given to the Supplies, and the Neceſſity, which proceeded from thence, of borrowing large Sums at high Intereſt, they laid the firſt Foundation for the Debt under which the Nation yet labours---That by theſe Means they at length reduced the King to the Neceſſity of conſenting to the Partition Treaty, for which they reviled and abuſed him, and raiſed the Ferment of the People upon him, though it was the Infant of their own Faction---That by this means they preſerved *France* in the Zenith of her Power, at leiſure to prepare againſt the Death of the King of *Spain*, an Event which was expected every Day---That though the Proſpect of a new War was ſo immediate and ſo certain, they forced the Reduction of the Army to ſeven thouſand Men; ſo that when the War of 1702 broke out, before the *Grand Alliance* could take place, by the Management of theſe faithful and ſteady Friends of *France*, that Prince was enabled to make an entire Seizure of the *Spaniſh* Monarchy, and to ſtrengthen himſelf to ſuch a Point, as to carry on a War againſt

moſt

moſt of the Powers of *Europe* for twelve ſucceſſive Years, to which *England* alone contributed above Seventy Millions.

They remembered farther, (though this pernicious Conduct had eſtranged the Nation from them for a time, and had caſt the Adminiſtration of Affairs into the Hands of the Whigs; during which whole Period, this Nation was attended with the moſt amazing Series of Succeſſes ever read of in Hiſtory;) that the ſame Men continued the ſame Practices, till by low Arts, they had frightned, and by infamous Inſinuations gained both upon her and upon the People, ſtill concealing their grand View till they had got into the Adminiſtration.

They remembered farther (though it ſeems to be forgotten now) what they did when they came there.——That they betrayed the *Faith* of this *Nation* and deſerted their *Allies*.—— That they did it with Circumſtances, which clearly proved their Intention to yield them up a Sacrifice to *France*.—— That they made a ſeparate and an infamous Peace, by which they ſaved *France* from inevitable and immediate Ruin, and caſt away that immenſe Treaſure, which had been expended in the War, entailing a future Expence ſtill greater even than that they had thus iniquitouſly thrown away; expoſing us to greater Danger than we had even then eſcaped, laying a Foundation for her Advancement to a much higher Point of Power, and preventing at the ſame time, by their Perfidy to the Confederates, as far as in them lay, all Probability of the ſame Union to obſtruct her Views again.

They remembered how clearly and how ſteadily this Plan of ſerving *France*, had been purſued, and how it was brought to its full Effect.——And they remembered how near their Grand View, to which this was ſecondary, was brought to an Iſſue too.——In what manner before the Death of the Queen, they had deeply laid the Plot of abuſing her Authority to bring the Pretender to the Throne.—How notwithſtanding their affected Loyalty to their Royal Miſtreſs, by which they had not only duped her, but deceived the Nation; they baſely meditated her Ruin, to whoſe Weakneſs they owed their Advancement. —How by their dark Intrigues they broke her declining Conſtitution and cauſed her Death.—The only Service they ever did her; ſending that unhappy Princeſs, by this Precipitation of her Fate, to a better World, before ſhe had experienced in this, far worſe Calamities, which they were preparing for her; the Loſs of her Crown and Dignity, perhaps a violent End, at leaſt Impriſonment for Life.

They remembered the Deliverance of this Nation by the Acceſſion of his late Majeſty in the moſt critical Conjuncture.

—They

—They remembered the Confidence of this Conſpiracy, which had ripened ſo far in four Years Tory Adminiſtration, that they thought themſelves able to effect that by Force, when they had loſt all Power, which could not have been defeated had they continued a few Months longer in it.—They remembered the late Rebellion, which broke out immediately after, and which was ſuppreſſed, more by the Interpoſition of Divine Providence, than by human Means.

Remembring all this, the laſt Scene of which happened not eleven Years before the Commencement of the late Oppoſition, which may be properly dated from the *Hanover* Treaty in 1725.—The People could not entertain a Fear of a *Tory Faction*.—This Scene of Wickedneſs had ſo fully detected thoſe, who ſet themſelves in the Front of ſuch a Faction, that even the *Tories* themſelves bluſhed to ſee the Tools they had been made; and trembled equally with the *Whigs*, at the Hazards which their Folly had brought upon the Nation; ſuch as, to do them equal Juſtice, their *Heads* had never comprehended, nor their *Hearts* ever intended to promote.—The ſhameleſs Conduct of that Adminiſtration, with regard to *France*, and the *Pretender*, cauſed an univerſal Averſion to the Tories; and many of them, ſenſible of the Errors of their former Conduct, retained nothing of what they were but the Name.---The whole Nation appeared united in a warm Attachment to the preſent Royal Family.---The *Faction* of which we ſpeak, ſenſible of their wounded Intereſt, hardly ſhewed themſelves in any Shape, for ſome Years.---Any new Oppoſition avowedly begun by them in that Conjuncture, would have ruined them for ever. —*Their Arts and their falſe Pretences were too recent to impoſe upon Mankind.—And their Converſion, had they pretended any, would have been too ſudden and unnatural to have gained Belief.*

As Security rarely fails to be the Mother of Danger, ſo it was with us,—This ſeeming Security deceived both the *Miniſter*, and the *Publick*. I ſhall ſpeak frankly and without Partiality to either.—It tempted him to act with too much Wantonneſs, and Negligence in Power.—It tempted *others* too much to indulge their Reſentment and private Views.---The *Faction* was no longer dreaded but deſpiſed.---When that has been the Caſe, it has been always found, at length

Incedimus per Ignes
Suppoſitos cineri doloſo. Hor.

The Miniſter, void at firſt of all Apprehenſion of this latent Danger, gratified his ill Humour to, or took no Pains to manage the

the ill Humours of, thoſe he happened to diſlike, neglected Popularity too much, and ſtudied only how to avoid War, as the Means to procure the Continuance and the Eaſe of his Adminiſtration.—He knew that in War, if not ſucceſsful, the ill Succeſs is always attributed to the Miniſter.—If fortunate, that it was unavoidably attended with great Expence, at which, in the long run, the People murmur.—He likewiſe ſaw, that in War, military Men, and active Spirits muſt, by degrees, obtain ſome Share of Power; which he was determined to engroſs.—All *Europe* quickly ſaw this Foible, and the two Powers, from whom we have to fear the moſt, the *French* and *Spaniards*, play'd him off unmercifully.—Their Methods were different, but both tending to the ſame End. —The *French* flattered him with an inſidious Friendſhip, and the Affectation of a pacifick Diſpoſition.—The *Spaniards* bullied him upon every Turn.—It muſt be candidly confeſſed that the Peace of *Utrecht* in 1713, and the Difficulties unadjuſted then, had greatly embarraſſed all the Affairs of *Europe*.—*France* and the Emperor had agreed by the Treaties of *Raſtadt*, and *Baden* the following Year; but great Differences between the Emperor and *Spain* ſubſiſted till long after this Miniſter was taken into that Employment.—His Predeceſſors had been puzzled with theſe Differences.—And in endeavouring to appeaſe them, had already, by the *Quadruple Alliance*, and ſeveral ſubſequent Treaties and Proceedings, in a great Degree diſguſted both thoſe Powers. At the Time therefore, when the Reins of this Government were put into his Hands, it required greater Abilities for Foreign Affairs, and another Turn to extricate this Nation out of theſe difficult Circumſtances.—Inſtead of adhering firmly to the Emperor, this Miniſter yielded to the Views of *Spain*, who inſulted us till ſhe had carried one Point, and then inſulted us again, till ſhe had obtained another.—The Miniſter ſtill vainly flattering himſelf with gaining that Power by conſtant Obligations. — But the Queen, who governed there, knew neither any Sentiment of Gratitude, nor any Limits to her Ambition.—By this Conduct he ſtill provoked the Emperor to a higher Degree, which *Spain* obſerving, took that Opportunity to accommodate her own Affairs with the Imperial Court.

This ſudden Friendſhip between the Courts of *Vienna* and *Madrid* alarmed the Miniſter, who knew he had not the Friendſhip of *the one* Court, whatever he had done and ſuffered for it; and that he had juſtly incurred the Reſentments of *the other*. He therefore grew jealous of this Union, and dreaded ſome Effect from it, though he knew not what.—

He

He apprehended that the Peace of *Europe* was upon the Point of being disturbed again; and without considering the Nature of such Disturbance, that it could not prejudice this Country; that it was, on the contrary, the most desirable Event that could have happened, and that *France* could alone have Reason to consider this Union with a jealous Eye:—He suffered himself to be imposed upon by imaginary Fears, insinuated by *France*, and immediately exerted himself to form a Confederacy against the *Emperor* and *Spain*; whose Union was effected by themselves, for no other Reason but because we had refused to mediate for them; and that neither Decency nor Resentment could permit *Spain* to accept the Mediation of *France*, from whom she had received a recent Indignity of a very high Nature, by sending back the *Infanta*, who had been betrothed to the King of *France*.

This Confederacy, which went by the Name of the *Hanover* Treaty, was concluded between *France*, *Prussia*, and *Great Britain*, the 23d of *September*, 1725, about four Months after the Treaty between the *Emperor* and *Spain*, concluded at *Vienna*.—The late King of *Prussia* was then living, and it is obvious by the Conduct of the *Son*, what Views the *Father* might have had to induce him, among other Discontents with the *Imperial Court*, to come into this Measure.---And it was still much more obvious, why *France* should have joined in a Project, which was of her own Invention, and the only Measure, that could have recovered her out of the most dangerous Situation that she was ever in.---The House of *Bourbon* was divided against itself, and she was very sensible it could not have stood, if this Alliance between the *Emperor* and *Spain* had continued in Force.---The natural Antipathy of the Imperial Court, and the Resentments of *Spain* to *France*, too plainly accounted for the Sums remitted from the *Spanish* Court to *Vienna*, and the vast Encrease of the Imperial Armies.----These Armies could not have waded through the Ocean to have attacked *Great Britain*: The *Emperor* had not a single Ship to bring them hither, and the Fleets of *Spain* had been destroyed in the *Mediterranean* in the Year 1718.---Had it therefore been as solemnly true, as it was undoubtedly false, that those Stipulations had been made in the *Vienna* Treaty to affect *Great Britain*, which the Minister had been imposed upon himself, or desired to impose on others to believe, *Great Britain* must have been out of its Senses to have been alarmed at them.---A Squadron of Ships of War sent upon the Coasts of *Spain*, and another of Observation on our own Coasts, together with the Body of Forces constantly maintained at Home, would

have

have prevented all Poſſibility of the ſmalleſt Danger of Invaſion, which can never be juſtly feared but from *France* alone, or *France* and *Spain* united, a Caſe viſibly not then exiſting, and more remote than it ever was.--The *French* therefore well knew that theſe Preparations muſt have been deſigned againſt themſelves; and if the very diſtant Sound of War had not terrified the Miniſter to the Loſs of his Wits, we might probably have ſeen an Event at that Time, which we ſhall probably never have in our Power to ſee again---The Houſe of *Bourbon* ruined by itſelf, and *France* reduced, without the Expence of a ſingle Shilling to this Country.

We have now ſeen *France* preſerved, and the Houſe of *Auſtria* confederated againſt by its natural and old Ally *Great Britain*; we have ſeen the ſame effected by the Puſillanimity of a *Whig Miniſter*, which was the conſtant View of a *Tory Adminiſtration*.---The ſame honeſt Zeal which animated the Whigs againſt the Tories, moſt juſtly and indiſpenſibly induced many of them to enter into an Oppoſition to an Adminiſtration, who with different Principles purſued the ſame End---This will warrant, before God and Man, the Oppoſition that we have lately ſeen.--- It ſhews, that it was carried on upon Whig Principles; that it was the grand Principle of humbling *France*, and of aſſiſting the Houſe of *Auſtria*, to which they adhered, and which they intended to maintain by this Oppoſition --- It was not a Quarrel about particular Laws or Alterations of the Conſtitution, as it is now falſely ſuggeſted to have been. Something of this kind is attempted in the Courſe of every Oppoſition, and ſomething of this kind is from time to time neceſſary, within the Bounds of Moderation, to be done, to confine Government to its firſt Principles, and proper to be attempted in ſome Conjunctures, even in a further Degree than it is intended to be done, to keep Miniſters of a certain Character in Awe, and to maintain the People in a Senſe of their Advantages, which ſuch Miniſters, without that lively Senſe in them, might have it otherwiſe in their Power to impair---But theſe were ſecondary Views; the grand Point intended, and what theſe were employed only as Engines to attain, was *to remove the Miniſter, and to bring back the Councils of this Country to its true Intereſt.*

The Conjuncture was now come, which had been long impatiently expected by the Faction---Confuſion was begun---and the Government attacked without the leaſt Appearance that the Faction had been the Authors of it---The Whigs, who oppoſed, did it with great Vigour, but were ſtill known to be true in their Principles, both to the King and to the Conſtitution---The Faction, who could not, as I have already obſerved, *venture to*

have avowedly begun a new Oppoſition themſelves, or practiſed their former Arts, which were too recent to impoſe upon Mankind, or pretended a Converſion, which would have been too ſudden and unnatural to have gained Belief, found the Occaſion extreamly apt to buſy themſelves again—They would have joined with the Miniſter, who was now indiſcreetly doing what they wiſhed, if they had believed he had wiſhed it too; but as they knew he did it by a kind of fatal Neceſſity, which a Series of Errors had induced, they knew that neither he, nor that Part of the *Whigs*, who continued to ſupport him, ſome through the ſame Blindneſs, ſome through Gratitude to *him*, ſome through the very Apprehenſion of *them*, and ſome for other Reaſons; yet none of them did it upon *their* Views, or would ever concur to bring it to *their* deſired Concluſion.—They therefore knew that they would ſooner or later change this Conduct, and that beſides they would never join with them.—The only Game they therefore had to play, was to act an under Part with this Whig Oppoſition—By this Conduct they had a double Policy; *firſt*, to concur in raiſing the Ferment of the Nation to the higheſt Point they could (which by long Obſervation never was yet raiſed ſince the Revolution, but that it took a Turn in favour of their great View) and *ſecondly*, to efface the Suſpicions that the Nation entertained of them.

The grand Criterion of the Conduct of the two Parties being (as I have already obſerved,) of the *Whigs*, *to oppoſe the Growth of the Power of* France, and of the *Tories*, *to advance the Intereſts of that Power*—The Faction concurring in this Oppoſition, which ſo directly formed itſelf upon the *Whig Principle*, exerting themſelves with the utmoſt Rancour and ſeeming Sincerity againſt the Miniſter, for his Conduct with regard to *France*, uniting in all the Popular Bills, and Republican Propoſitions, (which were by this, and have commonly been by all Whig Oppoſitions, more eſpecially indulged,) and being ſilent upon the Topicks of *Paſſive Obedience*, *Non-reſiſtance*, and the *Danger of the Church*, from all theſe Circumſtances joined to a Partiality to believe well of thoſe who aſſiſt us, let the Motives be what they will, and a Tendency to diſbelieve the Miniſter, who very conſtantly rung the Alarm againſt their ſecret Principles, all which was improved by the moſt ſolemn Aſſurances of their good Intentions; they at length wrought upon the Publick to believe, that their Views were intirely changed—Many were by this Time dead, who remembered all thoſe Arts and Practices which I have formerly mentioned, and a new Race were by this Time ſprung up in their Room, by their Age, and the Nature of Youth, ſuſceptible of light Impreſſions, actuated by warm Paſſions, and ignorant of what had paſſed before their Times.

Times.—To this were added such a Series of Mistakes, and such unfortunate Events, as brought the Interests of all our Allies, and consequently the Interests of *Britain*, into the utmost Danger, the Minister still unavoidably blundering on, not able to make a Peace, nor to carry on a War—Harrassing the Country by great and fruitless Expences, to provide Forces against Events, which were neither sufficient to answer the End, and which he never had Resolution to employ towards the End—bubbled by *France*, insulted by *Spain*, hated by the Publick. Thus the Resentments of the Nation rose at last so high, that they became incapable to consider any Danger, or to suspect any Treachery but from him.—In this Situation of Affairs, it is easy to account why the Faction still subsisted, and why it must have been a vain, perhaps not a wise Attempt at that Time, to have endeavoured to have convinced the Publick that they did.—The Whigs, in the Opposition, thought honestly, and they thought truly, that the Nation was inevitably ruined, if this Minister continued to govern in our Councils longer. The House of *Austria*, which is as much the Barrier to the Liberties of *Britain* as the strong Towns of *Flanders* are to the *Dutch* Republick, was reduced to the lowest Ebb, and upon the very Brink of utter Destruction.—No effectual Means proposed, no Means possible during his Continuance in Power to give it any Assistance. In this Condition they were compelled to use the Aid of any Set of Men whatever, to procure the Removal of this Minister; and they thought they might depend safely upon the national Experience of the past Behaviour of the Faction, upon the Integrity and Well-meaning of the Generality of the People, upon the real Excellency and peculiar Blessings of this Constitution, never in any Event to be overborne by either a Jacobite or Tory Faction.---In fine, they trusted to their own Influence, which then governed and directed the whole Opposition without Controul, to settle and consolidate the Principles of the Nation, as soon as the Minister was removed, and his Measures rectified.

These are the true, and they are sufficient Reasons to explain why the Nation gradually lessened in its Apprehension of this Faction, why the Tories thus combined were conceived to be no longer what they had been formerly. But the Whigs, who led the Opposition, and were most considerable in it, who now compose the Administration in Part, and who now oppose no longer, were not so easily deceived.---They could not but observe the Views of these Men in their pretended Coalition with them.---They could not avoid seeing (though they prevented, and discouraged them as much as they could, and kept them down in a very great Degree) the malevolent En-

deavours of these Men, to poison the Minds of the People against the Royal Family, and to give the general Discontent a Tendency to Disaffection against the *Prince* upon the Throne: which they laboured wholly to confine to the Person of the *Minister*.—They saw too evidently, to be duped by any of their Pretences, that they maintained the same Inveteracy to the Whigs.—They supported no Whig in any Election, where they could possibly avoid it, without a Detection of themselves, or the Ruin of an Opposition so convenient to their View.—The Whigs even saw much more, which in that Circumstance it was not their Interest to discover to the Publick, that they endeavoured, by refusing to concur in several personal Propositions against the Minister, to try whether they could not induce him to strike a separate Bargain with themselves—and at the Close of the Opposition, in the first Sessions of this Parliament, when they adhered more firmly to these personal Propositions, they knew it was becaufe the Minister had not catched at the Bait they had thrown out for him, and was not to be deluded by their Arts.

From all that we have here observed, it is very notorious, that the last Opposition was a *Whig Opposition*, and not a *Tory Faction*.—That the plain Origin, and avowed Views of this Opposition, were the Removal of the Minister, and the Change of his Measures.—That when this was done, they, from the very Beginning of that Opposition, intended no more, never meant, nor were ever expected to maintain it longer.—That it would have been inconsistent with their avowed Professions, and with their real Principles, if they had.

It is farther obvious, that the Tory Faction, though they concurred with them, had done it without either *Principle* or *Affection*, and never had the Influence to give this Opposition any Taint or Colour, nor were they suffered to compass one publick Measure of their own—That the Whigs, though they could not refuse the Concurrence of their Votes, and their Assistance to swell the Number of Opponents, never pretended, or had any real Friendship with them, nor ever had Reason from their Sincerity to have it, much less ever gave them any Encouragement to hope that they would join with them any longer, than till they had changed the *Minister*, and changed the *Measures*.

If then it shall appear, that the Minister and the Measures are now changed—if it shall appear, that these Men after this commenced a new Opposition, when the principal Whigs, who before directed the Opposition, had done with that Direction,—What Man can deny, *that the Leaders of the late Opposition have*

acted conſiſtently and honeſtly both in their firſt Beginnings to oppoſe—and then in deſiſting to oppoſe at the Time they did.

And if it ſhould appear, that the *Whig* Leaders of the late Oppoſition, though they had no further Connexion with theſe Men after that Change of the Miniſter, and the Meaſures, was effected, which was the only View they intended or profeſſed, or concurred with theſe Men in, did yet endeavour, out of a Deſire to deſtroy (as much as in them lay, and till they found it an *Utopian* Undertaking) the Evil of *Parties* in general, and the Diſtinction of *Tory* in particular, by uſing their Influence to advance many of theſe, (who ſeemed the leaſt violent) into Employments, where they might be placed without the Danger of their influencing the publick Meaſures, and where they might have given Probation of their Sincerity.—If they had actually in a very few Days begun to do this, and if it will appear that for no other viſible Reaſon but this, that the *Tories* and *Jacobites* were not permitted to take the Government by Storm, and that their Ambition could not be ſatisfied, or their Views anſwered, without thoſe Employments were conferred upon them, which would inevitably give them the Power of influencing the publick Meaſures; and if the Terms were ſuch as to force their whole Faction into the Adminiſtration, without allowing the Prince to except againſt a ſingle Man, and their Impatience, ſuch as to deſert their Leaders, and to form a new Party before they had given them any reaſonable Time—What Man can have the Confidence to deny, that they acted *not only with greater Friendſhip to theſe Men than they deſerved, but with as much Honour as it was in human Power honeſtly to do?*

And thirdly, if it ſhould appear, that by this new raiſed Oppoſition, it is the manifeſt View to do that, which, as we have already obſerved, is the Criterion of the Conduct of a *Jacobite* Faction, viz. *to advance the Intereſts of* France; and if this manifeſt View is now followed by the very ſame wicked Arts and Meaſures, which that Faction in all former Periods have purſued, I may be juſtified in that Aſſertion which it is my Point principally to prove—*That the Oppoſition of this Time is not an Oppoſition, but a Faction, and that of the moſt dangerous kind to this Nation.*

Now that this is true, and rather to illuſtrate than to prove this (for Things ſelf-evident, and what ariſes from the Recollection of Facts, neither will admit, nor ſtands in need of Proof) I ſhall make it the Plan of my Diſcourſe in the following Sheets:--Firſt, *To ſhew the State of our Affairs, as they ſtood previous to the Change of the late Miniſtry, and to give a ſhort Deduction of the Conduct of the Oppoſition till the Whigs and the preſent Faction ſeparated*

ſeparated from each other.--- I ſhall then obſerve the Conduct of the Faction thus ſeparated from the Whigs to the End of that Seſſions of Parliament. --- I ſhall in the third Place obſerve the Conduct of the new Adminiſtration, the Succeſs of their Meaſures, and the Difference that appeared in the Situation of our Affairs upon the ſecond Meeting of the Parliament.--I ſhall ſhew in the next place, the farther Meaſures of the Faction in their Attempts to delude the People, in their Methods of Oppoſition, and the Tendency of both.--- I ſhall then proceed to offer a few candid Reflections upon thoſe popular Topicks, which are the Engines principally uſed to play upon the Paſſions of the People, and to divert them from a cool Reflection of the true Condition of our Affairs in this Conjuncture, and conclude with ſome general Conſiderations, which will lead the Publick to a juſt Senſe of thoſe Dangers to which they are expoſed, by a further Concurrence with what is now plauſibly called by the tender Name of the preſent Oppoſition.

We have already mentioned the Conduct of the Miniſter, with regard to the *Emperor*, *Spain* and *France*, at the time of the *Hanover*-Treaty, which throwing this Nation into the Arms of *France*, and breaking off from our old and natural Connexion with the Houſe of *Auſtria*, divided the Whig Intereſt, and was the Ground of the late Oppoſition.---We are now to ſee the Meaſures afterwards purſued by the ſame Miniſter, and the Conſequence they had.—But before I quit this Subject of the *Hanover*-Treaty, which was the fatal Ground of all our preſent Confuſion, to confirm what I have already ſaid, with regard to the juſt Alarm the *Whigs* took at it, I muſt obſerve, that by a ſeparate Article of this Treaty, *Great Britain* engaged, " in caſe War ſhould be declared by the Empire againſt *France*, " that though ſhe was not comprized in the Declaration of ſuch " War, *Great Britain* ſhould act in Concert with *France* till " ſuch War ſhould be determined ;" and by Virtue of the third Article of the ſame Treaty, " ſhould, if Neceſſity required, " declare War upon the Empire." *And thus*, ſays a [a] Foreigner, who is quoted often upon Occaſions of this Nature, and cannot be ſuſpected of any Party Concern in the Affairs of this Country,--*By this Treaty, the Duke of* Bourbon, *then Firſt Miniſter to the Moſt Chriſtian King, brought to Maturity what his Predeceſſor had projected, and* France *at length attained what ſhe had ſo long wiſhed, and for which ſhe had in vain expended ſuch immenſe Sums in the preceding Reign.*

The Conſequence immediate upon the Concluſion of this Treaty, was a vaſt additional Expence. — And without all Doubt, the Raſhneſs of this Meaſure had engaged us in a War, which

[a] *Rouſſet.* vol. II. fol. 188.

which would have ruined the Balance of Power in *Europe* without Reſource, (the Powers of the grand Alliance being now upon the Point of purſuing the Deſtruction of each other, with the ſame determined Rancour, which they had formerly exerted againſt their common Enemy the *French*,) if the Emperor, notwithſtanding the Pride and Inſolence, of which he was accuſed, and the ſhameful Indignity with which he was treated, obſerving the Danger in which we had, by *our unnatural Apprehenſions*, involved ourſelves, had not, with an happy Moderation, himſelf opened a Way, (in a very uncommon Manner, through the Channel of a Nuncio of the Pope at *Venice*,) to bring this Matter to an Accommodation; ſo that at length, upon the Suſpenſion of the *Oſtend* Company, which was one of the pretended Subjects of the Quarrel, a new *Preliminary Treaty* was ſigned at *Vienna*, in *June* 1727; which quieted our Miniſterial Fears of a general War in ſome degree for a Time: During this Interval we ſuſtained an immenſe Expence in defending *Gibraltar*, raiſing Troops at Home, and hiring Troops abroad, the ineſtimable Loſs of many thouſands of our Seamen, and the Ruin of the never-to-be forgotten Squadron ſent with *Hoſier*, to rot in Sight of the Treaſures of *Peru* and *Mexico*, at *Porto-Bello*.

But there yet remained great Matter of Anxiety; for *Spain*, under frivolous Pretences, which ſhewed her manifeſt Contempt for the *Britiſh* Miniſter, refuſed to ratify this *Preliminary Treaty*, and continued her Hoſtilities, till the *Emperor*, with great Candour, deteſting this Chicane, took part with our Court againſt her.—And *Spain*, finding no Support, was at length obliged to accede by a new Act ſigned at the *Pardo*, the 4th of *March*, 1728.—By which it was agreed, that all Hoſtilities ſhould ceaſe, and all the Differences between *Great Britain* and *Spain* be ſubmitted to the Deciſion of a future Congreſs.

The Miniſter, ſenſible of the Danger he had eſcaped, was glad of the Opportunity, which offered itſelf in that Congreſs (which was held at *Soiſſons*) to reunite with the Imperial Court.—Notwithſtanding all the Indignities that had paſſed, and all the Provocations he had received, the Emperor retained ſo juſt a Senſe both of his Obligations, and his Intereſt to cultivate the antient Friendſhip of the Houſe of *Auſtria* with *Great-Britain*, that he was willing to overlook all that was paſſed; and as his Union with *Spain* before, had given ſo much Umbrage here, he thought by raiſing Difficulties, and by delaying the Execution of ſome Articles of the former Treaty with *Spain*, he ſhould give us Proofs of his Sincerity.—But alas! he had not yet experienced what he had to ſuffer from the pacific Councils, or (as they are termed

termed by the great Conductor of them himself,) the *preventive and defensive* Measures of the *British* Minister.— *Spain* was incensed at this Conduct, and at the Emperor's candid Behaviour with regard to the *Preliminary Articles*; we now began to be as much frightened at the *Variance*, as we had been terrified before with the *Union* of these two Powers; we had practised our *defensive* as we have seen; we must now try our Skill in *preventive* Measures, and with the like Success.

The Emperor's Conduct deserved the Gratitude of the whole Nation; and merited the best Returns that could have been made him.—On the other hand, during this whole time, even after the signing the Act at the *Pardo*, *Spain* had treated us with the utmost Insolence, taken and plundered all the Vessels of this Nation, that fell into her Hands, with as little Reserve as if we had been at open War. These Circumstances together should, in all human Wisdom, have induced the Minister, to have laid aside his old Way of alliancing with *France*, to have improved the Misunderstanding between the *Emperor* and *Spain*, and to have endeavoured, with the utmost Vigour, to crush that Insolence of *Spain* by force, which he saw visibly, was not to be reclaimed by generous Usage, by the Moderation of suffering her to declare War without any reciprocal Declaration on our Part, by our signal Abstinence from a Seizure of above four Millions Sterling in *America*, nor by the Patience we had exercised under so many Indignities, Insults and continued Depredations. But instead of doing this, in Conjunction with his good Ally the *French*, he concluded a new Treaty with *Spain*, which was signed at *Seville*, the 9th of *November*, 1729.

The Emperor, who had shewn himself so truly desirous of preserving the Peace of *Europe*,—who had acted with so much Moderation and Candour, to preserve the Friendship of this Nation, was not acquainted in the least with this Treaty, till it was concluded; ---- it was kept secret from him; and no Wonder,---for it contained an Article, which has since proved, as we have seen, and as he always foresaw it would, of the most fatal Consequence to his *Italian* Dominions:---This Article was the immediate Admission of 6,000 *Spanish* Troops into the Places of *Tuscany*, *Parma* and *Placentia*, to secure the Reversion of those States, after the Deaths of their respective Princes, to Don *Carlos*, which in the *Quadruple Alliance* the Emperor had consented to be done only by *Neutral* Forces, and even that very much against his Inclination.

It may be easily conceived what Effect such a Treatment as this must have had upon the Emperor: It justly gave him the greatest Alarm, as well as raised his Resentment to the highest degree.

gree.—Even in his Conjunction with *Spain* in 1725, intimate, as it had been repreſented to be, he was never brought by *Spain* to conſent to this Alteration,—and what made the Matter ſtill worſe, theſe Territories being Fiefs of the Empire, this arbitrary Settlement with relation to them juſtly incenſed the Empire too.

Theſe *preventive Meaſures* put us into worſe Plight than ever.—*France* had brought us about again, and we were now upon the Point of joining, not only *France*, but of uniting with the whole Houſe of *Bourbon*, not only againſt the *Emperor*, but the whole *Germanick Body*.—*Spain* and *France* urged us openly and vehemently to compleat theſe new Engagements.—The *Emperor* in the mean time marched a powerful Army, and filled all *Italy* with his Troops, determined to reſiſt the Execution of this Treaty, which he thus prevented for the whole Year 1730.—The *Miniſter* was now in Deſpair, his Fleets at *Spithead* had not terrified the Emperor's Armies in *Lombardy*.—But the Reſentments of *France* and *Spain* at his Inactivity, and contradictory Proceedings, terrified the Miniſter.—[a]The Marquiſs *de Caſtellar*, the *Spaniſh* Miniſter at *Paris*, publiſhed a Declaration there, by Order of his Maſter, upon the 28th of *January* 1731, with bitter Reproaches againſt this Conduct, *renouncing all his Engagements with us, profeſſing that he now looked upon himſelf as intirely at Liberty to act what Part ſoever he ſhould find moſt ſuited to his Intereſts*. Thus he had viſibly diſobliged all Parties, he thought a War inevitable, and himſelf undone.—His new Treaty of *Seville*, upon which he had plumed himſelf ſo proudly, now vaniſhed into Smoak.—But the Emperor's good Senſe and Moderation ſaved our Miniſter once more.—He conſented to this ruinous Meaſure, tho' with Tears in his Eyes.—He conſented to admit a Prince of the Houſe of *Bourbon* into *Italy*, whom we were viſibly carrying thither to eſtabliſh in a great Monarchy at the Expence of his Dominions.—Willing not even yet to deſpair that this Nation would ſee its Errors at laſt, he determined to try us once more, and ſubmitted to make this Sacrifice, on condition that we ſhould accede to the *Pragmatic Sanction*, and guaranty the reſt of his Dominions to his eldeſt Daughter.

This Treaty concerning the Admiſſion of the *Spaniſh* Troops into the *Italian* States, and the *Guaranty* of the *Pragmatic Sanction* was concluded at *Vienna* the 16th of *March* 1731.—between the Emperor and *Great Britain* alone. Its View was to enforce the Treaty of *Seville*.—Yet it was concluded without the Participation either of *France* or *Holland*, who had

[a] *Rouſſet*, Vol. VI. fol. 11.

been the contracting Parties to that of *Seville*.—The *Dutch* were however at length prevailed upon to accede to it.

We now began to think again that we had done great Matters, for the preſent we had pacified the *Emperor*, and prevented a War. —We obtained a Declaration from the Court of *Spain*, dated at *Seville* the 6th of *June* following to revoke that of the Marquis *de Caſtellar*, of the 28th of *January* before mentioned: And as a Proof of our Reconciliation with the ſecond Power, we were permitted to have the Honour, upon the 17th of *October* 1731, to eſcort the *Spaniſh* Troops into *Italy*, with a Squadron of ſixteen *Britiſh* Men of War, at the Expence of 200,000 *l.*

But we are come at length to the final Period of the Succeſs of theſe *preventive and defenſive* Meaſures—they could no longer hold—the whole World clearly ſaw, to what the Politicks of the *Britiſh* Miniſter amounted—and that he was determined to be moved neither by Indignity or *Danger*.

France had carried her Point, ſhe had heartily regained the *Spaniards* to her Intereſts, ſhe had deſtroyed all Cordiality between the *Emperor* and *England*, ſhe had detected the Weakneſs of this Nation ſo far, that ſhe ſaw *ſhe* had nothing *to fear*, and that *all other Powers* had nothing *to hope* from *Britain*.—She had been a contracting Party to the Treaty of *Seville*, and we had bound ourſelves to enter into no new Engagements without her Concurrence. Yet the late Treaty with the Emperor, which was to enforce it, had been concluded without her Participation, nay without her Knowledge.—She highly and loudly reſented this Treatment, as a manifeſt Neglect, an Inſtance of Contempt, and a publick Affront; and ſhe had the better Handle to exclaim againſt us for it, becauſe we had affected to think ourſelves ſo ill uſed, by the like Conduct of the Emperor, with regard to the Treaty of *Vienna* in 1725.—From this Moment ſhe thought of nothing but Revenge, and to avail herſelf of the Means we had ſo manifeſtly given her, to take it with Impunity.

The *Spaniſh* Troops had not been long landed in *Italy*, before an Alliance was formed between *France*, *Sardinia* and *Spain*, to attack the Emperor's Dominions in *Italy*.—The King of *Poland*'s Death was foreſeen, and ſhe took ſuch Meaſures as ſhe thought had effectually ſecured the Election of King *Staniſlaus* to that Throne.—With the Aſſiſtance of that Prince ſhe projected to have fallen upon the Emperor's Hereditary Countries, while ſhe diverted his Forces upon the *Rhine*, and her Confederates employed him in the Defence of *Italy*.—Not many Months were paſs'd, before the Miniſter had a more fatal Cauſe of Inquietude than ever---War became inevitable---his Conduct had delayed it, only to make it fall with more ruinous and irreſiſtible Effect.

The

The King of *Poland* died the 21ſt of *January* O.S. 1732-3. and in *March* following the King of *France* declared that he would ſupport the Election of his Father-in-law.---The Emperor was ſenſible of what was preparing for him.---He knew that if this Election took Effect, it would be impoſſible to reſiſt the Confederacy formed againſt him.---He therefore took part with the Elector of *Saxony*, now the preſent, and Son to the late King of *Poland*:---Yet endeavouring as much as poſſible not to give any Pretence to *France*, for attacking him upon this Score, he left it to the *Ruſſian* Arms to ſupport that Prince.---But *France* never wanted a Pretext, when ſhe found herſelf in a Condition to proſecute her Views by Arms.---Confiding in her Engagements with *Sardinia* and *Spain*, ſhe grounded this Pretext upon the ſecret Negociations the Imperial Court had carried on with *Ruſſia* againſt King *Staniſlaus*, declared War, and marched her Armies againſt the Emperor----while on the other ſide the 6000 *Spaniards* conveyed by the *Britiſh* Fleet into *Italy* not a Year before, ſhewed the Uſe for which they were deſigned.---They joined the *Sardinian* Troops, attacked the *Milaneſe*, and in Conjunction with a Body of Auxiliaries from *France*, ſoon made an entire Conqueſt of that Dutchy.

The Emperor confiding in the Engagements we had entered into, ſo immediately before, to ſupport the *Pragmatic Sanction*, had withdrawn his Troops from *Italy*.---The *French* had attacked him in the Empire, and were endeavouring to bring the *Turk* upon him.---It was impoſſible for him long to make Head alone againſt the different Attacks made and meditated upon the Empire itſelf, and his Hereditary Countries, and to defend his *Italian* Poſſeſſions at the ſame time.---He found himſelf however able with great Difficulty for that Campaign to maintain his Kingdoms of *Naples* and *Sicily*, and to keep his Footing in the *Mantuan*.---In that perilous Interval he called upon *Great Britain* to execute her late Treaty, he ſhewed that it was yet in her Power to ſave *Naples* and *Sicily*, at a ſmall Expence, and by her Fleets alone; he reproached us with the Ruin we had brought upon him by engaging his Conſent to the Introduction of the *Spaniſh* Troops, and urged the Points both of Honour and National Intereſt, by which we were obliged ſo particularly to interfere in this Quarrel, as our Support and Guaranty had been the only Condition upon which he had given that Conſent.--He implored us, in the moſt moving Terms, not to deſert an old, a faithful, and a ſincere Ally, ſo ſtrictly united by all the Bonds of mutual Affection and mutual Security, in a time of this imminent Diſtreſs, a Diſtreſs, which our own Councils, and his Acquieſcence to them, had reduced him to.

But the Minister, totally confounded, knew not how to act at all.—He stood insensible to the Danger both of his Allies, and of his own Country, unmoved equally with the Complaints, Reproaches and Intreaties of the Imperial Court. He sought only to cover his own Shame, by retorting the Blame upon the Emperor.---He reproached him with having brought these Difficulties upon himself by Negociations with *Russia*, to prevent the Election of King *Stanislaus* to the Throne of *Poland*, and abused him for not submitting to that, which must have reduced him to a Condition incapable of Defence or Relief.---Thus adding the most galling Insults to the most irreparable Injuries, he endeavoured to quiet the Alarms of the People of *Great Britain* by his Emissaries, who were instructed to preach up a Dependance upon the *good Faith* of *France*, who in her Declaration of War (which she so religiously adhered to, as we have seen) had solemnly engaged to make no Acquisition by it; thus abetting the Cause, and proclaiming both the Justice and Moderation of that perfidious Power.---In the mean while no Alliances were formed to support the Emperor.---The *Dutch*, who had unwillingly been dragged by us into some of our former Treaties, would now treat with us no more; they had been taught by fatal Experience to dread any farther Connexion with us. We neither assisted the House of *Austria* with Troops nor Money.---Our Squadrons, so ready to be employed to aggrandize the Glory of a *Spanish* Triumph, were not to be hazarded in the Defence of our Allies.---We first permitted the *French* Fleets to sail into the *Baltic* unmolested, with Troops and Supplies to sustain the Cause of *Stanislaus* in the North;---In the next Year we suffered *Spain* to transport a Body of 20,000 Horse and Foot, (without any Attempt to interrupt them) to join their Troops in *Italy*, who before the End of that Year 1734, ravished the Kingdoms of *Sicily* and *Naples* from the Emperor, and added two powerful Kingdoms to the Possessions of the House of *Bourbon*.

Stunn'd with these rapid Successes, and almost inanimate with the Fear of Dangers, in which that very Fear had thus involved the World; the Minister seemed to have forgotten every thing,---during all this Time he did nothing.---But as violent Passions, from the very Cause of their Existence, which is the Weakness of human Nature, cannot be of long Duration, he began to revive a little, and could not refrain, as soon as he did, to attempt again to exercise his Talent of Negociation; to which the Self-opinion of his Brother, and his own Apprehension of Arms, had given him an obstinate, fatal, and incorrigible Turn.---He began to make Pro-

posals,

poſals, and to offer his Mediation to the Courts both of *Paris* and *Vienna* :---But the Court of *Vienna* ſeverely wounded by theſe repeated Cruelties, Indignities and Ill Uſage, in the midſt of her deepeſt Calamity, diſdained and deteſted to treat with him any more ,---and *France*, though ſhe had reaped ſo much Advantage from his Conduct, equally contemned the Man, to whom ſhe owed it all. For even they, who profit by Infidelity or Weakneſs, abhor the Authors of it.--- Nothing proves the wretched Condition to which we had reduced ourſelves, and the Opinion ſhe entertained both of our Councils and our Arms, better than the Anſwer made to *theſe Propoſals* by the King of *France* ; which was concluded in theſe Words,--- *I will do my utmoſt Endeavour in* Germany *to weaken my Enemies* ; *I have already declared that I would not keep Poſſeſſion of any of the Places I ſhould take.*--- *Let* England *reſt ſatisfied with this Promiſe.---She would have pleaſed me in her Mediation, if ſhe had not at the ſame Time armed herſelf.---But I would have her to know, that no Power in* Europe *ſhall give Law to me. And this you may tell your Maſter.*

Thus deſpiſed and treated as we juſtly deſerved by all the Powers of *Europe*, *France* herſelf extended more Compaſſion to her greateſt Enemy than we had ſhewn to our beſt Ally.---She now thought herſelf ſecure of laying the Foundation of ſuch Debility in the Houſe of *Auſtria*, as would at leaſt enable her to reduce it lower when ſhe pleaſed, if ſhe ſhould find occaſion for it.--- She thought it more prudent to lie by after ſhe had done this, till ſhe might by the Emperor's Death, have Opportunity to break the *Auſtrian* Succeſſion, and avail herſelf of the Aſſiſtance of the *German* Princes to undertake that then, which ſhe had no Pretence to attempt during his Life ; and which muſt have inevitably drawn thoſe very *German* Powers againſt her, till that Event happened ; much more ſhe could not have done, without their Aſſiſtance: She had ſown, in all Appearance, a laſting Diſcontent between the Empire and the Maritime Powers ; ſhe had it in her Power to join *Lorrain* to her own (already vaſt) Dominions, and to add two Kingdoms to another Branch of the Houſe of *Bourbon* : Both theſe Acquiſitions required ſome Time to be ſettled in a Way to be uſefully employed hereafter.---By declining any farther Advantage for the preſent, ſhe carried a Shew of Moderation and voluntary Abſtinence, which ſhe knew would effectually deceive the Fools, who abound and ſtrengthen her Party, by their Credulity, in every State of *Europe*.---All this induced her to conclude Peace with the Imperial Court (in which we were in no Degree conſulted.) And ſhe made her Confederates ſubmit to it about *October*, 1736.

By

By this Peace, notwithſtanding all her former Aſſurances to the contrary, ſhe made no Scruple to ſecure *Lorrain* to herſelf: Which Country, with its Revenues, is able to furniſh and maintain an Arm of 30,000 Men, and brought her Territories above 150 Miles more forward into *Germany*, than they had before extended on that Side; this enabled her at a much ſhorter Warning, and with a much ſuperior Force, to attack the Empire, when ſhe ſhould afterwards ſee occaſion to do it: Compleating at the ſame Time, an entire Influence over four Electors of the Empire, *Palatine*, *Mentz*, *Triers* and *Cologne*.—The Effects of which, we have viſibly ſeen by the Election of the preſent Emperor.—The Dominion given to the Infant Don *Carlos*, reduced the Forces of the Houſe of *Auſtria* by above 40,000 Men, and added an equal Number to the oppoſite Scale:—All this the Miniſter of *Britain* brought about by his *loudly ſelf-applauded Preventive and Defenſive Meaſures*; and this, hampered by the Conſequences of his pacifick Conduct, became, at length, out of his Power to prevent.

During the whole Period of this War, *France* was ſo little apprehenſive of our being able to exert ourſelves in Defence either of our Honour or our Intereſt, that contrary to what, in ſuch a Conjuncture, would have appeared a politick Part in her to act, ſhe took every poſſible Means to inſult, to diſgrace, and to triumph over our Weakneſs.—*Dunkirk* had been gradually and privately reſtored, in Contravention to the moſt clear and poſitive Article of the Peace of *Utrecht*, that it ſhould never be made a Port again, and the Miniſter had connived at this Violation of that Treaty; though its dangerous Situation, in caſe of a future War with *France*, is ſufficiently known and underſtood.—But now *France* openly employed great Numbers of Men to cleanſe the Harbour, and to raiſe Batteries upon the old Foundations of the former Works; inſulted the Ships, not only of our Merchants, but of the Royal Navy of *England*, in very many Inſtances, affecting the ſame Superiority at *Sea*, as ſhe had too viſibly acquired, by our Conduct at *Land*; encouraged the *Spaniards* to continue their Depredations; debauched and invited publickly, both *them*, and the *Indian* Nations in *North America*, to attempt our Settlements there; and what is even yet beyond all this, iſſued an Arrêt, commanding all the *Britiſh* Subjects then in *France*, upon Pain of the Gallies, either immediately to *depart the Kingdom*, or to *inliſt in her Troops*; and, in Conſequence, impriſoned great Numbers, both of the *Engliſh*, *Scotch* and *Iriſh*, there.

Spain on her Part, had no ſooner diſmiſſed our Fleet, which had convoyed her Troops to *Italy* upon the Expedition before men-

mentioned; but she began to treat us even worse than she had ever done before: her Depredations were excessive, and her Captures amounted to prodigious Sums; she publickly laid Claim to some of our Provinces in *America*, and interrupted not only our general Commerce, but that of the *South-Sea* Company; which were both particularly confirmed by Treaty.—Our Navigation to the *West-Indies* was render'd almost impracticable; and by the Barbarities of the *Spaniards*, and the Insults of *France*, the Spirit of our Seamen, nay their very Race, was visibly running to Decay: Yet the Minister, *fearful of a War*, submitted to all this.

At length, the Nation was exasperated to such a Point, and the Complaints and Clamours of the Merchants ecchoed so loudly through the whole Kingdom, that both Houses of Parliament in the latter End of the Year 1737 and the Beginning of 1738, could no longer refrain from expressing a great Anxiety at this tame Conduct, with Respect to *Spain*; declaring their Opinion, that the Insolence of *Spain* ought no longer to be endured, and that if immediate Satisfaction was not given, and Security obtained to remedy what was *past*, and to prevent what we saw was to be expected for *the Time to come*, this Nation must seek Redress by Arms.

The Minister, still unable to resolve himself for War, still infatuated with the Notion of his Brother's Abilities for Negotiation, depended upon his former Arts of Treaty-making.—*Spain* knew him now so well, that she wantonly play'd with him; she kept him off till the very Time, that the Parliament was to meet, without doing any thing at all; by which she reduced him to a terrible Distress.---He did not dare to meet the Parliament, after their Resolutions and Addresses, and the Temper he had left them in the last Sessions, without having done any Thing.---Yet the Time was come, and nothing at all was done.---His only Expedient was to prorogue the Parliament; and to make use of this short Space to humble himself before *Spain*; to shew them the Condition he was in, and beg their Assistance, at any Rate, and upon any Terms, to give him a Lift for the present---Whatever Form of Words he used, or in what manner soever this Negotiation was carried on, this was visibly the Nature of it; for he could not conceal his Condition; and what immediately followed, evidently proves, that it was fully understood by the Power with which he treated.

Spain having sufficiently gratified her Mirth, sported with, and mortified the Man, began to think that she might carry the Jest too far; that a War, for which she was not yet effectually prepared, might be the sudden Consequence; and that it was

not her Intereſt to ruin a Miniſter, whoſe Puſillanimity had ſerved her as effectually for many Years, as if her *own* had preſided over the *Britiſh* Councils: She therefore conſented to a Treaty, under the Name of a *Convention*, which was ſigned at the *Pardo*, not ſooner than the 14th of *January* N.S. 1738-9. but then diſpatched with the utmoſt Expedition.

Scarce had the Courier cleaned his Boots, but the Parliament was called---they met the firſt of *February* 1738-9. and the Miniſter enlarged upon the great Advantages of this new Treaty, by which he bragged, [a] *That he had obtained more than ever on like Occaſions was known to be obtained, more than the moſt ſucceſsful Arms could have procured; and that this Negotiation had been the beſt conducted, and the moſt happily finiſhed, of any we meet with in Hiſtory.---That he remembered he had the laſt Seſſions undertaken to be anſwerable for the Meaſures of the Government, while he had the Honour to be a Miniſter, and that he was prepared to make good his Promiſe.*---He added, that if Gentlemen would perſiſt to raiſe a Ferment without Doors againſt this *Convention*, they would thereby render *a War unavoidable.*

But the Publick were not ſo much terrified with this Argument of *an unavoidable War.* They on the contrary knew, that it was juſt and abſolutely neceſſary, and had been already delayed too long;---and when this *Convention* was laid before the Houſe, which was done upon the 6th of *March* following, it did not leſſen that Opinion.

And to ſhew how little Reaſon there was for that Opinion to be altered by it, I ſhall ſtate in a few Words, what Points the Nation juſtly expected to be finally adjuſted by this Treaty.

The firſt Point, *was the diſclaiming all Right to ſearch our Ships in the* American *Seas, under Pretences of their carrying on a contraband and illicit Trade.*---Now as there neither ever *was*, nor *is* any Treaty ſubſiſting between the two Nations, which either ſpecifies, intimates, or ſuppoſes any ſuch things as *contraband Goods*, and as if the Pretence ſhould be allowed of an *illicit Trade*, no Ships (from the Circumſtances of that Navigation) could paſs or repaſs to our own Settlements in the *Weſt-Indies*, without being expoſed to be rummaged and confiſcated by the *Spaniſh Guarda Coſta's*, it was abſolutely *a Condition, (ſine qua non) without which, we could never end our Differences with that Nation.*

2*dly*, *Spain* had, with intolerable Arrogance, and upon frivolous Pretences, claimed a Right to our Provinces upon the Coaſts of *Florida*, which included *Georgia*, and a Part of *South-*

[a] See this Speech in the Debates of the Houſe of Commons, Vol. X. fol. 335, by *Chandler*.

Carolina,

Carolina.—The Honour therefore and Intereſt of this Nation, abſolutely *required an actual Diſavowal of this pretended Right.*

3*dly*, The Depredations committed upon our Merchants, under the frivolous and unjuſt Pretences of this contraband and illicit Trade, amounted to 340,000 *l.*—That juſt Claim and Debt was therefore to be allowed or paid, and this was *another juſt Condition expected by the Nation.*

4*thly*, The King of *Spain*, during the former Differences, having ſeized the Effects of the *Britiſh* South-Sea Company, to the Amount of above a Million, and 68,000 *l.* and during the former Negotiations, this Sum having been allowed on his Part a juſt Debt, and the South-Sea Company having on the other hand acknowledged a Debt on their Part of 68,000 *l.*—there was a Ballance due to the South-Sea Company of above a Million Sterling, the Payment of which was *a fourth Condition expected by this Nation.*

Now if the Nation had not received Satisfaction in theſe four Particulars, (eſpecially the two firſt) Juſtice was not had, nor any Security obtained.

Let us therefore ſee in what manner this Satisfaction and Security were provided for by this Treaty.

As to the *firſt Condition*, (our Right to free Navigation, and no Search, the grand Point of all our Difference,) nothing farther was provided than had been provided for twenty Years before—It was again referred to be diſcuſſed in future by Commiſſaries, of which we had ſufficiently ſeen the Effects before, and already experienced all that we had to expect from it, which was indubitably nothing.

As to the *ſecond Particular*, to the great Aſtoniſhment of the whole Nation, they found, that their Right to Provinces, from which we derived a prodigious Benefit, *Carolina*, (which by the Encreaſe of the Commodity of Rice, is become of late Years one of the moſt profitable Colonies belonging to the *Britiſh* Empire;) and *Georgia*, (to ſettle which the Nation had put itſelf to a great Expence, and which by its Situation in the Gulph of *Florida*, and by a proper Uſe of its Ports, might command the Return of the whole *Spaniſh* Treaſure, and was of infinite Conſequence to prevent the Conjunction of the *French* upon the *Miſſiſſipi*, and their *Sugar Iſlands*) were not only ſubmitted to the like Diſcuſſion of Commiſſaries; but what was more amazing and unworthy, that we had bound ourſelves, till the Deciſion of theſe Commiſſaries, not to erect any Forts, or to do any thing to ſtrengthen or ſecure our Poſſeſſions there, which was, in other Words to leave them in the ſame weak and defenceleſs State they were then notoriouſly in, to be over-

run upon the firſt Attempt the *Spaniards* ſhould think fit to make upon them.

As to the third and fourth Particulars, it appeared, that the boaſted Satisfaction we had obtained for our injured Merchants, whoſe juſt Demand, (including that of the South-Sea Company,) amounted to 1,340,000 *l.* was provided for as follows.

Imprimis, The Million due to the South-Sea Company *from the King of Spain* was left to the Deciſion of Commiſſaries, whether it was due or not, which all Mankind underſtood to be the ſame thing in effect, as to have *entirely given it up.*

2*dly*, The 68,000 *l.* due *from the South-Sea Company*, was agreed to be due, and *to be paid immediately.*

3*dly*, As to the 340,000 *l.* due to our Merchants, on account of the Depredations committed upon them,—this Account was ſettled in the following Manner.

	l.
1*ſt*, From the ſaid Claim of the Merchants was arbitrarily deducted by the Daſh of a Pen, *without any Reaſon at all aſſigned* - - -	140,000
2*dly*, The King of *Spain* was allowed to deduct for the Prompt Payment *of what was never intended to be paid* - - - -	45,000
3*dly*, The *Britiſh* Nation were to allow *Spain* for the Ships taken and deſtroyed in the Year 1718, *in time of actual War* - - - -	60,000
4*thly*, The South-Sea Company were to make immediate Payment of the 68,000 *l.* due from them to the King of *Spain* - - - -	68,000
5*thly*, *Spain* was allowed to deduct the Value of a Ship called the *Thereſa*, taken in the Port of *Dublin* in 1735, as alſo the Amount of whatever ſhe had formerly given in Satisfaction to our Merchants for their Loſſes; which two Sums amounted to more, but we ſhall only ſtate at	27,000
	340,000

Thus it is manifeſt that the Plan of this Treaty was laid upon this Ground, that the King of *Spain* was not to pay one ſingle Shilling; ſo that, in fact, all the Pretenſions, both of our Merchants and the *South-Sea* Company, were entirely abandon'd by it.—But what was ſtill worſe, the Court of *Spain* refuſed to agree, even to this Treaty, till the Miniſter had conſented to an *Act*, whereby the King of *Spain* declared, That he entered his *Proteſt* againſt the Execution of it *proviſionally*, in

in caſe the *South-Sea* Company did not pay, in a ſhort time therein limited, the ſaid Sum of 68,000 *l.* and reſerved farther to himſelf, a Right of ſuſpending their *Aſſiento* Contract, in caſe of Failure on their Part.—Now as it was impoſſible, that the *South-Sea* Company would ever be induced to pay 68,000 *l.* upon one Head of an Account, in which they had, (after the Deduction of that Sum,) a Balance of *a Million* due to them; and as they did immediately after reſolve not to pay this Sum, the Caſe of the Nation was directly this; that *Spain* was prevailed upon to do this temporary Job for the Miniſter.

1*ſt*, By a publick Connivance (if it may be ſo called) at their Pretenſions to ſearch our Ships, and to interrupt our Navigation.

2*dly*, By a publick Agreement, that our *Trade* ſhould ſet down unſatisfy'd with the Loſs of 1,340,000 *l.*

3*dly*, By a tacit Acknowledgment of the Pretenſions of *Spain* to a Part of our *American* Dominions.

4*thly*, By a poſitive Agreement to leave thoſe Dominions in a defenceleſs State, that *Spain* might ſeize them when ſhe pleaſed.

And 5*thly*, By the Suſpenſion of the *Aſſiento* Contract.

To this Condition had our *preventive and defenſive* Meaſures now reduced us.

With this *Convention* the laſt Thread of pacifick Policy was ſpun; the Nation could endure it no longer; the Miniſter was at length compelled to draw the Sword.—His Majeſty's tender Regard, both to his *own* Honour, and to the Intereſts and Honour of *the Nation*, induced him to declare War againſt *Spain*, in the Summer 1739.

How that War was carried on upon the ſame timid Principles, is but too evident. The Court of *Spain* had Time to ſtrengthen herſelf to ſuch a Degree, that ſhe became at length invulnerable in the *Weſt-Indies*; and *the War continues ſtill without a Poſſibility of any material Succeſs in our farther Attempts upon that Part of her Dominions.*

And now the Diſtreſſes brought upon us by this unparallelled Chain of puſillanimous Proceedings, burſt like a Torrent on the Miniſter, who had been the Occaſion of them.—Upon the 9th of *October*, O.S. 1740. the Emperor died of a Cholic, attended with a Vomiting and Inflammation of the Bowels, in a Conjuncture ſo apt for the Views of *France*, that there was little Room to doubt, either of the Cauſe or Conſequences of his Death:—His Territories had been guaranty'd, long before, under the Title of the *Pragmatick Sanction*, to his eldeſt Daughter, (the preſent Queen of *Hungary*,) by a Majority of the *German* Princes, by *Great Britain*, *Denmark*, *Holland*, *Spain* and *France*; and of the two latter held (the one) *Naples* and *Sicily*,

(the other) *Lorrain*, by no other Tenure than that of the Obſervance of this Treaty. But though *France* made no Scruple to declare, that ſhe would ſtrictly fulfil her Engagements with Regard to the *Pragmatic Sanction*; and that ſhe would keep clear of every Thing, that ſhould reſtrain the free Choice of a new *Emperor*, and though the King of *Pruſſia* gave the ſtrongeſt Aſſurances, that he would ſupport it to the utmoſt of his Power; yet it was eaſy to ſee, that theſe Engagements would meet with no Regard, and that theſe Declarations were deſigned only to amuſe and deceive.

The Elector of *Bavaria* begun by refuſing to acknowledge the Rights of the Queen of *Hungary*, and aſſerting a Claim to her Dominions.—In *December* following, to the Amazement of all *Europe*, the King of *Pruſſia* fell into the Queens's hereditary Countries, and entered *Sileſia* with an Army of 40,000 Men.—In the ſucceeding Spring, the *French* marched a great Army into *Germany*, and joined the *Bavarians*; they alſo ſent another great Body of Forces into *Weſtphalia* upon the Confines of the Electorate of *Hanover*.—The Elector of *Saxony* likewiſe marched an Army into *Bohemia*.—*Sweden*, by the Intrigues of *France*, declared War againſt the *Ruſſians*: By which, and by the treaſonable Practices, which ſhe fomented there, that Empire became incapable to aſſiſt the Houſe of *Auſtria*. The King of *Naples*, with a great Body of his own Forces, in Conjunction with a formidable Army of *Spaniards*, both Horſe and Foot, which again were permitted by the Miniſter to embark, and land unmoleſted by our Squadrons, was prepared to attack her *Italian* Dominions:—And by the Influence of *France*, the Elector of *Bavaria* was choſen Emperor.—*Upper Auſtria* was already, before the End of that Year, overrun; *Bohemia* and the greater Part of *Sileſia* loſt; another *Spaniſh* Army marching towards *Savoy*; the King of *Sardinia* (from his dangerous Situation, and other Circumſtances) much ſuſpected; the Electorate of *Hanover* unavoidably compelled by ſuperior Force to a Neutrality; the *Dutch* intimidated by the ſame Force; *Denmark*, encouraged by *France*, and wholly occupied to make its Advantage of the Troubles in the North; and *Great Britain* exaſperated to the utmoſt Verge of Patience, upon the very Brink of domeſtick Confuſion, ſtill directed by the *ſame Miniſter*, who from this Situation of Affairs, and from the Temper of the People, naturally reſulting from it, was wholly incapacited from affording any material Aſſiſtance to the Queen of *Hungary*, and ſtill perſevered to demonſtrate, even in this laſt Criſis, by his Conduct of the *Spaniſh* War, and by his Permiſſion of the *Spaniſh* Embarkations, that his Inclinations were as foreign as his

his Abilities to a vigorous Exertion of the Power of this Nation, at a Time, when Councils, *even desperately violent*, seemed the only Possibility, under Heaven, to preserve *us* and *Europe* from Destruction.---Even yet, incorrigibly bent upon inconsistent Schemes of Negociation, he turned his Thoughts to a Project of more Temerity and Indiscretion than ever he had hitherto projected, and attempted to form an Alliance to dismember *Prussia*; which render'd it a Thing almost impossible to bring him afterwards into a moderate Temper, or to effect a sincere Reconciliation with him.---Thus overwhelmed on every Side; Great Armies of *French*, *Bavarians*, *Prussians* and *Saxons* within a few Days March of *Vienna*; and no Part of her Territories unmolested, but the remote Dominions of *Hungary*; and those States, that bordered on the *Turk*, in daily Expectation of being attacked likewise from that Quarter, the unhappy Queen of *Hungary* was thrown, for her only Resource, upon a People, who, till this Time, had never afforded any Assistance to their Sovereign; but had, on the contrary, taken all Occasions to rebel and join a foreign Power. Her veteran Troops all destroy'd in the late War against the *Turk*; the Fountains of Supply from her richest Countries, then in the Possession of her Enemies, wholly turned against her.---This was the Condition to which the only Power, that could maintain the Balance, and without which no rational Man can think, that this Nation can long subsist without becoming a Province to *France*, was brought by this determined Suite of the *preventive and defensive* Measures of the *British* Minister.

Such was the State of our Affairs, when the present Parliament begun its first Sessions upon the first of *December*, 1741. I might expatiate here, to aggravate the wretched Condition to which this Country was reduced; but I am far from meaning to represent this Conduct, in the worst Light that it might bear: My View is very different.---Exasperated as the People are already, he that attempts to encrease the Flame, deserves to perish in it.---Would to God it were forgiven, upon Condition that it could be forgot; but it cannot be forgot, nor will, for this Reason, ever be forgiven: My Meaning therefore neither is to attempt the one nor the other.—But my Endeavour is to divert the Publick from that mad Resentment, which must complete their Ruin.—I shall shortly come to shew, how far already this Resentment has misled them.—How, deviating from the only Principle, that can warrant Punishment, they wound their *Country* and *themselves* in the Extravagance of *Passion*.---The Pursuit of Punishment, when no good End can possibly be answered by it, is Revenge; *Revenge* with *Nations*,

as well as with *private Men*, is in itself *deteſtable* ; and, in its Conſequences, *fatal*. Let *Sweden* be the Mirror to reflect the Face of this Nation : We have lately ſeen that brave, that free People, *puſhing violently towards their own Deſtruction with a ſtrange Similitude of Fate.—Firſt, by ruinous Meaſures brought into deplorable Circumſtances ; then purſuing ſanguinary Vengeance on their Miniſters ; Miniſters, from the Paſſion of the Time, neither ſafe to be given up, nor to be ſaved ; tearing every Fence of Government and Conſtitution down, to reach the Object of their Hatred ; artfully led on, under this Pretence, to abuſe their Liberty with a dangerous Licenſe ; taught to think themſelves entitled, becauſe they met with Obſtruction in this View, to invade the Privileges of all the other Parts of their Legiſlature ; yet all this Time ſtupidly forfetful of the very Cauſe, for which alone they ought in Juſtice to have condemn'd the Conduct of thoſe Miniſters, or to have been thus enraged, embarraſſing their Government, labouring to plunge it ſtill deeper into the ſame Evil, by endeavouring to perſevere in the ſame Foreign Meaſures, and to prevent their wiſeſt and moſt honeſt Men from availing themſelves of the moſt fortunate Opportunities to preſerve the Nation, and to retrieve paſt Errors ; till, at length, from the Exceſs of popular Power, the Weakneſs of their Government, the Want of Virtue in Particulars to reſiſt the Temptation of falſe Popularity, the Want of Courage to withſtand a factious Calumny, and the ſecret Intrigues of a Foreign Court, inviſible to themſelves, tho' glaring to the whole World beſides, they were encouraged to attempt direct Rebellion, in Favour of a Pretender, whoſe Advancement to the Throne was morally certain to have fixed the Chains of Arbitrary Power, for ever on their Country.*

After this, ſome may poſſibly demand, Why then have you recalled to publick View, theſe former Errors of the Miniſter ? As I am ſure I have done it with Integrity, ſo I am deceiv'd if I have not done it with ſolid Reaſon.---The Sore, that rankles, muſt be opened and deeply probed : The Man, who would, in this Diſorder of the Publick, ſerve his Country, cannot hope to do it by concealing Faults.---To deny notorious Truths, is an Attempt to impoſe upon Mankind, too groſs to be borne ; the Nation is honeſt, though it is deceived, and will liſten to no Arguments, that are obviouſly mean, ungenerous, diſhoneſt, or uncandid.---Not to acknowledge what I have done in the preceding Pages, would be to accuſe the People of unjuſt Reſentment during a Space of 20 Years :—And, as in the preſent Conjuncture, I think it my Duty to accuſe them of unjuſt Reſentments, and to convince them that they are juſtly accuſed ; by a contrary Conduct, I could not fail to provoke, inſtead of healing

healing Animosities; to lay a Foundation of Prejudice, which no Solidity of Reason could be able to remove; and infallibly defeat the honest Intention, which alone has led me to give the Publick and myself the Trouble of this Discourse.

It was likewise necessary to do this for another very important End, to give the Clue to the true Source of our Misfortunes, and to the Origin of the late Opposition; which can be the only Means, either to moderate the Rage of the Publick, to remove their Prejudices, to distinguish their Friends, to direct them to the Knowledge of their Enemies, to preserve their just Attachment to their Prince, or to maintain the Constitution of their Country.

For when the People mistake the Cause, their Conclusions must be false and dangerous---their Opinion of those, who see more clearly, and act the best for their Interests, easily abused---they are liable from false Causes assigned by wicked and artful Men, to think desperately of Government, and to seek for Remedies not adapted to the Disease, and of so violent a Nature, as to tear the Body Politick to Pieces.

And that this has been the Case, will become very manifest upon a due Consideration of this Deduction of our Affairs during the late Administration---the People not considering well the Spring of this unhappy Train of Conduct, have been falsely and infamously taught, that it took its Rise from the Treachery of the Minister, and from a low and private Prejudice in the Prince to his Foreign Dominions, abetted by a Band of corrupt Mercenaries, and supported by the Defects of a Constitution, which gives too much Power to the Crown—None of which is true.

It was the Embarrassment of our Affairs, first, by the Peace of *Utrecht*, and since, by a timid, obstinate and indeed selfish Character in the Minister.—It was the unavoidable Consequences of the Treaty of *Hanover*, which was made before his Majesty's Accession to the Throne, but for which he was therefore not answerable, and which it was afterwards infinitely difficult to redress. —It was a Chain of fatal Circumstances, neither derived from a greater Degree of Corruption than will be found in any opulent State upon Earth, nor from any Defects, but what (or worse) are found in the purest Constitution under Heaven: All which will more fully appear by the following Deduction.

But to return---In this Crisis of Affairs, Ruin abroad appeared almost impossible, highly improbable to prevent,---the Nation at home in such a Ferment, that nothing but Confusion was by every rational Man expected.---To avert either, it was obvious that the Minister must be removed, the Publick neither

would

would, nor could have engaged in thoſe expenſive Undertakings which were our only Reſource, under the Conduct of ſuch a Man.—But how to effect this Change was the great Labour.—There is Reaſon to believe, that his Majeſty was as much convinced of the Neceſſity of a Change, as the Miniſter was convinced that it was high time to prepare for it.—It was even certain, that the beſt Men in the Oppoſition began to fear greatly the Effects of the Spirit they had raiſed, however neceſſary, however juſt it had been to raiſe it; but the greateſt Danger of all was to have deſiſted in that Conjuncture. Thus even they who were moſt ſenſible of the dangerous Ferment, were by Neceſſity compelled to raiſe it ſtill higher to prevent its fatal Effect.—Oppoſition was redoubled with a Degree of Fury, which nothing but this Circumſtance could warrant.—The Dilemma was great on all Sides—the more the Miniſter was preſſed, the more difficult and dangerous it was both for him and for the Publick to give way—and had he been diſintereſted enough to have reſigned his Power in the Manner ſome would have adviſed it, to ſpeak honeſtly, there was Hazard not only to his own Perſon, but to the Intereſt of his Maſter, and the Conſtitution of his Country.—It was dangerous to depend upon the Moderation of a Party ſo combined as it now appeared to be, and heated with ſo unavoidable a Fury. On the other hand, it was impoſſible for the honeſt Men, embarked againſt him, to have deſiſted either.—Matters had been driven too far to rely upon the Prudence of their Antagoniſt, and they had too many Examples to venture to truſt that even this Danger could have reclaimed his indomptable Spirit of Peace. It was equally unſafe, both for the *Publick* and *themſelves* to have riſqued the double Danger of their Enemies, and the Reſentment of their Friends—If by ſuch an indiſcreet Retreat, *they had much weakened their Party*, they could not have had ſufficient Aſſurance, that the Miniſter would have made that juſt and wiſe Uſe of it, which could have been their only Inducement for ſo diſintereſted a Meaſure.—He might have employed this Acceſſion of Strength, to have confirmed himſelf in his imprudent Politicks, to have ruined Liberty, under the Pretence of deſtroying Faction, and have taken this Opportunity to have wreaked his private Revenge.—Again, if this Conduct ſhould have had a different Effect, *and not much weakened the Party they left*, it muſt have ſerved only, to precipitate the Views of bad Men, and left the Nation diſtracted and mad under the Lead and Direction of the worſt and moſt dangerous Perſons in the Kingdom.—Upon the whole, it was neither in the Power of the one to *retire*, nor of the other to *deſiſt*.

Moſt

Moſt certain it is, whatever the ignorant Vulgar may think, or wicked Men pretend, that the domeſtick Peace was at this Conjuncture in the utmoſt Hazard, and that at this Hour we had been involved in horrible Confuſion, if his Majeſty's Prudence had not dictated, and aſſiſted us in the middle Way of Moderation, in which all Safety conſiſts, by yielding to a Change of the Miniſter, and yet reſolving to defend (as far as in him conſtitutionally lay) the Perſon of the Man removed, from the Rage and Fury of the Time. By this Meaſure, that intire Victory of Party, which muſt have produced inſufferable Inſolence, and raiſed unforeſeen, extravagant and irreſiſtable Expectations, was awarded with its Conſequences, which, like a Torrent, would have broke in upon us, and in a mercileſs manner ſwept away both good and bad who had given Oppoſition to it, and probably carried before it, in its Tide of Reformation, all the Guards and Securities of this happy Conſtitution.—Had the Government been taken by Storm, had the People been once blooded, who can ſay where he would have ſtopt, or who could have had Authority to caſt down the Bar before them.—In ſuch Conjunctures, Reaſon and Experience ſhew us that the private Soldier drives his Officer before him—all Order and Diſcipline are at an end—and whoever endeavours to reſtrain the Violence, is looked upon as an Enemy, diveſted of his Command, and new Leaders choſen out of thoſe, who with moſt Fury and leaſt Remorſe will carry Devaſtation furtheſt.—By this Meaſure therefore, Time was given for many to reflect, who in the Heat of ſuch an Event, would have been hurried Lengths they never intended to have gone, and plunged into Precipices, which many, who have eſcaped already, conſider with Horror, that they lately ſtood ſo near, and which many more, as they conſider and cool, will every day look back upon with equal Terror.—This Conduct likewiſe afforded opportunity to make the proper Alterations by degrees, and with a deliberate Choice, to put the publick Affairs into the Hands of Men, who were diſtinguiſhed, rather by their Abilities and Integrity, than by their Heat and Paſſion, or popular Accompliſhments.—It gave room to weaken Faction, by the Gratification of ſome warm Men, but to do it ſo as not to encourage its haſty Growth again. It prepared a way for a laſting Change of Meaſures, and ſecured an Intereſt to ſupport them at the ſame time; as it enabled thoſe who had acted under the former Adminiſtration upon wrong Principles of Policy without Fear of Ruin, or Shame of Tergiverſation, tacitly to reclaim their Conduct, and prevented that fatal Evil, (which was otherwiſe inevitable, and muſt have

brought our Affairs into a worſe Condition than ever,) the raiſing a new Oppoſition out of the defeated Party, whoſe Number, though defeated, were at this very Conjuncture equal to thoſe by whom they had been compelled to yield.—Thus this prudent Firmneſs on the one hand, and prudent Condeſcenſion on the other, manifeſtly ſaved this Nation from Perdition—the beſt, the moſt able, the moſt conſiderable Men, and thoſe of the true Whig Principle, were ſeparated from a wicked Party, with whom Neceſſity had obliged them formerly to unite, and who were upon the point of getting the Direction of the Publick into their hands, under the pretence of delivering it from another Danger, which, great as it was, could not be worſe than that.—And thus the Government now ſtands upon the Foundation of a true Whig Intereſt, upon which alone it can ſafely ſtand, ſupported by Men, united by the manifeſt Revival of a Principle tending directly to their common Ruin.

We are now come to that Period of Time, when the late Oppoſition ceaſed, and a Separation was made between the *Whigs* and the *Tories*; they had travelled on in the ſame Road to this Point of a Change of the Miniſter; and the Power to change the Meaſures was in their own hand.—This, as I have very ſufficiently ſhewn, was the firſt and ſole Intention of the *Whigs*, ſo that their Journey was at an end; but the others were to travel further, and we ſhall ſhortly ſee through what miry Paths they went.—It was almoſt a Miracle they had kept company ſo long.—The *Tories* had plainly ſhewn, upon the late Motion, how little they were to be depended upon, even in the Proſecution of their common View; and for the *Whigs*, they had never pretended, never given any encouragement to think, that they ſhould continue Oppoſition longer than till they had carried theſe Points.—Nay, till this Event, the preſent Leaders of the *Faction* themſelves affected to intend no more.—All Men of Senſe, who knew them well, knew, that this was only Colour, to take away Suſpicion of their dangerous Deſigns.—What happened was therefore no Surprize to them; and, to ſay the truth, their Principles and Views being thus widely different, they muſt *both* have been inconſiſtent with themſelves, if they had not *both* done as they did.

A Change of the Adminiſtration being now become abſolutely neceſſary, the Equality of Parties being ſuch, that no Buſineſs could be carried on, this Change was reſolved.—In order to effect it, it was neceſſary to adjourn the Houſe.—It required ſome Time to deliberate upon the firſt Changes, and for thoſe Members of the Oppoſition, who were to be firſt taken in, to be rechoſen.

To

To this Adjournment (which was for 15 Days) all the Houſe agreed, the Whigs knowing the Neceſſity of it, and that a Change could not ſafely be made without it, and with theſe concurring, all thoſe who had private Views, and expected to reap a perſonal Benefit from this Change.—The Leaders of the *Tories*, who have ſince treated this Meaſure as iniquitous in the higheſt Degree, made no Objection to it then; they had one or other of the two Reaſons before-mentioned to induce them to it. The Reader may aſſign that which he thinks moſt probable, upon a Conſideration of their ſubſequent Behaviour.

In this Conjuncture, theſe Gentlemen thought it highly neceſſary to make their appearance at the Court, to which ſome had never gone ſince the Acceſſion of the preſent Royal Family upon the Throne; and many had abſented themſelves ſo long, that they feared they might be forgotten, which was by no means convenient, when ſo many great Employments were to be conferred in a few days.—It was neceſſary to convince the Prince, that their only Reaſon for abſtaining from this Demonſtration of Reſpect before, was their ill Opinion of the late Miniſter, and that they were now ready to ſupport his Majeſty's Meaſures, as warmly as the beſt Friends he had: But alas! the Sincerity of their Reconciliation, and the ſecret Condition of it, unhappily for them, were both as well underſtood at that time, in the Place to which they went, as they have ſince been clearly manifeſted in the Nation.

Thus far all Things proceeded well and quietly—not a Word was utter'd of any farther Reformation. The People were then ſuffered to think as they were naturally diſpoſed to do. *A Change of the Miniſter, and the Introduction of honeſt Men into the chief Employments, was thought the utmoſt Object of the People's Wiſh, and muſt in the end enſure whatever elſe was wanting.*

Tranquillity continued till an *Honourable Gentleman*, who had been conſiderable in the *Oppoſition*, was made *Chancellor* of the *Exchequer*.—This began to claſh with the Expectations of others; but ſtill, as there were many great Employments left, they were not yet tranſported far enough to declare a new Breach—ſo that they ſuffered this Gentleman to be re-elected without any Oppoſition.—The next Thing done, was the Appointment of the new *Treaſury*, which when they found compoſed of that Set of Men called *Whigs*, and but one *Tory* admitted upon that Bench, they began to murmur openly.—It was however ſtill too ſoon to take their final Reſolution—the Boards of *Admiralty*, and *Trade*, were not yet actually ſettled, and they waited the Event of the Diſpoſition there.—But when that of the Admiralty was taken into conſideration, for which ſome of the leading *Tories* were deſigned, (and which

all were willing to accept) His Majeſty having refuſed to admit one particular Perſon, and they thinking that the Reaſon aſſigned for that Exception might be a dangerous Precedent, which muſt equally affect great Numbers of their Body, it was reſolved to exert themſelves upon that Occaſion.—They accordingly inſiſted ſtrongly for this Perſon, and for ſome others, and in fine, for ſuch a Diſpoſition there, as was impoſſible to be complied with—which as ſoon as they found, and that the other Offices were not yet propoſed to be changed, they reſolved to keep no further Meaſures. Nothing was to be left to the Diſpoſal of the Sovereign, as ſoon as it appeared that he would not wholly reſign himſelf into the Hands of *Tories*, and that he preſumed to make Difficulties in admitting, even any one of thoſe, who had been ever marked, by their Friends as well as Enemies, as the Leaders of a *Party*, entitled to a ſtronger Denomination.

Some few Men of a different Principle, who deſerve a better Fate, by the Heat of Paſſion, the Effects of Ambition, and the common Fear of not being provided for to their Wiſhes upon this Occaſion, unhappily fell at this Time into the Views of theſe People; upon whoſe Shoulders they vainly imagined they might lift themſelves to what they now began to fear they ſhould never reach; and among theſe, *a Man*, whoſe Merits, Abilities and Weight entitled him to the higheſt Eſteem of all Parties, whoſe Error (of which he has been ſince too late convinced) is repaired to his own Conſcience, by his retiring from them; but can never be repaired to his Country, by his having retired from its Service in Conſequence of it.—This Appearance of a few *Whigs* on their Side had a very ill Effect: Under this Colour, they paſſed for what they have ſince ſhewn they were not:—Many young and undiſtinguiſhing Men, and many of the People, having no Apprehenſions to engage with an Oppoſition, which they at firſt ignorantly think directed by *Whig* Principles, becauſe they ſee a few *Whigs* among them: And the Difficulty of breaking from ſuch Engagements of Party, being ſo great, that few have Honeſty or Spirit to do it afterwards, when convinced of their Miſtake.—But as we have already obſerved in the Beginning of this Paper, *All Oppoſitions are compoſed of Individuals of all Denominations: And an Oppoſition is not leſs a* Whig *Oppoſition, becauſe it is joined by* Jacobites *and* Tories; *nor a* Jacobite *or* Tory *Oppoſition leſs a Faction, becauſe it is joined by* Whigs: *But the Difference lies in the Spirit that predominates, and in the Men that direct.—For, if the* Whigs *have the Aſcendant, and can force the Reſt into their Meaſures, Methods ſafe and honeſt are purſued.—But,*

if

if the Jacobites *or* Tories *have the Lead, or* Whigs *only bear the Name of Leaders, and are in Reality driven, by the Spirit of thoſe with whom they are connected, the Meaſures of Oppoſition are then equally carried on upon the* Jacobite *or* Tory *Views, as we ſhall prove it to be the Caſe at this Time; and ſuch an Oppoſition is, to all Intents and Purpoſes, a* Jacobite *or* Tory *Faction.*

Thus hurried by Impatience, heated by Deſpair, the *Faction*, with theſe unnatural Allies, after a vain and tedious Expectation of eight Days (for ſo much of the fifteen Days of the Adjournment had already paſſed, and they were not yet provided for) upon the 11th of *February*, 1741-2, a Day, which perhaps this Nation may have Reaſon never to forget, they came to a final Breach.—From this exact Period may be dated the Death of the late memorable Oppoſition, and the Birth of a fatal Faction, who have already laid the Foundation of Calamities, which will require much Wiſdom and Virtue to avert; and which, only that Providence, that has ſo often remarkably interpoſed to ſave this Nation, can entirely preſerve it from.

It was given out in dark Whiſpers, that the *Whig* Leaders of the Oppoſition, who, by their Abilities and Services had obtained the foremoſt Rank, in whoſe Hands the Settlement of this great Affair therefore naturally lay, and with whom, from the Knowledge of their Principles, the Government could only treat, had betray'd their Party; that the Circumſtances of this Treaſon were ſuch as to require a Conjunction of all honeſt Men to reſiſt and to defeat it; that the Proof was undeniable, and that it was neceſſary the Matter ſhould be laid open before the whole Oppoſition: The Members of the Oppoſition were all ſummoned, and the Expectation of Mankind raiſed to the higheſt Pitch: As well they, who underſtood the Nature of this Meeting, as they, who underſtood it not, out of equal Curioſity concurred to attend it: And among the reſt, the Gentlemen, who conducted the new Settlement, and thoſe, who had been already taken into Employment, were deſired to be preſent to defend themſelves againſt this formidable Accuſation.

The Charge was introduced with great Solemnity; "Gen-
" tlemen were reminded of the dangerous Situation to which
" the Nation had been brought by the late Adminiſtration;
" how glorioufly and ſteadily they had perſevered in the Op-
" poſition; how happily at length their honeſt Endeavours,
" and the juſt Spirit of the People, had brought them in ſight
" of the long wiſh'd-for Port; that as every Set of Men had
" contributed to bring this important Point to bear, it was
" juſt all Denominations of Men ſhould receive an equal Re-

" ward of their Virtue ; that if a proper Uſe were made of " this happy Conjuncture, this Reward might be obtained ; " that the total Rout of the Miniſterial Party was what they " had a Right to expect ; and that this would make Room for " all.—But that there was too much Reaſon to fear, that this " Uſe would not be made of the happy Opportunity ; that a " few Men had preſumed, without communicating their Pro- " ceedings to that Aſſembly, to take this Work upon them- " ſelves ; that by their Manner of doing it, they had ſufficient " Cauſe to apprehend they did not mean the general Ad- " vantage ; that they had been now eight Days in this Em- " ployment ; and by the few Offices they had as yet beſtowed, " they were juſtly to be accuſed of not acting with the Vigour " that was expected of them by the whole People.—That " among other things, what adminiſtered Matter of great " Jealouſy was the Choice of thoſe already preferred ; that this " Choice having fallen principally upon *Whigs*, it was an ill " Omen for the *Tories* ; and that if they were not to be pro- " vided for, the happy Effects of the Coalition of Parties muſt " be deſtroyed, and Parties again revived to the great Preju- " dice of the Nation ; that it was therefore highly neceſſary " to unite cloſely, to keep firmly together, and to continue " to oppoſe, with the ſame Vehemence as ever, till Juſtice " was done the *Tories*, and till the Adminiſtration was founded " upon the *broad Bottom* of both Parties."

A Right Honourable Gentleman, ſince advanced into another Houſe of Parliament, with whom the Management of this Change was chiefly entruſted, together with ſome of thoſe, who were lately taken into Employment, anſwered theſe Objections to their Conduct with great Temper.—" They firſt ob- " ſerved, how hard a Treatment they had met with in return " for the long Services they had done their Country, and the " Share they had confeſſedly had in bringing the Oppoſition to " the Point at which it was arrived, now upon frivolous Pre- " tences, and a Jealouſy, in the Nature of Things, not yet " poſſibly grounded upon any ſolid Foundation, to be brought " before ſuch a Tribunal, accuſed publickly in the Face of the " whole World, of that, which no ſingle Man dare in pri- " vate, to their Faces, charge them with; loaded with Suſpi- " cions, which once raiſed are hardly ever to be wiped off by any " Conduct; and branded with the Imputation of an imagi- " nary Crime, ſo eaſily to be believed in the then Temper of " the Nation ;—that they deſerved a very different Uſage, by " the Integrity, with which they had hitherto proceeded, " and with which they were determined to proceed :—That

" as

" as to the taking the Management of this Affair into their
" own Hands, the Overtures having been made to them, it
" was their Duty, and it would have been the Duty of any
" Man, to whom they had been made, to have uſed his beſt
" Abilities to have brought about a happy Settlement, after
" the Diviſions, by which this Country had been ſo long torn;
" and which could not longer ſubſiſt without the utter Ruin
" of the Intereſts of this Nation abroad, and the Danger of
" fatal Diſturbances at home:—That the ſuperficial Vulgar
" might imagine it a more proper and equitable way to refer
" this Settlement to the Deciſion of the whole Party; but that
" no Man of tolerable Underſtanding and Experience could
" cheriſh an Idea ſo unpracticable and abſurd; that Govern-
" ment was not yet reduced to ſuch a Point, as to ſurrender
" at Diſcretion, eſpecially to an Enemy, who had declared
" ſo publickly they would give no Quarter; that Govern-
" ment neither *could*, *would* nor *ought* to be taken by *Storm*;
" and that it behoved Gentlemen to conſider what muſt in-
" evitably be the Conſequence of ſuch an Attempt; that the
" great Points were to change the Miniſter, and to change
" the Meaſures: That the one was viſibly already done, and
" they would engage to perform the other. That, as to the
" Diſtribution of Employments, there was neither Juſtice,
" Decency, Duty or Moderation, in dictating to the King,
" how to diſpoſe of every Preferment in the State; that his
" Majeſty had ſhewed a Diſpoſition to comply with the De-
" ſires of his People in the moſt effectual manner; for he had
" already ſupplied the principal Miniſterial Poſts with Men,
" who had hitherto been moſt confided in by the People, and
" ſuch as could not have given Occaſion to the People to have
" changed their Opinion of them; becauſe, though nominated,
" they had none of them yet done any ſingle Act of Office:
" That as to the Changes already made, they were as nume-
" rous as the Importance of the Matter, and the Nature of
" the Thing could poſſibly admit ſo ſoon, and that it might
" have been more to the Credit of their Party, if their Pa-
" tience had extended a little longer than the few Days, that
" had paſſed ſince the Time of their Adjournment.———As
" to the partial Diſtribution of Employments to the *Whigs*,
" that ſo far as their Intereſt ſhould hereafter extend, they
" would uſe it faithfully to his Majeſty, and their Country,
" by recommending ſuch to ſerve him, whoſe Principles they
" knew had been miſrepreſented, and who were true to his
" Family, let their Appellations be what they would: But
" that it might be well ſuppoſed a Work of ſome Time, to

" remove

" remove Suſpicions inculcated long, and long credited, with " Regard to a Denomination of Men, who had formerly been " thought not heartily attached to the Intereſt of the Prince " upon the Throne; that ſome Inſtances, of this Intention, " had been already given in the late Removals, and there " would be many more, but that it muſt depend upon the " prudent Conduct of the *Tories* themſelves, wholly to abo- " liſh theſe unhappy Diſtinctions of Party. In fine, they " begged of them to conſider how falſe a ſtep they had already " made,—and that this paſſionate and groundleſs Diviſion " would infallibly give new Courage to the Party they had " juſt ſubdued; that it diſcovered a Weakneſs, of which Ad- " vantage would be certainly taken; that it muſt inevitably " leſſen the Power of thoſe who were employed, and, if per- " ſiſted in, would in a great meaſure prevent the Succeſs of " their Views, both for the Publick, and their Friends."

It is not to be ſuppoſed, that any of theſe Reaſons had much weight on the different ſides of the Queſtion.—The Abuſe and Indecency, with which the Gentlemen newly taken into the Adminiſtration were treated, upon this Occaſion, plainly convinced them, and every intelligent Man, that the Deſign of this Meeting was to throw them off, that the *Tories* might now diſengage themſelves from the Direction of the *Whigs*, under whoſe Conduct they had been reſtrained, and with whom they could never expect to carry the Point they had in view.—They could never have taken a better Opportunity, than that of the National Ferment of the Time, nor have done it with leſs Suſpicion, or encreaſed their Numbers more than by doing it, when the Suſpicions of Men were, as they always are in ſuch Conjunctures, diverted another Way, and when the Fears, Diſappointments and Diſguſts of many of different Principles, naturally led them all to join with any Set of Men that ſtill continued to oppoſe.—We have already obſerved how far theſe Paſſions had miſled ſome *Whigs*, that, inſenſible of the fooliſh Part they play'd, they lent their Names to colour the Deſigns of the *Tories*, and became the Tools to preſs publickly for their Admiſſion into Employments, which they could not, with any Decency, nor without diſgracing themſelves with the People, have ſo glaringly inſiſted upon themſelves.

The Publick quickly found the Effect of this wicked Conduct, for it deſerves no better Name.—It was no ſmall Aſtoniſhment to many, who had hitherto concurred in the Oppoſition, and gave no ſmall Diſguſt to obſerve it.—No Man of Senſe and Honeſty thought he could juſtify adhering longer to a Set of Men, whoſe Party-View was now ſo openly avowed,

and

and who, like a Band of *Huſſars*, had abandoned themſelves to the Plunder, even before the Battle was half done; they knew the Conſequence muſt be, at leaſt, that this mercenary Conduct would ſuffer the Miniſter to eſcape uncenſured.—— All therefore they could hope farther to do, was to prevent his Return into his former Station, and to procure a Change in his Syſtem of Politicks, to get the beſt Laws they could, to prevent the like Abuſe of Power, and at leaſt to ſecure it in the Hands of thoſe, who they thought leaſt likely to abuſe it in their own Time.—It is true, they never intended to have given the *Tories* the Lead in the Government, or to have made a *Tory* Adminiſtration; from the Nature of that Party which I have ſufficiently explained already, they had been falſe both to their King and Country, if they had done it —— But they honeſtly did intend to have promoted the moſt moderate of that Party, deſirous of uniting, by this Experiment, as many as they could, in Affection to his Majeſty, and his Royal Family; to which the Gratification of private Expectations is with ſome a very neceſſary Step.—But their Conduct was ſuch, as diſabled them from carrying their Views much farther for them, and had they preſſed it after this, their own Principles muſt have come into Suſpicion.—They had therefore juſt Grounds to have made a total Separation from them; but from a Regard to their Country, they ſtifled their Reſentments; they advanced ſeveral *Tories* ſhortly after, and ſome into very great Poſts ſince that Time.—They united to promote an Enquiry into the Conduct of the late Miniſter, which they puſhed as far as the Strength of the oppoſite Party, who were now rallied upon theſe Diviſions, could poſſibly admit, and far enough to ſhew ſuch Errors in his Adminiſtration, as rendered it impoſſible for him to be employ'd again. They engaged the Government to purſue Meaſures entirely oppoſite to the pacific Plan ſo long fatally purſued; they maintained their Principle of ſupporting the Houſe of *Auſtria*, and furniſhed her with effectual Supplies; and they carried a Place-Bill to leſſen the Miniſterial Influence in Parliament.—In Foreign Affairs they did every thing that could be wiſhed, and much more than could have been expected; in Domeſtic, they went, if not quite as far, as perhaps they might have ſafely gone, yet as far as they could go ſafely in ſuch a Ferment; or indeed, as they were able to go, when thus deſerted and weakened by the Madneſs of theſe Men.

We have now ſhewn the Commencement of the preſent Oppoſition, which from its Origin may be eaſily judged what it is.—Its Origin plainly was, not from any wrong Meaſures,

in the Leaders of the late Oppoſition, for (as they juſtly obſerved themſelves) they had as yet done nothing when they were thus deſerted; no more than *eight Days* had paſſed ſince the Retreat of the Miniſter; and the *Parliament* had not yet met; ſo that it was impoſſible the *Faction* could have done it from any Obſervation of their wrong Behaviour *there*.——Had the *Tories* been as wholly proſcribed, as it was falſely ſuggeſted they were intended to be, was the late Oppoſition began upon the Principle of bringing them into Employment, or was it the *Right*, or the *Concern* of the People to inſiſt who ſhould have the moſt beneficial Places?——The Principle of the late Oppoſition was, as it has been fully ſhewn, to bring back this Nation to its true Politicks with Regard to the Houſe of *Auſtria*, and the Balance of Power.—Was the Purſuit of Places ever avowed to be the Grounds of Oppoſition? it has been indeed ſatirically imputed to be ſo upon all Occaſions, but it was never ſupported by the Publick upon that footing, nor ever avowedly confeſſed to be ſo, by any Oppoſition, before this which now diſtracts this Country; and which I therefore juſtly and truly call by no other than its proper Name, and ſhall farther prove, by its ſubſequent Proceedings, to be a *Faction*, if ever a *Faction* did or can exiſt in *Britain*.—And as the Tree is beſt known by its Fruits, we ſhall be particular in tracing its Conduct ever ſince.

As it was too ſoon to ſtile themſelves *a new Oppoſition*, becauſe the Parliament had not yet met, and they knew not what Meaſures would be purſued; they therefore formed themſelves, for the preſent, under the Title of the *Broad-Bottom*; a Cant Word, which correſponding equally with the Perſonal Figure of ſome of their Leaders, and the Nature of their Pretenſions, was underſtood to imply, a Party united to force the Tories into the Adminiſtration.

Thus intitled, they laid their general Plan of Action, reducible to the following Heads, which were the known Eſtabliſhment of their Predeceſſors in the ſame Faction.

1*ſt*, To villify and abuſe, without Meaſure, Mercy, or Reſerve, all, who in any one ſingle Vote ſhould differ from them.

2*dly*, To advance or inſinuate any Falſhood, or miſrepreſent any Meaſure, however groſsly, to the better ſort of Men, if they could propoſe to delude or inflame the People by it.

3*dly*, To ſpirit up the People againſt the Re-election of any Member into Parliament, who ſhould accept of any Employment.

4*thly*,

4*thly*, To wean the People from their Affection to the Houſe of *Auſtria*, to diminiſh their Apprehenſion, or to encreaſe their Fears of the *French* Power, *either*, juſt as Events ſhould make it moſt convenient to do. To undermine the great and ſalutary Principle of ſupporting a Balance of Power upon the Continent, by Pretences of the Inability of the Nation, of the Folly of engaging in Wars, in which we propoſed to make no Acquiſition for ourſelves, and of the Security of this Nation in its maritime Force alone, let what would happen upon the Continent.

5*thly*, To bait the People by the Proſpect of an Encreaſe of Popular Power, by propoſing Alterations in the Conſtitution, the *Effects* of which, and conſequently the neceſſary *Meaſure* of which, the common ſort are by no means able to underſtand.

6*thly*, To poiſon the Affections of the People to the Prince upon the Throne, by endeavouring to convince them, that every publick Meaſure was influenced by his Ambition, Reſentments, Paſſions, or Attachment to ſome Foreign Terrirory.

[a] Mr. *Addiſon* obſerves in one of thoſe excellent Papers called the *Freeholder*, which he wrote expreſsly againſt the ſame Faction, then in its Zenith, ſoon after the End of the late Queen's Reign; that even at that Time perſonal Abuſe had been remarked to be the prevailing Characteriſtick of that Party,—— and he gives the Reaſon for it, which ſtill holds good at this Day, *That having nothing of Weight to offer againſt their Antagoniſts, if they ſpeak at all, it muſt be againſt their Perſons; when they cannot refute an Adverſary, the ſhorteſt Way is to libel him, and to endeavour to make his Perſon odious, when they cannot repreſent his Notions as abſurd.*---It was the *Fort* of their Party, and practiſed at all Times; it was by the infamous Obſervation of that Maxim, *Calumniari fortiter ut aliquod adhæreat*, and by their ſcandalous Perſonalities againſt the great Duke of *Marlborough*, the preſent Dutcheſs, the Treaſurer *Godolphin*, and all the Whigs who ſupported their glorious Meaſures, that they routed them at laſt.—They met with too much Encouragement then not to tread in the ſame Steps,—the *Examiner* had then the Impudence to accuſe that Miniſtry of carrying on that War *upon different Principles from thoſe upon which it was begun*, which could not have been, unleſs that War had been begun upon the Principle of preſerving inſtead of diſtreſſing *France*.—And the preſent Faction, with equal Aſſurance, ſcandalouſly inconſiſtent, as they are themſelves, accuſe the new Part of the Adminiſtration of *Inconſiſtency*, at the Time they are carrying on Meaſures or reducing *France* with the utmoſt Vigour; when it is noto-

[a] *Freeholder*, N° 19.

rious, to have been the grand Principle and View upon which they engaged in Oppoſition. Yet glaringly abſurd and ſhameleſs, as this Charge evidently appears to be, upon the leaſt Reflection, they have actually and incredibly, by their Emiſſaries properly planted, and properly inſtructed, brought Numbers of the Vulgar to join in the Chorus of this Song.—No Man could venture to vote on a different Side in the moſt indifferent Propoſition, but he was treated with immeaſurable Abuſe:—By this Exceſs of Calumny and Malice, they had more than one Advantage in View.—It ſerved to terrify weak Minds to return and be more ſteady.—And though ſome Men of true Spirit might be the more determined to deſert them, they found the Loſs of theſe outbalanced by the Number of thoſe, who were awed and intimidated by it.

In this manner the whole World muſt be ſenſible how far they have proceeded, ſparing neither Age nor Sex, Rank nor Character,—which Abuſe has been ſwallowed with as much Diſgrace to thoſe who have received it, as to thoſe who have delivered it. But Envy and Malice are two great Ingredients in the Tempers of Men, and the Commonalty look upon the Indulgence of this crooked Diſpoſition to be a Mark of an independant Spirit; according to that old Obſervation of the great Hiſtorian *Tacitus*, *Obtrectatio livor pronis auribus accipiuntur, quippe adulationi fœdum crimen ſervitutis, Malignitati falſa ſpecies libertatis ineſt.*

The ſecond Part of their Plan was purſued with equal Induſtry, the ſame [a] Author, in another of his Papers, obſerves, how ſteadily this Set of Men have conſtantly diſtinguiſhed themſelves by their little Regard to Truth, their little Solicitude for what the thinking Part of Mankind would conſider of their Conduct, or how long the Lye of the Day would laſt.—He enumerates a Multitude of their deluſive Inventions, in the Reign of King *William*, and in his own Time, adding a juſt and melancholy Obſervation, *that their ſelf-intereſted and deſigning Leaders cannot deſire a more ductile and eaſy People to work upon.* Truſting to this Ductility, and the undiſtinguiſhing Nature of the common Race of Men, they made no Scruple to charge thoſe, who ſupport the preſent Meaſures, with a Change of Principles—Confounding thus the *Oppoſition* with the *thing intended by it*, and making *Oppoſition itſelf* a Principle, which no honeſt Man will ever make it. The People are told, *that it was the Principle of the new Adminiſtration to oppoſe the Government, that they do not oppoſe the Government now, therefore the new Adminiſtration have deſerted their former Principle.* This paſſes for ſound Logick, upon the ſimple Herd they lead. It is vain to ſhew the

[a] *Freeholder*, N° 7.

bare-faced

bare-faced Fallacy, *that it was their Principle to oppoſe the Meaſures, only when they thought them bad, and that it was the Meaſures and not the Government they oppoſed; that the Meaſures are now changed, and they think them no longer bad, that therefore they are no Deſerters of their Principle, if they now deſiſt from Oppoſition.*—Confiding farther in the Ignorance of their Creatures, they make no ſcruple to throw into their general Charge againſt thoſe who ſupport the prèſent Meaſures, many of thoſe paſt Occurrences and Errors, which happened before their Time, which they formerly condemned, and which are now, (if not equally exploded) at leaſt equally counter-acted both by the new and old Part of the Adminiſtration, and the Conſequences of which they are now every Hour labouring to remedy and avert.—Thus wilfully miſrepreſenting every Meaſure, jumbling and confounding Facts and Dates, Names and Things, ſo crude and ſo irrational, that none but the loweſt of the Vulgar could be able to digeſt them.

They proceeded with the ſame Diligence in the Execution of the third Article of this Plan,—for no ſooner was any Gentleman, who had been engaged in the late Oppoſition, admitted into Employment, than Heaven and Earth were moved to prevent his Re-election. When they had once given over the Thoughts of being employed themſelves, the Note was immediately changed; and it is a Matter never to be ſufficiently admired, how ſtupidly the People, in many places, fell into their Views, without conſidering the Abſurdity of what they were put upon to do. When the Houſe adjourned, the Doctrine then was, as I have before obſerved, that a *Change of the Miniſter, and the Introduction of honeſt Men into Employments, were the utmoſt Objects of the People's Wiſh, and muſt in the end enſure whatever elſe was wanting.* But it ſeems, ſince the *Tories* were not to be admitted, no other Men were to be deemed honeſt. Nay, after a little time, when it was found, that thoſe of more obnoxious Principles were abandoned to Deſpair, even a *Tory*, under theſe Circumſtances, found it difficult to be permitted quietly to be rechoſen—ſo ſilly were the *little Tools* of this *Faction*, as to delight in, and admire at the Wiſdom and Integrity of a Maxim now eſtabliſhed, that none of the *Party* ſhould *have a Place*, till the Views of their *Great ones* were complied with firſt.—They ſtill went on calumniating the new Adminiſtration for not making Changes faſt enough, when they themſelves had ſhut the door againſt it, and when no Man, who was not willing to ſacrifice his Fortune, by the vaſt Expence of a certain Oppoſition, or expoſe his Perſon to the dangerous Inſults of the Mobs they raiſed upon every ſuch occaſion, could accept.

accept. Thus the People were brought to inſiſt upon a Point, which, like Ideots, they were led at the ſame time palpably to prevent themſelves.—I have not miſrepreſented this Matter; it is well known, that this was the Method of their Proceeding to all Perſons without Diſtinction, and they begun it, before any Man could have given poſſibly any Reaſon to be diſtruſted by his Country, becauſe it was begun before the Parliament met again, after the famous Adjournment. *An honourable Gentleman*, (who by the greateſt Number of Voices, that ever any Man had upon ſuch an occaſion, was elected *Chairman of the Committee of Elections* but a few Weeks before, who in that nice Conjuncture, for his unexceptionable Character, with regard to all Parties, was pitched upon for that Office by the whole Oppoſition, who neither had, nor could have had, at that time, given a ſingle Vote to diminiſh that Reputation,) being advanced to be a Commiſſioner of the *Admiralty* by his Majeſty, (for no other reaſon, but that he was thought agreeable to the People,) was immediately marked out, as an Object of Deteſtation to his Country, and not ſuffered to be choſen into Parliament again.—Another *Right Honourable Member* advanced to the ſame Office, was perſecuted, if poſſible, with more ſcandalous Circumſtances, the Mob of the whole County, for which he ſerved, were hired to inſult him. Subſcriptions raiſed out of the Pockets of the *whole Faction*, nay preſſed publickly in the very *Houſe of Commons* to make a Purſe to carry on an Oppoſition to him: Though at the ſame time, this *Noble Perſon* was a Servant to the *firſt Subject* of this Kingdom, preferred at his Requeſt and Recommendation, and advanced as a kind of Pledge of Union between the Royal Family itſelf; and though *his Maſter* was confeſſedly the Perſon by whoſe Influence and Concurrence in the Cauſe of his Country, the late Oppoſition was principally brought to its Iſſue, who had ſuffered infinitely more in the Courſe of it, than the meaneſt private Gentleman in the Kingdom, and who had done that for the Publick, which no Man in his Station ever did before him, which could not have been expected of *him*, and after this Treatment, muſt never be expected of *any other* in the ſame Situation.—Thus they gave fair Warning to the *Father*, by their Conduct to the *Son*, what he had to expect from this Set of Men, who, hardened by Diſappointments of their own creating, inſenſibly loſt all regard, either to Prudence, Decency, or Gratitude.

I ſhall not in this Place proceed to obſerve minutely, upon the manner of executing all the other Particulars of their Plan, becauſe it required a conſiderable time before they could ripen the People, into a ſufficient degree of Madneſs, to endure thoſe groſs

groſs Attempts upon their Underſtandings and their Principles, which they have ſince made with too much Succeſs. The Arts to be exerted to theſe Ends, were a little ſlow in Operation, and to be practiſed at firſt tenderly.—However, they ventured to ſound the Ground they ſtood upon, and to make ſome Trial, what Abſurdities the Temper of the Times would bear.

In Order to do this, almoſt as ſoon as the Parliament was met, they began to oppoſe every ſingle Propoſition that was made by the new Adminiſtration; and though now thoſe very Meaſures were purſued, with the utmoſt Vigour, upon which they themſelves, and the whole Voice of the People, had ſo long and vehemently inſiſted; and for not purſuing which an Enquiry was actually ſet on foot, into the Conduct of the late Miniſter, who upon this account was, according to their own Doctrine, to make attonement by no leſs a Sacrifice than that of his *Life*, his *Eſtate*, his *Honours*, and the *utter Ruin* of his *Poſterity*; yet with a bare-faced Aſſurance, which raiſed the Deteſtation and Aſtoniſhment of all reaſonable Men, and which was a very Mockery upon Common Senſe, they oppoſed the ſending 16,000 of our Troops into *Flanders*, the taking 4,000 of the *Iriſh* Troops upon the *Britiſh* Eſtabliſhment, to be ſent after the former, and even in ſome degree obſtructed the Vote for 500,000*l.* to aſſiſt the Queen of *Hungary*.—It was viſible enough, and it had been their own Form of Reaſoning but a few Weeks before, that Meaſures of this kind, nay more vigorous, if poſſible, were neceſſary to be taken in that deſperate Situation in which we then ſtood, to convince the *Dutch*, the King of *Sardinia*, and all foreign Powers, that we were now in earneſt.—The Experience they had long had of our Councils would not ſuffer them to truſt us lightly:—The Form of the *Dutch* Government in particular, made them ſlow to reſolve, and their Situation made it deſperate to engage, till they were ſure of a ſolid Support:—The King of *Sardinia* had heartily and generouſly ſtept into the Breach, but his Circumſtances were, if poſſible, ſtill more critical:—The Kings of *Pruſſia* and *Poland* neither could have ſtopped, if they would, nor probably would if they could, and muſt have been hurried on where *France* ſhould have directed, or their own Ambition have invited; if by the gathering of this Cloud, a Storm had not been threatned from the Quarter of *Great Britain*, which might have created both Doubts and Terror as to the Event of their Quarrel; this was therefore the only way to induce them to be more moderate and circumſpect in their Proceedings. It was certain, that nothing leſs than this could ſuſtain the drooping Spirits of the Queen of *Hungary*, and of her

her diſtreſſed and faithful Subjects, in the deſperate Condition to which they were reduced: it was therefore paſt all doubt, that if theſe Meaſures were not purſued, ſhe muſt immediately accommodate with *France* upon any Terms; and that *France*, having broken the only Power, which could give her any Diverſion in an Attempt upon *Great-Britan*, would have been immediately at liberty to have joined her whole Power with that of *Spain*, and to have given Law to us:—This approaching Situation of our Affairs was but too viſible; nor was it at all extravagant, or very remote to foreſee, that it would become much worſe; that ſome of the Northern Powers might be induced to enter into her Views, and that even the *Dutch* might, at length, be obliged to act as Inſtruments to the long premeditated Deſign of that dangerous People, to deſtroy the Religion, Laws, Liberties and Commerce of this Nation.—— This was plainly not to be averted by any other Means than theſe, and yet were theſe oppoſed, though at firſt in ſo aukward a Manner, that it was viſible they were afraid the People would be ſhocked at this ſudden Turn, and detect their ſhameful Inconſiſtency,——which juſt Effect indeed it had with ſome; yet with ſo many it ſucceeded beyond their Expectations, that it encouraged them to a Conduct of the ſame kind, ſo extravagant, in the next Seſſions of Parliament, as will hardly obtain Belief in future Ages.——But the Order of Time, which is neceſſary to obſerve in this Narration, prevents my giving a farther Deduction of it in this Place.

I ſhall take the Liberty however to follow them in ſome other Branches of their Conduct, as far as they went for the Remainder of that Seſſions, during which they acted conſtantly with due Regard to one or other of the Rules of that Plan before mention.

The Lords having thrown out [a] *a Bill* which the Commons had paſſed, and which was by them thought neceſſary to be carried at that Time, they made a daring Attempt againſt that Body, ——they appointed a Committee to inſpect their Journals, and grounded upon their Report a Vote of Cenſure upon that Branch of the Legiſlature,——they fortunately miſcarried in that Attempt, in which, if they had ſucceeded, the utmoſt Confuſion muſt have enſued; and Confuſion muſt have been their only View, for what elſe could be intended, when under the Notion of obliging the Lords to follow their Opinion, without which they pretended the Nation could not be ſafe in future, they openly made an Attempt for an immediate Diſſolution of

[a] The Bill for indemnifying the Evidence againſt the Earl of *Orford*.

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the Conſtitution.—Is the Conſtitution now ſo little underſtood, or has Popular Fury ſo deſtroyed all Traces of it, that it ſhould be neceſſary to explain its Principles at this Day?—Is it not founded upon *this*, which is the *Corner-Stone* of the whole Building, that the *King*, the *Lords*, and the *Commons*, *ſhould have an abſolute Negative upon the Proceedings of each other?*—With what Face then can they, who pretend to ſtruggle in favour of the Conſtitution, by endeavouring to make the Houſe of Commons more independant than it is, at the ſame Time attack the Houſe of Lords, to deprive them totally of the ſame Independancy, to which no man can deny that they have an equal Right; ſuppoſing that they were ever ſo juſtly founded, and entitled to procure further Securities for the Houſe of Commons, it is an incontrovertible Fact, that by this avowed Attempt, and indeed by all the Doctrines of late inſtilled into the Minds of the People, they aim at the Deſtruction of the Conſtitution in another Part, which is equally Eſſential,—the beſt Pretenſions they therefore have, are only theſe; that they build with *one* Hand, and pull down with *another*; and that while they ſtop one Breach againſt the Influence of the Crown, they open a wider, to the Democratical Spirit of the People, —the Conſtitution *may*, nay, it *has*, ſuffered equally from *both* —but what renders it doubly ridiculous, is, that the Crown will equally be able to enter in at the one Breach as at the other,—and every thinking Man may eaſily foretel, that by what Steps ſoever this Conſtitution comes to be deſtroyed, an abſolute Power in a ſingle Perſon, muſt be the final Conſequence, —this Conduct therefore plainly opens to us, how falſe their Pretences to the Conſtitution were, equally falſe with every other they have made.—For however, at times, both the King, the Lords, and the Commons, in their Turn, may have obſtructed what was for the publick Good by this negative Power. —Yet this is no more than what muſt, and ever will be, the Conſequence of a Diviſion of Power in this Conſtitution. —And if, whenever Power is in any degree abuſed, it is immediately to be deſtroyed.—No Government can ſtand, for no Power can be given, but that it is liable to be ſometimes exerted ill; yet ſurely no Man will venture to deny, that it is better to ſubmit to ſome unavoidable Evils of Society, than to revert into a State of Nature; but this the People were too much heated to conſider.—It was inculcated, that all Power ought to lie in the People, which, if it be rightly underſtood, implies, the People, including all its Magiſtrates and Members, of which both the King and the Lords are undoubtedly a part.—But if it be taken in the confined Senſe of Fac-

tion, imports a Republican Propoſition, wholly contradictory to the Genius and the Principles of this Government; nay, if the People conſidered this as they ought to do, ſo far from being incenſed either with the *Lords* or with the *Crown*, for oppoſing the Popular Points, which they have ſometimes obſtructed, they would not think themſelves intitled ſo much as to repine at it,—they would conſider, that as they have a Title, by the Laws of this Country, to ſuch Powers in the State as they now enjoy, they are under no ſort of Obligation to part with them to the third Eſtate,—that this Impetuoſity to force them to it, is not only the ſtrongeſt Provocation, but alſo no inſufficient Reaſon to keep the Ground they have, that naturally ſpeaking, by their permanent Intereſt in the Legiſlature, their impoſſibility of ever becoming Maſters of the State, and their evident Intereſt to keep both the Crown and the People from too great an aſcendancy; the Lords are the Part of the Conſtitution, who are moſt likely to be ſincere in its Preſervation, either from Tyranny or Faction, and therefore the moſt proper to hold the Balance.—The Intereſt of the Lords is undoubtedly to watch and carefully attend to both, for both may, in ſome Conjunctures, be ſuſpected to deſire to engroſs the whole Power;—and whenever they throw themſelves into either the one or the other Scale, a rational Man would ſooner judge by their Conduct, how the State of the Conſtitution ſtands, than by any other Circumſtance.—It was intended, they ſhould do this, and be at full Liberty to do it; though ſuch muſt be (and it ever was) their Fate, that which-ever Party they eſpouſe, whether that of the Crown, or of the People, the Heat and Paſſion of the other will infallibly find ſome Pretences of Partiality or private Intereſt to charge them with, as their Inducements to that Conduct.—But they are made to ſtand to all this, and they muſt ſtand this, and be ſupported in it, or elſe our Conſtitution cannot ſtand.—This deſperate Meaſure however paſſed upon the People, like the reſt of their Conduct, as a generous Attempt for Liberty, and anſwered the Purpoſe of Popularity, which, next to the View of Confuſion, was their ſecond Expectation from it.

We now come to the popular Bills, with which the People have been ſo much inflamed; of theſe I ſhall take the leſs Notice in this Place, becauſe I have reſerved my ſelf to ſay ſomething farther in the Concluſion with regard to them.—But, tho' I ſhall not here enter much into the Merits of theſe Bills, I muſt ſpeak a little of the Conduct of the *Faction*, with regard to them which cannot be paſſed over, becauſe their Impoſition upon the People was extremely groſs, and their Diſhoneſty in imputing the Failure of them, (ſo far as they have failed) to thoſe who are

far more innocent in this Reſpect than themſelves: They are chiefly comprehended in *a Law for the better Regulation of Elections*, another *to prevent Members from ſitting in the Houſe of Commons, who have Penſions from the Crown*, in *the Repeal of the Septennial Act*, and *a Law to exclude a certain Number of Placemen from ſitting in the Houſe of Commons.*—Now, as to the firſt of theſe, it is notorious to the whole Houſe of Commons, that it was a Bill, as much laboured by the Gentlemen of the new Adminiſtration, and many of thoſe, who now ſupport the Meaſures of the Government, as it could poſſibly be;—and that they were ſincere, is evident, by what has been ſince done with regard to the *Scotch* Elections in the laſt Seſſions;—the true Reaſon therefore that a general Bill did not paſs at that Time, was one which equally affected all Parties, and which will everlaſtingly prevent an effectual Bill of this kind; and this is the different Rights of Election, which are ſo numerous, that they diſtract and confound the different Intereſts of Gentlemen, which, to ſpeak fairly on all Sides, induces them, by one plauſible Pretence or other, for their private Regard, to *oppoſe*, or to *propoſe*, ſo many different Clauſes, that ſuch Bills at length become impracticable and impalatable to all—the Burgage Tenures too, which Gentlemen will neither part with, nor can tell how to regulate, are another invincible Obſtruction; and the Powers and the Penalties create further Difficulties, which no Human Wiſdom has yet been able to ſurmount.—For this Reaſon therefore, to impute the Failure of this Bill to any Set of Men, is notoriouſly unjuſt, unleſs it were by laying it in ſome meaſure more ſeverely upon ſome particular Gentlemen of the *Faction* itſelf, who contributed more eminently than others to confound that Part of it, which related to certain Counties, where they laboured to increaſe the overgrown and almoſt unconſtitutional Intereſt they have already.—*As to the Penſion Bill*, it is a Bill allowed in private by all Parties to be impoſſible to take Effect, becauſe the giving and taking of Gratuities of this kind are Tranſactions of ſo private a Nature, that Men muſt be downright Fools, and both Parties unite to make a Diſcovery againſt themſelves, or the Law could take no effect.—Even in the Caſe, that Perjury muſt attend the Acceptance of a Penſion, it might induce ſome profligate Men to double their Crime;—but it is not to be ſuppoſed, that he who would ſell his Country, would heſitate to violate his Oath.—However, this was the only poſſible Proviſion, and upon this Footing, an honourable Gentleman now in the Adminiſtration, often preſented it to the Houſe;—but the great Care of the preſent Patriots would not truſt it any more in his ands, after he was taken into Employment, and a wife and buſy

Man among them took it upon himſelf, who being a true Tory, and therefore of a refined Conſcience, and naturally prejudiced to Oaths, purged it of its deteſtable Whig Clauſe, which reduced it to a mere nothing, a Law without a Penalty, ſo that the Bill became a Jeſt with all Parties, and many in that light voted for it *then*, who had always oppoſed it *before*.—The Bill therefore fell into contempt, and was no longer regarded by any one, but him who had garbled it in this judicious manner.—Having thus related the ſecret Hiſtory of this popular Bill, I have only to add, that it is for the Intereſt of the Publick it ſhould never paſs into a Law, and was never deſired by any Man of Senſe that it ſhould;—and yet that it is for the Intereſt of the Publick, that it ſhould be frequently propoſed in the Houſe of Commons, which double Conſideration may render it very conſiſtent for the ſame Man, to vote for it at one time, and to vote againſt it at another,—this may ſeem a Paradox; but it is eaſily explained;—for by frequently bringing it into debate, the Deteſtation and Scandal of ſo baſe a Practice, is maintained in its full Vigour, which is in reality the only Guard againſt it.—Whereas, if the Bill were once paſſed, the great Nothing, which is deſired, being effected, there would be no farther Diſcourſe upon the Subject; thoſe Opportunities of expoſing the Meanneſs and the Danger of the Thing, thoſe animating anniverſary Speeches againſt it would be loſt; and with them in a great degree, the Remorſe and Shame, that now attend the Crime.—We come in the next place to conſider, the Behaviour of theſe Gentlemen with regard to *the Repeal of the Septennial Law*, in which they have deluded the People ſcandalouſly: It is true, that they moved for this Repeal, and that ſome of the Gentlemen in the Adminiſtration oppoſed it; but they did it upon a Conſideration, which ought to have, and will have the greateſt Weight with every thinking Man; they took juſt Notice of the tempeſtuous Temper of the People at that Time, and the yet unſettled Condition of our Affairs; they then obſerved, that the Repeal of this Law muſt cauſe a new general Election before it could be poſſible that theſe Diſorders ſhould ſubſide, and before they could make any ſolid Judgment of the effects of the late Change; that as every new Election hazarded, at leaſt, the Syſtem of the Time; foreign Nations would not exert themſelves in this Conjuncture; from a Dependance on the Principles of Men, who might probably be changed, and conſequently new Politicks prevail, almoſt as ſoon as they had been embarked with us;—That as the like Conſiderations had juſtified the Meaſures of the Septennial Law at the Time it was made, ſo the Conjuncture of this Time might prevail, at leaſt ſo far, as

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to continue till it might be debated fairly, and with leſs Heat and Partiality, than it could poſſibly be at this Period, whether the preſent Eſtabliſhment of Parliaments ſhould ſtand; and, if that ſhould appear improper, whether we ſhould fix upon an Annual or a Triennial Election;—that a Triennial was objected to with ſtrong Reaſon, and that many thought an annual would be leſs dangerous; but that it was difficult to ſettle either in the preſent diverſity of Opinions upon it:—At the ſame time, ſome of the *principal Leaders of the Faction* voted againſt it themſelves, and that *without giving any Reaſon at all*; ſo that the People were deſerted in it, by thoſe very Men, upon whom they depended to carry it through, and who with a baſe Concealment of this Fact, make no ſcruple to lay the Miſcarriage of this Bill, in which they had, at leaſt, an equal Share, ſolely to the new Adminiſtration.—We now come to the *Place-Bill*, in which their Conduct was deteſtable, for jealous of the Honour and the Popularity, which the new Adminiſtration naturally ought to have acquired by it, they not only falſely miſrepreſented it in the moſt outragious manner, but even openly oppoſed it: The new Adminiſtration had acted in this with the utmoſt Prudence and Sincerity, and had done much more than could have been expected of them.—The *Crown* and the *Lords* are known to be jealous of the Growth of the *popular Intereſt*, and it is by mutual Jealouſies of this kind, that our Conſtitution can alone ſubſiſt; the Violence and Extravagance of the Leaders of the Faction did not diminiſh this Jealouſy; the Courſe of the late Elections, and the Temper of the People, not only ſhewed it leſs neceſſary than it had been conceived before by many well-meaning Men, but their Demands were ſo unlimited, and ſo little Contentment ſhewn with former Compliances, that there was in truth very little Proſpect of regaining the good old Temper of the Nation by any thing that could be done;—this rendered it the more difficult to obtain any thing; for it was well known, that no Bill brought in by theſe Incendiaries, would be moderate enough to gain the Aſſent of the three Eſtates; it was therefore the only Method that could be taken to enter into a tacit Treaty with the Lords, to agree upon ſome Bill of this nature, which they ſhould previouſly engage not to reject.—It was ſurely better to procure ſomething, than by puſhing for more to get nothing. The Lords agreed to this:—They conſented not to oppoſe a Law, that ſhould exclude above thirteen conſiderable Employments then actually enjoyed by Members of Parliament, and above two hundred ſmaller Offices; which, by conferring three or four upon one Perſon, might have made a vaſt

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Number of additional Preferments, a Thing ſtill in the Power of the Crown, notwithſtanding any former Laws, to have done.—But at the ſame time, they abſolutely declared they would go no further at that time, till they had ſeen how far this would operate upon the Conſtitution :—This Difficulty removed, it was neceſſary to gain the Conſent of the Houſe of Commons too ; but the *Oppoſition*, by their Breach with the *new* Adminiſtration, had been ſo weakened, and the Friends of the *old* had now rallied to ſuch a degree, that there was no carrying any Point by Force againſt them. Thirteen or fourteen of that Party, who were more than ſufficient to have turned the Scale againſt the Bill, were, as we have before obſerved, of the Number to be excluded by it ; it could not be expected that they would abandon their Employments inſtantly, to pleaſure their Antagoniſts ; the only way poſſible to gain their Conſent, was to poſtpone the Execution of this Law to the End of the preſent Parliament : The deferring its Execution for ſix Years was not material to the Conſtitution, and it was thought by all moderate Men, a great Sacrifice in his Majeſty, a Condeſcenſion in the Lords, and an honeſt Acquieſcence in the Perſons poſſeſſed of theſe Employments ; in the one to reſign ſo much of his *Prerogative*, in the other to ſtrengthen the *oppoſite Side of the Balance*, and in the third to part with their *Employments*, which they had a Proſpect to preſerve much longer than that Term. The Impoſſibility therefore of gaining more, if more had been palpably neceſſary, muſt have juſtified the new Adminiſtration for getting this : But what made it more infamous to reproach them upon this Head was, that it was actually more than was ever gained by the People, at any one Time, or by any one Bill before :—The other Acts for limiting the Number of Placemen in the Houſe of Commons were all of them obtained one after the other, and at different Periods ; though more therefore had been ſtill wanting, they ought to have contented themſelves for a Time with this, as their Predeceſſors had done in the like Conjunctures :—But the *popular Spirit* diſgraced itſelf upon this Occaſion, and ſuffering itſelf to be led away by Men, who ſtudied nothing but their private Ends, gave too juſt handle for that Inſinuation, which muſt be moſt fatal to all *its Views*, and for a Charge upon the *People* of *England*, which has been too juſtly laid againſt all others, that give them one Thing it only leads them to expect more, and that nothing but a total Tranſlation of all Power to their Scale will put a period to their Clamour : What therefore was done by the Faction in this Inſtance, was viſibly done only with a View to deſtroy the good Opinion of a Law, the moſt truly popular,

that

that was ever obtained by this Nation; if they could effect this, they did not care what the People loſt by it, either in their real Security, or in the Suſpicions, that would ariſe with thinking Men, of their dangerous Views againſt the Conſtitution; they knew (which is abſolutely the Caſe to this Day) that not one Man in 500, whom they ſhould enflame upon this Subject, would ever read, or conſider the real Extent, of this Law; they ſuggeſted to the People, that the new Gentlemen in the Adminiſtration had formerly contended for *a total Excluſion* of all Employments; and thence imputed an Inconſiſtency to them, becauſe they had now excluded what they *falſely* called a *few*, whereas this never had been the View, nor ever was intended by thoſe Gentlemen at any time: They never contended for a Place-Bill much more extenſive than the preſent is, and yet it may be juſtly ſuppoſed, that they did, and might honeſtly inſiſt upon more than they thought ſufficient, as the only way to obtain a Compromiſe at laſt, for that which was.

This Plan of creating Confuſion was purſued in many other Reſpects, and by many other Miſrepreſentations equally groſs and wicked; which are too tedious to be mentioned here:—The laſt I ſhall mention in this Place, is that with regard to the Enquiry into the Adminiſtration of the Earl of *Orford*.

We have ſhewn already how juſt Offence his Conduct had given to the *Whigs*, and how by a fatal Series of pacific Meaſures he had brought almoſt the ſame Cataſtrophe upon his Country, which ſome day or other will too probably be effected by another Set of Men:—The *Whigs* avowed their Oppoſition to be levelled at this Man, not out of any perſonal Averſion to him, but becauſe he was irreclaimable in this fatal Point; the *Whigs* had levelled at this Man for another Reaſon, which was, during the Courſe of this neceſſary Oppoſition, to prevent the Diſcontents from taking a Turn to the Prejudice of the Royal Family, and had confined themſelves in their Attack to his Perſon, that by the Removal of one Man they might leave it in the power of the Government to reſtore the publick Tranquillity again whenever they ſhould think proper:—It was therefore upon an honeſt, though political Principle, that their Oppoſition was thus perſonal; not out of thoſe vindictive and ſanguinary Views, which in the Courſe of the Oppoſition the *Tories*, who had allied themſelves with them, treacherouſly in private Diſcourſe accuſed them of, and which now they upbraid them with having departed from.—Yet allowing that ſome Men in their firſt Engagements in the late Oppoſition, had embarked upon perſonal Motives, and had been

been heated to this Degree by their Reſentments, or the Diſappointment of their Ambition, ſhall it be forbidden to Age, Experience, Reaſon, Virtue and Reflection, to take their happy Effect, and moderate thoſe Paſſions, which are in themſelves wicked and unwarrantable; and ſhall it be imputed as a Crime to any Man to have ſacrificed his private Views and his Reſentments, as ſome have greatly done upon this late Change, to the Peace and Tranquillity of their Country? But it is the Nature of theſe Men in their *Alliances*, to expoſe the *Faults* of thoſe, with whom they act, and in their *Enmity* to traduce the *Virtue* of thoſe they act againſt.

However, though the *Whigs* in the late Oppoſition did not mean to purſue their Vengeance to the Head of this Miniſter, they certainly did mean to deprive him of all his Power, and to ſet ſome Mark upon him that might prevent his Return into it again, and if poſſible deter any future Miniſter from the ſame unhappy Conduct.—One Part of this they have been able to effect, and it is the moſt immediately neceſſary, and the moſt material; and we ſhall honeſtly ſhew the Reaſons why they did not compaſs the reſt,—Reaſons very ſufficient to ſupport them againſt all the infamous Suggeſtions of the Faction.—I ſhall ſpeak with Freedom and with Candour.

Whoever duly conſiders the Courſe of the Miſmanagements of this Man, of which I have purpoſely given a large Deduction, will evidently ſee, that the infamous Peace of *Utrecht*, in which it is well known he had no hand, naturally laid their firſt Foundation;—the Diſorders ariſing afterwards from the unſettled State of *Europe*, brought on the *Quadruple Alliance*, that, in Proceſs of Time, begot the Treaty of *Hanover*, and from the Treaty of *Hanover*, by the fatal Blunder of joining *France* againſt the Houſe of *Auſtria*, he became involved in ſuch Difficulties, as he could never recover —But ruinous as, to ſpeak fairly, all his future Meaſures were, they were of ſuch a Nature, as could not be imputed to any corrupt Engagements with any foreign Power, upon which Ground alone the Publick think it warrantable to purſue him to Deſtruction.—I muſt repeat it, the very Nature of his imprudent Conduct clears him from a Suſpicion of this; he proceeded round the Globe, obliging and diſobliging every Power of *Europe* in its Turn.—This he reiterated ſo often, and provoked them all ſo much, that it is morally impoſſible, the Reſentments of theſe Powers, ſhould not have produced a Diſcovery of this Treaſon, if any ſuch there had been.

This is palpably the Fact, this is honeſtly the Truth, with regard to his *Foreign* Tranſactions, and every *Domeſtick* Subject of Complaint naturally flowed from the ſame Spring.

For

For Oppoſition grew inſenſibly ſo ſtrong upon this untoward Step, that it drove him to practiſe any Art, to defend not only his Power, but his Perſon,—his pacifick Obſtinacy became at length in a manner neceſſary both to himſelf and to his Country;—he dreaded the Confuſion which he apprehended from a Change,—the Event hath ſhewn he had ſome Reaſon, tho' he blended his private Fears too much with his Apprehenſions for the Publick—an Error which every Man's Tenderneſs to himſelf expoſes him to,—he foreſaw what has ſince happened, that even a juſt, a neceſſary, and a ſucceſsful War, nay, a War demanded by the whole Nation, would ſecure no Miniſter, who engaged in it, from the Diſcontents, which the bare Expences, and much more the various Accidents that attended it, would infallibly create.—That private Views, and corrupt Principles, influence ſo great a Majority in every Oppoſition, that though the Points were complied with, upon which they then inſiſted, they would ſtill, in general perſevere; that they would even miſrepreſent the Conduct of their own Plan, and that however ſcandalous it is for a Nation to preſs its Government into Meaſures, and to deſert them when engaged, yet that in the heated Multitude, the Majority are compoſed of Men, in whom ſuch Scruples are not found.—He foretold, what has been ſo well verified, that the Enemies of their Country, however low and dead they may appear in Times of Quiet, revive in the Heat of War, like Flies and noxious Inſects in the Sun. He therefore thought that in attempting to appeaſe the publick Diſcontents, by complying with their Demands for War, he ſhould only furniſh Fuel for their farther Nouriſhment.—He knew, that by the fatal Conſequences of *Party*, National *Diſſatisfaction* is, in this Country, very nearly allied to *Diſaffection*,—as much as he at firſt deſpiſed the *Tories*, he dreaded them as much at laſt,—he juſtly feared that the Succeſs of the *Party* that oppoſed, though led by *Whig Leaders*, and founded upon *Whig Principles*, would infallibly end in the Formation of a *Tory Faction*; and he dreaded, from that Faction, what every wiſe and honeſt Man dreads from it in this Conjuncture, and what we ſhould have already fatally experienced, if ſome, from whom perhaps he leaſt expected this Moderation, had not gallantly oppoſed themſelves to the Torrent, thinking it the more incumbent upon them to reſtrain its Fury, and confine it within juſt Bounds, as they, (though honeſtly and neceſſarily compelled to it,) had been the Men who raiſed it, preferring the ſolid Satisfaction of having twice ſaved their Country, to all the Noiſe of giddy Popularity, reſigning it when they could no longer keep it by virtuous

Means, despising the Rage and Malice of a *Faction*, sincerely pitying, but determined not to follow an honest, but deluded People, who after passing many Dangers, and perhaps smarting for their Folly, will live to do Justice to the great Characters, they now licentiously and injuriously defame.

These were the Principles upon which the Earl of *Orford* went, and this was the whole Mystery of his unfortunate Administration.—It is easy to point out both his *Follies* and his *Faults*.—His *Folly* was to lay down for this Country, a System prudent for a petty State, but very improper for a Country, which bears so great a Sway, and ought to take the Lead in *Europe*.—It is for a little State to pursue little Measures, to temporize, to trust to Expedients and Events, to wait for Accidents, and the Activity of other Powers. But this is a Policy ill becoming us, and fatal ever in its Consequence, both to ourselves and to our natural Allies, whose Rank and Condition of Power compels them to consider an immediate Security, and can never admit them to exert their Force against that *State*, whose constant Aim is Universal Monarchy, till we raise the Standard first, and convince them, that under that Protection they may do it safely. His *Folly* appeared in another Instance, in not yielding sooner to what he could not hope long to prevent, an Evil which gathered Strength, and became more dangerous by Delay, and by the Means he was obliged to use in order to delay it.—His *Fault* lay in his Fondness to continue in his Power, which induced him, or misled him, to overlook the true Interest of his Royal Master, and his Country, and to pursue the Maxim of Peace to a ridiculous Extravagance. By this *France* was raised,—by this our Allies were ruined,—by this the Safety of *Britain* was reduced into the utmost Hazard,—and by this his Country became contemptible abroad, and hateful at home; till, to support his System, and to preserve his Person, he was at length driven to make use of every Means of Ministerial Influence, to strain every Nerve of Power, allotted by the Wisdom of our Ancestors for the Security of Government, and to apply that Force to his own Defence.——By all this he has brought the necessary Guards of our Constitution into Disrepute, and has established an Opinion in many, and a Suspicion in more, that our Constitution is impaired; whereas, in truth, it has only been abused,—a Difference extremely great, and such, as if not attended justly to, may hurry us into the Use of Remedies much worse than the Disease. In this Light does the Conduct of this Minister appear to every moderate Man, and no doubt in a yet more favourable Light to those who were his Friends, who had concurred in his Measures many Years, who owed him many Obligations.—Never

was

was a Man in private Life more beloved, and his worſt Enemies allow, no Man did ever in private Life deſerve it more: —He was humane and grateful, and a generous Friend, to all whom he did not think would abuſe that Friendſhip.— That he was falſe, and determined to the Prejudice of thoſe, whom he conſidered in this Light, is no more than will be found in any Miniſter or Man,—and that he ſhould be deceived in ſome Caſes, by unjuſt Suſpicions, is but human too. —Many therefore have been unjuſtly treated by him, though but few conſidering the Manner in which he was preſſed, and the great Length of his Adminiſtration.—This Character naturally procured that Attachment to his Perſon, which has been falſely attributed ſolely to a corrupt Influence, and to private Intereſt; but this ſhewed itſelf at a time when theſe Principles were very faint in their Operation, and when his Ruin ſeemed inevitable.—The Violence with which he was puſhed, the Ferment of the People, who would content themſelves with nothing but his Life, made theſe Men exert themſelves in the extraordinary manner they have done to preſerve him.—Many, who condemned his Conduct, and would have gone ſo far as to have deprived him of a Poſſibility of exerting the ſame again, did not think it warrantable to take that ſevere Revenge, upon an obſtinate miſtaken Man, who had indeed violated the Intereſts of his Country, and treſpaſſed upon the Power in his Hands, but who had not expoſed himſelf to the Penalty of any one known Law.—This *Summum Jus*, appeared to them to be *Summa Injuria*, and the Laws muſt have been more tortured to have reached him capitally, than he had ſtrained his Power to maintain himſelf:—Yet had he not been defended in the manner in which he was, (offenſive enough to thoſe who conſider the *Manner*, and not the *End*) ſuch a Sentence, in the Rage of that Time, had been, in all Probability, his Fate.—Few were in their Hearts inclined to this Extremity, though many, by the fatal Attraction of Party, might have been drawn to have ſigned his Warrant, who would have afterwards heartily lamented what they had done.—Had it been even neceſſary to have taken this violent Step, there is in *Engliſhmen*, as ſure a Seaſon for Compaſſion as for Fury:— To the *latter*, they are eaſily *raiſed*—from the *former*, when the Deed is done, they never can be *diverted*. An Adminiſtration *founded* in, or a Party *cemented* by *Blood*, would have been the *Loathing* of this *Nation*, and in this caſe would have been ſo *juſtly*.—If this be truly conſidered, was it not more honeſt, was it not more juſt, to ſtop ſhort, without even that Puniſhment, which perhaps very many think was due, than

to have carried that Puniſhment ſo far, as to have fixed the Guilt of Murther upon this Nation.---And leſs than Murther it can hardly be, to take the Life of any Man, which no Law of this Land could have taken from him.---Theſe Conſiderations operated with ſo many, that had it been ever ſo juſt, it was not practicable to have gone farther with him;---the other Members of the Legiſlature reaſoned firmly upon the Reflections I have mentioned, the Majority of the Houſe of Commons thought ſo too.---The farther Purſuit might have therefore been an Amuſement to the Multitude; but it was not for *that alone* reaſonable to perſiſt in it, as no good End could follow from it, the Effect could have only been Confuſion, and a Handle to blacken and reproach the Characters of Men, whom Gratitude, Principle, and juſt Scruple with-held, and who were fixed to with-hold for ever.---All that I have here obſerved is, not out of any affected Tenderneſs or Complaiſance to him, or to his Friends, but only to ſhew how natural it was to have met the Obſtruction in this Point that has been found, and how impoſſible it was to have proceeded farther with this Miniſter, than was done by the new Adminiſtration.---We have ſeen, that the very Men, who reflect upon them for it, had been by their intemperate Behaviour the great Cauſe why the Party of the late Miniſter had rallied. Their Violence in this Particular, was the finiſhing Stroke;---no other Point could have united his Friends in the ſame Degree.---It was obvious, after the firſt Experiment, that this muſt have been the Caſe; opiniatring this Matter further, therefore manifeſtly proves, that they meant nothing, but to make this Man's Cauſe an Engine of Sedition, by which they laboured, to render a Perſon, who *in Power* had done *great Prejudice* to his Country, the *total Ruin* of it *in his Fall.* I ſhall conclude, with regard to this Particular, with only one Obſervation, That of all Men living, the *Tories* have the leaſt Reaſon to vilify his Conduct.---Firſt, becauſe it was the Diſorders cauſed by their wicked Conduct in the Peace of *Utrecht*, that firſt laid the Foundation of all the Errors of this Miniſter.---Secondly, Becauſe the *Whigs* had not proceeded in this ſanguinary Way, againſt a Miniſter of their *Faction*, whoſe Conduct had been directly levelled againſt his Country, and who had aſſiſted in a Plan for effecting that which at leaſt appears, to every *Whig*, the greateſt of all Crimes, the advancing a *Popiſh Prince* upon the Throne, and ſacrificing every Thing to *France*, to compaſs this pernicious View.---And, Thirdly, Becauſe they had *themſelves* ſtopt ſhort but the Year before, upon a Motion which tended only to remove the Miniſter from Power;---their Behaviour therefore againſt

againſt the Miniſter in the preſent Time, ſhews, firſt, That they are without Shame; ſecondly, That they are void of Gratitude; thirdly, That they are falſe in their pretended Zeal, and conſequently, that their Behaviour upon this Head ought to be odious to every Man, who has any Senſe of Virtue, Honeſty, or Honour; but their Point was to miſrepreſent the new Adminiſtration, and the ſame Deſire of Miſrepreſentation, led them to fall ſoon after, without Mercy, on the Characters of the Members of the Secret Committee, ſome of whom, not long after, obtained Employments, which they thirſted after themſelves, and the View of which was ſo apparently one of the Grounds of their own Oppoſition.---This they pretended to be a Proof of Treachery and Corruption, in the Perſons upon whom they were conferred; whereas the juſt Reflection to be made upon it, was moſt pleaſing to all well-meaning Men, ſince it was a convincing Evidence, that the Prince upon the Throne bore no Reſentment even to thoſe of his Subjects, who were engaged in the deepeſt manner againſt his late Miniſter, when he was once ſatisfied, that they were not tainted in their Principles, either to himſelf, or to the Conſtitution of their Country.

Thus it was, that the Faction proceeded as ſoon as they loſt ſight of their private Advantages, and the Proſpect of a *Tory Adminiſtration*.—Every one of their Proceedings viſibly appeared to tally with the Conduct of the ſame Faction in all former Times:—They could not be miſtaken, and there wanted nothing to fix it upon them, but direct Attempts to poiſon the People, with regard to the Prince upon the Throne, and to the Royal Family.—This farther Evidence was not long deficient, for even before that Seſſions was over, the Publick ſwarmed with ſuch Seditious and Treaſonable Libels, and impudent Productions, both in Verſe and Proſe, as never had been endured in any Age or Nation, which, encouraged by Impunity, have ſince riſen to a Point that calls aloud for ſignal Puniſhment.—But to what it arrived at laſt, is not yet Time to relate; it was not till the next Seſſions, that the Maſk was compleatly taken off, and the Method I have laid down obliges me, firſt, *to obſerve the Conduct of the new Adminiſtration during the Interval of Parliament, the Succeſs of their Meaſures, and the Difference that appeared in the Situation of our Affairs at the ſecond Meeting of the Parliament.*

Now, as to the Conduct of theſe Gentlemen in the Adminiſtration, and thoſe who have acted with them, it appears undeniably, from what we have already ſhewn with regard to the *Faction*, that they could act no other Part than to ſupport the Meaſures of the Government.—Firſt, Becauſe theſe Meaſures were their own, they were directed by themſelves, and it is

a palbable Abſurdity for an Adminiſtration to oppoſe itſelf. Secondly, Becauſe nothing but Ruin could have enſued, either *at Home* or *Abroad*, if they had not deſiſted when they did.

For if they had not deſiſted when the Miniſter was removed, and when the Direction of the Meaſures was left to them,—one Month's Continuance of the former Adminiſtration, muſt have deſtroyed the Houſe of *Auſtria* without Redemption,—and they had been much more criminal even than the late Miniſter himſelf, if they had neglected this Opportunity to ſave it, and refuſed when it was in their power to do it;—again, if they had declined the Acceptance of this Power when it was thus offered to them, what equal, or what other Benefit could have accrued to their Country by it?

It is obvious that nothing but Confuſion at home could have been effected by it.—Their Party had been broken wilfully by the intemperate Conduct of the Faction; and it is abſurd to imagine that Parties thus broken can be ever reunited:—By the Effects of their Madneſs, the Miniſterial Party, which had never been vanquiſhed, and had only retreated, were now rallied, and as they were before equal, were now as viſibly ſuperior in the Houſe of Commons, as they had been all the Time before in the Houſe of Lords, and in another Place;—the reaſonable and the moderate Men had already, or certainly would have left them; and if a civil War had happened, every Man of Family and Fortune had been driven from them by it. Now that a civil War had been the Conſequence, is the Opinion of every Man of Experience in this Country: The Symptoms of it never appeared ſo ſtrong in any Period of our Hiſtory; many knew this who concealed it, and ridiculed the Apprehenſion, reſolving to run all Riſques for their private Advantage, and many more becauſe it was the only probable Way of ſucceeding in the great View peculiar to their Faction.—Convulſions of this kind are never foreſeen by the Generality of Men; for if they were, they could not poſſibly happen, becauſe Faction would be deſerted before it could proceed ſo far: The People of *England* were drawn on to the great Rebellion by the very ſame Pretences, with which they were now encouraged to perſiſt; they were told that the oppoſite Side would yield if they continued firm:—None or very few of the Parliament of 1641 thought that the King either would or could have reſiſted: Sir *Benjamin Rudyard*, a very leading Man in the Oppoſition of that Time, upon his Death-Bed grievouſly lamented that he had been deceived by *Pymm* and *Hamden* into this Opinion; *Whitlocke*, another of that Stamp, ſtrongly obſerves this Management in the Faction of that Age; both Lord *Clarendon* and *Whitlocke*, and indeed

all the other conſiderable Hiſtorians of that Time, agree upon it, and remark the Aſtoniſhment of the whole Nation, when the King took the Field, and the Battle of *Edge-hill* was fought; that they began ſorely to repent, but it was then too late, and they were obliged to go on:—Now if a King of *England* at that Time, who had ſtrained Prerogative ſo high, who had manifeſtly declared his Pretenſions to abſolute Power, who had galled both the Poor and Rich, and had ruled with a Rod of Iron, could have ſtood his ground ſo well, and during that Conteſt frequently brought his Antagoniſt to the Brink of Ruin, and his People to the Verge of an irredeemable Bondage, what Man can think ſo baſely of his Countrymen in this Age, as to imagine, that a Prince would now find no Friends, who has ſtrictly made the Laws of this Land the ſole Rule of his Government from the Beginning of his Reign; under whom no one Inſtance of illegal Conduct can be alledged, and againſt whom nothing was pretended to be urged, but the having upheld too long a Miniſter, who was odious, (whether juſtly or unjuſtly, no matter which,) to his Country; when even this had been done in a legal Way, nay when that Miniſter had been actually removed at the preſſing Inſtances of the People, and before the Majority of either Houſe of Parliament had pronounced him guilty of any Crime:—This Opinion therefore is very weak, and weaker ſtill when we compare that Time with this. There was then no *Pretender* to the Throne, from whom a Change of Religion, and a Confiſcation of Eſtates might be expected, which Fears would operate upon many now, and cannot fail to tye a mighty Number ſteady to this Family; that Prince had no Revenues, and he had no Army; the preſent Prince has both: And though he neither could nor would employ either to enſlave his People, he undoubtedly would and could exert them in his own juſt Defence, and in that of the Conſtitution of his Kingdoms; and he would be warranted before God and Man to do it:—But would any Man of Senſe, any Man who ſincerely loved his Country, deſire to drive things to this Extremity?—It is vain to flatter and cheat the People with an affected Tenderneſs for Liberty, when they preſs ſo furiouſly to put it upon ſuch an Iſſue:—It needs no *Solomon* to paſs a Judgment to which of the two Parents this Child belongs.

In truth there was no Poſſibility for an honeſt Man in his right Senſes to act any longer with this Party, when it was notorious by their Conduct, and by their Declarations in their Meetings to ſupport what they called the *Broad-Bottom*, that their Conteſt was not only ſo in Fact, but avowed to be for private Profit and Employments. When in that Conjuncture, all the

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Cry againſt thoſe, who were firſt taken in, was grounded ſingly upon the Non-admiſſion of all the *Tories*, and others of known worſe Principles; had it been either wiſe or honeſt to have ſtopt that Settlement of our Affairs ſo infinitely neceſſary to prevent Ruin Abroad and Confuſion at Home, for the ſake of any private Men whatever, and much more for the ſake of Men of ſuch a Character? It had been already done in ſome Degree; it was earneſtly wiſhed to have done it farther; It might have been prudent in ſuch a Time, to have gratified even the private and corrupt Views of ſome for the Publick Tranquillity; and it would have been done, if the publick Safety could have ſuffered it; in proportion as the Moderation of Particulars could have allowed: But the Violence of the Faction put it beyond Diſcretion, and out of the Power of Government to do it. Their Conduct fully confirmed all former Suſpicions; the Demand was too general to be complied with; the Execution expected too ſuddenly; the Nature of it too diſguſtful to diſpoſe the Heart of any generous Man to yield. There is a Degree of private Intereſt, which may, which muſt be allowed to human Nature. It is not Honeſty but Folly to decline any Advantages, which are not procured by any Sacrifice of Principle, or any other unworthy Means; but when it appears barefaced and impudent, when it is regardleſs of all ill Conſequences, when it attempts to raviſh and over-power all juſt Authority, it then becomes deteſtable, dangerous and muſt be cruſhed at all Events; was it not enough that the Miniſter had been borne down by the People? that every Day produced new Changes in Favour of the new Adminiſtration? Muſt the Government, the Privy-Council, all Employments in the State be canton'd out *ad arbitrium populi*, nay by a *private Cabal*, or at the *Tavern-Meetings* of a direct *Faction?* What would the rational World think of this Conſtitution, if the Laws of this Country put this Power into the Hands of the People; but how much more monſtrous, if it ſhould, or could be ſuffered to be done at their Caprice, without any Law at all, and by their own arbitrary Will?

When a Combination viſibly appeared, to exclude all Men from a Re-election into Parliament, who accepted of Employments; when the moſt expenſive Oppoſitions were created by all the worſt and moſt corrupt Means to turn ſuch Elections againſt the Perſons who accepted; how was it poſſible for the new Adminiſtration any longer to purſue their View of bringing in their Friends, much leſs of making that Rout among the Placemen of the old Party, which was ſo vainly and abſurdly inſiſted upon?---When it was now on a ſudden become the wild Doctrine of the People, to let no Placemen at all into Parliament; and

and when the Doctrine of the Faction was, that none ſhould be ſuffered to come in but by their Conſent and Approbation; was not the Abſurdity of *the firſt* a thing, that rendered it impoſſible; the Conduct of *the other*, of ſuch a Tendency, as no Government can or ought to bear; prepoſterous beyond the Power of Words to expreſs it, inconſiſtent with the Conſtitution, ſubverſive of all Order in the State, and productive of ſuch Conſequences, as muſt have encouraged Faction to a Degree, that would not allow one Hour's Peace in future Time to this Country.

With Regard to the Popular Laws, the Leaders of the Oppoſition ſincerely wiſhed many Things amended in our Conſtitution; they had begun by a *Place Bill*, by the *Alteration in the Mutiny Bill*, with Regard to the Billetting of Soldiers in the City and Liberty of *Weſtminſter*, have ſince proceeded by *a Law for regulating the* Scotch *Elections*, and by the *Abolition of the Pot Act*, which being under the Regulations of the *Exciſe*, and ſettled at the *arbitrary* Eſtimation of that *Commiſſion*, was a heavy Oppreſſion, and great Inſtrument of Influence through the whole Capital; and they *ſtill do honeſtly mean*, as faſt as they can, to rectify all other Matters of *juſt* Uneaſineſs.—But was it poſſible, as Things were circumſtanced, or would it be prudent, in any Time, to make every Alteration of this kind at once?—If theſe Things be duly conſidered, they are great Points already gained.—Theſe Things however are ſaid to be nothing, but the little Content they have given is no Proof that they are nothing.—I wiſh it may not rather lead to prove, that nothing but a total Change to Popular Government will do.—In ſuch an heated Condition, was it fitting that Popular Bills, be they neceſſary, or be they not, ſhould be raviſhed by Force, when all thoſe different Plans of Reformation, which, during the Courſe of the former Oppoſition, had been propoſed by Men of different Principles, never approved by all, and aſſented too temporarily by the different Parties *only* for the ſake of Union,—poſitively known not to be all neceſſary, but moved as *Succedanea* to each other; when one was loſt, to ſupply its Place by another, not in the View to procure *all*, but in Hopes at laſt to get *ſomething*.—When all theſe different Propoſitions were now ignorantly and groſsly confounded by the Vulgar, and blended into (what was never dreamed of, or intended in the greateſt Fire of Oppoſition) one regular Scheme of a new Conſtitution, and when this was inſolently made the *Alternative* of *Peace* or *War* between the *Governours* and the *Governed*,—when, among thoſe who thought themſelves moſt moderate, no two Men agreed upon what was neceſſary.—Some thinking that all Se-

curity lay in a good Place-Bill, about the Degree and Extent of which they likewiſe differed.—Some in a *Penſion-Bill*, which others more juſtly thought would ſignify nothing.—Some in a Law for *Triennial Parliaments*, which all who did not delight in Riot, or in the Proſpect of Corruption, thought both dangerous and dubious.—Some for *Annual Parliaments*, which others thought too frequent.—Some for what was called *Juſtice on the Earl of* Orford.—Others not for ſanguinary Views.—Some for *a Reduction of the Civil Liſt*, which others thought unjuſt to be taken away, having been legally given.—Some for the *Sale of all Employments*.—Others for allowing a few.—Some for taking *the Diſpoſition of them out of the Crown*, which others thought Anti-Conſtitutional.—Some for *allowing them to ſubſiſt*, but to be given only *to thoſe who were not in Parliament*, that is, among *themſelves*.—Some to allow them but *to be given for Life*.—Some for making the *Army independant*.—Others for *no regular Troops at all*. In this Paſſion, Irregularity, and Uncertainty of Publick Opinion, if the Leaders of the Oppoſition had ſtood out till the People were ſatisfied, it is plain they muſt have ſtood out for ever.—For what Conceſſions ſoever had been made, the Bulk of that Set of Men, who, as I have obſerved in the Beginning, compoſe all kinds of Oppoſition, would have ſtill remained diſſatisfied.—And this Set of Men, whether in the Right or the Wrong, always aſſume to themſelves the Title of *the People*. Farther, whatever ſingle Points had been obtained, it was now become a Maxim, that nothing was got, if all was not got, and at leaſt thoſe who had not been gratified in their reſpective favourite Propoſitions, would have ſtill continued to abuſe and villify in the ſame degree.—And if all had been granted, which was impoſſible, and abſurd, (becauſe, as I have obſerved, all was never by any wiſe Men intended,) many others had been offended and terrified, at ſo great a Change in the Conſtitution, to the other Extreme.—They would have juſtly complained, That the King and the Lords were rendered uſeleſs, that an Anarchy muſt be at length the Conſequence, that the People would be raiſed to the Power of doing tumultuouſly every thing they liſted, and that being arrived at this Power, they would naturally fall under the Direction of wicked and factious Men, who would lead them to purſue a thouſand wilder Projects, which would have daily opened in proportion to their Succeſs. In conſequence of this, a new Oppoſition would have riſen upon quite contrary Notions.—This Oppoſition would have naturally degenerated into thoſe deep *Monarchical Principles*, which would have brought us back again to *Paſſive Obedience*, *Non-Reſiſtance*, *Hereditary Right*, and all that *Train* of

of *Nonſenſe*, which infeſted the *Reaſon* of this *Country* ſo many Years.—Great Numbers are to be found in this Nation, who will not truſt to the limited Views of the People, who know, that when they gain one thing by Force, they are taught from thence to extort every thing by the ſame means; that as ſurely as *Princes* aim at *abſolute Power*, the *popular Intereſt* equally drives at a *Democracy*; and when they are put into a Condition to enforce their Demands, never will deſiſt in any Country till they get it.—This is not the Meaning of any honeſt Man, who would ſooner keep this Conſtitution, with all its Faults, than put to Sea in Storms to ſearch for another.—The People and Tribunes of *Rome* never reſted till they got the Power of the Commonwealth into their Hands:—Their Ambition then became ſo notorious, their Views ſo corrupt, their Attempts ſo mad, that the Senate they oppoſed, and endeavoured to deſtroy, (though themſelves not wholly free from Blame,) made Friends by the Extravagance of their Antagoniſts, to reſiſt them.—In the Reſiſtance, private Men grew too great for both, and the Conteſt ended in the Loſs of Liberty.—It did ſo in *England* in the Time of *Cromwell*; the People never ceaſed puſhing for the whole Power, till Reaſon came on the Side of the Crown;—the *King* was then enabled to reſiſt, which, when he did, if he had conquered, the Nation had been Slaves to him,—as it happened, the popular General became the Tyrant.—The unreaſonable Oppoſition of the Cortez to the Emperor *Charles* the Fifth, compleatly ruined the Liberties of *Spain*,—it was worked up into Rebellion, and it would be good to remark the Pretenſions of that Oppoſition, the Commencement, Courſe and Iſſue of that Rebellion, if we had time to do it here.

Yet no Man will deny, but that the People and Tribunes of *Rome* were in the Right to oppoſe the too great Power of the Senate to a certain Point.

The People of *England*, to oppoſe the weak and wicked Government of the Miniſtry of *Charles* the Firſt, had they known where to have ſtopped.

The Cortez of *Spain*, to have exerted their Privileges, had they done it with Moderation, and without falling into Faction.

The *Error* lay, in not being contented with the juſt Conceſſions that were made to every one of theſe.

The *Crime* in attempting by Force to alter their reſpective Conſtitutions, which ought ever to be deemed ſacred:—Conſtitutions once eſtabliſhed, can never be with Juſtice altered, but by the full and free Conſent of the different Members of the Legiſlature.—It is intolerable for any one Member of it, to force the reſt to concede any thing. Such an Attempt rarely

falls to meet the Fate, which attends Injuſtice in all its Steps; it ſeldom ends, but in the Ruin of the Projectors, and in the utter Defeat of what they project.

As long as Men, by legal Ways alone, endeavour to procure Laws, which appear good to them, and quietly ſit down under their Diſappointment, if a Majority cannot be prevailed upon to come into their Opinions, and do not inſolently think themſelves entitled to model the Conſtitution of their Country to their own fantaſtic Whim, ſuch Endeavours deſerve no Cenſure, they may in time produce good Laws, and good Effects. —But when Men pretend to dictate to the Legiſlature, and impudently preach and juſtify Rebellion, if they meet with Contradiction, Government muſt anſwer ſternly to ſuch importunate Demands:—While ſuch a Temper continues, it is dangerous to grant any thing, one ſuch Precedent will beget a thouſand, and is ſufficient to overthrow the beſt eſtabliſhed Conſtitution upon Earth: When it ſhall ſubſide ſo far, that the People ſeem to be capable of Contentment, upon moderate Conceſſions, that Man is diſhoneſt, who will not exert himſelf to procure for them all that is fair, juſt, and prudent.—But till then, he muſt be mad, or worſe, who will yield one ſingle Point, which they never receive with Gratitude, but attribute always to themſelves, and conſider, as extorted by Force, an Evidence of their own Power, an Imbecillity in Government, and an Encouragement to all Intemperance.

When ſuch was the Caſe of this Country, when Men of the moſt infamous and factious Views, began to unmaſk, and ſhew themſelves without the leaſt Reſerve, when Treaſon was become a public Topic of Diſcourſe, when all Decency, Order, and Subordination, was in a manner deſtroyed, and the Populace indiſcriminately treated every Character of Dignity, Worth, and Honour with an outragious Inſolence and Contempt.—Had it been the Part of Patriotiſm to have ſtood out longer, to have further aggravated and inflamed this Extravagance, which threatened the Diſſolution of Government itſelf in all its Parts?

When it was manifeſt, that there was a Party, whom nothing could content but the Ruin of the preſent Family upon the Throne, and who would have ſtill continued to oppoſe, let what Changes ſoever have been made.—When by the moſt flagrant Inſtances of Paſſion, Faction, wicked Principles, both Republican and Jacobite, private Corruption, and an utter Diſregard of the Publick, were become thus manifeſt: when even popular Laws, as the Place-Bill, and the Rectification of all our Foreign Meaſures were oppoſed; when nothing but tearing the Government down, the Conſtitution up

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by the Roots, putting the Adminiſtration of all our Affairs into the Hands of the moſt violent and dangerous Men, when no Time was given to effect any thing; but in the very firſt Week of the Change, a few Men diſappointed of Places, which they had carved out for themſelves, had raiſed the Inflammation to a higher Point than ever, when the Effect of their Labours upon the People had diſcovered what a deſperate Temper they were in, when, in order to gain them to their Side, they had pawned, as it were, their Honour, *if they acquired Power* to yield every thing that the moſt violent deſired,—when, if this Compromiſe with them had been afterwards *broken*, the Nation muſt have fallen into worſe Confuſion; and if the Compromiſe were *kept*, the Government and Conſtitution muſt have been ſubverted,—when they had openly drawn the Sword, and avowed Revenge, againſt thoſe Leaders who had wrought the Change, could thoſe Leaders have ſtood out till theſe Men were ſatisfied, could they have reſigned their Station, relied again upon theſe People, or entertained any Hopes, that the Union broken, by the Violence of theſe Men, could have been reſtored again, or could they have had any Proſpect with this diſunited Body, to have prevented the Return of the former Miniſter?

When by this mad, inconſiſtent and wretched Conduct the honeſt Leaders of the former Oppoſition were in ſo great a degree diſarmed of Power to do all the Good they wiſhed to the Publick, or the Service they intended to their Friends; was it not wiſe and honeſt to make the beſt Uſe, that they could of this Conjuncture? When the Madneſs of others prevented their making it better, was it not for the Intereſt of their Country to act in ſuch a way; as to keep out the former Miniſter, and to employ the Influence of their new Stations equally to prevent the Continuance of the old Meaſures, and to prevent the pernicious Deſigns of a dangerous *Faction* in this unworthy Manner labouring to come in?—Were they not juſtified to join with thoſe, who (upon various Motives, ſome from Error, ſome from Shame, ſome from the Difficulty of quitting the Party, with which they had been ſo long engaged, ſome from a miſtaken Principle of Gratitude, and falſe Notion of Honour, nay, ſuppoſe ſome from Corruption itſelf,) though they had done wrong before, were now ready and willing to change their Conduct, to rectify Miſtakes, and to purſue thoſe very Meaſures, which were abſolutely neceſſary, right in themſelves, which had been the declared View of all honeſt Men till that Moment, and had been loudly called for ſo many Years by the whole People? No worthy Man will deny that they were

were not juſtified in this Conduct; no Man of Senſe can deny but that they did both honeſtly and greatly in what they did; *Cunctando reſtituerunt rem, non enim ponebant rumores ante ſalutem*: And by this temperate and ſteady Behaviour under all theſe galling Difficulties, of Inſult, Clamour and unjuſt Reproach, they maintained ſo much Credit in deſpight of thoſe, who laboured to deſtroy it, that they changed the whole Spirit and Conduct of the Adminiſtration.

The Conſequences of their vigorous Proceeding, quickly ſhewed itſelf in a wonderful degree; the Face of Affairs turned in a moſt merciful and happy Manner, beyond the moſt ſanguine Hope and Expectation of Mankind: The King of *Pruſſia* and the Queen of *Hungary* were brought to Terms; the one to quit his Confederacy with *France*; the other to yield a Part of her Rights to induce him to it; the firſt manifeſtly from an Apprehenſion of the Iſſue of the Conteſt, which grew precarious upon the Exertion of the *Britiſh* Power; the other in a Confidence of future Support from this Nation, in Return for an extraordinary Conceſſion. The *Auſtrian* Armies ravaged, plundered and became entirely Maſters of *Bavaria*, carrying the War into the Countries, and ſuſtaining themſelves at the Expence of the Enemy: Animated by the Proſpect of further Aſſiſtance from *Great Britain*, and depending in conſequence upon that of the *Dutch*, (whoſe Armies were actually augmented by 30,000 Men, and who begun in proportion as they ſaw they could confide in our Councils, to withdraw their Deference from *France*) they exerted themſelves with a Bravery and Spirit, which carried every thing before it; the Supplies we had given the Court of *Vienna* enabled her, beſides leaving 20,000 regular Troops in *Flanders*, to take the Field with three Armies; one in *Bohemia*, another in *Bavaria*, and a third in *Italy*; which laſt, in Conjunction with a Body of *Sardinian* Forces, were ſufficient to make Head againſt a numerous Army of *Spaniards* in that Country; the farther Supply given the King of *Sardinia* enabled him not only to form that Army laſt mentioned, but to compoſe another; at the Head of which, with infinite Hazard to his Perſon, infinite Hardſhip and Fatigue, he defended his Dutchy of *Savoy* during the whole Summer, and the greater Part of a long Winter's Campaign againſt another great and well-appointed Army of *Spaniards* headed by a Prince of *Spain*, and in ſpight of all their Efforts, in which their beſt Troops and immenſe Sums were waſted, has to this Hour barr'd their Paſſage into *Italy*; nor was this all, for by a ſtrong Fleet of Men of War in the *Mediterranean* and a proper Uſe of it, we ſtruck ſuch Terror,

ror, that the Court of *Naples* was obliged to agree to a Neutrality, and prevented an Army of 40,000 Men from ſuccouring the Troops of *Spain*, which in the firſt Place, ſaved the Loſs of the Ballance in *Italy*; in the ſecond, proved the Ruin of the *Spaniſh* Army there: in the third, laid thoſe Seeds of Diſcontent between the *Spaniſh* Court and that of *Naples*, (the former thinking it the ſtrongeſt Inſtance of Ingratitude, to be deſerted in this Extremity, by their own Son, who was ſo lately raiſed to that Dignity ſolely by the Expence of the Blood and Treaſure of the *Spaniſh* Monarchy) as will probably never be removed, and may be the Foundation of great Advantage to us hereafter; in the fourth Place, it has diſcoverd to us, of what Weight we may hereafter be in that Part of *Europe* in a higher degree than ever we knew it; in the fifth, it has been the moſt ſevere Revenge, and was the moſt complete Method to diſtreſs the Court of *Spain:* For in a War with that Power, we could not have waſted her Treaſure, and ruined her Reputation, in an equal Degree, or deſtroyed ſo many of her Troops in twenty Years, by any other Means, with this farther Advantage, that we rendered the Adminiſtration of the Queen intolerable to her Subjects, who were thus oppreſſed with Taxes, and drained of all their Men and Money to gratify ambitious Views, attended with theſe aggravating Circumſtances, that they brought not only Ruin, but Diſgrace and Scandal upon their Arms in every Inſtance: To this was joined an almoſt total Interruption of their Trade, and their Returns of Money from the *Indies*, which, as faſt as their inexpreſſible Neceſſities obliged them to be made, were, in very many Inſtances, intercepted by the Vigour and Diligence of the Navy ſtationed, commanded and directed by the new Admiralty; which Gains, if fairly accounted for, not only ballanced all the Loſſes, that our Merchants have ſuſtained (notwithſtanding the Number of their Privateers and the Extent of our Commerce) ſince the Time of the late Change, but have gone far to wipe off thoſe Scores, which had been run up againſt them, by the Neglect and imprudent Conduct of the former Adminiſtration.

It could now be ſaid no longer, that our Hands were tied by Fear, by Corruption, or by neutral Engagements.—We rode triumphant on the Ocean, our proper Element,—we confined the whole *French* and *Spaniſh* Fleets, who, tho' combined, dared not venture to oppoſe us, while we employed but a Part of ours to do not only this, but to keep *Naples* to its Neutrality, to inſult their Ports, and barr their Privateers from iſſuing in any Numbers from the reſt.—We reſtored the Honour of our Flag, and now returned the Inſolence of *France*, whom we

treated

treated with the ſame Contempt, with which ſhe, for many Years, had treated us.—We burnt the Ships of *her* Allies, and *our* Enemies, in her very Ports, we ſearched and rummaged almoſt every Veſſel ſhe put to Sea.—Our Fleets ſailed from *Jamaica* with an avowed Deſign to attack, ſink, burn, and deſtroy the Squadrons ſhe ſent into thoſe Parts; and ſhe knows the Orders of our Admirals, to ſink, burn, and deſtroy, any other Fleet ſhe ſhall venture to ſend out again; yet ſhe has been obliged to pocket every one of theſe Affronts: If our Naval Dignity is not reſtored by theſe Actions, what can reſtore it? and if theſe Things cannot be denied to be true, as they cannot be, what Impudence, and what Wickedneſs muſt it be to villify the preſent Government, to poiſon and deceive the ignorant and unwary Multitude, with a perpetual Din, of the low contemptible Condition to which we are ſaid to be reduced? It is a Shame to ſuffer ourſelves to be abuſed in this groſs Manner; the Leaders of the *Faction* themſelves laugh at the Folly and Deluſion of the People, that they have fooled to ſuch a Point. They even now deſpiſe thoſe Wretches who are thus ſeduced, they themſelves loath and deteſt the ſeditious Tools of which they now make their Uſe, and when they have ſerved their Turn, will aſſuredly turn their Backs upon them: But let me return to ſay one Word more upon our Conduct with Regard to *France*:—Let any Man look back upon the inſolent and imperious Treatment, which towards the Cloſe of the laſt Adminiſtration we received from that Power. Let him then conſider what we have ſince done, and let him anſwer, if he can, whether this Nation has received no Benefit by the late Change.—*France* has found, and proclaims it by her Conduct, whatever *we* may ſtupidly and ungratefully do at Home, that ſhe trembles at the Power and the Meaſures of this Nation. If publick Contempt be publick Weakneſs, as it is with Nations known to be; what Applauſe is due to thoſe, who have ſhifted that Contempt from themſelves, and caſt it upon the Enemy, and who have conſequently procured that Weakneſs to *France*, which the former Miniſter had by twenty Years tame Adminiſtration with Pains procured for us; if there be any Senſe left in this Nation, they muſt ſee all this; if there be any Honeſty, they will confeſs it, let their private Views or Diſappointments be what they will; if there be any Warmth of Heart, Love, or Regard, for the Honour, the Dignity, the Safety and Well-being of our Country, they will proclaim it in deſpight of Faction, popular Ferment, or any private Danger. The Maxim of *Tacitus*, however applied by him, will hold true with every State, *Majus famâ potentiæ*

quam

quam ſua vi nixa: Great as the Power of *France* may be, it is the Fame, the Opinion of that Power, that has ſo long ſupported her in her ambitious Views, enabled her to trample upon the Rights and Liberties of all *Europe*, and to ſport with the moſt ſacred Ties of Truth and Faith of Treaties; it is this, that encouraged her, after ſo many ſolemn Declarations in the laſt *German* War, *that ſhe would acquire nothing*, to graſp that mighty Acquiſition of *Lorrain*; it was this, that induced her, in that perfidious manner, to violate her Engagements to the *Pragmatic Sanction*, which were the Condition of that Acquiſition; it was this that terrified every Potentate in *Europe* into a Submiſſion to all her Indignities, and into Non-Reſiſtance under the Yoke ſhe has impoſed ſo long upon many Nations, and under the Proſpect of the Chains ſhe was forging for all the *European* World. Is it not therefore a mighty Point, gained by this Nation, in the ſpace of little more than one Year, to have reduced that over-bearing Power into this deficient State of Credit, and to have reſtored that Credit to ourſelves, which was ſo totally loſt?—It is not an empty Vanity, but a ſolid Benefit.—Can any Thing tend more, hereafter, to lighten the Expence of future Struggles for the Liberty of *Europe*, than this Reduction of the Credit of that Nation, and this Reſtoration of our own? Can any thing prevent ſo much the Occaſion of taking up Arms, as that Diſcovery, which will induce all the Powers in *Europe* to be leſs afraid to do it againſt *France?* And can any thing give ſo great Weight to our Negociations without Recourſe to the Sword, as the general Opinion, that whenever we draw it, we are able to curb that Power? This Conduct viſibly muſt have this fortunate Effect, that if it be unhappy for us to be reduced to the Neceſſity of engaging in Land-Wars upon the Continent, it will render that Neceſſity leſs frequent; if the Greatneſs of the Expence is grievous, and drains us of our Specie, it muſt make it leſs in future, as it muſt ſecure us more ready Aſſiſtance and ſtronger Alliances, than if we wanted that *Fama potentiæ*, and that *Opinion*, which by the Providence of God, and the Conduct of our Affairs has been now reſtored again.

Thus, we have undeceived the World as to the Power of *France*; not *that it is not great*, which would be deluſive; but that it is not *omnipotent and irreſiſtible:* And thus we have in a ſhort time gone far, not only to reſtore Things reduced both at Home and Abroad to an almoſt deſperate Condition, but even turned the Errors of the former Adminiſtration to Advantage; which is viſible in the higheſt Degree, by the Effects

of our Measures in the *Mediterranean* already mentioned.—Without all doubt, one of the most fatal and unhappy Steps of the late Administration seems to have been the neutral Conduct there (though whether, all Things considered, it was avoidable, is not perhaps so easily determined) by which the *Spanish* Armies were enabled to be landed safely in a Time of War, in Sight of our Squadrons, in *Italy*; and to form a Junction with the *French:* yet by the Vigilance since, the Neutrality of *Naples*, and the driving both Fleets into one Pound, we have enclosed all the Land-Forces of *Spain* far from Home, and in great Measure out of the Reach of Recruits, Necessaries and Supplies; and we have our Padlock upon the greater Part of the Maritime Force of those two Powers, which would have harassed us exceedingly had they been in different Parts; kept us in perpetual Alarms, distressed our Trade; and so divided our naval Force, that notwithstanding our Superiority at Sea, we should have suffered many Inconveniences, nay, even Danger from them, to our own Coasts, and some of our Settlements abroad.—It will yet have a farther Effect, it dispirits and brings down the haughty Spirit of that People, who are ever pressing for War, it discontents them with their own Administration; and if we can do it as effectually as their former Conduct has done it by us, *there need not be a greater Curse upon that Government, a greater Plague, a greater Obstruction to their Views, nor a surer Way to bring them to their Ruin.*

By the Advantage that we have made of our Fleets in those Seas, we have derived another great Advantage, for by temporising with the King of *Naples*, we have secured the Elector of *Saxony* and King of *Poland*, who, besides the Hazard of his own Dominions, has, by his Alliance with *that Prince*, his Interest to consider too, and who may be justly supposed to suffer some Weight in the Scale of his Determination, from a Reflection of the Condition to which his Daughter might be reduced, by any Rashness he might be guilty of, in this Conjuncture.

By these providential Successes, which all the vile Sarcasms of Faction can never prevail, to have attributed to any other Cause than the manifest Revival of the *British* Spirit, directed, as it now is, the *French* were every where so foiled, that the *Austrians* were enabled to act upon the offensive, and to besiege *Prague*, where they confined no less than 24,000 of the best Troops of *France* for the whole Summer, with two Mareschals of *France*, and prevented them with the rest of their broken Army, from receiving any Supplies, or from doing any considerable

derable Miſchief,—till, by the Neceſſities into which they were at length brought, the Court of *France* was compelled to withdraw the Army under the Command of the Marſhal *Maillebois*, from the Circle of *Weſtphalia*, where 35,000 of their Troops had been employed to awe the Electorate of *Hanover* and the *Dutch* at the ſame time. This was one of the firſt Steps they took in the Beginning of their Attempts on *Germany*, and one of the wiſeſt, as the Conſequences of their Inability to continue it, have fully ſhewn.—By this they effected three great Ends; they diverted all the *Hanoverian* Forces from the Aſſiſtance of the general Cauſe; they awed the *Dutch*; they prevented the Conjunction of the Troops of *England*, and of *Auſtria*, in the *Low-Countries*, with thoſe of *Hanover*, and thoſe of both the former with the *Dutch*.—*Hanover* was obliged in Prudence, for the common Good and Safety of the *Allies*, to conſent to a temporary Neutrality; for if they had hazarded the Event of War, (inferior, as they were, in Number) and if they had been defeated, that Body of Troops, which, as we have ſince ſeen, were intended to more important Purpoſes, had not only totally been rendered uſeleſs; but there could have been no Poſſibility of compoſing afterwards that grand Army which was neceſſary to be compoſed, if we effectually intended to aſſiſt the Queen of *Hungary*, and to deal roundly with *France*, and which has been ſince compoſed, notwithſtanding the poſitive Aſſertion of the *Faction*, *that it could never be*, to whom the Devil has owed a Shame, and has fairly paid them, by giving them the Lye in every one Point that they have advanced.

This Neutrality of *Hanover* having made ſo great a Noiſe, I muſt have Leave to enlarge a little farther on this Subject; (for though my preſent Purpoſe is not to defend the Meaſures of any Time antecedent to the late Change, it is honeſt to do Juſtice to every Man, and not at all neceſſary to add more Errors than are due to the former Adminiſtration.) To ſpeak fairly of it, however maliciouſly it has been made the Matter of Ridicule, it was the only Step that in that Circumſtance could have been taken with any Judgment or Diſcretion, from this known and general Principle, that you ſhould never riſque a Diviſion of your Forces, if you can avoid it.—The Court of *England* conſidered the *Auſtrians*, *Heſſians*, and the *Engliſh* in the *Netherlands*, together with the *Hanoverian* Troops, as one Army, diſperſed in remote Quarters, but intended to be aſſembled, and to act together when conjoined; they were then capable of making a formidable Army, and might be able to act or undertake any Thing, and we had great Reaſon to believe, and

received the ſtrongeſt Aſſurances from the Leading Men in *Holland*, that when it was aſſembled, they would concur with a large additional Body of *Dutch* Troops;—if therefore the *Hanoverians* had acted ſingly, and been defeated ſingly, the other divided Corps of Troops had been of very little Uſe, (as we have juſt now obſerved) and might have followed their Fate. But a farther certain, and yet more fatal Event muſt have followed from it: The *Dutch* Miniſtry would have never been able to have procured the Aſſent of the States, or to have engaged them in a Cauſe ſo hopeleſs, as it would have then appeared, when the Electorate of *Hanover* ſhould have been reduced into the ſame Condition with *Bavaria*, and have proved the ſame Acceſſion of Strength to the *French*, that the other Electorate now affords to the Queen of *Hungary*. This might very poſſibly have been the Caſe; and any Man, who has not been thoroughly drench'd with the Poiſon of the Times, muſt be ſenſible, how ruinous ſuch an Incident muſt have been, independent of any private Regard for thoſe Dominions, to the common Cauſe of *Europe*.—Whoever is the leaſt converſant in publick Affairs, or has even common Senſe, muſt be able to judge of theſe Reaſons, which were rendered infinitely ſtronger by this Circumſtance, that they actually did, by their Neutrality all that time, afford the Houſe of *Auſtria* a moſt material Aſſiſtance, depriving the *French* and the *Bavarians* of ſo great a Force,—to which, under God, was owing the Preſervation of the Houſe of *Auſtria*; for by this means the happy Turn was effected in *Bavaria*, and that Superiority acquired to the Arms of the Queen of *Hungary*, which, had this Neutrality been never made, and had this Body of Troops been joined to the *French* and *Imperial* Armies in *Bavaria* and *Bohemia*, could have never happened, and they muſt in all probability have ruined her in one Campaign.—While the twenty-ſix or twenty-eight thouſand *Hanoverians* were upon their own ground, they were a Match in the defenſive Part for a greater Number; but if drawn from thence, they had been equal only to the Numbers, of which they actually did conſiſt themſelves.

So long therefore as the *French* continued upon the Confines of the Electorate of *Hanover*, there was neither Prudence or Neceſſity to act any other than a neutral Part; for by their Situation, and the Advantage of their own Country, it is demonſtrable, that twenty-eight thouſand anſwered the End of an actual Aid to the Queen of *Hungary* of 35,000 Men.

But when the reduced Condition of the *French* obliged them to quit this Meaſure, it was neceſſary for us to change our Plan—

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the *Hanoverian* Troops, had they remained in the Electorate, were then of no longer Uſe. In ſuch a Conjuncture, no honeſt Man in *Britain* would have wiſhed, that ſo great a Body of the beſt Troops in *Europe*, which by good Fortune were under the Influence of this Nation, ſhould be unemploy'd.—The Queſtion therefore was, in what way they might be moſt advantageouſly employ'd,—ſome imagined, that it had been proper to have followed the *French* Army, and the wiſe Politicians of the *Faction* bellowed loudly againſt this Neglect of Policy, as they pretended it to be; but many invincible Reaſons oppoſed themſelves to this Advice; ſome time muſt have neceſſarily been ſpent in ſettling a Point, which was of ſo nice a Nature, both in our own Councils, and in thoſe of the Imperial Court;—and by that time (tho' it was very ſhort) the *French* Army had got a great way upon their intended March.—It was to be conſidered again, that the *Hanoverian* Troops could by no means follow with the ſame Expedition, that the others went;—they had no Magazines, the *French* had exhauſted the Proviſions, and though they had paſſed through the ſame Country, when freſh and unannoyed, yet even they, from want of previous Preparations, ſuffered much in their March, and dwindled greatly;—how much therefore more muſt thoſe, who trod the ſame Ground after them, have ſuffered; how much muſt they have been delayed? The Seaſon of the Year began to be advanced, and the Summer muſt have been conſumed, before they could have reached the Enemy; who in all Probability muſt have effected (if it was to be effected) whatever they could have propoſed, before we could have come up with them.—Again, if the Enemy upon the Purſuit of the *Hanoverians* had turned ſhort upon them, and waited in ſome ſtrong Poſt, they might have engaged them to great Diſadvantage, being ſuperior in Number;—and they might have obliged them to ſtay and face them in a Country, that they had left behind them ruined;—they had the ſtrong Town of *Egra* to befriend them, which the *Hanoverians* could not have neglected, nor have taken.—Thus the Effect of their March would have probably been fatal to that Body of Troops, who muſt at beſt have wintered far from home, in a ruined Country, liable to all the Inconvenience of a Winter's Campaign, and we ſhould have put ourſelves with a much ſmaller Force, and in a much more helpleſs Condition, near our Enemies, to have endured yet greater Hardſhips, than thoſe, by which even their great Armies, inured by two Campaigns, and much better provided for the Event, have been in a manner mouldered into nothing.—Yet even this Riſque would have been run, if it had been inſiſted upon by the

Auſtrian Miniſters, with whom we acted with the ſtricteſt Harmony.—We laid before them all theſe Ill-conveniencies, and the irretrievable Prejudice that an Accident to this Body of Troops muſt have occaſioned in the next Year's Operations.—The Impoſſibility in that Caſe, of bringing into the Field, or forming a ſufficient Army, to deal with that Force, that might be brought againſt us by the *French*:—That our *Engliſh* Troops, (which were not even then all landed) and the *Auſtrians*, in the *Netherlands*, were too remote to join the *Hanoverians* in any reaſonable Time, had they ſet out upon that March immediately; that they were not yet accuſtomed and hardened to the Fatigues of War, and muſt therefore have been intirely ruined by ſuch a March, at ſuch a Diſtance, and at ſuch a Seaſon of the Year; that if it were poſſible, by the Means of the difficult Paſſes in the Mountains of *Bohemia*, by withdrawing the Troops from *Prague*, (leaving a ſufficient Number to form a diſtant Blockade, and to diſtreſs the Garriſon,) to prevent the Junction of the two *French* Armies, *Prague* muſt fall of courſe, the *French* muſt be diſheartened and confounded by their Diſappointment, and both their Armies ſuffer terribly, as they always did in the following Winter; while the Armies of the Allies united, much more numerous, ſtrong and vigorous, might enter into Action freſh, and with infinite Weight in the enſuing Spring.—Theſe Reaſons had their juſt Effect, they were proved ſolid by the Event.—The *Engliſh* Councils directed the *Auſtrian* Operations upon this Occaſion, and they felt the happy Conſequence.—The Army of *Maillebois* never could penetrate through the Paſſes of *Bohemia*; but there involved, were miſerably butchered and deſtroyed, by Sword and Famine;—while the Garriſon of *Prague* were reduced in prodigious Numbers, by vain Attempts to eſcape, their Parties continually cut off, and their Proviſions and Supplies ſo effectually obſtructed, that they were at length neceſſitated in the ſevereſt Seaſon of that cold Climate, and after the moſt inſufferable Hardſhips, to abandon the Capital of *Bohemia*, and the whole Country, to their lawful Sovereign, (excepting *Egra*, on the extreme Borders of it,) bringing off with them not 10,000 Effective Men, the miſerable Remains of at leaſt 30,000, who had triumphed in that Country in the Beginning of that Year.—But upon their Arrival, Diſeaſes broke in upon them, and ſwept off ſo many, even of that ſmall Number, and of the Army ſent to bring them off, that they could not remain there, and muſt have periſhed for Want, if they had been ſtill harraſſed by the *Auſtrians*.—In fine, they were reduced to ſuch Diſtreſs, by a Series of Calamities, that leſt it might be ſaid, of *two great Armies*, amounting together to more than 70,000 Men, not one ſhould live to return, the *French* Court recalled

recalled their ſhattered *Remains*, and of *both*, not more than 20,000 Men had the Felicity to ſee their Native Soil again; where the few that ſurvived the incredible Fatigues they had ſuſtained, brought back, rather Weakneſs to their *Maſter*, than Security to his *Frontier*, filling his wretched Subjects with Grief, Dejection of Spirit, Deteſtation of the Views of their ambitious Monarch, and Terror of the Miſeries they have endured; which every Man, capable of bearing Arms, by the abſolute Power of their Government, and the Diſtreſs of their Affairs, ſees himſelf likewiſe hourly in Danger to undergo.

Thus far we have obſerved how much Folly, Ignorance and Villany have concurred to miſrepreſent two important Points; the Neutrality of *Hanover*, and the Conduct of our New Councils in not marching after *Maillebois*'s Army: To proſecute this Deduction of our Affairs during the laſt Interval of Parliament, we come now to ſhew the Part acted by our Adminiſtration upon the Removal of that Army. The Deliberations we have mentioned took up no more, as I remember, than three Weeks; and the Point being agreed between the Miniſtry of *Auſtria*, and our own, *that the* Hanoverian *Forces ſhould not follow*, the next Step was obvious: If our own Reaſon could not have ſhewn it to us, it was dictated and pointed out by *France*; it was evident, as we have before obſerved, that the View of *France* in ſending her Armies to the Frontiers of that Electorate was no other than to prevent the Junction of the *Hanoverian*, *Dutch*, *Britiſh* and *Auſtrian* Forces: if that was ſo favourite a View, that ſhe put herſelf to ſo vaſt a Charge for it, opiniatred that View ſo long, and ſubmitted to all the Ill-Convenience of weakening her Armies in every other Part for it; would it have been excuſeable in us not to have profited by ſuch a Leſſon, and to have loſt the Opportunity, which the Abſence of that Army gave to form the neceſſary Conjunction of all our Forces;—the only Perſon, who could have Reaſon to demur upon the Point was the Elector of *Hanover* himſelf; who by detaching ſuch a Body of his Troops, and breaking his Neutrality, left his Country expoſed to ſome Hazard, that if the former Troops ſhould change their Deſtination, or ſucceed in their Attempt, they might return to take a ſevere Revenge upon his Dominions with Impunity: When therefore his Majeſty agreed to this Propoſition, the Miniſters of *England* could not have anſwered it to their Country, if they had not availed themſelves of this Body of his Forces.

They therefore took 16,000 of theſe Troops into the *Britiſh* Pay; not, as it has been maliciouſly inſinuated, in a Method contrary to the Conſtitution, and unknown before; but in a Method

Method warranted by all former Examples both in the Reign of King *William* and Queen *Anne*, when in the Interval of Parliament it became neceſſary from any Event to hire Foreign Forces, the Buſineſs was concerted by the Crown, the Treaty for the Subſidy agreed, and the Eſtimates referred to Parliamet; where the Liberty ſtill remained entire to reject them: The ſame Method was purſued in this Inſtance, the Parliament had the Eſtimates laid before them, and might have refuſed to confirm the Meaſure, if it had appeared to them improper or unjuſt; ſo that of all the Debates that ever paſs'd in Parliament, none ever violated more the Heart of every fair and honeſt Man, than that with relation to theſe Troops; in which this Point was with equal Confidence and Malice urged to the moſt indecent Extremity, in Defiance of all Truth and Candour, and with a manifeſt View to impoſe upon the Underſtanding of Mankind; there was not a Man of the leaſt Experience, who did not know that this was a Part of the known Prerogative exerciſed in innumerable Inſtances, and a Prerogative not like ſome others, which may be thought to have been a Relique of bad Times in Government, when the Conſtitution was leſs pure; or crept gradually in, when the Power of the Crown was ſtrained too far, but a Prerogative founded upon the ſupreme Law of all Neceſſity, without which no Government could ſtand ſecure one Hour: for what muſt be the Condition of this Country, if in no Dilemma, no Exigence whatſoever, (and ſurely none was ever greater than that of which we are now ſpeaking) during the Interval of Parliament, the Crown might exerciſe a Power of this Nature? What Opportunities in the moſt critical Conjunctures might be loſt? What Ruin muſt our Armies be expoſed to, in caſe of any ſignal Defeat abroad? But it is a Point too obvious to be longer inſiſted upon, and the Abſurdity of denying it is equalled by nothing, but that of debating *one whole Day* to prove *a Meaſure illegal* and *unparliamentary*, and to condemn it becauſe it had not the *Authority of Parliament*, which was *that very* Day ſubmitted to the Judgment and Power of the Houſe *whether it ſhould be a Meaſure at all or no.*

But to ſhew farther how tender his Majeſty was of exerting his Prerogative, beyond what the Neceſſity of our Situation required, his Majeſty hinted it to his Parliament at the Cloſe of the antecedent Seſſions.—After ſpeaking of the Supplies which had been already granted, *for the Support of the Queen of* Hungary, *and to reſtore and ſecure the Balance of Power, ſo particularly recommended by his Parliament*; he added farther, *And if it ſhould become neceſſary for me to contract new Engagements, or to enter into farther Meaſures, I rely upon your Zeal and Perſeverance in ſo juſt a Cauſe, to make them good.*

When

When the Prince foreſees that an Exigency may poſſibly ariſe, at a Period of Time in which he cannot poſſibly take the Council of his Parliament.--If in ſuch an Exigency the Nature and the Practice of the Government permits him freely to take what Meaſures he may judge neceſſary for the Intereſts of his People, without any Form or previous Notice whatſoever, if yet that Prince reminds his Parliament of ſuch a poſſible Contingency, as far as the Nature of the Thing can poſſibly admit, inſtead of a Stretch of Prerogative, it muſt appear, to every candid Man, the ſtrongeſt Mark of Tenderneſs to the Privileges of his People, a manifeſt Inclination to decline the Exerciſe of his Prerogative, and, in fact, the greateſt Condeſcenſion.--There is no Man of Candour, who will conſider this, but muſt ſee, that the moſt open, moſt frank, moſt generous, and moſt reſpectful Conduct, next to the direct Requeſt, *to be permitted to take the Meaſure*, was *to hint it to the Parliament, that it was intended to be taken.*

Now, that his Majeſty could not lay this Scheme before his Parliament, or open his Deſign more directly than he did at that Time, is proved by the ſtubborn Evidence of Facts and Dates, which though miſrepreſented by the *Faction* upon every Turn, and concealed, when they do not ſerve their Purpoſe, cannot be totally denied.---It is confeſs'd, that this Meaſure might have been, in all Probability, intended before the Diſſolution of the Parliament.--But could it be then reſolved? In the Nature of the Thing it could not, becauſe it was a Contingency, which could only happen if the *French* Army marched;--it may be ſaid, that ſome Steps had been already made by *France*, which convinced the King and the Adminiſtration, that they intended to march;--and if not, it is probable his Majeſty would not have touched at all upon it.---But theſe Steps might have been only taken as a Feint, at leaſt Accidents might have intervened to prevent the Execution of that Project.---Unleſs therefore his Majeſty had been not only King of *Great Britain*, and Elector of *Hanover*, but King of *France* at the ſame Time, he could not have told his Parliament, that his Electoral Troops ſhould march to join the National Troops of *England*, when this Meaſure depended upon an Event which was not in his Power, and which actually did not happen in a conſiderable Time, the Parliament riſing upon the 15th of *July**, and the March of the *French* Troops not having taken Effect till ſeveral Weeks after. As therefore it was impoſſible to have communicated that as a *poſitive Meaſure*, which in its Nature

* The *French* Army did not march from *Frankfort* towards *Bohemia*, till the 30th of *Auguſt*.

could not be then reſolved, ſo muſt it have been an Abſurdity, viſible to all Mankind, to have told the Parliament, *eventually*, which was the ſame thing as to have told *France*, and all the World, what we intended to do in caſe they marched.---The Politicks of theſe Times are of a very extraordinary Nature, when the Government is not only preſſed, from Day to Day, to diſcover, by Motions for Papers, every ſecret Tranſaction, every Negotiation, and Plan of Operations, even while they are ſtill depending; but when we are to foreſtal the Meaſures of our Enemies, and to tell them, *Gentlemen, take care what you do--if you do ſo, we will do ſo,--if you march from* Hanover, *we will certainly uſe that Opportunity to unite our Forces as ſoon as poſſible after you are gone.*

The Prudence of the Adminiſtration appeared likewiſe in the *Time*, the *Place* to which they marched, and in the *Nature* of this Bargain.---As to the *Time*, it had been Madneſs to have ſlipped this Opportunity, to form our Army, which might have afterwards been impoſſible; had we deferred it till the Spring, as ſome have taken great Pains to perſuade the People we ſhould have done, *France* might have taken ſuch Meaſures, or ſuch Events might have happened, as would have rendered it then impracticable;--again, (which would have been a Matter very near as fatal in its Conſequence) the World might have been convinced, that it was never intended to be done at all; it was of the laſt Importance to ſhew the *Dutch* a powerful Support to induce them to engage as ſoon poſſible. As to the *Place*, another Point of Importance was to give the *French* Alarms upon their own Frontier, to prevent their ſending any farther Force to *Germany*, or to prevent their aſſiſting the Infant Don *Philip*, who was already very ſuperior to the King of *Sardinia*, for which our National Troops were by no means alone ſufficient: And it had its Effect; the Letters of *Van Hoey* ſhew, that *France* did not ſlight thoſe Meaſures, which our own People ridiculed. They have ſince diſcovered what the *Dutch then thought*, and what the *Dutch* have now *publickly declared*.--The *French* encreaſed their Troops in *Flanders* with all the regular Troops they could draw together, and much of the Militia from the remoteſt Part of their Dominions; they ſent but faint and inſufficient Succours into *Germany*, and none at all to the *Spaniſh* Army.--By the March of theſe Troops into *Flanders*, we had therefore viſibly theſe ſeveral Advantages.---Firſt, That they were a great Encouragement to *Holland*.---Secondly, That they were a Security to the *Barrier*, and to the *Netherlands* in all Events.---Thirdly, That they created the moſt diſtant Diverſion that could be made.---Fourthly, That, as far as poſſible, they

they prevented the Neceſſity of a Rupture, becauſe *France* would not probably attempt to attack us there, unleſs compelled to it, ſo long as the *Dutch* had not acceeded, and was nevertheleſs obliged to prepare and arm in the ſame Degree, as not knowing how ſuddenly they might take the Reſolution, which *they* were then *inclined to*, and have ſince *reſolved*; whereas if they had marched to the *Rhine*, as others of our wiſe Politicians have for the only Alternative ſuggeſted, that they ſhould have done afterwards, *France* would have been induced, either by Neceſſity, or Prudence, to have attacked us there, when only half our Force had been aſſembled, and at leaſt we had been engaged precipitately in that Extremity, while there was yet a Poſſibility, that the Difficulties of the *French*, and Encreaſe of our Ability and Succeſs might have brought about a Termination to theſe Troubles. We reaped another Advantage from the good Quarters in thoſe Provinces, which kept our Troops in better Health, and in more Convenience; being in a plentiful Country, and that of an Ally; whereas we could have quartered no where elſe, without the greateſt Inconvenience.—We were there equally ready (conſidering the Seaſon of the Year) to perform any Service that the preſent or future Exigencies ſhould require; beſides the Difference of being united near to our own Country, where Supplies could be furniſhed with more Eaſe and Expedition; and where all the Money, that was conſumed, contributed, though indirectly, to aſſiſt the Houſe of *Auſtria*; as it enriched her Provinces, and enabled them to pay more punctually, and to furniſh greater Sums to their Sovereign's Aid: Laſtly, it enabled us to amuſe the *French*, and gave us an Opportunity to pretend a Deſign on *Dunkirk*; which drew down a large Body of their Troops to the very greateſt Diſtance, from whence they could annoy the Enemy: A Point ſo artfully conducted, that every other Power were ſerious at it but our own People.

As to the *Nature of the Bargain*, much has been ſaid upon this Head, to prove it not only *bad*, but *criminal* in the higheſt Degree. In order to the ſetting this Matter in a clear Light, it is neceſſary to obſerve, that during the long War of 1702, great Numbers of Foreign Forces having been hired, the Method then purſued, and the Conditions then obſerved, have been the Rule by which we have gone ever ſince; our ſubſidiary Treaties therefore run all upon the ſame Plan, and contain the ſame Conditions, that they did then; (excepting in two or three Articles of a trivial Nature, which the Change of the univerſal Diſcipline and a particular Circumſtance made it neceſſary to differ in, as we ſhall have Occaſion to ſpecify

hereafter.) This Expence is conſtantly ſummed up in *three* Articles,—That of *Levy-Money* for the furniſhing and compleating both Horſe and Foot, that of the *Pay* of the Forces, and that of an *annual Subſidy* beſides, in a certain Proportion, according to the Number of the Troops; theſe three Articles of *Levy-Money*, the *Pay of the Forces*, and the *Subſidy to the Prince*, make the general Charge common to all the Forces, that we have hired for a Space of above forty Years:—This is the Bill always brought us in for mercenary Troops;—*Not that any of theſe Articles is literally the Sum applied to the Account of the Charge of that Article, of which it bears the Title, but the Deficiency of the one is made up by the Exceedings of the other, and many Contingencies and Neceſſaries are accounted for under this Form; upon the groſs Amount of which, theſe Princes are enabled to make good their Engagements with us.* There is likewiſe another Condition, always tying us to contract for a certain Number of Years, whether we want the Troops or not; without which they would find no Account in their Bargain.—When the Conjuncture of Affairs obliged our Miniſters to take the *Hanoverian* Forces into Pay, if they had had the Inclination to have paid their Court meanly to his Majeſty, they were therefore warranted by all Precedents to have made their Bargain upon this Footing, as theſe Troops were in a Manner the only Troops we could have hired at that Time; as they were as good as any in the World, as they were ſituated the moſt commodiouſly for our Service, and as they muſt have been uſeleſs to the common Cauſe, and have been diſbanded, if we had not paid them, his Majeſty's Electoral Dominions, not being ſufficient to maintain both them, and the other Troops he had raiſed in this critical Situation of Affairs, eſpecially with the great additional Charge of Marching: The Miniſters therefore could have deſerved no Cenſure, nay, might have even merited Applauſe, for taking a Meaſure, which would have been juſt, fair, and equitable, and beneficial to this Country, even upon the common foot of other mercenary Troops; nor could this Nation have had any Title to have complained of his Majeſty, if in his different Capacity, as Elector of *Hanover*, he had deſired to be conſidered on the ſame Footing as any other *German* Prince.—But his *Majeſty*, with a *Generoſity*, for which he has met with a very *ungrateful* Return, declined theſe Pretenſions, and to ſhew his own Zeal for the Service of the Houſe of *Auſtria*, and his Deſire to make the Burthen to *Great Britain* as light as poſſible, he conſented to Conditions, to which no other *German* Prince would have ſubmitted, and which were both in preſent, *certainly*, and in proſpect, *probably*, a great Reduction

of

of the Charge to this Nation; for whereas in all other Treaties of this kind, part of the Sums ſtipulated are paid, and commence before the March of the Troops—He conſented, that their Pay ſhould commence only upon the very Day they began their March from *Hanover*, viz. the 31ſt of *Auguſt* 1742.—He inſiſted upon no Terms, *as to the Time that we ſhould pay them*, ſo that if the Troubles, in which we were involved, ſhould have determined in the Space of *one Year only*, we were bound to keep them *no longer*,—a Circumſtance that might very poſſibly have ſaved a *Million* of Money to this Nation, and which might have proved (were this a Bargain of neat Profit to his Majeſty, as theſe Incendiaries ſuggeſt) a Loſs of as much to his Majeſty, in his Electoral Capacity.—Nor was this all; but his Majeſty entirely remitted that Article of *Annual Subſidy*, which every other *German* Prince has done, now does, and ever will inſiſt upon; and which, according to the Proportion paid to the King of *Sweden*, as Landgrave of *Heſſe-Caſſel* (who beſides Levy-Money * and the Pay of his Troops, receives an annual Subſidy of 33,000 *l.* for only 6,000 of his Forces) his Majeſty had been entitled for 16,000 of his Troops, to near 100,000 *l. per Annum*; which Saving to this Nation, together with the other Particulars we have mentioned, make ſo vaſt a Difference between the Charge of theſe Troops, and thoſe of any other we could have hired, that it is an Impudence beyond Example to have treated this Point in the Manner in which it has been treated by the *Faction*, as we ſhall farther ſhew hereafter.

But though it may not be ſtrictly regular in Point of Time or the Order we have laid down, to take full Notice of the Proceedings of the *Faction* upon *this Head* (till we come to *the next* viz. *their Conduct in the next Seſſion of Parliament*) yet it will not be illconvenient to clear the Way, by removing the Rubbiſh of thoſe Objections, with which they have flattered themſelves, to cover the Malignity of their virulent Scandal upon this Meaſure, becauſe this Scandal was of a Nature ſo uncommon, deſperate and dangerous, that it will be greatly for the Advantage of the Publick to preſent it naked, ſtripped of that deluſive Garb in which they have uſed ſo much wicked Art to dreſs it, and void of any other Matter that may divert the Publick from the full View and Contemplation of its Iniquity.

To proceed therefore; under this Head of the Nature of the Bargain for the *Hanoverian* Troops, it was objected, *that by taking theſe Troops into* Britiſh *Pay*, *before we marched into* Germany, *we paid full one half Year before we had Occaſion for them*.—As to this, it has been already anſwered, that we might not

* See the Votes of the Houſe of Commons, *April* 14, 1740.

not have been able to have joined at all, if we had not done it when we did; it has been likewiſe ſhewn, how many other Advantages we both did reap, and expected juſtly to reap from it. By Parity of Reaſoning, we ſhould not have begun to embarque our National Troops for *Flanders*, till the Beginning of this Campaign.—And if Troops are not to be aſſembled, till the Moment they are to enter upon Action, or if an Adminiſtration is to be condemned for being in Readineſs to act as ſoon as Circumſtances will admit, or for not acting, before either Time, Circumſtances, or the Seaſon of the Year will give them leave; and if an Army is expected to fight whenever it is in the Field, without Regard to any Event or Situation of things, we have to deal with Politicians, whoſe Ignorance or Prejudice render them unworthy of any reaſonable Anſwer.

Another Objection was to *the granting Levy-Money for Troops already raiſed, and again, to the granting a greater Levy-Money than is paid to other Foreign Troops.* As to the *firſt*, we have already given a ſufficient Anſwer, by obſerving the Nature of all theſe Contracts, viz. *That no one of theſe Articles literally contains the Sum applied to the Charge of that Article of which it bears the Title: but the Deficiency of the one is made up by the Exceedings of the other, and many Contingencies, Neceſſaries, and extraordinary Expences, are accounted for under this Form; upon the groſs Amount of which, and not otherwiſe, Foreign Princes can be enabled to afford their Troops to us at the Rate they do*, and upon this Foot it was allowed lately to the Troops of *Denmark*. As to the *Second*, the Levy-Money of theſe Troops is in the ſame Proportion with that of all others; but the Sum was the larger, becauſe the Body of Troops, hired in this Inſtance, conſiſted One-third of *Horſe*, whereas in moſt of our other Contracts of this Nature, the Horſe have uſually amounted only to *One-ſixth*; and particularly in the Caſe of the *Danes* and *Heſſians*, which lately were and now continue in our Service.

It was again objected, that we *are charged with a new Article for the Officers of the Artillery*; and it is true, that it is a new Article, but it is an Article which ariſes from an Improvement in the Military Diſcipline, and one of the moſt remarkable of any that have been made in modern Time. Every Regiment, in the Service of all the *German* Princes, carrying with them two Field Pieces, which they manage with a very extraordinary Addreſs, firing incredibly often in one Minute; and no Man can pretend to ſay, that it was not neceſſary to conform ourſelves to the Diſcipline of the Age we live in, and to avail ourſelves of any new Advantages in War, which might either give us a *Superiority*, or put us upon a *Level* with the *Enemy*.

We

We were accuſed again with making a bad Bargain in *charging the Exchange, by the Eſtimate laid before the Houſe of Commons at the Rate of ten Guilders ten Stivers the Pound Sterling, which is ſuppoſed to be an Exchange of eight Stivers to our Diſadvantage*, and an unneceſſary Expence of 26,000 *l.* But this was fully anſwered in Parliament, though all the Writers of the *Faction* made no Scruple to conceal it in their ſubſequent Productions.— "They were there told, that in the Nature of theſe "Things, all Eſtimates muſt be formed upon ſome poſitive "Rate of Exchange; that this Rate was mentioned in the "Eſtimate, becauſe from the Variation of Exchange, it might "have amounted to that, and to prevent a Deficiency if it "ſhould; but that this Eſtimate did by no means fix the Rate "of the Exchange, and that all Savings that aroſe or might a-"riſe upon that Head, were conſtantly, and would, according "to ancient Cuſtom, be certainly accounted for to Parliament." — This Objection therefore has no other Foundation than the Ignorance or Malice of the *Faction*.

It was likewiſe objected, that *in all Contracts of this Nature during the former War, there was a Deduction of Two and one-half* per Cent. *to be applied to the Uſes of the War*, which amounted to 16,447 *l.* and which was not deducted in this Contract.---This Objection ſavours ſtrongly of the Party from whence it comes, ---they had been ſearching after Precedents from the Conduct of their *Faction* in the Reign of the late Queen *Anne*, when their Predeceſſors made no ſmall Diſturbance upon this Head, and when the ſame *Faction* attacked that Great Man the Duke of *Marlborough* in Parliament, for having taken this Deduction of Two and one-half *per Cent.* from the Foreign Troops under his Command. *In the Report of the Commiſſioners for taking, examining, and ſtating the publick Accounts of the Kingdom* at that Time, which was intended as an Inquiſition upon that General, they then inſinuated this Abatement of Foreign Pay *to be a Deduction for the Uſes of the War:* But the Nature of the *thing* was fully explained, ſuch a Deduction has been always made and is made at this Time; but it neither then did, nor conſequently does now, appear in any publick Account. It is a Sum which was firſt obtained by Conſent of the allied Princes in the Reign of King *William*, in the Nature of a voluntary Tax upon their Subſidies, afterwards continued in the Time of the Duke of *Marlborough*, and in the Reign of Queen *Anne*, always allowed by Warrant from the Crown to the General in Chief for procuring of Intelligence, and other ſecret Service, but never laid before Parliament in Diminution of any Eſtimate. Nothing

more

more therefore needs be ſaid to ſhew the Fallacy and Malevolence of this Objection, or to wipe off the Imputation of Exceſs in this Particular.

For a farther Aggravation, a Compariſon was attempted to be drawn *between the Charge of the* Hanoverians *hired in the late War in* 1702, *and thoſe now taken into our Pay.*-- But no ſuch Compariſon can properly be made, becauſe we have not the Materials for it,--the *Dutch* firſt took them into their Service, and they were afterwards turned over into *our* Pay.--The *Dutch* therefore paid the firſt Expences of Levy-Money, *&c.* and unleſs we had Acceſs to the Archives of that Republick, neither *they* nor *we* are qualified to aſcertain this Point, though it is not reaſonable to believe, that theſe Troops were then hired upon Terms different from thoſe which have been the general Rule in Caſes of the ſame Nature.

The next Matter of Cavil was the *extraordinary Charge of a Regiment of* Hanoverian *Guards*, which being equal in Expence to twice their Number of common Men, is reckoned another Inſtance of exorbitant Expence, But, ſurely, there is no Man who will diſpute this to be a proper Expence, when the Prince commands in Perſon, and he muſt be very much abandoned, who will think it decent to urge it now, when this Nation has ſo lately obtained ſo great and ſo manifeſt a Benefit from his Majeſty's perſonal Appearance at the Head of our united Army.

The laſt Objection, which has made the greateſt Noiſe, tho' it deſerves the leaſt Notice, *is to the hiring of* Hanoverian *Forces at all upon any Terms.* It is demanded, how an *Engliſh* Adminiſtration dare adviſe the Hire of Forces the moſt obnoxious, Forces that muſt create ſo great a Diſcontent, Forces that muſt eſtabliſh that dangerous Diſtinction of *Engliſhmen* and *Hanoverians*, and a Meaſure that muſt ſhake the Intereſt of his Majeſty upon the Throne, and poiſon the Affections of his People?--- But let us have the Liberty to put a few Queſtions to theſe Gentlemen in our Turn.---Could we have compoſed a ſufficient Army without theſe Troops? Why is it more criminal to hire theſe Forces in the preſent War, than in that of Queen *Anne*, when we conſtantly entertained a great Body of them in our Pay without any Objection? What is it that has rendered theſe Forces *now* obnoxious which were never ſo *before?* What has created any Diſcontent upon this abſolutely neceſſary Meaſure? What has eſtabliſhed that dangerous Diſtinction of *Engliſhmen* and *Hanoverians?* What is it that has ſhaken the Intereſt of his Majeſty, or poiſoned the Affections of his People (*both* which have been indeed ſtrongly endeavoured, but I thank God *neither* yet affected) no other Anſwer can be given to any of theſe Queſtions, but that there is in this Country at this Time,

a Faction deſtitute of Principle and Shame, and void of all Remorſe, who taking Advantage of the Ignorance and vulgar Prejudices of a heated People, have glaringly attempted, by fallacious Arguments, vile Miſrepreſentations, and downright Falſhood, covered by a popular and confuſed Jargon of ſeditious Rhetoric, to gratify their Revenge, to advance their private Intereſts, and to promote their pernicious Views, at the Expence of ſacred Truth, and moral Virtue, at the Hazard of the Liberties of *Europe*, the Peace of their own Country, and the Security of a Prince and Family, upon whoſe Eſtabliſhment the Conſtitution of theſe Kingdoms can alone depend.

We have now pretty fully gone through with a Deduction of the Meaſures taken by the Adminiſtration during the Interval of Parliament; we have explained the Nature and the Neceſſity of theſe Meaſures; we have ſhewn the Succeſs, and almoſt miraculous Alteration in the Situation of our Affairs; which were viſibly their Conſequence. But whether they were the neceſſary Conſequence of them or not—the Face of Affairs was in fact ſo wonderfully changed, that inſtead of that Proſpect of almoſt inevitable Ruin, which appeared before our Eyes, in the Beginning of the previous Seſſions of Parliament, there was, at leaſt, a great Probability of ſaving the Houſe of *Auſtria*, and of reſtraining the Ambition of *France* from profiting by her immenſe Expences, and the Labour ſhe had taken, to move the whole Earth to the Deſtruction of the only Power, that ſtood between her and the virtual Poſſeſſion of the Univerſal Empire.—Let us inculcate this happy Alteration by a ſecond Recapitulation of it.

Saxony and *Pruſſia* were disjoined from the Alliance of *France*, and with Circumſtances, that in a great degree ſecured us from a Poſſibility of their uniting with her again during the preſent Contention; *Bavaria* was not only incapable of affording any material Aſſiſtance to the Views of *France*, but actually a conſiderable Part of it in Poſſeſſion of the *Auſtrians*, two great *French* Armies of veteran Troops totally deſtroyed; Diſeaſes and Deſpair, the viſible Companions of the remaining Forces of the Emperor and *France*, inferior to the *Auſtrians*, who were now flush'd with Succeſs, enrich'd with Plunder, enured to Arms and Victory: Theſe remaining Forces coup'd up in a Corner of *Bavaria* and *Bohemia*, in the utmoſt Diſtreſs for Proviſions, not to be recruited till the Spring; and then, from the vaſt Loſſes of the regular Troops of *France*, only by new Levies of a raw and diſheartened People, forced, driven and preſſed into the Service, with the moſt manifeſt Dread and Terror of it; the *French* Government, deteſted and deſpiſed by

its own People, for its ill Succeſs and ruinous Meaſures; the Queen of *Bohemia* repoſſeſſed of the greateſt Part of her Dominions; and of a Treaſure ineſtimable, the united Hearts of all her Subjects, moved to the utmoſt Degree of Tenderneſs by her Danger and the Injuſtice of her Enemies, warmed with the moſt fervent Zeal, by her gallant, firm and prudent Conduct; the King of *Sardinia*, ſteady to his Engagements, and infinitely ſerviceable to the common Cauſe; the *Spaniards* check'd, foil'd and diſappointed in all their *Italian* Views; the King of *Naples* bridled by our Fleets; the *Swedes* confounded by *French* Councils, and by the juſt Arms of *Ruſſia*; courting the Mediation of *Great Britain* for their Preſervation, who but the Year before had been led by *France* to diſturb the Peace of the *North*, in Contempt of *Britain*, and probably not without a remote View to her Deſtruction; the *Dutch* potently armed, viſibly able, and ſecretly inclined to join us in the Quarrel; a very great Army in the *Britiſh* Pay of the beſt Troops in *Europe*; freſh and ready to enter into Action, whenever Neceſſity ſhould require; the *Turks* incapable of being moved by *France*, thinking of nothing but their own Preſervation againſt the Attempts of *Perſia*:---Theſe were the happy Circumſtances into which, by the Providence of God, and the Prudence of the Adminiſtration, our Affairs were brought, when his Majeſty opened his Parliament upon the 16th of *November* laſt.

We now come to the next Head of our Diſcourſe, the Conduct of the Faction at the next Meeting of the Parliament---They, who had been longeſt in an Oppoſition, and had conducted it, and knew the moſt of it, even they were unable to conceive in what manner their former Collegues would behave, upon what Footing they could oppoſe the Support of Meaſures ſo lately popular, conducted with ſo much Judgment and Vigour, and attended with ſuch providential Succeſs; or thwart the Proſecution of his Majeſty's further Views to take Advantage of this happy Change: They knew indeed the Men by long Experience, they were well acquainted with their Views, and that they would ſtick at nothing to obtain that Share in the Emoluments of Power, which their Madneſs had ſo lately deprived them of; but they were at a Loſs to comprehend how they would betake themſelves to ſcreen their Views from the Detection of the People, without whoſe Aſſiſtance they could do nothing; a People brave and honeſt, endued with more Underſtanding too, with more Lights and Knowledge from the Nature of our Government than any other People in the World, and in general never wrong, but when ſeduced by *Fraud*, or heated by *Paſſions*; the Succeſs appeared too notorious to admit of thoſe *Frauds*, without

out Misrepresentations too gross to be even supposed; and the Grounds of those *Passions* had been too justly removed, in all Instances, that it was practicable to be done; it was therefore thought impossible, that any such Attempt would meet with the least Encouragement, since the *previous Step* must be to eradicate *the old Principle* upon which the Safety of this Nation has ever depended; which it has never departed from without Shame and Misfortune; and which the People ever recurred to again, however temporarily seduced, viz. *that this Nation must eternally oppose the Advancement of the Monarchy of* France.

The *Faction* saw all this, and considered their Game at first as desperate, but their very Despair obliged them to persist—they knew that Opposition could never want some Allies from such as had been duped by them, and knew not how to retreat, and from such as, by the same Errors, were in the same desperate Condition with themselves, from such as were avowed *Jacobites*, and such as were of beggarly Circumstances, who had a Possibility of bettering themselves by the Confusion of their Country, which though far short of a Probability, was yet better than a Certainty of *Ruin* and a *Goal*, which stared them in the Face.

They had a farther Dependance upon the Liberty of the Press, which is always a mighty Engine, of equal Use to *Liberty* and *Faction*, they took Advantage from the Knowledge that the Ministers they now opposed were tender of it, and knowing this, they thought themselves secure in the most monstrous Abuse of it that was ever known in any Age or Nation.—A Use which their former Leaders, when it was under their Direction, never put it to themselves, in the same degree, *nor pointed to the Mark, at which it has been since wickedly levelled.* —This was the Spring by which they proposed to set the whole Machine in Motion, and by this they depended to retail Scurrility and Treason with Impunity (for Argument they had none) upon a wretched Set of People, who with Education just sufficient *to enable them to read*, spend all their leisure Time, and sometimes more than they have conveniently to spare from behind the Counter, in some blind Coffee-house, and thence retiring to their Tavern Assemblies, retail it out again, to Men still below them in this *great Qualification*; where, to shew that they understand the true Spirit of every libellous Production, they enter into all its Sentiments, and become, in their own great Opinions, and in the Opinions of their Auditors, after a little Habit in this Way, consummate Politicians, judging of the Interests of all States and Kingdoms, and of all Ministers and Princes, as well as of their own, *whom they constantly take*

for granted to be the worſt of all, and the ſole Authors of every Calamity and Diſorder of the whole World.

With theſe *Troops*, and with this *Artillery* of *Faction*, they ſtill thought themſelves enabled to take the Field.—They had, it is true, ſeen all Squadrons of Oppoſition intermixed with Bodies of theſe, but never led by ſuch Generals, nor conſiſting of theſe Troops alone: However truſting in their Numbers, and depending upon their Noiſe, which, though it would produce no Argument from their own Quarter, prevented thoſe that came from another, from being heard, they commenced the ſecond Campaign, confiding more in the Diviſion of their Enemy, than in their own Strength, and truſting that ſome unfortunate Events, or ſome unhappy Errors, might, in Time, afford them better Colours, than (in ſpight of all the Varniſh they could put upon it) their Cauſe would for the preſent bear.

Of late Years, by the vaſt Encreaſe of Trade, and the Cuſtom of living in the Capital, for the greateſt Part of the Year, *London* and *Weſtminſter* had vaſtly encreaſed; —all great Cities are the Seat both of *Liberty* and *Faction*,—in Proportion to their Numbers and their Wealth, their Abilities either to defend the one, or to exert the other, encreaſe. —For the Means of one, and of the other, are the ſame, and they differ only in the Extent to which they are carried, and in the Lengths they go.—From this Encreaſe it was, that the late Oppoſition derived its Force, and it was by the Influence of theſe two Cities, in great meaſure, that they routed the late Adminiſtration.--*Weſtminſter* had in a particular Manner exerted itſelf to maintain its Freedom of Election, which had been, with unaccountable Imprudence, invaded with very ſtrong and odious Circumſtances at their Choice of Members for the preſent Parliament.—The Adminiſtration ſtill, with greater Raſhneſs, were determined, if they could, to make this irregular Election ſtand, which ſo much offended all, as well violent as moderate Men, that there aroſe a Conjunction of all Intereſts, and of all Principles, which created an Oppoſition ſo formidable, that it was not to be reſiſted, and ſuch as, it is hoped, there will never be the ſame Occaſion to ſee again.—The Juſtice of the Cauſe, and the Conſequence of its Iſſue to the People, made Men exert themſelves with an uncommon Spirit, and cauſed them to appear in vaſt Numbers, and in very frequent Aſſemblies, by which Men of all Tempers became acquainted, who would otherwiſe never have known each other.—The moſt *warm and violent* conſorted together, who when they had carried their Point, and found the Sweets of Victory, (from a kind of Turn natural to that Order

of

of Mankind, and to Perſons of ſuch a Diſpoſition) knew no longer how to confine themſelves within their own proper Sphere, and thought themſelves equally qualified and equally entitled to direct the Nation, as to conduct their own Election. Thus when the *Moderate* and *Wiſe*, contented with having done their Duty, and carried the only Point with which they were intitled to interfere, retired peaceably to reap the Fruits of an Event, which produced many other beneficial Conſequences to their Country: *Theſe*, though *a mere Handful*, ſtrengthening themſelves with Numbers who had no Right to vote, and laying hold of every Man they could draw in, ſtill continued to maintain the Shadow of their former Meetings. *Theſe* were the firſt applied to by the *Faction*, and aſſuming the Title of a numerous, powerful, and worthy Set of Men, who had lately made ſo great a Noiſe in the World, under the Stile of the *Independant Inhabitants of Weſtminſter*, were, in Conjunction with proper Inſtruments in the City of *London*, to take the Lead, and to ſet the Example to all the other Cities and Corporations of the Kingdom. Through this Canal, the Ice was to be broken to the People in general, and Inſtructions were drawn up, in which three or four were out of Form conſulted, and which about *fourſcore* out of 16,000 Electors in *Weſtminſter*, and *two or three hundred* out of 6000 Liverymen in *London*, ſanctified with their Approbation.—Theſe being publiſhed in the printed Papers, were, with Diligence and Expedition, ſent into the Country, as the Senſe of this great Metropolis, to be thence taken for the Voice of the whole People of *England*; and for Fear, notwithſtanding this Suggeſtion, that the People in the Country would not ſufficiently reſent it, if their Repreſentatives did not literally conform themſelves to this pretended Senſe of the whole good People of *England*, they publiſhed a Pamphlet, to convince them, that it was the Duty of every Member of Parliament, to vote in every Inſtance as his Conſtituents ſhould direct him in the Houſe of Commons,—a Thing in the higheſt Degree abſurd, for *it is the conſtant and allowed Principle of our Conſtitution, that no Man, after he is choſen, is to conſider himſelf as a Member for any particular Place, but as a Repreſentative for the whole Nation*,—without which there could neither be Freedom of Judgment, or Speech, without which all Debate muſt be entirely unneceſſary, and without which the Legiſlature would be torn with Faction, Nonſenſe, and Contrariety of Intereſts, to a degree of Confuſion that muſt deſtroy all Government.—Hence it is that Parliaments have never allowed the Right of Inſtructing to lie in the People; and it has accordingly been a Practice, which, introduced firſt in the

Times of the *great Rebellion*, has never ſince been exerciſed but in Times that threatened *the ſame Confuſion.*

Yet when theſe Inſtructions appeared, they were far from anſwering the firſt End of inducing all others to follow their Example. Some few Corporations did it; but no Endeavours of the Faction could extend it far: Nay, ſome addreſſed their Members, and particularly *Briſtol*, the *third City* in the *Kingdom*, in direct Oppoſition to them; nor is it to be wondered at, for the Inſtructions from *London* were not only a direct and ſcurrilous Libel upon the Adminiſtration, but the moſt ſeditious Inſtrument, that ever was penned, and very little ſhort of Treaſon both againſt the King and Conſtitution. Thoſe of *Weſtminſter* were leſs fruitleſs in perſonal Abuſe, which they hinted only, that they kept in Reſerve till they ſaw whether their Ideas were complied with; in many other Reſpects they went *as far*, and in ſome, *viz.* with Reſpect to the Conſtitution, *ſtill farther* than the City of *London* itſelf.

The diſtinguiſhed Points of theſe ever memorable Performances may be reduced to the following Heads, *1ſt*, the *Abuſe of Perſons* without the leaſt Reſerve or Decency: *2dly*, The *Place-Bill*: *3dly*, The *Triennial Law*: *4thly*, *Juſtice* upon the Earl of *Orford*: *5thly*, *Granting no Supplies* till the *2d*, *3d*, and *4th* Point here mentioned were complied with.

Now if every one of theſe Points be duly conſidered, we can be at no Loſs to diſcover what their View was, and from what Quarter their Inſtructions came.—With regard to the firſt, as I have obſerved before, *the Abuſe of Perſons* was the Fort of the Faction in all former Oppoſition; but as they were very ſenſible that to anſwer any View by it, they muſt carry it to a greater Exceſs; and do it with greater Injuſtice and Confidence than was ever done before, it was very prudent to be able to quote for their Example, what they termed the Senſe of the whole Nation.—As to the ſecond Article, the *Place-Bill*, they knew no *wiſe Government* would think it prudent to ſtrengthen the popular Intereſt in ſuch a time of Inflammation; that therefore *King*, *Lords* and *Commons* would refuſe to paſs it, as they had the more Reaſon to do, a Bill of the ſame Nature very conſiderable in its Conſequences (though miſrepreſented groſsly) having paſſed in the laſt Seſſions. As to the *Triennial Law*, they were ſure that could not be obtained, becauſe they knew there were not ten Men ſeriouſly for it, in the whole Parliament, and their moſt flaming Patriots had themſelves voted againſt it in the laſt Seſſions. As to *what they called Juſtice* upon the Earl of *Orford*, they knew that they had already by their own Conduct put it out of the Power of any Set of Men to effect

ſect it; which was the Reaſon that in Truth they inſiſted upon theſe three laſt mentioned Points; being ſure from thence, though Things fell out the beſt for this Nation, and the worſt for them, never to want Ground and Pretence for Oppoſition, and for a ſeeming Juſtification of the *grand Point of all, the diſtreſſing of Government, by granting no Money to the Crown*; which without this Addreſs and theſe Arts, the People would have looked upon them, not as *Patriots*, but as *Monſters* and *Madmen*, in the then critical Situation of Affairs, to have oppoſed, when *the Ballance of Power*, that Point with Juſtice ſo much favoured at all Times by this Country, lay at an immediate Stake.

It was thus by heating the Minds of the People, and by ſetting them in a vain Diſpute, that they endeavoured to bring the Nation off from the true Scent, and to pave the Way for the Revival of their *Tory* Principles again :—By inculcating theſe popular Points, and ſpreading a certain general Maxim very fallaciouſly applied, that *It was of no Conſequence what became of the Liberties of* Europe, *if we did not firſt ſecure our Liberties at Home*, they diſguiſed their Attempts of deſtroying both the one and the other.

The *Faction* having now no Means to gain upon the Reaſon, ſought only to depend upon the Madneſs of the People, and having laid a Foundation by *theſe Inſtructions* before mentioned, upon the firſt Opening of the Seſſions, oppoſed *the Addreſs to his Majeſty in Return for his Speech from the Throne*, in which were enumerated ſeveral of thoſe Advantages, which called ſo loudly for the Gratitude of this Nation both to *God* and *Man*; but they diſcovered no Temper of that kind to *either*: Nay, as if the Senſe and Memory of all their Auditors had been totally loſt, they diſclaimed againſt the preſent State of things, as if equally bad and deſperate, with that out of which we had ſo happily eſcaped, retailing by rote the ſame Imputations to the preſent Conduct, and the ſame Reflections upon the preſent State of our Affairs, as they had learned of their Leaders before, when the Situation of Affairs was totally the reverſe: Notwithſtanding the viſible Importance of convincing the World abroad, in this critical Conjuncture, (eſpecially after the great Confuſion of this Country and the Change of the Miniſtry) that the Publick were united to ſupport the Common Cauſe; though it is well known, as an able Foreigner obſerves, *que ſur tout depuis le Commencement de ce Siecle, les Harangues des Rois de la* Grande Britagne *à l' overture du Parlement ſont conſiderés comme des Eſpeces d' Oracles touchant la Situation generale des Affaires de* l' Europe;

P Europe * :—And though, whoever has travelled abroad is ſenſible how the Expectations of all Nations are raiſed or depreſſed according to the Sentiments expreſſed from the Throne, and according to the Reception of the King's Speech in the firſt Debate of Parliament; it was in vain to reaſon from hence, that what gained Credit with all Foreign Nations, ought to meet with ſome Reſpect at home.—That the Conſequences of not correſponding with the Sentiments of the Crown, muſt either be a Suggeſtion of *Falſhood* in his *Majeſty*, or of *Ignorance* or *Madneſs* in *ourſelves*; that in ſuch a Situation this muſt throw Things back again into all the firſt Confuſion—that any Coldneſs expreſſed in ſuch an extraordinary Conjuncture, muſt convince the World, that a ſecond Revolution of our Adminiſtration was to follow,—that as the Confidence ariſing in all our natural Allies, and Dejection in our Enemies, proceeded only from the Proſpect of the Change of Meaſures conſequential to it, both would infallibly be defeated by a Proſpect of the Diſcontinuance of that Adminiſtration.—That theſe Reflections muſt convert the Confidence of the one into Deſpair, the Dejection of the other into Confidence,—that this muſt infallibly induce the King of *Sardinia* to liſten to the Invitations of Advantage thrown in his Way by *France* and *Spain*; intimidate the *Dutch* from entering into Engagements with us; compel the Houſe of *Auſtria* to ſubmit immediately to any Terms which *France* ſhould impoſe, and irrecoverably ſacrifice all *Europe* to be cantoned out at the Will of that imperious Power; induce *Pruſſia* and *Saxony*, who had juſt receded from that Confederacy, to purſue new Views of Advantage to themſelves, at the Expence of that diſtreſſed Princeſs; ſacrifice all the Sums already expended in this Cauſe, and totally defeat all the Views, we now ſo reaſonably entertained, of reſtoring the Balance of Power. In fine, that it would inevitably drive us back into the Steps of the laſt Adminiſtration, which even the *Faction* ſtill affected to condemn and puniſh.—All this had no Effect; theſe Arguments could have no Effect on Men, who had Views to which they bore no Relation, and who, by their original Principles, wiſhed ſecretly the very Thing that others, by their Reaſoning, endeavoured to prevent; at laſt the Senſe of the Houſe being taken by a Diviſion, it appeared, not leſs to the Amazement of themſelves, than to that of all honeſt Men, that ſo many were of their own Principles, ſo many defeated in their Expectations, ſo many fettered in Apprehenſions of the Popular Spirit of the Time, the Hazard of their future Elections, the Fear of Perſonal Abuſe,

* *Rouſſet.* Vol III. fol 327.

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the miſtaken Shame of deſerting what they called their Party, (though they knew them in the wrong, and wiſhed to be out of the Enchantment) ſo many led away by the ſpecious Pretence of imaginary or irremediable Grievances, and ſo many weak and deluded Men, that they were joined by a very great Number.

This Degree of Succeſs elated them ſo far, that they gave a Vent to all their Rage and Malice againſt every one, who had differed from them in this Vote;—painted it out to the People in every Colour of Inconſiſtency;—they had treated thoſe, who acted with the former Adminiſtration, for twenty Years paſt, without Mercy, as the greateſt Villains for entertaining for a Principle, *that they ſhould vote with their Party in all Queſtions whatſoever, right or wrong, and that Party could be no otherwiſe maintained:* Yet, as much as they had condemned this Principle a little while before, they made no Scruple to adopt it now, and for this ſingle Vote, branded every Man, who gave it, at once, as a Deſerter of the Cauſe of his Country, exerting every *low, mean* and *infamous Art*, to *injure*, *blacken*, and *defame* him.

The *Faction* now obſerving, that they were abetted, not only without Doors, but within, by a larger Body of People than they could have at firſt imagined, determined in the next Inſtance, without Reſerve, to try how far that Deluſion had extended, and could ſupport them.—When therefore the Eſtimates for the 16,000 *Britiſh* Troops in *Flanders* came to be conſidered, *they oppoſed, with the utmoſt Vehemence, the granting the Supply for this Service, inſiſting upon their being recalled home, and diſbanded*;—and now they began to appear in their full Colour the Men they were; they not only trod in the Steps of their Predeceſſors, in the Reign of King *Charles* the Second, King *William*, and Queen *Anne*, but they travelled that Pace, which none of them had gone before.—None had ever ſo openly avowed the Views of leaving the whole World to the Mercy of *France:* No *Engliſhman* before could have dared to make a Propoſition of this Nature, when our Armies were actually united in the Field, and *France*, bending its utmoſt Force to the Ruin of our moſt potent and conſtant Ally abroad.—Even in that infamous Scene in the Reign of the Queen, they were contented, for the firſt Step, to agree to a Ceſſation of Arms, and to ſeparate from their Allies:—They made a Peace, ſuch as it was, before they brought back a ſingle Regiment;—they had then the Pretence of ſome Conceſſions from *France*, ſmall as they were, compared with the Advantages in our Power at that Time to have procured:—they had the Plea of a dangerous Intereſt, that the General had acquired in the Army, and of

ambitious Views, in a great Subject, which a Princeſs, *the laſt of her Race*, had no Ability to contend with ;—they had Pretences, from the immenſe Sums which had been already expended upon the War, and which People naturally wiſhed to be eaſed from almoſt at any Rate ;—they had even ſome Shew of Conſiſtency in their Conduct ; for they had been long at work to obſtruct and oppoſe the Continuance of it.—But for theſe People, all Appearance of Reaſon and Conſiſtency was as remote to juſtify them in what they did, as their Deſign was manifeſt to ruin the Intereſt, to pervert the Principles, to inſult the Underſtandings, and abuſe the Weakneſs of their Countrymen.

We can never recur too often to this Point, that whoever knows the Hiſtory of this Government, can judge of its Intereſts and its Dangers, muſt know, that it has been, and ought to be, the conſtant Principle of Politicks, by which this Nation muſt be ever governed.—To keep down the Power of the Houſe of *Bourbon*, that if ſhe now acquires ever ſo little an Addition to it, *In its Conſequences, the Trade, the Liberty, the Religion, the Independency of this Nation, will be inevitably undone.—That to prevent this Power from Encreaſe, we muſt ſupport ſome great Power on the Continent, capable to ſtand for a Time, till Confederacies may be formed againſt her* ;—that for Ages paſt, and ſtill at this Hour, *no other Power is [in any Degree equal (or capable in any reaſonable Proſpect of Time to be made equal) to that Taſk, but that of the Houſe of* Auſtria.—And that *therefore the Sum of all the Politicks of this Nation is to ſupport, by all the Means in our Power, the Houſe of* Auſtria.

The Nation had ſo long ſeen the Force of theſe Maxims, had ſuffered ſo much from every temporary Departure from them, and inſenſibly advanced into ſo manifeſt Danger, by every Relaxation from theſe Principles, that there was not a ſingle Man, who did not profeſs them, and upon this was grounded that univerſal Clamour againſt the late Adminiſtration. The Author of that worſt and moſt malicious Libel that ever was publiſhed, entitled, *The Caſe of the* Hanover *Troops*, himſelf confeſſes, that the univerſal Diſſatisfaction of that Time was principally owing to this weak, and, as he adds, wicked Conduct of our Foreign Affairs, and Neglect of theſe Principles. I may ſay more, there was not a ſingle Man of this Nation, who was not fully convinced, that they were true, though ſome were ſorry for their private Views againſt the Government, that they ſhould be purſued for no other Reaſon, than that they knew them to be true:—And therefore, upon the late Change of the Adminiſtration, it was reſolved, by the almoſt univerſal Senſe of the whole Nation,

Nation, notwithſtanding the firſt impotent Attempt of theſe Gentlemen to prevent it, that theſe 16,000 National Troops ſhould be ſent into *Flanders*.—When this was done, however, the Affairs of the Queen of *Hungary* had already providentially begun to mend, by a fortunate Winter's Campaign, and our Spirits were a little raiſed, by ſeeing her Ruin a little protracted. —Yet it was then evident, that theſe 16,000 Men were far from being able alone to prevent that Ruin. Had the Nation therefore been ripened enough into a fatal Diſtraction, much more might have been *then* urged, with greater Plauſibility, againſt this firſt Step, than againſt the Continuance of it, after it had been made.—The Proſpect of being able to compoſe an Army ſufficient to act againſt *France*, was then in ſome Degree precarious and remote: It might have been, (as it has been ſince) urged, that this could only operate by way of a Diverſion;—and hardly that, becauſe the *French* could not fear Hoſtilities from ſuch an Handful of Men;—yet, I ſay, the Meaſure was even then approved by the almoſt univerſal Senſe of this Nation,—as it was a Beginning, as it maintained the Faith of Treaties, as it was a Pledge of the future Intentions of this Country, and a Proof of our Change of Politicks, as it was a Root and a Foundation for other Troops to be gathered to, as Time or Incidents, or the common Danger, might induce;—and as it was conformable with *an eſtabliſhed Rule of Politicks*, *that he that gains Time*, *gains every thing*.

The Senſe therefore of theſe fundamental Principles brought, as I have ſaid, in a manner, the whole Nation to be willing, at a Time, when two of the greateſt Powers in *Germany* were embarqued, and in the Field, in Conjunction with *France*, againſt the Queen of *Hungary*,—at a Time, when *Hanover*, and the *Dutch*, were both awed by a *French* Army; and when no certain or immediate Proſpect appeared, of Aſſiſtance on any Side, but from the Houſe of *Savoy* in *Italy*, to adventure this Experiment, an Experiment of 6 or 700,000 *l.* They thought every thing was to be tried in ſuch Extremities, and no Expence to be conſidered, where the *Trade*, the *Liberty*, the *Religion* and *Independency* of this Nation, were viſibly at Stake.

How then could this ſcandalous Oppoſition to the Continuance of this Meaſure be ſwallowed by the Publick in the very next Year, when the Face of our Affairs was changed in ſo wonderful a manner in our Favour, when *Pruſſia* and *Saxony* had deſiſted from being Enemies to the Houſe of *Auſtria*, when the *French* Armies had been ſo greatly diminiſhed, when the Queen of *Hungary* had almoſt cleared her whole Dominions from the Enemy, when the *Dutch* and *Hanover* were no longer awed by

France, when inſtead of a naked Body of 16,000 Men, by the Junction of *Heſſians*, *Hanoverians* and *Auſtrians*, we had actually an Army collected in one Body of 50,000 Men: The Anſwer to this Queſtion is eaſily made, the Ardour of the Nation had, by infamous Arts been converted into the Heat of a *Faction*; Oppoſition, which was before conducted by *Whig* Principles, was now led by Incendiaries and *Jacobits*; who never did, nor ever will lead the People but to Meaſures inconſiſtent with their Intereſts and Safety.

But though the Wicked abound in this and in every other State, yet they are never numerous enough alone to attempt the Ruin of their Country, they muſt have a vaſt Acceſſion of the Honeſt to aſſiſt them, and they muſt impoſe upon their Weakneſs to abet their Views; they muſt have ſome Pretences to prevail upon them:—Let us now conſider what theſe Pretences were.

"They firſt began tenderly to inſinuate that our firſt Prin-
" ciples of Policy, however long maintain'd, were in them-
" ſelves erroneous; and that conſidering the former immenſe
" Expences of this Nation, the little Fruit that we had reap-
" ed from them, and the Probability of being ſtill from Time
" to Time engaged in new Quarrels, it was fit to be conſider-
" ed, whether it was not proper to enter upon a new Syſtem;
" that it was viſible we could never make any Acquiſitions up-
" on the Continent to reimburſe our Expences; and that we
" therefore conſumed ourſelves only for the Benefit of other
" Powers; that our Navy was a ſufficient Protection for us a-
" gainſt the whole World; that the regular Troops, which
" theſe Views obliged us to maintain would prove the Ruin of
" our Liberties; and the vaſt Taxes produce the Ruin of our
" Trade; ſo that it was thrown out as a Doubt fit for the Na-
" tion to conſider, whether it was not better to leave the reſt
" of the World to ſhift for itſelf as well as it could, and to
" entrench within our own natural Boundaries, take our
" Chance, and defend ourſelves the beſt we could." They were obliged to venture thus to ſhake the eſtabliſhed Principles that they might afterwards debauch the Underſtandings of the People, in which they proceeded exactly upon the Plan of their Brother Politicians, the *Jeſuits* and the Church of *Rome*, who begin all their Practices on thoſe they mean to ſeduce, by raiſing Doubts as to the Fundamentals of their Faith, which when once departed from, expoſe their unwary Pupils to be driven from one Point to another, till they at laſt reſign their Senſes to their inſidious Guides; theſe Political Seducers could not have failed to learn the Craft of a Set of People of whom they

followed

followed the Views; and like thoſe by whom they had been taught their Leſſon, they applied theſe Inſinuations with great Caution at the firſt, and only upon ſuch Objects as thro' the Weakneſs of their Underſtandings were too dull of Apprehenſion to detect their Views, and who from their Ignorance could not be able to know, that theſe were the conſtant Practices of the *Jacobites*, *Enemies* of their *Country* and *Friends* of *France* upon all Occaſions.

There is always much Ignorance and much Weakneſs in the Bulk of Mankind, ſo that it was not long before they found the Effect of this ſecret Management; and they were further aſſiſted by a certain Temper, which every thinking Man muſt have obſerved in human Nature of the lower Claſs, *that they delight in any thing that is new, and in the marvellous*; theſe Refinements upon our Policy were ſtrange to them; and they admired at the Sagacity of thoſe, who had ſtruck out thoſe new Lights; which they were proud to appear the Inventors of, or at leaſt, to ſhew their ſuperior Judgment in comprehending as ſoon as hinted, and to diſplay this ſuperior Sagacity, farther inculcated all theſe Doctrines, upon the common People, who are always prone to reliſh a Diſcovery, which promiſes a Reduction of their Taxes and of an Army.

But alas! how ſhallow are the Underſtandings of theſe Men, who can be impoſed upon by this ſuperficial Reaſoning? Can the Wiſdom of this Age entertain the Vanity to think, that their Anceſtors have for ſeven hundred Years perſiſted in an Error, which the bright Genius of the enlightened Vulgar have now at length diſcovered to be ſuch? ſhall every Cobler in his Stall pretend a Knowledge of political Affairs, ſuperior to that of the beſt, the wiſeſt, the greateſt Men of this and all former Ages, whom their Education, and whole Turn of Life have adapted and dedicated to the Study of Politicks and Government? What ridiculous Vanity is this? and what Folly, to imagine that Men, who have no Intereſt in the State, but the Profits of their daily Labour, ſhould be more anxious for the Well-being of their Country, than thoſe, who have vaſt Properties to take Care of; who really feel the Burthens, which are but imaginary upon the reſt (becauſe in the Nature of things they caſt off the Load of all publick Charges from themſelves upon the Rich, by an Advance both in the Price of their Commodities and Labour,) and who alone ſuſtain all the Taxes of the Nation? Whoſe Lands are ſaddled directly or indirectly with the whole Expence; who, if Ruin falls upon their Country, muſt, by Forfeitures and Confiſcations, loſe their Eſtates, their Titles, and perhaps their Lives, while theſe, living by the natural

natural Occaſions of all Mankind, muſt ſtill be neceſſary to every State, transform it how you will, muſt be from that Neceſſity preſerved, and carry with them, through all Diſaſters of their Country, a certain Method of Subſiſtence. Shall this Order of the People, from the falſe Oratory, and Declamations of a few ſeditious Leaders, be perſuaded to oppoſe their new-fangled Sentiments to ſuch Men as theſe, preſume to ſet up for Leaders of Political Opinions, and by a few Inſtances of temporary Neglect in Great Men, (warped perhaps on ſome Occaſions from their Duty to their Country, by the Allurements of great Offices in the State,—or miſled into the Support of wrong Meaſures, for a time) be carried away, to think their Affairs more ſafe under the Direction of Men of deſperate Fortunes, low Rank, and even of the very Commonalty themſelves;—or becauſe all the Inſtances of frantick Management in Princes, have been collected together, to make a Bundle of Infamy againſt Government by Monarchy, and to expoſe the Errors and Wickedneſs of ſome crowned Heads;— are they to conclude, from theſe partial Informations, that Monarchy is no longer to be endured, or truſted with any degree of Power, however legally entitled to it by the Conſtitution of their Country?—and that neither the Prince, who derives his Glory from the Greatneſs of his People, his Security and Affluence from their Proſperity, nor the Nobility, whoſe Titles and Eſtates depend upon the ſame Source, are proper Judges of the Intereſt of the Publick, while they deem themſelves the only knowing, wiſe, and honeſt Politicians of the World.

Again,—Will this Nation be ſeduced to ſuch a Point as not to ſee, that neither this, nor any other in the Word can ſtand alone, and without Allies?—ThatMaritime Power is precarious, neceſſarily divided often, and capable of changing from one State to another, when protected only by itſelf—That when the *Romans* gained the univerſal Empire on the Continent, though much in a lower Condition in their Marine than *France* now is, the *Carthaginians*, the only State of the whole World then potent in this reſpect, were in the End deſtroyed.—That we ourſelves only by one fortunate Defeat ruined the Naval Force of *Spain* in 1588, and acquired the Dominion of the Sea.—That every People almoſt in *Europe*, have now ſome degree of Power upon that Element, and that a little Acceſſion of Influence to *France*, muſt put her in a Condition to compel that whole collected Power to contend with ours,— that ſhe might, with *a little Extent* of her Barrier, and *Arrondiſſement* of her Dominions, reduce half of her Armies, and employ half of her Revenues to encreaſe her Fleets.—That the Experience of

all our Hiſtories ſhews, the utmoſt Care of the moſt numerous Squadrons inſufficient to ſecure us againſt being inſulted, nay, even actually invaded;—and that ſuch Invaſions have never failed to put us to great Expence, and have always given us great Alarms, and ſometimes proved ſucceſsful;—that we have rarely wanted a Faction, at any time, to back and to abett Attempts of this Nature; nor that, from the Nature of our Government, we ever ſhall,—and that when they were thus backed, and thus abetted, they hardly ever failed of their Deſign.—The very Government, and Monarchy and Conſtitution of this Country, owe their Origin to theſe Invaſions;—not to ſpeak of the *Romans*, whoſe Conqueſts are very remote, the *Saxons* conquered this Iſland, from the *Britons*, by their Fleets; the Empire of the *Saxons*, who, in Proportion to thoſe Times, had very conſiderable Naval Forces, was, for a while, entirely overthrown by the *Danes*;—and ſcarce had the *Saxons* recovered their Ground, but that the *Norman* Invaſion compleated all, and made an entire Conqueſt of this Nation.—From thence forward is it forgot how we have ſuffered by Deſcents from *France*; how the Contentions for private Title were perpetually carried on by foreign Aids, to the Perturbation of our State; how frequently every Party ſucceeded in their Turn; how near the *Spaniards*, as I have before obſerved, came to make a Province of this Iſland; how the Revolution, in the Memory of thoſe now living, ſucceeded, in ſpight of all the Vigilance of Government; how *Ireland* was upon the very Point of being loſt; how the *French* invaded, and retreated thence with Impunity; how, ſince that Time, many Deſcents have taken Effect; when our Navy was in its Zenith, and thoſe of other Powers at their loweſt Ebb;—how vaſt a Number of our Ships have been found inſufficient to anſwer all our ſeveral Purpoſes of Defence, of Trade, the Annoyance of our Enemies, and Protection of our own Coaſt, againſt one inconſiderable Enemy, and one hollow Friend?—If we have not forgot all this,—we muſt be mad, to think, that, at any Time, or in any Situation, this Nation can, with Security, alone confide in their Naval Force, much leſs when the reſt of *Europe* ſhall be reduced to the dread of, or to a provincial Dependance upon a great Empire, within three Hours ſail of ſome Part of our Dominions, and within ten of our Capital itſelf.

Will this Nation, however careful of its Liberty at Home, out of a remote and, honeſtly ſpeaking, little to be dreaded Danger of the Influence of a ſmall Military Force, expoſe itſelf to thoſe Inſults, which muſt deſtroy all Peace and Quiet, interrupt

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all Commerce, and may, upon every Turn, ruin the publick Credit of this Country, which gives Life to every Thing, in which we find either Profit or Security at home :— But much more ſhall this Nation, from theſe imaginary Dangers, be diſtracted enough to diſband her Armies in the Time of actual War, and run headlong into the manifeſt, immediate and certain Dangers of a Foreign Yoke ?—Are we to put ourſelves to immediate Death for fear of dying hereafter ?—What Folly is it, (out of a magnified Miſrepreſentation of Diſtreſſes, imaginary, and falſely pretended, Decay of Trade, or Suggeſtions of Poverty in the midſt of immenſe Opulency, greater than either we or any other State in *Europe* ever yet enjoyed,) to refuſe Succour to *thoſe Allies*, whoſe *Standing Armies* awe that Power, which, when once unreſtrained by them, can never poſſibly be reſiſted, but by ſuch Standing Armies at home, as would indeed be ruinous both to Trade and Liberty. By theſe occaſional and temporary Expences, we ſecure the future and conſtant Aſſiſtance, and avail ourſelves of the Benefit of Standing Armies of numerous and potent Nations, which anſwer, upon any Emergency abroad, that Want, which we otherwiſe ſhould have of them at home, and without which our Country would infallibly, ſooner or later, be the Seat of War,—without which our Inhabitants, inſtead of Manufacturers, muſt univerſally become Soldiers,—and our Battles be fought within our own Bowels, and by our own Countrymen, inſtead of being fought in the Countries of our Enemies, and to the Depopulation of other Nations.— No Expence can be too great to ſecure us theſe Advantages, or to preſerve us from theſe Evils,—and to pretend, that the Benefits of our Situation are to be carried further than this, or to be ſecured by any other Means in the preſent State and Politicks of all the Powers on the Continent, is a *Preſumption* upon the Goodneſs and Felicity permitted us by Providence, and *a Nonſenſe* that will deſtroy it all.

However evident this Reaſoning may be, yet it's contrary met with Advocates, and enlarged *their Bottom*; but, *broad* as they affected to call it, and *broad*, as it really became, by the Folly and Paſſion, and the Ferment of the Time, the Foundation, upon which it was built, was too bad to admit it to ſtand without it was yet much *broader*, to which End they employed their Sophiſtry, upon the Head of our Troops in *Flanders*, ſtill much farther. This they urged in the Debate of that Day ; but afterwards, according to their Cuſtom, retailed among the People, in a Pamphlet, intitled, *The Queſtion ſtated with regard to our Army in* Flanders. At the Cloſe of which, they ſummed up all their Argument, corrected by the Debate, inlarged by the Col-

Collection of the various Reaſonings of their Orators, and reduced by Leiſure, into the Method beſt adapted to impoſe upon the Publick.

Theſe Reaſonings were drawn into the Form of Queſtions moſt falſely and fallaciouſly compoſed, and as falſely and fallaciouſly anſwered by themſelves, which I ſhall take the Liberty to anſwer in a different Manner.

The firſt Queſtion was in theſe Words; *1ſt*, Why, with one War upon your Hands, will you draw yourſelves into another?

2dly, Why will you make yourſelves Principals in a War, in which you ought only to be Auxiliaries?

3dly, Why do you run yourſelves into Expences you can't bear, into Difficulties you will find it ſo hard, if not impoſſible to get out of, into Inconveniencies you ſee no End of, Purſuits where there is nothing to gain, and Struggles in which you have ſo much to loſe?

4thly, Why, if the Queen of *Hungary* is to be farther aſſiſted, do you, inſtead of ſending her Money, which might aſſiſt her, expend treble the Money ſhe would be thankful for in raiſing Forces that can't aſſiſt her?

5thly, Why did you diſſuade the Queen of *Hungary* from liſtening to all Offers of Accommodation the laſt Summer, and particularly at the Siege of *Prague?* Why did you endeavour to prevent her accepting the Terms propoſed of reciprocal Evacuation of *Bohemia* and *Bavaria*, leaving other Claims and Pretenſions to future Negotiations and civil Deciſion, which is the End they muſt come to, unleſs theſe Squabbles laſt for ever?

6thly, Why did you embarque in this Meaſure, without the Junction, Conſent, Approbation, or even Participation of *Holland?*

7thly, Why have you alone taken upon you the Hazards, Burthens and Expences of a Scheme, which all the Powers of *Europe* combined, would not perhaps be able to execute, and which no Power in *Europe* will aſſiſt you in?

Theſe Queſtions are, by the Confeſſion of the Author, who was known to be a capital Writer, the Subſtance of all they had to offer upon this Head, —and we ſhall now come to ſhew their flimſy Texture; — they are intended to paſs as ſo many ſolid Facts, attended with ſo many irrefragable Reaſons, how much they differ, from either Fact or Reaſon, appear by the following Reflections.

As to the firſt Queſtion, we entered into the ſecond War, becauſe we were bound by the ſtrongeſt Ties of Treaty and publick Faith to do it; — becauſe the firſt War could never have been brought to a happy Concluſion without it; — becauſe the ſecond Enemy ſupported the firſt; — becauſe the ſecond Power,

without entering avowedly into that War, ſupplied, encouraged, and fomented the Difference between us and the firſt; and becauſe there is more Safety in an open Enemy, than in a falſe Friend:—becauſe the Views of the firſt and ſecond Enemy coincided with each other; – and becauſe we were certain, that the ſecond Enemy would have joined the firſt, with her whole and an irreſiſtible Force, when ſhe had finiſhed her Work in *Germany*, and that then we ſhould have had to deal with both theſe Powers, without any one Ally in the World, --- whereas, by joining againſt the ſecond, at the Time we did it, we were able to act in Conjunction with ſome of the greateſt Powers in *Europe*, and a reaſonable Expectation of the Aid of more;---becauſe the raſh Attempts of the firſt Power, partly to gratify her own wild Ambition, and partly to aſſiſt the Plan of the ſecond, had afforded us the Means, if we engaged againſt the ſecond, of ruining the Armies of the firſt, of confining her Fleets from any Poſſibility of doing us any Harm, and in fine, of diſappointing her moſt favourite Views, of exhauſting her Revenues, and of throwing her Government into Confuſion in one Campaign, more than by any other way of waging War with her to the End of the World.---All this could be only done, when we had the one War upon our Hands, by engaging in the other.

As to the ſecond Queſtion, it will ſcarce admit of any Anſwer, becauſe the Aſſertion it implies is abſolutely and notoriouſly falſe in Fact, for we have hitherto not been Principals in this War in any Senſe whatever: We have acted only as Auxiliaries to the Houſe of *Auſtria*. --- And this it ſeems I need not take the Pains to juſtify, ſince in acting as Auxiliaries, we are by Confeſſion of this Author only what we ought to be.

The third Queſtion contains a complicated Charge, to which I ſhall diſtinctly anſwer: 1*ſt*, It is as happily as it is palpably untrue, *that the Expences into which we are involved, are ſuch as we cannot bear*. For to the heavy Diſappointment of the Enemies of this Country, the great Supplies of the laſt Year have been raiſed upon Terms as low, notwithſtanding all the Arts of monied Men, and all the Terrors ſcattered by the *Faction*, as they ever were in Times of the moſt profound Peace, while the Enemy, we are engaged with, cannot raiſe the Sums he wants, at twice the Rate of Intereſt we pay: Nor are they likely to reap any greater Satisfaction, with reſpect to the Supplies in the next Seſſion. 2. *As to the Difficulties, which are foretold to be ſo hard and impoſſible to get out of*, it is now viſible that by the Steadineſs of this Parliament, and the Bleſſing of God upon our Arms, we have already proved the *Faction* to be lying Prophets, and what has already happened, ſufficiently promiſes us a full Detection of

of the Falſity of every one of their Predictions. 3. *As to the Inconveniencies we ſee no End of*, it is undoubtedly true, that no human Reaſon can preſcribe an exact Period to any War, the Inconveniencies of which muſt laſt till ſuch War is determined; but if this be an Objection, it is ſuch a one, as muſt make againſt engaging in any War, however juſt or neceſſary, in any Country or Conjuncture whatſoever. 4. We are charged *with Purſuits, where there is nothing to gain, and Struggles, in which we have ſo much to loſe.*---But can theſe Men paſs for Patriots upon the Publick, who ſay, we have *nothing to gain*, by reſtoring that faithful Ally, which is alone able to ſtem the Ambition of the *French* Monarch, the implacable and ever dangerous Enemy of this Country? or can they be thought to have either Common Senſe or Honeſty, who contend, that we ſhould lie by in time of ſuch Danger?---*When are Men to ſtruggle, but when they have ſo much to loſe, as the Trade, the Independency, the Religion, and the Freedom of their Country?*

The fourth Queſtion demands, *why we did not aſſiſt the Queen of* Hungary *with Money only?* I cannot but obſerve, that this Queſtion, conſidering the Tendency of their *former* Inſinuations, is a little unneceſſary, unleſs they doubted of the Weight *they* might have upon the Publick;---for the general Turn of their Diſcourſe has been, that it is vain to aſſiſt her, either with Men or Money. ---In good Truth, if the Subject were not of too ſerious a Nature, it would be impoſſible not to laugh at the miſerable Shifts they have been put upon to defend their wretched Cauſe. Whenever any Man of Senſe and Knowledge kept them cloſe in Argument, and urged the Faith of Treaties, the Danger of *France*, the Ruin of the Ballance, the Caſe of the Earl of *Orford* (cenſured by themſelves for neglecting theſe Conſiderations,) they confeſſed all this, and denied, that they oppoſed it; they ſaid, that they agreed in the Neceſſity of aſſiſting the Houſe of *Auſtria*, and that they differed only in the Means; yet, if ever they could faſten upon any weak, ignorant, or ill-diſpoſed Perſon in private Converſation, it was their whole Labour to convince him of the Danger, Impracticability, and Inutility of doing it at all. This was the Topick upon which their Tools and Emiſſaries were inſtructed conſtantly to entertain the People,—nay, they came at laſt to talk publickly in Parliament in the ſame diſingenuous manner, and with the ſame Inconſiſtency.— It will not be ſoon forgot, in what Manner, or how in the Debate of this very Point, their moſt eminent Directors argued, *ſome* grounding their Harangues upon this Poſition, " That the late Succeſs of the Houſe of *Auſtria* had reduced " *France* ſo low, that ſhe could not carry on the War with

" any Profpect of Succefs; that the Queen of *Hungary* might " therefore make a fafe and an honourable Peace; and that to fup- " port her any longer would be to abet her in a War of Acqui- " fition and Ambition, with which we ought to have no Con- " cern; *others* declaiming upon this direct contrary Principle, " that the Houfe of *Auftria* was now reduced fo low, that fhe " could never more be looked upon as a proper Power to be " maintained for the Support of the Ballance againft *France*, " and that confequently, the Expence of aflifting the Queen " of *Hungary* in this View was fruitlefs and deftructive, and " tending only to encourage *her* in *the Purfuit*, and to plunge " *ourfelves* into *the Certainty* of more immediate *Ruin*." It is unneceffary to make any Remarks upon the Difference of the *Premifes*; it is enough, that the *Conclufion* was the fame from both. This kind of Reafoning therefore, as I have already obferved, feems to have rendered this Queftion (*why we did not aflift the Queen of* Hungary *with Money only of little Importance*) becaufe, according to the Doctrine we have mentioned, the proper Queftion fhould have rather been, *Why do we aflift the Queen of* Hungary *in any way whatfoever?*—However, we fhall follow our Gentlemen for the prefent in their own Way,—and anfwer firft, becaufe, though fhe might have been thankful for a third Part of the Money, which our Troops coft us, as any Power in her late deplorable Circumftances would have been, it was not *her Thanks*, but *her Prefervation* from immediate Ruin, it was not *her Gratitude*, but *the Recovery of her Power*, to ballance *France*, which it was our Bufinefs to procure; it muft have been an Aid that would be *effectual*, or we fhould have left her worfe than we found her. Now this Infinuation, that a pecuniary Aid would have been alone effectual, is far from being true, though the whole Money, which our Armies coft us, had been remitted to *Vienna*.---Firft, becaufe fuch immenfe Sums, exported out of this Country thither, would have diftreffed us greatly, and would have none of it return'd; it would have therefore been impracticable to have continued this Expence for any time: Whereas, by Experience of the laft War, it was manifeft, that very near two-thirds of the Charge of the Armies we maintained within a nearer Diftance of this Country, returned to us again; and we have had a Proof that we can fupport a War in this Method without any vaft Diminution of our Specie. 2*dly*, Becaufe fuch immenfe Sums muft, from the Nature of that Court, have been much wafted or confumed; but, however applied, could not fo conveniently have anfwered our Ends, becaufe we fhould have loft the Advantage of a Diverfion to the Forces of *France*, which

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is a Meaſure of the greateſt Benefit in War. *3dly*, Becauſe we ſhould have loſt the Advantage that reſulted from the Security of the Barrier, from the Encouragement of the *Dutch*, from the Protection of the States and Circles lying upon the Confines of *France*, and the Influence we have ſince manifeſtly gained upon the Diet of the Empire. *4thly*, Becauſe no other Meaſure could have put it in our Power to attack and pentrate into *France* itſelf, if God ſhould proſper our Arms with any remarkable Succeſs, and becauſe by this Apprehenſion the Flower of her Armies have been conſequently retained at home, and ſhe more likely to be brought to Terms of reaſonable Accommodation. *5thly*, That by this means we availed ourſelves of two great Points; *firſt*, of the Cavalry of the Allies, which is the beſt in *Europe*, and muſt have been for the greateſt Part unemployed in this Quarrel, if the War had not been carried on in this manner; and, *ſecondly*, of the natural Superiority which Confederated Powers have over a ſingle Nation, and what was our manifeſt Advantage in the laſt War, *viz.* that the Loſs of Men on our Part will fall more equally, and will be leſs felt; while the whole Loſs of *France* falls upon her own Nation, from whence alone ſhe is able to recruit; which Circumſtance, all other things ſuppoſed to be equal, muſt enable the Queen of *Hungary* to ſuſtain the War longer, and with leſs Inconvenience than the *French*.—For whatever the Vulgar have been taught to think, the *Auſtrian* Dominions are by no means inexhauſtible of Men;—tho' the *French* have ſuffered more, yet the *Auſtrians* have loſt a great Number, and it is a certain Fact, that *France* alone contains more Inhabitants than all the Countries of the Queen of *Hungary* put together.—As to the laſt Aſſertion, *that we have raiſed Forces that can't aſſiſt her*, it was founded upon an infamous, wicked, and abominable Falſhood, *That the Troops, with whom they acted in Conjunction, could not, nor would not, march in the Empire*, now as fully laid open, and diſproved in every Reſpect, as it was impudently and maliciouſly maintained.—In fine, a full Anſwer to all this Traſh and Ribbaldry is contained in one Word *Dettingen*, which, had they their Deſerts, ſhould be branded in the Forehead of every Member of the *Faction*.

The fifth Queſtion is grounded upon and conveys the Aſſertion of a Fact, which to this Hour they cannot tell whether it be true or falſe; that we diſſuaded the Queen of *Hungary* from liſtning *to all Offers of Accommodation, the laſt Summer, particularly at the Siege of* Prague, &c. To this I reply only, that if we did it we did wiſely. None but Politicians, ſuch as theſe, would have conſented to a Ceſſation of Arms; (for theſe Offers

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of Accommodation in effect amounted to no more) the only View of which was to prevent the Ruin of 30,000 Regular Troops of *France*, and all the ill Conſequences ſhe ſuffered in the enſuing Campaign. Let us farther ſee upon what Terms;—*Why you, the Queen of* Hungary, *are Miſtreſs of* Bavaria, *which we cannot recover*; *we, the* French, *are Maſters of half* Bohemia, *which we cannot keep*; *give us therefore up* Bavaria, *and you ſhall have* Bohemia; *ſaving only to the Emperor, our Ally, (that is to ſay, both to us and him, a ſufficient Pretence to attack you again immediately, when we have got out of our preſent Scrape, with an additional Force) his Pretenſions to all your Dominions, the preſent Poſſeſſion of Part of* Bohemia, *and the Town of* Egra, *which is the Key to the whole*; *giving up moreover to him your Intereſt in* Swabia, (*which is little leſs than the third Part of that Circle, and has, by the Number of its Votes, the ſame kind of Influence in the Diet of the Empire, as* Cornwall *in the* Britiſh *Parliament*;) *together with the* Foreſt Towns, (*which as ſoon as you have parted with, your ancient and permanent Alliance with the* Swiſs, *by which they are tied never to act in any Capacity as Enemies againſt you, will be diſſolved*;) *then will we deliver up the City of* Prague *into your Hands.*---Now, that this City of *Prague* (out of which 10,000 of 30,000 that were there, and their beſt Cavalry a Part of that Number, never lived to return, which did not long after, and was then every Day expected to fall into the *Auſtrian* Hands,) was all that the Queen of *Hungary* could have gained by this Ceſſation, is too viſible to be denied; and it is therefore no Wonder, that ſhe was ſo obſtinate as ſhe is repreſented by the *Faction*; ſhe was not inclined to truſt to a new Capitulation with that very Body of Troops, who, had they not, contrary to all military Faith and Rules of War broke a Capitulation, by which they ſaved their Lives at *Lintz* a few Months before, could not have been at *Prague* in that Conjuncture to have demanded a ſecond Opportunity to abuſe the Mercy of this generous Princeſs. Yet, ſhortly after, it was made a Pretence againſt her for not accepting theſe abſurd Terms. The *Faction* abuſed her for it, and proclaimed that ſhe no longer merited our Aſſiſtance, that ſhe was vindictive and ambitious, and that ſhe had changed the Nature of the War, that it was now become offenſive inſtead of defenſive on her Part; that ſhe deſerved to periſh for her Folly, and our Miniſters to be hang'd for adviſing her to it:--To what?--Not to truſt to the inſidious Offers, to the Faith of that perfidious Power, Offers, that gave no Aſſurance of any Accommodation; Offers plainly calculated to enable her Enemies to fall upon her immediately after, with redoubled Force, tending only to deprive her of the happy Opportunity,

portunity, which God had preſented, to give the greateſt Blow to *France*, that was ever given to her in one Campaign ; Offers *to bribe her by an Advantage, which was, in Fact, already in her Hands,—to be guaranty'd to her, by the Honour and Honeſty of* France,—*confirmed by the additional Power of her releaſed Army, and ſecured by the Reſervation of the Emperor's Title to all her Dominions, which the Emperor has, by his Memorials, ſince actually avowed as his Intention never to have departed from.* The Acceptance of ſuch Offers may be adviſed by *Jacobite* Counſellors, and abetted by inconſiderate and never-to-be-unblinded *Tories* ; but no honeſt *Engliſhman* can bear ſuch flagrant and manifeſt Diſcovery of a Confederacy in this Country to promote the Views of *France* ; or ſuffer himſelf, by any Pretence, to aſſiſt in the Advancement of ſuch a Party into the Adminiſtration of Affairs, as could recommend it to be done.

Indeed theſe Endeavours to prevent us from availing ourſelves of every Advantage againſt *France*, theſe outragious Attempts to prejudice our People againſt their natural Allies, this heaving with ſuch exceſſive and unnatural Efforts againſt the Principles of Reaſon, Safety and Juſtice ; all this puts it out of our Power, to deal more gently with theſe Men. And were it in our Power their Malice and Inveteracy to all who differ from them, deprives them of all Title to any better Treatment.—But to proceed—

Our Miniſters therefore acted honeſtly and wiſely (if they did give the contrary Advice) and unleſs they had been of the Principles of that *Faction*, which abandoned the *Catalonians*, and the *French Proteſtants* of the *Cevennes*, made the ſeparate Peace of *Utrecht*, ſacrificed their Allies, and all the Advantages of the late War, the Glory, Intereſt and good Faith of this Nation ; and unleſs they had entertained the ſame View, the Preſervation of the Houſe of *Bourbon*, for the Service of the Pretender, they could have given no other. If this Step had not been taken, by this Time indeed we ſhould not have had an Army in *Flanders*, nor would there have been a ſingle Army in *Europe*, that could have ventured to have oppoſed the Views of *France* ; the Queen of *Hungary*, attacked by the collected Force of *France*, would have clearly underſtood what was meant by the *future Negociations*, and the *civil Deciſion* then propoſed to her ; ſhe muſt have ſubmitted long e'er now to the Will of that relentleſs Power ; and we ſhould have had all our Thoughts turned vainly, and without Effect to execute the pleaſant Scheme of theſe wiſe and honeſt Patriots, that of *entrenching ourſelves in our Iſland againſt the united Power of* France *and* Spain ; how long it had been before theſe Entrenchments had been forced, every knowing Man can eaſily ſee and underſtand.

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The next Queſtion is, *Why did you embark in this Meaſure without the Junction, Conſent, Approbation, or even Participation of* Holland.—This Way of inſinuating Falſhoods with an *If*, and in this Manner, has the ſame Effect upon the People, as ſo many certain Facts, and give theſe Men the Opportunity, when the Inſinuation is proved falſe, either by the Reaſon of their Adverſaries, or the Event, to ſay they only ſuggeſted what ſeemed to them the Caſe, and that they never poſitively aſſerted theſe Things.— But as they have all the Effect of poſitive Aſſertions, and as they reaſon upon them always, as if they were to be taken for granted, and for ſo many undeniable Truths, we have no other way to treat them, but to take them on our Part, as the People are intended to take them on theirs. ---Theſe Aſſertions then, are all of them either falſe, or fallacious, but if ever ſo true, the Meaſure was ſuch as the whole People (for the Reaſons I have mentioned, when I firſt entered upon this Head) with all its Inconveniences, and theſe great Uncertainties, thought themſelves reduced to an abſolute Neceſſity, by way of Experiment, to undertake.---That we did it without the Participation of *Holland*, is a glaring Untruth, for it cannot be ſoon forgot how our Miniſters were ridiculed by the *Faction*, for the preſſing Inſtances we made in *Holland*, to engage them to join with us at that Time.---And that it was without their *Junction*, *Conſent*, or *Approbation*, is very fallacious, becauſe theſe Words convey an Idea, which is abſolutely falſe, *that they refuſed* to join *at all*, *that they gave us Reaſon to believe*, *that they never would conſent*, *and that they had given us to underſtand*, *that they condemned our Undertaking*.---Whereas the Fact was only this, that they would not join in the Inſtant that we firſt deſired, ---that they would not conſent till they found that they might depend upon the Vigour and Stability of our Adminiſtration,--- that they would not publickly approve of a Meaſure, in which it was not ſafe for them to engage, till they ſaw a Force ſufficient to protect them, and till they were convinced, that the Efforts of a *Faction*, which had betrayed them once before, were too weak to defeat its Effect, and to cauſe them to be left, as they were formerly, at the Mercy of the *French*.---Theſe appear to have been their only Reaſons.---This we knew at that Time by the Aſſurances of their Miniſtry to ours;---this the *French* then equally underſtood (as any Man may ſee by *Van Hoey*'s Letters;) and this is now ſo clearly demonſtrated by their actual Acceſſion to our Views, that for the future the People, if they are not infatuated, muſt be convinced, how little Dependence they ought to have upon Men, who ſcruple no wicked Arts to render them the Tools to effect their ſtill more wicked Deſigns, and

that

that *there may be a Neceſſity, in ſome Conjunctures, to repoſe a Confidence in the Abilities, Integrity, and Intelligence of thoſe who who direct their Affairs.*

The ſeventh Queſtion aſſerts three monſtrous Facts, equally falſe, and equally tending to the Ruin of our Country:---1ſt, *That we have taken upon us alone the Hazards, Burthens and Expences of this Scheme*; that is, of preventing *France* from being Miſtreſs of all *Europe*:---2dly, *That all the Powers in* Europe *combined would not be able* (perhaps) *to execute this Scheme*:---3dly, *That no Power in* Europe *will aſſiſt us in it.*

I am already wearied, and it is impoſſible to find Variety of Terms to expreſs the Iniquity of the Conduct of theſe Men.--- All their Aſſertions are ſo exactly correſpondent with each other, that the ſame Epithets muſt be perpetually repeated, when we reflect upon them; yet it is impoſſible for honeſt Men to let ſuch Advances paſs unanſwered.---What Impudence can be ſo great as this, to ſay, that *England* alone has taken upon itſelf the Hazards, Burthens and Expences of this War?---The Houſe of *Auſtria* has now in different Parts, and in different Armies, no leſs than 180,000 Men:---Under Prince *Charles* 63,000; under other Generals in *Germany*, employed in the Sieges or Blockades of *Egra*, *Ingolſtadt*, &c. 30,000;---with the King of *Sardinia* and Count *Traun* 27,000; in *Flanders*, and upon the *Rhine*, 20,000; in the *Trentine*, and the *Tirol*, and adjacent Parts of *Bavaria*, 15,000; upon the *Adriatick*, ready to ſuccour, either the *Italian* Armies, or to be carried into the *Neapolitan* Dominions by our Fleets, 12,000; and at leaſt 13,000 Men in the Garriſons of *Auſtria*, the different Parts of *Bohemia*, *Hungary*, *Moravia*, *Servia*, *Croatia*, *Sclavonia*, *Carinthia*, *Carniola*, *Stiria*, and other Provinces which, bordering upon the *Turk*, can never be totally left unfurniſhed;---the King of *Sardinia* has above 40,000 and with his Militia above threeſcore, which amounts at leaſt to *Two hundred and forty thouſand Men*, towards which we contributed no more than the Vote of 500,000 *l.*---Can it then be ſaid, that we alone have taken upon us the Hazards, Burthens, and Expences of this Scheme, this genuine and incontrovertible State of our Confederacy, even at the Time of this Debate, evinces better than any Scheme of Argument or Words can do, the Falſity of every one of theſe three Aſſertions.---*That we bear the whole Expence---that it is impoſſible for all* Europe *combined to prevent* France *from becoming Miſtreſs of the World---and that we have no Allies*---ſo far untrue, that ſince the Acceſſion of the *Dutch*, though as yet with no more than 28,000 Men, and his Majeſty's Quota for the Electorate of *Hanover*, (both which the *Faction* impudently aſſerted we were

never to expect,) together with the *Engliſh*, *Heſſians*, and *Hanoverians*, in the *Britiſh* Pay, we have now in this Confederacy, and actually in the Field, little leſs than 320,000 of the beſt Troops in *Europe*, which is a greater Force than *France* alone will be ever able to bring againſt us, which ſhe cannot maintain, and which, as her Troops conſiſt at preſent of the very Reliques of her exhauſted People, if they are once defeated, her Country cannot recruit again. And we are farther morally ſure, ſhould the War continue, of a much greater Aſſiſtance from other *German* States, certainly from *Ruſſia*, and not impoſſibly from even *Saxony* and *Pruſſia*. So that as our Affairs now ſtand, conſidering the total Ruin of *Bavaria*, the Inability of *Spain*, the immenſe Loſſes and Expences of *France*, which have been all waſted to little Effect, the Security of the *Turk*, the deep Reſentments, and the Stake for which the Houſe of *Auſtria* now contend, the *manifeſted Perfidy* and *detected Views* of *France*; we are in a much fairer Situation, if we avail ourſelves of it, as we ought, to reduce *France*, than we ever were in any Period of Time. The only Danger therefore to which we are now expoſed is from the Wickedneſs of this *Faction*, and the Levity and Folly of our own People, who may, by their intemperate Conduct and Impatience, induce our Miniſters to accept of indifferent Terms from *France*, (though they know that ſhe now lies in a manner at our Mercy,) rather than be compelled after yet greater and more clear Advantages to ſacrifice ſtill a fairer Proſpect. Let me therefore adjure my Countrymen, by all that they hold moſt dear and ſacred, not to concur in obſtructing and defeating this glorious Opportunity, which God has thrown before us, which if properly improved is the only likely means to ſecure us for Ages yet to come, (moſt certainly for many Years,) againſt all thoſe Expences, that have been ſo long heavy on us; againſt the Neceſſity of thoſe ſtanding Armies, which are ſo odious; and againſt thoſe Taxes, which, by the neceſſary Methods of their Collection, ſo greatly, though unavoidably, harraſs the People; which create that Dependency of which they are ſo jealous, and prevent the Diminution of that Debt, which is at preſent ſo great a Clog upon our Lands, our Commerce and our Influence abroad.---The natural Conſequences of that Succeſs, which it ſeems at this Time ſo much in our Power to enſure, will far more effectually ſecure the Conſtitution of this Kingdom, than all the Paper Guards of popular Laws. Theſe are but palliative and vain Remedies: if carried too far, tend only to aggravate the Differences and Jealouſies between *Prerogative* and *Privilege*, and may compel Government to invent new Arts of a more ſecret, and conſequently of the moſt dangerous Nature to the Liberties of every Nation.

We

We have now done with our Reflections on the Conduct of the *Faction* upon this Head of the 16,000 Troops in *Flanders*; and I hope with ſome Advantage to the Publick, by the cleareſt Vindication of that Meaſure, and by the manifeſt Detection of the Views of thoſe, who oppoſed it, and ſeduced the People to be diſcontented with it, Wicked as their Conduct was in this, I know not how to deſcribe its dangerous Tendency with relation to the next Point, upon which they ſhewed themſelves. There are ſome Crimes ſo horrible, Deſigns and Views ſo infamous and ſo pernicious, that they ſecure themſelves from Detection by the Honeſty of Mankind, whoſe Ideas can ſcarce riſe to the Suſpicion that Man ſhould be guilty of them. Of ſuch a Nature was the Oppoſition of this *Faction* to the Queſtion of the *Hanoverian* Troops.

In all the Courſe of the former Oppoſition, (though no rational Man will attempt to excuſe every paſſionate Conduct of any Party,)—yet being conducted by Men, who ever ſtrictly maintained their Affection to the Royal Family upon the Throne, who knew, that its Security was the Security both of *Liberty* and the *Proteſtant Religion*, it may be affirmed, that they never endeavoured to poiſon the *Affections* of the *People* to the *Prince* upon the *Throne*.---It was the *Miniſter* they attacked only, and a *Change* of his *Perſon*, and his *Meaſures*, as we have already obſerved, were all that they encouraged the People to expect.---Had their *Prince* been guilty of any *Errors*, or ſubject to any *Infirmities* to which human Nature is expoſed, as well upon the *Throne* as in a *Cottage*, they would have thought it their Duty to have covered and concealed them all, rather than have hazarded one Grain of the Affections of the People to the Family upon the Throne.---If any Thing of this kind ever eſcaped, (and very little of it did in that Oppoſition,) it was the ſecret and never-to-be-traced Venom of *Jacobites*, who united in their Party, and abuſed the Liberty of the Preſs; but for any one of thoſe Men who are now taken into the Government, or who now act with it, who were the Leaders of the Party at that Time, they neither acted nor countenanced, nay, they kept down and deſtroyed that Tendency wherever it appeared.---Their Oppoſition was upon true Whig Principles, their Writings all tended to fix the People to theſe Principles, and one of the Reaſons why they encouraged the Spirit of Popularity and Republicaniſm, perhaps too far, was to divert the People from a contrary and fatal Turn another way.---But the Dregs of that Party, ſtripped of their Leaders, gleaned [illegible] the Whigs, by whom they were then governed, are now fallen into the Hands of Men, whoſe Principles are the very reverſe,—who

labour to deſtroy every Seed of Affection, or good Opinion in the People, towards the Royal Family.

To render this deſperate Deſign more practicable, they had thus begun to deſtroy the Senſe of the People, as to the Neceſſity of the War, and the Aſſiſtance of the Houſe of *Auſtria*, in the manner we have ſeen, that they might (and it was impoſſible to be done without it) with more Effect inſinuate, in due time, the pernicious Belief, that it was a War engaged in merely for the Intereſts of *Hanover* alone.

They flattered themſelves that the Time was now come.--- The Preſs ſwarmed with ſuch treaſonable Pamphlets, as were never ventured, or ever known to be publiſhed in any Age or Nation.--The King's Perſon was in Ballads, and Libels attacked with a Licence, which never was taken, even in the great Rebellion, when the King and the Nation were in actual War upon each other. It was now aſſerted publickly, and in Print, [a] *That the Intereſts of* Britain *had been ſteered, ever ſince the Acceſſion of this Family, by the Rudder of* Hanover.--[b] *That the Intereſts of* Great Britain *had been conſtantly and manifeſtly ſacrificed, for many Years, to that of the Electorate.*--- [c] *That the Intereſts of* Hanover *had been the Touchſtone of all our Meaſures ſince the Acceſſion.*--- [d] *That* Great Britain *had been hitherto ſtrong and vigorous enough to bear up* Hanover *on its Shoulders, and though now waſted and wearied out with the continued Fatigue, ſhe was ſtill goaded on, as if already ſold to Vaſſallage, and by Compulſion obliged to perſiſt in the ungrateful Drudgery, without Hope of, or Title to, Redemption,--- and forced* [e] *to ſubmit to the Ignominy of becoming only a Money Province to that Electorate.--That nobody could or did indeed wonder at the Affection his late Majeſty expreſſed for his native Country, and nobody blames the Tenderneſs his preſent Majeſty preſerves for it: Both of them had their Beings and their firſt Impreſſions in it. Nor would it be ſurpriſing,- if the Succeſſor ſhould have ſome Predilection for the Meridian in which he was born and educated, but it is a terrible Doctrine, that of being a pecuniary Province to a little State upon the Continent, deſtined only to bolſter up its Pride, ſupply its Indigence, and gratify its ſcandalous Avarice, to laviſh away, upon a puny hopeleſs ſtunted Child, the Nouriſhment neceſſary to ſupport the healthy and thriving one---[f] Exhauſted and beggared as we are already, a ſervile Submiſſion, and the breaking and taming of the true* Engliſh *Spirit, may poſſibly be thought the next Thing neceſſary;*

[a] Caſe of *Hanover* Troops, fol. 30. [b] The Intereſt of *Hanover*, fol. 19. [c] Ibid. fol. 51. [d] Caſe of the *Hanover* Troops, fol. 71. [e] Ibid. fol. 83. [f] Caſe of the *Hanover* Troops, fol. 54.

ſary ; in order to which, the Intereſt and Influence of Hanover *are no longer now to be diſguiſed or concealed, but openly avowed as the Rule of our Conduct, and the Spring of our Actions.*--[a] *Lured by an inſatiable Thirſt of Gain, in whatever Shape ; in love with military Spectacles, and to make a Soldier-like Figure in the Field,* Hanover *may proceed as far as a March, or a Counter-march more would be too much.*---[b] *Will you loſe the Affections, and exhauſt the Strength of your Kingdom, for the Addition of a Bailliage to the Electorate.*---[c] *We have too much good Senſe to be ſo impoſed upon, too much Spirit not to reſent the very Attempt, and too much Diſcretion to beggar ourſelves for the ſake of an Infant, which has been a Snare and a Curſe to us from the Beginning.*—This is the venomous Stile, theſe are the very individual Words and Language of this deteſtable Set of Men, ſet forth not only in their Speeches, both within the Houſe and without, but publiſhed in the Face of Government, and to the World, delivered to the People as their Creed, inculcated as the Fundamentals of their Political Faith, written by their moſt eminent Men, avowed by them, recommended, and with amazing Induſtry ſpread through the remoteſt Corners of the united Kingdom. I have referred to the Pamphlets themſelves, and to the Pages, that I may not be accuſed of Miſrepreſentation ; (the Books are in every Man's Hands,) for they who are capable to aſſert this, are baſe enough to deny it when they have done it.

Let us now ſee upon what Pretences, and upon what imminent Danger, this Fire, Fury, and Treaſon, dared to avow itſelf, to expect Countenance of the People, or to eſcape its Puniſhment.--It was for this, and this alone, becauſe *the Miniſters had taken* 16,000 Hanoverian *Auxiliaries into* Britiſh *Pay, to ſerve in the Quarrel againſt the Houſe of* Bourbon, *and to ſupport the Houſe of* Auſtria. Without which we have ſo fully demonſtrated that it could not in that Conjuncture have been ſupported, or the Ballance of *Europe* ſaved from utter Ruin.

The Articles of Impeachment drawn up againſt the King of *England*, (for the Attack was now puſhed to the Foot of the Throne itſelf) were theſe :

1ſt, *That the King and his Father, Electors of* Hanover, *having no Regard nor Paternal Affection to their* Britiſh *Dominions, had falſely and treacherouſly, to their People of* England, *betrayed their Intereſts, and by a corrupt Majority in Parliament, had ſacrificed the Wealth, Treaſure, Security, Liberty and Reputation of this Country, by one continued Series of uninterrupted Meaſures, to the contemptible Intereſt of their* Hanoverian *Dominions.*

[a] A Vindication of the Caſe of the *Hanover* Troops, fol. 29.
[b] Ibid. fol. 54. [c] Caſe of *Hanover* Troops, fol. 72.

2dly,

2dly, *That to give the finiſhing Blow, to perfect this long-laboured and indefatigable Undertaking, and to gratify an Avarice inſatiable, his preſent Majeſty had hired* 16,000 *of his* Hanoverians *under a Pretext of compoſing an Army of Auxiliaries for the Service of the Houſe of* Auſtria.

3*dly*, That at the Time he did this, [a] *he was convinced of the Impracticability of raiſing this Phantom of the Houſe of* Auſtria, *to be again in a Condition of ballancing the Houſe of* Bourbon.

4*thly*, That at the ſame time,—[b] *He knew too well, that it is againſt the Intereſt of every Prince in* Germany, *and even of the King of* Sardinia *himſelf, that ſuch an Event ſhould take place.*

[c] 5*thly*, That he had done this:—*When the Queen of* Hungary *became not only ſucceſsful in her own Enterprizes, but found Means to diſengage* Pruſſia *and* Saxony *from* France, *nay, even* France *herſelf became perplexed and entangled to ſuch a Degree, as to find herſelf obliged to offer Terms to the Queen of* Hungary, *for the ſaving both her Forces and her Honour.*

6*thly*, [d] That he had been guilty of a Conduct *to the laſt Degree impolitick, to ſay no worſe, not to adviſe that Princeſs to accept the Offers of* France, (viz. *to ſave both the Forces and Honour of* France,) *with which Terms*, Pruſſia, Saxony, *and every Prince in the Empire, but one, are ſatisfied.*

7*thly*, [e] That he had perſiſted in this Scheme of hiring 16,000 of his *Hanoverian* Troops, *though from the Moment that the Queen of* Hungary *rejected theſe Offers, the Intereſt, and (of courſe) the Policy of the* Dutch, *was changed, the Dread of* France, *and its being to be paid, at the Expence of their Barrier, was loſt.*

8*thly*, That therefore he had violated *the invariable Maxim* (*i. e.* the Maxim laid down by the *Faction* to ſerve the preſent Purpoſe) *never to enter into a Land War, but when the* Dutch *Barrier was in Danger:* And that *he knew very well*, becauſe the *Dutch* ſtood out, *there was no real Neceſſity for our meddling at all.*

9*thly*, That he had done this, *when he knew the* Dutch *would never join us, which it was evident they would not, becauſe they had not.*

10*thly*, That he had done this, though by the Laws of the Empire, *he knew that theſe Troops neither would nor ought to march into* Germany *in Aid of the Queen of* Hungary, *and tho' he knew they could be of no Uſe to her in* Flanders, *nor any where elſe.*

[a] Caſe of *Hanover* Troops, fol. 51. [b] Ibid. fol. 52. [c] Ibid. fol. 49. [d] Ibid. fol. 53. [e] Ibid. fol. 49.

11*thly*,

11*thly*, That he had done all this *contrary to the Senſe of Parliament, and in a manner that violated the Conſtitution and Privilege of Parliament.*

There are but three Inſtances in all the Hiſtory of this Country, of Articles of this Nature brought by the Subject againſt the Prince; in the Reigns of *Edward* the Second, *Richard* the Second, and *Charles* the Firſt; and in every one of theſe it was by Parliament, and after the Prince was virtually or actually depoſed; but ſuch an Arraignment of any Prince, while he ſat upon his Throne, and had the Approbation of his Parliament for every Meaſure that he took, was never paralleled in this or any other Country.

And when we conſider, not only the malevolent and deſperate Tendency of this Charge, how the Facts have been miſrepreſented, how the Events have ſhewn the Falſhood of almoſt every Article that is here laid down, and how obvious the Anſwer is to every one of the reſt; when we conſider the Views (to which they directly led) of Ruin to the Peace and to the Intereſt of this Country both at home and abroad;—who can ſay, that the Authors of this wicked Conduct, who now ſtile themſelves by the gentle Term of *Oppoſition*, are charged by too harſh an Appellation, when they are proclaimed by the Name and Title of *a Faction.*

A Faction they are and muſt appear to every cool and honeſt Man the worſt in their Deſigns, the moſt daring in their Attempts on Government, and the leaſt warranted by any Pretence or Shew of Reaſon, that ever reared its monſtrous Creſt in this Nation.

To obſerve, as it might be done, upon the *Inconſiſtencies, falſe Concluſions*, and *Abſurdities*, contained in each Article of the Charge above-mentioned, would be to provoke *Mirth*, inſtead of that *Horror* which ought to ariſe upon this Proceeding, and would divert that *Attention*, and *deep Reflection*, which the Nation ought to have upon the *Danger* they are in from the Practices of theſe Men.—As to every Point that may ſeem to have the leaſt Colour of Objection, I have purpoſely anſwered before, in the former Pages of this Work, that I might not interrupt that Reflection, and for the ſame Reaſon I ſhall here cloſe my Account of the farther Conduct of theſe Men, with reſpect to this *memorable Queſtion of the* Hanoverian Troops; to which Conduct nothing could add Aggravation, ſince its pernicious Intention manifeſtly was no other, than *by one uniform Proceeding, to dethrone his Majeſty in the Hearts of his People, that they might the more eaſily detrude him afterwards from the Throne itſelf, and to preſerve the Houſe of* Bourbon, *in a Condition to place a Succeſſor*

Succeſſor in his ſtead. In which View, they likewiſe gave all Obſtruction in their Power to the Supplies, and to every Way and Means to raiſe them.

But we are now, by farther Circumſtances of the laſt Seſſion, to ſhew how they have impoſed upon Mankind; —particularly in thoſe three Points, by which they had duped the Publick to adhere to them, and to give up their Senſes like an infatuated People with Regard to Foreign Affairs; *viz.* the *Place-Bill*, the *Triennial Law*, and the Inquiry into the Conduct of the Earl of *Orford*;—as to the *laſt* it is notorious, that they moved it only as a *Matter of Form*, and ſupported it in a Manner, that ſhewed it was a *mere* Farce; nay, they actually attempted, to take Advantage of the Union, which could not at once be rendered perfect between the Members formerly attached to his Party, and thoſe that were lately admitted into the Adminiſtration, by giving ſufficient Hints of a Diſpoſition to treat with him not only for his Indemnity, but for his Readmiſſion into Power again, upon Condition of being employed themſelves; to which they applied themſelves in an open and unguarded Manner, diſcovering in no one Point (after this Form was paſſed) the leaſt real Inclination to prejudice him further; on the contrary treating his Friends with an affected Diſtinction of Reſpect, directing all their ſcurrilous Speeches and Invectives ſolely againſt the *new Part of the Adminiſtration*, nay, comparing *their* Conduct with *that* of the former Miniſter, not only with an Advantage, given in the Compariſon, to the former, but with Encomiums from the Mouths of their Principal Orators, upon his Wiſdom, Moderation and tender Regard to the Intereſt of his Prince and Country. Whoever ſat in the laſt Seſſions of this Parliament will bear me witneſs as to what I aſſert; but they did it ſo groſsly, that it is almoſt paſt the Belief of thoſe, who did not ſee and hear it, and ſo as to ſhew manifeſtly that they conceived the Capacities of their Audience in Parliament, to be as dull and capable of Impoſition, as thoſe of the Herd they had ſo fatally and ſucceſsfully practiſed upon without: But they were miſtaken here; they had there to deal with *Whigs*, who can never be impoſed upon by theſe Men, who have experienced them too long, and know them too well, to truſt them in any Shape, which *Proteus*-like they are ready to aſſume to attain their private Ends. Even the Miniſter himſelf was contented with what he thought a better Security, the *Affection* of his old Friends, and the *Principles* of the new Part of the Adminiſtration, which would not ſuffer them to inflict any Puniſhment or to take Revenge upon any Man whatever, whoſe Deſtruction, from a Chain of Conſequences,

and

and the Ferment of a Nation, thus inflamed by these Incendiaries, must have brought Confusion upon their Country. He thought it more safe to rely upon the good Sense and Honesty of his declared Enemies, than to confide in the Faith of a *Faction*, whose Practise and Principle it was to deceive and to betray. The *old Part of the Administration*, though (from a natural Exultation in the Security, which the Folly and Wickedness of these Men, had beyond their Expectation insured for them,) they might divert themselves, and express some Pleasure to see this Turn in their Favour, and to find the Burden of Abuse retorted upon those, who had not long before been very liberal of it to them, still knew this never-to-be-forgotten Truth, that neither they nor the Nation could be safe at any Time, without the Union of the *Whigs*; and could not stand without it for one Hour, in the present State of Things. The same Knowledge induced the *new Part of the Administration* to bear with Patience all this Malice of the opposite Party, and the disagreeable Circumstance of being not entirely well treated by those they co-operated with: they considered these things to be as unavoidable, as it was certain, on the other hand, that Time would by Degrees redress this temporary Inconvenience; and they comforted themselves with this happy Reflection, that the Benefit which had accrued to the Nation, was singly owing to the *Firmness* of their *former*, and the *Moderation* of their *present* Conduct; that any *Good* unattained, or any *Evil*, likely to ensue, was the Off-spring of the Wickedness, Passions and Folly of other Men; and that the Success and Prudence of their Measures, had maintained the Balance of Power *abroad*, and the Interest both of their King and Country *at home*. By this visible Insincerity of these pretended Patriots, the Publick ought, and will, if they are not wholly blinded, see that *the further Success of this Enquiry is an impracticable thing, that it is not owing to those upon whom they cast the popular Odium of it, and that it is now palpably kept in Reserve only for a Subject of Distraction and Disunion of the honest Part of this Nation.*

Now as to the *Place-Bill*.—How ridiculous it is for these Men, (who embarked in the present *Faction* avowedly upon the Account that they had not been the very first of the late Opposition taken into Employment) to be the Persons entrusted by the People of *England* to obtain for them what they desire, in this Respect, wants nothing to give it Illustration; yet, if it wanted any, it would receive it from the faint Attempt of the *Faction* to compass this Point, which was visibly no more than to maintain the Shew of their Professions, and far from being carried on with that Warmth and Spirit which they

exerted in the other Purſuit of diſtreſſing the Government in every Step and Shape in the Proſecution of the neceſſary, juſt, important and practicable View of recovering the Weight, Influence, loſt Honour, and Security of this Nation, with Regard to its Affairs abroad :—How therefore can the People be deluded with their Pretences to procure what theſe Demagogues have put it out of the Power of any body to procure for them, and what ſo manifeſtly appears they have no real Intention to procure themſelves, were it in their Power? ---It is therefore evident, that this Point is likewiſe now only maintained for the ſame Views of Diſunion and Diſtraction.

Their Conduct, as to the Point of a *Triennial Parliament*, clears this up yet more plainly.—Theſe Men have not ſo much as followed the *Inſtructions*, which they themſelves *inſtructed* the People to inſiſt upon ;—for they never once attempted, or made any Motion, during the whole laſt Seſſions, towards the Repeal of the *Septennial Law*,—which is to be accounted for no other Way, than that they found an infinite Majority diſpoſed againſt it, or that they themſelves were not ſincere in their Profeſſions for it.—Both theſe were indeed their Reaſons, and either might be ſufficient to open the Eyes of Men.—But as to the latter, we have already ſhewn, that their chief People voted directly againſt it themſelves, when it was propoſed in the preceding Seſſions,—and they muſt either have acted counter to themſelves, which would have expoſed them too much, while their former Votes were freſh in every Man's Memory, or have detected this great Truth, to thoſe whom they laboured ſtill to deceive, that they never themſelves intended it ſhould paſs.—What Dependance then, or what juſt Proſpect can the People have to compaſs this favourite View, by the Aid of thoſe Men to whom they have abandoned their Senſe and Reaſon, and every Thing that is moſt dear, from the idle Expectation that they will obtain it for them?

If then the People of this Country may ſo clearly ſee, that theſe Points are, from every Circumſtance, and above all, from the former Imprudence, and the preſent deceitful Conduct of this Set of Men, not poſſible to be attained.—Why do they perſiſt *to imagine a vain thing?*—If their Oppoſition, as from what I have obſerved, is moſt undoubtedly the Caſe, cannot tend to procure theſe Things for them ;—for what is their Perſeverance in that Oppoſition, *but for Oppoſition ſake?*—Or what Effect can it produce, but the Prevention of a certain important Good, *the Eſtabliſhment of a perfect, permanent, and almoſt deſpaired of Security, as to our Foreign Affairs?*—Which would any rational Man reject, (conſidering moreover the irretrievable

trievable Condition we ſhall be reduced to if we ſhould loſe this happy Opportunity) for the ſake of the Pleaſure of *Oppoſition only?* —Can any Man juſtify this deluſive Entertainment of the Multitude, with Projects, which in his Soul he knows *impracticable*, and which, if *practicable*, are undoubtedly both of the *niceſt Nature*, and of very *dangerous* and *uncertain* Operation, from the unforeſeen Conſequences that attend all great Alterations in the Government of all Countries?—Or will any honeſt Man think himſelf intitled to lay the Seeds of ſuch Diviſions and Diſcontents in this Nation, as manifeſtly tend to ſhake the Foundations of the Monarchy, and the Conſtitution of this Country, for the ſake of *Oppoſition only?*—This is all the Fruit the People can at this time hope to reap from it,—their Leaders indeed may hope another,—what that is, the Tenor of their Conduct plainly manifeſts, and that it is both of a *publick* and *private* Nature.--But will the People be allured to abet ſuch Views for the *Publick*, or is it worth their while to hazard and to ſacrifice ſo much for the *private Views* of ſuch pretended Patriots?

I might content myſelf, if I only wrote to reaſonable Men, and to Men in their right Senſes, with this full Detection of the corrupt and peſtilent Views of this Faction, and with this Evidence of their Want of Capacity, as well as Inclination, to compaſs any thing but the Ruin of this Nation both at Home and Abroad. But as I write to Men heated and inflamed with Paſſion, to a giddy and unthinking Multitude, elated with their late Succeſs, and thence liable to misjudge of their Abilities, and to think that practicable which in a cooler State they will plainly ſee to be wholly out of their Power,—as, ſo long as they ſhall think their Pretenſions to be juſt and neceſſary, they will never deſiſt from the vain Purſuit; and as, by this Means, the Nation will be harraſſed with the moſt fatal and endleſs Confuſion, I ſhall now, with the utmoſt Candour, Honeſty and Truth, endeavour to give them a juſter View of thoſe falſe Opinions, which in ſome very important Points, they ſo vainly, and yet ſo paſſionately entertain; though it may claſh with the Popular Opinion, ſo as to draw down the worſt Inconveniences upon myſelf; though it may even diſgrace the Judgment, or create ſome unjuſt Reflection upon the Sincerity of others, as ſubjecting them to the Imputation of having maintained Doctrines which were in themſelves erroneous, or even ſuch as they knew to be ſuch. Candour, Honeſty, and true Patriotiſm, will make it rather a Matter of Honour than Shame in theſe Men, to ſubmit to theſe Inconveniencies; nay, even to make a fair Acknowledgment, either of their Miſtakes, or Faults, rather than by a

falſe Deſire of appearing *conſiſtent*, to be really *inconſiſtent*, in their moſt capital Profeſſion, and Intention, that of *ſupporting, in every Event, and at every Hazard, the true Intereſt and Happineſs of* Britain.

We have already obſerved in another Place, that the Views of the *Jacobites* had been ſo univerſally exploded by their infamous Conduct during the laſt four Years of the Queen, and by the Proof that aroſe of their dangerous Deſigns, from the Rebellion, that broke out ſoon after; and the Nation was ſo univerſally convinced of the Danger of that Faction, had ſeen ſuch Conſequences from their pretended Patriotiſm, and thought themſelves ſo happy in that critical Deliverance; that our Government enjoyed a Tranquillity beyond the Experience of any former Time. The *Jacobite* Spirit and the *Republican* Temper of the People, both ſeemed in a Manner to have been annihilated by the different Inconveniences alternately brought by both upon the People in the Space of threeſcore Years; the Concurrence therefore of the whole Nation made the Government ſo ſtrong, and the Adminiſtration of Affairs ſo eaſy; that it tempted the late Miniſter to wanton in his Power, to diſoblige many able and conſiderable Men, to deſpiſe the People, to be guilty of Miſmanagement in the Conduct of our Revenue, and to form Projects for the raiſing of Money, without due Attention to the Tenderneſs and Suſpicions of the People upon any Encreaſe of Influence or Power; till by this Conduct, by attempting to engroſs more than he could execute, and by undertaking to manage Foreign Affairs, which he little underſtood; our Condition inſenſibly grew very deſperate both at home and abroad, and yet the People ſeemed inſenſible of this to ſuch a Degree, and made ſo conſtant a Choice of thoſe he recommended, that moſt Men thought their Spirit greatly changed and broken, and that it was neceſſary to rouſe them from the Lethargy they ſeemed to be in. This honeſt Apprehenſion made them not afraid to animate the People by Diſcourſes of a *Republican* Turn; —the Liberties of *Europe* were upon the Brink of irretrievable Ruin, and if theſe were loſt, the Liberties of *Britain* could not ſtand:— Any means, that were not more dangerous than immediate Ruin, were thought lawful to be uſed, to effect this Change; the Means they uſed, far from ſeeming dangerous, appeared falſe to them, and to have a Tendency to bend the People from that Pile, which, upon all our late Diſorders, had appeared to caſt very dangerouſly another Way.--But their Zeal undoubtedly hurried them too far in this Reſpect. We have ſpoken freely of the *Faults* and *Errors* of the *late Miniſter*; we

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ſhall not ſcruple to ſpeak with the ſame Freedom of the *Oppoſition to him.* This was at leaſt an *Error*, if not a *Fault* in them, ---and the Publick at this Hour feel its bad Effect.

For the People have been ſo heated with Diſcourſes of this kind, that they have taken that, which was the *Means* to be the *End* and *View* of Oppoſition. The great and original End and View of their Oppoſition, was to *change the Miniſter*, and to *change the Meaſures*; but the People now having got theſe *Ends*, and carried this *View*, conſider them only as the Means to get in effect what no prudent Man ever wiſh'd or intended they ſhould get, *the whole Power of this Government, and the whole Conſtitution into their own Hands.*

Moreover, by the Ferment that has ariſen in this Nation, it has manifeſtly appeared, that neither the Spirit of the People is ſo low, nor the Power of the Crown ſo high, as both were imagined by many to have been during the Courſe of that Oppoſition. It appears, that the People are ſtill able to remove a bad Miniſter, and to force a Change of Meaſures, whenever it becomes the univerſal Senſe, that the Miniſter and the Meaſures are really wrong; the Liberty and Power therefore of the popular Intereſt in this Country is inconteſtible, and as great as it is neceſſary or ought to be in any. To change the Ballance of the Conſtitution is not their Right, nor ought thoſe Alterations to be made, which would enable them to do it.

It appears further, that the Views of the popular Intereſt, inflamed, diſtracted and miſguided as it has been of late, by thoſe into whoſe Hands it has unhappily fallen, are ſuch as they were never imagined to have been; a Party of Malecontents (by the Sufferance of the moſt ignorant and uninformed) aſſuming to themſelves, though very falſely, the Title of the People, claim with it a Pretenſion, which (were their Title juſt,) no People could have a Right to claim, erecting themſelves into a new Order in the State, affecting a Superiority to the whole Legiſlature; inſolently taking upon them, to dictate to all the three Eſtates, in which, the abſolute Power of the Government, by all the Laws of this Country, has indiſputably reſided ever ſince it was a Government, repining at every Decree they make; endeavouring to animate the People, in effect, to reſume into their own Hands, that vague and looſe Authority, which exiſts (unleſs in Theory) in the People of no Country upon Earth, the Inconvenience of which is ſo obvious, that it is the firſt Step of all Mankind, as ſoon as formed into Society, to diveſt themſelves of it, and to delegate it for ever from themſelves:—A Power, which could not be permitted

mitted even in a Society of 500 Families, impracticable in a great Empire, and therefore an ideal Doctrine, tending to no Point or Purpose whatsoever, but to cast this Nation into the most horrible Confusion, and to throw it back into a State of Nature. That has likewise appeared, which nothing can discover but Revolutions or Conjunctures, that approach so near them as this has done; viz. *that though the Influence of the Crown has seemed for some Years to have increased visibly, the popular Interest has been for many Years invisibly encreasing in a far greater Proportion.* The greatest Changes in all States are wrought by certain Alterations in the Circumstances and Properties of the People; which escape the most penetrating Eye, till Time and Accidents have ripened them to a proper Crisis. The Convulsions of Nations are like the Shocks of subterraneous Fires, formed by an Assemblage of combustible Materials, long collecting, and unsuspected till the very Moment of their fatal Explosion; the *Effects* are therefore the only means by which such *Causes* can be learned: The *Republican* Spirit so strangely risen as we have lately seen it, thus to work its Ends, it has preposterously joined with its Antipathy the *Jacobite*, directs us surely to this *Cause*; which can be no other than the great Encrease of Property in the People. The *Revenues of the Crown*, however magnified, we shall presently come to shew, have borne no Proportion to it, the *Encrease of the Peerage*, either in *Property* or *Number*, (notwithstanding the Additions that have been made since the Revolution,) partly from the great Caution of the Crown for many Years past, and partly from a weak and mistaken Prejudice in their own Body to the Extension of Honours, have in no degree kept pace with it; and the Lords are hardly now of any Poize in this Government. Induced by the Circumstances of the Time, to examine the Point, it is visible beyond all Power of Contradiction, that this has been the Case.—At the *Revolution* the Numbers of the People were computed nearly at *Six Millions*, and by the long Peace, and necessary Encrease of Procreation, this Number cannot be *at present* less than *Seven*, or in that Proportion; the Expence of the People per Head was about *Seven* Pounds at the *Revolution*, at *this Time* it is universally agreed, that this Expence amounts to *Ten*. Now as the Revenue of the People must infallibly be at least as much as the People spend, it follows, that the Revenue of the People was at the Revolution *Forty-two Millions*, and that it is *Seventy Millions* now: The People have therefore encreased in their annual Income *Twenty-eight Millions* (or in that Proportion) since the Revolution; and as it

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is a Maxim inconteſtible in Politicks, that Power always follows Property, which muſt ſooner or later operate in every Country, it is manifeſt, that the People have acquired in the Space of fifty Years, more ſolid Weight in the Scale of this Conſtitution, than they could have gained, or can gain by all the popular Laws, that ever were made, or can be made in their Favour to the End of Time.

Before I proſecute this Argument, to the Concluſion which I intend from it, perhaps it may be thought neceſſary to explain a little, how it came to paſs, that this Growth of the Popular Intereſt ſhould be ſo little perceived till now.—It happens in all ſuch Caſes as it has happened in this, and for the ſame Reaſon,—the Spirit of the People riſing with their Circumſtances, creates Difficulties to Government, of which it feels the Effects, long before it apprehends the Cauſe. Theſe Difficulties in a manner drive Government to exerciſe all its Authority, and to uſe many Arts in its own Defence, by which the People who do not ſee the Neceſſity it is under to do this, condemn, and conſider as Attempts offenſive, when they are in reality defenſive.—The Inſults of the one, and the Arts of the other therefore both encreaſe, till neither think themſelves ſecure, (which is the Misfortune, and in long run the Ruin of all mixed Governments) without new Laws, to encreaſe Power on the one Hand, and Privilege on the other.—And, for a time, it is very evident, why the Government is rather more ſucceſsful than the Popular Intereſt in theſe Attempts, becauſe the Generality of Men finding themſelves eaſy in the general Proſperity, and obſerving no material Change in the written Conſtitution, rather chuſe to ſupport the Government, though they do not approve all its Proceedings, than to abet the Popular Views,---the Peace of Society being (at leaſt for the Time) ſecured by the firſt, and always endangered by the laſt.---But, in the long run, Accidents will happen, which will either change the Perſons of thoſe in this moderate and cautious Way of Thinking, or diſtract their Principles, or confound their Judgments,---and when this happens, the Popular Spirit, having once made the Breach, blows up the Dam at once, and deſtroys, in one Hour, the Works that have been an Age erecting, to reſtrain it within its due Bounds: Thus, for want of an exact Knowledge of the different Nature of the Force, which Government employs againſt the People, and that of the Popular Intereſt againſt the Government; and from this Circumſtance, that the *one* is *viſible* in every Step of its Encreaſe, the *other latent* and *concealed*; and from hence, that *the one*, by its

its gradual and conſtantly oppoſed Progreſs, is not only obſerved, but magnified, while *the other* encreaſes inſenſibly, and without either Oppoſition or Perception, it becomes, from the Nature of the Thing, extremely difficult for any, and entirely impoſſible for the Generality of Men, not to be deceived in the Condition of the Conſtitution, under Circumſtances ſuch as theſe. Something will ariſe from an impartial and judicious Reflection upon theſe Particulars, very deſerving the Attention of all reaſonable Men. And the Judgment which muſt reſult from it, can be defeated by nothing but a Diſcovery, that the Crown has encreaſed in the ſame Proportion of Power as the Popular Intereſt has ſo manifeſtly done; in this Caſe there is nothing in all this Argument; but if it has not, *the Ballance undeniably preponderates on the Side of the People, more than it did at the Revolution*, that is to ſay, more than it ever did in any Period of our Government, *and conſequently the Diſcontents of the People, ſo far as they are founded upon a contrary Suppoſition, are moſt unreaſonable, unjuſt, and dangerous.*

In order to determine this Point, all that is neceſſary to be done, is, to conſider in what the Power of the Crown has been encreaſed ſince the Æra of the Revolution, there are but three Particulars in which it could poſſibly receive Addition, in the *Encreaſe of its Civil Liſt*; *in the Influence of additional Employments*; and laſtly, *in poſitive Laws in Favour of Prerogative*; of all theſe the firſt, which is *the Property* of the *Crown* muſt be in its Operation the moſt conſiderable, from what we have already obſerved as to the Effect of Property. This is therefore the Point, which we are to conſider firſt, and with moſt Attention:—But we muſt previouſly obſerve, that the Reaſon why we go no higher than the Æra of the Revolution is, becauſe though no Civil Liſt was ſettled before, the Civil Liſt Expences were enormouſly great, the Publick Charge being not above 700,000 *l. per Annum*, and the Revenue being above *Two Millions* from the Reſtoration to that Time.

Now as to the Encreaſe of the Power of the Crown from an Addition to its Property, it can conſiſt in nothing but the *Civil Liſt*; the Crown having no Ability, as it had before the Revolution, (when the publick Revenue and the *Civil Liſt* were both in the Diſpoſition of the Crown, and not divided,) to apply one ſingle Shilling of that publick Revenue to any Uſe, but to that for which it is appropriated.—Let us therefore examine the Quantum of the *Civil Liſt*.

Upon the firſt Face of this Examination, the Power of the Crown appears to be encreaſed, for the *Civil Liſt* is now 800,000 *l.*

800,000 *l. per Ann.* whereas in the Reign of * King *William*, and the late Queen it was but 700,000 *l.* But when this Point is duely conſidered it is indiſputable, not only that this is no *real* Encreaſe to the Power of the *Crown*, but that this Power is diminiſhed, notwithſtanding the *nominal* Addition to this *Revenue*.

King *William* and Queen *Anne*, as we have already obſerved, had but 700,000 *l. per Annum*; but *neither* had any Family to provide for, and *both* lived in Times, when that Income would have ſupported a greater Expence, than *a Million* would now do; for the Truth of which, I appeal to the Experience of every private Family, and to the known Advance of Price in all Commodities and Articles of Expence whatſoever. --- Excluſive therefore of the great Deduction, which ariſes from the Expence of his Majeſty's numerous Progeny, there is, in fact, inſtead of an Encreaſe of Power to the Crown in the Proportion of 100,000 *l.* a manifeſt Diminution of it in the Proportion of 200,000 *l.* which is the Sum deficient to make up a *Civil Liſt* equivalent (conſidering the Difference of the Times) to that of King *William*, or of the late Queen.

And indeed without a Conſideration of the Difference of the Times, no fair or juſt Eſtimate is poſſible to be made upon this Subject; every Century creates a mighty Alteration in this Reſpect. In the Time of the Conqueror the King's Revenues are reckoned by all the old Hiſtorians to have been enormous, and were computed at 1060 *l. per Diem*, which amounts to 386,900 *l. per Annum*; and we might therefore with the ſame Juſtice reaſon, that a Revenue at that Amount would be now too great, as to argue that the *Civil Liſt* ſhould not be greater now than it was forty or fifty Years ago; the Objections therefore, that have been made of late upon this Head, have been fallacious to the higheſt Degree, and either they, who have liſtned to them, never conſidered the Point as it ought to be conſidered, or have *ſecretly intended*, inſtead of keeping the Power of the Crown to its ancient Standard, *to reduce it lower than it ever ſtood in any Period of our Government.*

But when we look a little farther into this matter, however clear this Argument may be, we have no need much to inſiſt

* At the Revolution the *Civil Liſt* was ſettled at 600,000 *l. per Ann.* but this being very deficient to anſwer the Charges upon that Head, the Parliament in 1695 granted the King a Sum of 500,000 *l.* to pay his Debts, and in 1699, *Anno* 9 & 10 *Gul.* III. *cap.* 23. though the Queen was then dead, found it neceſſary to encreaſe the *Civil Liſt* to 700,000 *l. per Ann.*

upon it; for ſince the late Alteration of the Miniſtry, the Encreaſe of the Appointments of the Prince of *Wales*, has wholly taken away this Objection; his Royal Highneſs now enjoying his complete Allowance of 100,000 *l. per Annum*, which is the whole of that *nominal* Encreaſe of the *Civil Liſt*, above what it formerly was before his Majeſty's Acceſſion. When this comes to be conſidered, the Power of the Crown, with reſpect to Property, is not at all increaſed, even its firſt Aſpect; but is on the other Hand, when juſtly compared in all its Circumſtances, greatly and undeniably *decreaſed*, ſince the Period I have mentioned. Yet ſuch is the malignant Temper of this Age, that we have more to combat than Arguments and Facts---*Bonaque ac Mala non ſua Natura, ſed Vocibus Seditioſorum æſtimantur* [a]; Inſinuations of a malicious Tendency have Weight ſuperior to all the Reaſon in the World, and we muſt fight through theſe upon every Turn. Of this Nature is that vaunted Aſſertion in *The Caſe of the* Hanover *Troops* [b], of the late Queen's Generoſity in a Preſent made by her out of the *Civil Liſt* of 100,000 *l.* in one Year, towards carrying on the War with *France*; and from hence an oblique Argument is attempted to be drawn of a Superabundance in the preſent *Civil Liſt*, and an indirect Reflection, both upon the Miſapplication of the Surplus, and the Want of an equal Tenderneſs to the Publick in his preſent Majeſty; it is further manifeſt with what a wicked Intention this invidious Compariſon is made, from the officious Care of that infamous Author to remind the Reader, that that Princeſs was a Daughter of King *James* II. and from the Tendency of his whole Performance, which is plainly calculated to incline the People to regret the Loſs of that Family, by a Side Wind to trumpet the Fame of his own Faction, and to recommend it to the ignorant and deluded Multitude; the Queen being notoriouſly, at that Time, in the Leading-ſtrings of *Jacobites*.

It is impoſſible ſufficiently to admire either at their Confidence or their Impudence in this Mention of a Particular, which can be ſo ſtrongly retorted upon them: In fact, this pretended Generoſity was one of the moſt ſcandalous Actions, that the Crown was ever led to commit by any Adminiſtration; it was a manifeſt and groſs Cheat upon the Publick, who were extravagant Loſers by it; for ſome time after, *viz.* upon the 25th of *June*, 1713, the Queen was adviſed to acquaint the Houſe of Commons by Meſſage, that ſhe had contracted a very large Debt upon her *Civil Liſt* Revenues, which ſhe was unable to pay,

[a] *Tacitus*, Lib. Hiſt. 4. [b] Page 79.

pay, and therefore desired them to make good; and such was the Complaisance of a *Tory* Parliament, that notwithstanding the Detestation, which must have arisen in every honest Breast, upon the Detection of this clumsy Juggle; and tho' Mr. *Smith*, one of the Tellers of the Exchequer, honestly informed the House, that the Estimate of this Debt was astonishing to him, being made to amount, in *August* 1710, to 400,000 *l.* whereas he was able to affirm from his own Knowledge, that it amounted at that Time to little more than 100,000 *l.* and though many others undertook to prove that the Funds given for the 700,000 *l.* had, in reality, amounted to 800,000 *l.* and though these Gentlemen had prevailed so far, as to procure an Address to the Crown for an Account of the *Civil List* Debt at *Midsummer* 1713, and for a yearly Account of the Nett Produce of the *Civil List* Revenue, no Regard was paid to this Information, nor to this Address; none of these Accounts were ever permitted to be laid before the House, and upon the very next Day they voted no less a Sum than 500,000 *l.* for this Service. This is the Truth, and the whole Truth of that generous Exploit of the *Jacobite* Administration, under the Daughter of King *James* II. which was no more than a mean Trick, in which they basely employed the Name, and abused the Honour of that unfortunate Princess, to gull the Nation of 400,000 *l.*

From hence results an evident Proof, not only that the present *Civil List* is not greater than that of the late Queen, but that the *Civil List*, though we should wave the strong Fact of the Inequality of the same Revenues from the Difference of the Time, could not nearly suffice to answer the Expences of the Crown, even forty Years ago; it must follow therefore, either that a much greater Part of it was employed in *secret Services* and to *unwarrantable Purposes*, during that favourite Reign; or that the Oeconomy, even of the late profuse Minister, must have far exceeded that of the boasted Administration of a Set of Men they labour so much to ingratiate with the People.

The *Faction* reduced to this Dilemma, may possibly rather chuse to confess the *latter* than the *former*; but in doing this they must, in the first Instance, acknowledge a manifest Advantage to this Country from the Oeconomy of his present Majesty, who, though he has already reigned some Years longer than the late Queen, has hitherto neither demanded or received from his People on this Account, more than one single Sum of 115,000 *l.* and if they give it the only Turn that can be given to it, (after what we have already proved,) viz. *that it is equal to the Publick, whether the* Civil List *be greater or not, if his Majesty can afford out of it more than his Predecessors could afford*

to thoſe ſecret Services, which are ſuppoſed to affect the Publick Independency; this is what I abſolutely and juſtly deny: Becauſe (allowing it to be true in its utmoſt Extent) it is but a temporary Influence ariſing from a peculiar Turn, Temper, and, I may call it, a Virtue in its firſt Principle, which is accidental in the Perſon of one Man, may probably periſh with him, and cannot be looked upon as any real, ſolid or permanent Encreaſe of Power in the Crown, or Change in the Spirit of the Conſtitution. If this be duly conſidered, it ought greatly to quiet the Apprehenſions raiſed in the Breaſts of a very great Number of well-meaning Men, by the *Report* of the late *Secret Committee*; for however great the Sums there ſpecified to have been improperly applied to *Secret Service* out of the *Civil Liſt*, may be, (and very unwarrantable, in ſome Particulars, undoubtedly they are;) yet the Concluſion drawn from thence is not juſt, that our Conſtitution is decayed, in this reſpect, or in a worſe Condition than it has been in former Times. For this certainly cannot be the Caſe, when the *Civil Liſt* is evidently not encreaſed, either in fact, or in effect; and the utmoſt that can be drawn from this Report, or any Diſcovery that hath or can be made, muſt amount to nothing more than *that a temporary Circumſtance had put it in the Power of a late Miniſter to make a worſe Uſe of it, than his Predeceſſors had been willing, or than, in all Probability, for any Time to come, his Succeſſors can be able to do.*---Which may indeed affect that Miniſter, but ought not juſtly to affect the Conſtitution, or lead the Publick to any raſh and violent Alterations of it.

I am ſenſible, that this Doctrine will not, at firſt, ſuit well with the falſe Notions, which many have ſo paſſionately entertained of this Matter; but I am very indifferent upon that Head, *Magna eſt Veritas & prevalebit*; Truth may be borne down for a while by Prepoſſeſſion and falſe Inſinuations, but will force its way at laſt: As therefore it is my ſole Intention in theſe Papers, to bring my Countrymen into a juſt and moderate Temper, to allay that dangerous Ferment, which is now raiſed, and during the Continuance of which, it is impoſſible for them to make a right and impartial Judgment of their Affairs, I ſhall make no Scruple to oppoſe myſelf to their ſtrongeſt Prejudices without any Regard, whom I may oblige or diſoblige; I neither fear the Reſentments of the Friends of the former, nor court the Favour of the preſent Adminiſtration, I am not to be deterred by the Malice and Scandal of a *Faction*, nor will I humour the Paſſions and Folly of a People, whom every honeſt Man muſt endeavour to preſerve, even againſt their Inclination, when they precipitate themſelves, through Paſſion, Credulity, or Ignorance, into Ruin and Deſtruction.

To

To ſpeak therefore farther with the ſame Freedom upon the Subject of this Miſapplication of the *Civil Liſt*, as I have done upon every other Topic, which has hitherto fallen under my Conſideration, I muſt obſerve, that it is not eaſy for the Publick to judge, whether the Sums now diſcovered by this Report to be expended out of the *Civil Liſt* in the way, that they have appeared to be expended, were not, upon the whole, as great in former Reigns; the Preſumption is ſtrong that they have been much greater, becauſe it is evident, the *Civil Liſt* could have afforded it much better; and as no Parliamentary Enquiry was ever made before as to this Point, or directed to this Particular, at leaſt, their Information cannot extend to determine poſitively againſt this Opinion.

But what if we ſhould be able to diſcover, that in Truth notwithſtanding the Greatneſs of this Sum, *the Charge of the Government upon this Head was greater formerly than it is now?* yet this ſeems in a great Meaſure capable of being proved by Facts and Figures, the ſtrongeſt Evidence that can ſupport any Propoſition in the World.

For upon the great Settlement of our Conſtitution at the Revolution, the Parliament having called for all the Lights they could procure to enable them to judge of the Expence of Government in all its Branches, in order to make that *Separation* of the *Charge* of the *Crown*, and of the *Publick*, which was one of the great Benefits of that Change, and took away that extravagant Power, which the Crown before derived from having the ſole Management, and Diſtribution of the whole Revenue at large; it appeared that the Article of the Secret Service alone (beſides the Allowance to the Secretary of State, 6066 *l.* and the Penſions, which came to 146,703 *l. per Annum*,) amounted *communibus Annis* to 89,968 *l.* 8 *s.* 2 *d.* $\frac{3}{4}$ which, notwithſtanding the Temper they were then in, was not at all cenſured by Parliament as exorbitant at that Time.

Upon this Foundation I ſhall proceed to compare the Expence of Government under this Head before the *Revolution*, with the Expence of Government under the ſame Head, in the *preſent Time*.

It appears then that computing upon a Term of eleven Years before the Revolution, the Expence of Government upon the Article of Secret Service amounted to 989,652 *l.* 10 *s.* 6 *d.* $\frac{1}{4}$ again it appears by the Report of the *Secret Committee* (in the *Appendix* No. 10.) that in the ſame Term of eleven Years from the Year 1731, to the Year 1741 incluſive, this Article of *Secret Service* amounted to 786,355 *l.* 17 *s.* 4 *d.* to which Sum, the Committee have thought fit to add two Articles, both

of

of which are (with Submiſſion to ſo great an Authority) in a great Meaſure, different in their Nature from that Article, which is properly called *Secret Service*, *viz.* Money iſſued for *ſpecial Service*, 272,504 *l.* 8 *d.* and Money iſſued *to re-imburſe Expences* 205,390 *l.* 17 *s.* 10 *d.* which two Articles together amount to 477,894 *l.* 18 *s.* 6 *d.* They have likewiſe added further three other Articles, *viz.* 66,000 *l.* for the Secretaries of State, 68,800 *l.* upon Account, to the Sollicitor of the Treaſury, and 50,077 *l.* 18 *s.* to Authors and Printers, amounting together to 184,887 *l.* 18 *s.*

Theſe Totals of 786,355 *l.* 17 *s.* 4 *d.*—477,894 *l.* 18 *s.* 6 *d.* and 184,877 *l.* 18 *s.* come to 1,449,128 *l.* 13 *s.* 10 *d.* and with a few other ſmall Articles amount to the compleat Sum of 1,453,400 *l.* 6 *s.* 3 *d.* which is ſtated in the Report as ſuppoſed to be the Expence of the Civil Government in Secret Service, during the Space of the ſaid Eleven Years [a]. But if we are to compare the Expence of the former and the preſent Government, upon the Face of the two Accounts, it is viſible that we can only put the ſingle Article of *Secret Service* Money before the *Revolution*, againſt the *ſame* Article at this *Time*; which if we do, we ſhall find, that the ſame Article before the Revolution, amounted as above, in a Term of eleven Years, to 989,652 *l.* 10 *s.* 6 *d.* $\frac{1}{4}$. whereas it amounted to no more than 786,355 *l.* 17 *s.* 4 *d.* in the ſame Term, from 1731 to 1741 incluſive; ſo that, in this Light, the Charge inſtead of being encreaſed is diminiſhed ſince that Period, by no leſs a Sum than 203,296 *l.* 13 *s.* 2 *d.* $\frac{1}{4}$. And to conſider this Point in any other Light, though it may be done, with much Art, cannot, with any Degree of Certainty; for if, as in the Report, other Articles of Expence are brought (as ſeeming to have ſome Relation to it) to ſwell the Amount of the Articles of Money lately iſſued for *Secret Service*, it would be requiſite to ſcrutinize with the ſame Induſtry, into other Branches of the Charge of the Civil Government before the Revolution, which is impoſſible to do at this remote Diſtance of Time: So that, undoubtedly (however exceptionable either the Greatneſs of the Sums, at the firſt Sight, may be, or the Nature of their Application, or the Manner of their being iſſued) there is not any one of thoſe other Articles, which in the Report, are joined to this Sum of 786,000 *l.* that can be directly charged to this Account.

For who is it that does not perceive a very wide Difference between *Secret Service*, and the other two Articles of *Special Service*, and the *Reimburſement of Expences*. It is perhaps but

[a] The Enquiry was appointed for ten Years; but upon examining this Account of *Secret Service* in the Report, it appears to include eleven.

too

too probable, that ſome Part of the Money under theſe two Heads have been really applied to the ſame Uſe. Yet very great Sums muſt have been iſſued under theſe Titles, to Purpoſes very different from thoſe which ought to have given ſo much Alarm to the Publick; and this was undoubtedly the Caſe under ſome other Heads in all former Times.—As it is for this Reaſon out of our Power to make an exact Compariſon in this Way, I think it can be ſtated in no manner more correſpondent with the Truth, than as it has been ſtated here, and if ſo, the Propoſition is as ſufficiently proved, as the Nature of the Thing can poſſibly admit, *that the Charge of Government upon this Head, was greater formerly than it is now.*—However, after having thrown this out for the impartial Conſideration of the Publick, I will, for the ſake of Argument, and to prevent all Poſſibility of Cavil, admit both theſe Articles to be added in their full Extent to the Head of *Secret Service*, by which it will be augmented, though not at all accurately, to 1,264,250 *l.* 15 *s.* 10 *d.*

But after this Conceſſion I will venture to ſay, as to the other three Articles, *viz.* that to the Sollicitor of the Treaſury, that of the Allowance of 3000 *l. per Ann.* to each of the Secretaries of State, and that of the Money iſſued to Authors and Printers, it ſhould ſeem impoſſible, with any Candour, to bring them into the Charge of the *Secret Service*, and for the following Reaſons:

Becauſe as to the *firſt* Sum to the Sollicitor, it is given always upon Account, *viz.* for Crown Proſecutions, and other neceſſary, obvious and warrantable Occaſions of Government, of which the Committee themſelves were ſo well aware, that they have themſelves deducted that Sum from the grand Total.

As to the *Second*, which regards the Secretaries of State, this is in effect the Appointment of an Office, and ſtands juſtly exceptionable in this Compariſon, the rather, becauſe it was made a diſtinct Article from that of Secret Service in all Times, and is particularly ſo in the State of the Revenue at the Revolution, by which this Parallel is made, being not included in the annual Sum of 89,968 *l.* 8 *s.* 2 *d.* $\frac{3}{4}$, to which the Secret Service then amounted. And this was likewiſe in ſome ſort excepted by the Committee.

With regard to the *Third*, it is rather a Matter to be laughed at than conſidered ſeriouſly.—In the Nature of the thing, it is by no means a Secret Service: And in its Conſequences, eſpecially conſidering the Authors and their Productions, no Man will ſay, that it affected the Publick in the Way, which can only give the People any Right to concern themſelves about the Diſpoſition of the Civil Liſt.—It would be extreamly hard, if the Crown might not be allowed the ſame Privilege of the Pen,

which is allowed to any private Man, and certainly no Minister can be cenſured, if by Permiſſion of the Prince, and even by the Aſſiſtance of his private Purſe, he makes uſe of the ſame Liberty of the Preſs to defend the Meaſures of his Government, which the Subject, with Impunity, employs whenever he thinks proper, (and of late, with outrageous Licence,) to cenſure and confound it.

As the Sums iſſued therefore upon theſe three Articles cannot be added by any juſt Pretence; after admitting all that can poſſibly be admitted in the utmoſt Latitude, againſt our own Argument, the Account will ſtand in this Manner:

	l.	*s.*	*d.*
Total of Money iſſued for Secret Service in eleven Years, from 1731 to 1741, inclusive - - - -	1,264,250	15	10
Total of Monies iſſued under the Head of Secret Service for a like Term before the Revolution - -	989,652	10	06¼
Ballance upon eleven Years	274,598	5	3¾
Annual Charge of Secret Service, at a Medium of Eleven Years from 1731 to 1741 - - - -	114,931	16	10¾
Annual Charge before the Revolution	89,968	8	2¾
Annual Ballance	24,963	8	8

Which annual Sum of *Twenty-four thouſand nine hundred and ſixty-three Pounds, eight Shillings and eight Pence*, is the whole Encreaſe of the Expence of the Civil Liſt upon this Head, after a Term little ſhort of threeſcore Years, made up in a way of Accounting, the moſt partial and moſt favourable to thoſe, who wiſh a falſe and dangerous Opinion to prevail, which even upon this State cannot prevail hereafter with any *reaſonable Man*.

For every ſuch Man will conſider this Matter as it ought only to be conſidered, that is, upon the Foot of *an Influence acquired by the Crown over the Independency of the Subject, in proportion to the Sums applied in ſecret Gratuities to the Members of the Legiſlature, more now than in former Times*; and every ſuch Man will form a Judgment to himſelf, and create an equitable Ballance, not only upon the Quantum of the Money applied in Secret Service, but will take into his Aid ſome farther Conſiderations, *viz. whether* that Part of Secret Service, which is neceſſary to all Government, (becauſe as the Committee confeſs in the Report, *No Form of Government can ſubſiſt without a Power of employing*

employing Publick Money for Services which are from their Nature secret, and ought always to remain so,) must not unavoidably be from the Circumstances of Time, greater than it was formerly; and again, *whether* the same Degree of Influence can be acquired in these Times by the same Sums.

Now these Things being thus candidly considered, it will appear, that our Engagements with Foreign Powers, the Difficulties of the Age we live in, and the Distractions of *Europe* have been infinitely greater since the Revolution than they were before; that our Secret Service in Foreign Courts must have therefore been greatly more expensive than it was at that Period; and the Prices of Intelligence undoubtedly much higher than formerly they were; for Things of this Nature go always on encreasing, and the Value of Money is become greatly less in every Part of *Europe*.

Add to this, that the late Enquiry was confined to a Time of Peace, and a Time of very intricate Negociation (the Prudence or Imprudence of which, is not under our Consideration in this Question) during which, Expences of this kind have no established Provision, as they have in time of War; they have then an extraordinary Allowance of 10,000 *l. per Annum*, besides a Deduction of Two and a half *per Cent.* out of the Pay of all the Foreign Forces in the Service of *Great Britain*, of which we have already had Occasion to make some mention in another Place: And this (as appears by the famous Report of the Commissioners for stating the public Accounts, at the latter End of the Queen's Reign, 1712) amounted in the same Term of eleven Years, to 393,366 *l.* 9 *s.* 7. over and above the current *Expences of the Civil Government under the same Head*, which could not fail in some measure to be lessened by it.

Upon the whole, leaving it to every Man of Candour to determine how far the two Articles of Money issued to Special Service, and to reimburse Expences, may be allowed to have their Place in this Account, and submitting to every Man of Sense and Candour the Difference of the Times, the Deduction of 100,000 *l.* out of the *Civil List* for the Prince of *Wales*, the Circumstances of all our Foreign Affairs, and one thing more, which is hardly decent to be touch'd upon, but by way of Supposition, that if there be Corruption at home, its Wages must be much higher than they were heretofore, it is impossible to deny, but that the Property of the Crown, or in other Words, the *Civil List*, is, not only not really increased, but that it can by no means operate upon the Constitution in any Degree equal to what it might have done formerly, and therefore that the Power of the Crown is not in this Respect augmented

in proportion to the Power of the People, but in fact diminiſhed greatly.

We ſhould in the next place examine this Point, upon the Footing of *the Crown Influence from additional Employments*. But this will receive a ſufficient Anſwer under the next Head; with which it is ſo much connected, that it will be moſt proper to blend them both in one common Conſideration.

We therefore proceed to the third and laſt Point, *viz.* the Encreaſe of the Power of the Crown, *by poſitive Laws in Favour of the Prerogative*. But here I conceive it beyond the Induſtry of *Faction* itſelf to diſcover any one Circumſtance in which Prerogative has been extended.—On the other hand, it is moſt happy and moſt notorious, that Prerogative is within the laſt Century reduced to ſuch a Point, that no rational Man can deny, but that we have gone even farther than in the Opinion of the moſt eminent Writers upon Government, is neceſſary to the Preſervation of the Conſtitution of any Country: To this end, according to that famous Maxim laid down by *Machiavel*, *Government muſt be frequently brought back to its firſt Principles*; but from the Period of the Reſtoration, we have not only conſtantly been employed in paring away thoſe Luxuriancies of Power in the Crown, which had been inſenſibly growing from the Conqueſt, or at leaſt from the Reign of King *John*, till they had in a manner over-ſhaded all the Liberties of the People; but we have actually taken away many of the moſt important Branches, to which the Crown had been entitled from the very Beginning of our Conſtitution: Of which it cannot be improper upon this Occaſion to enumerate a few.

Firſt then, the Crown, from the Acceſſion of *William* I. by the Eſtabliſhment of the feodal Tenures was undoubtedly entitled to ſuch a Degree of Influence, as went incomparably farther in every Reſpect, and in every Light, in which it can poſſibly be conſidered to create an univerſal Dependance in every other Branch of the Legiſlature, than any other Circumſtance of human Invention, and much leſs any later Changes in the Conſtitution, were they as real as they are imaginary, could poſſibly do: The greateſt Part of the whole Kingdom, (beſides what was yet immediately more belonging to the Crown as its Domain,) was held *in capite* of the King; and by Virtue of this Tenure, the Crown enjoyed the following Prerogatives; 1. *The Profits of the whole Eſtate of every Family ſuch (as well of the Lords as of the Commons) during the Minority of every Heir.* 2. *The Right to diſpoſe of the Profits of ſuch Eſtates to whom it pleaſed.* 3. *The Guardianſhip of every ſuch Heir, and the Power*

of

of delegating that Truſt to any other Perſon. 4. *The Right to diſpoſe of the Heir or Heireſs of any ſuch Family, during their Minority, in Marriage.* 5. *A Title to one Year's Profit of the Eſtate, in Caſes where there was no Minority, before Poſſeſſion could be taken by the next Heir.*—Theſe, with many more of a like Nature, were ſome of the Crown Prerogatives, which exiſted legally in the Conſtitution of this Country from the Beginning of this Government, till about eighty Years ago, and if they are well weighed, it is impoſſible not to ſee what prodigious Means of Influence they afforded to the Crown. What *Revenue*, what *Employments*, what *Civil Liſt* could furniſh out Matter of ſuch Extenſive Obligation? What Noble Family in the one Houſe of Parliament, or what Man of great Eſtate in the other, but might be either tempted or neceſſitated to court its Favour? What Struggles would the Virtue even of a *Broad-bottom Patriot* undergo, contending with the Offer of the *Wardſhip* of a Duke of *Bedford*, or the *Cuſtodium* of a *Pelham* Eſtate, during a Minority of fifteen or ſixteen Years? In what Man is the *Amor Patriæ* ſo conſtant, paſſionate, and fond, that he could coldly look upon the Charms of a beautiful young Woman kindly tendred to his Arms by a firſt Miniſter, with the Titles and Inheritance of a Duke of *Marlborough?* Again, what would be the Conſequence of an Education wholly directed by Tutors and Guardians appointed by the Crown, upon all the Men of Property in the Kingdom? what the Effect of Gratitude upon the Minds of Gentlemen, in whoſe behalf the Crown ſhould wave ſome Parts of this Prerogative?—in favour of whom the Crown ſhould remit its Title to the Profits of the Minor's Eſtate? or leave it in Truſt to be improved by the neareſt Relation for the Heir? or decline to take the Relief, or one Year's Profit, to which, even in Caſes of no Minority, it was entitled? From hence it may be worth conſidering whether that is quite a conſtitutional Principle, which has been laid down with ſo much Confidence of late, and in ſo vaſt Latitude, *that the Crown ought to have no Degree of Influence upon the other Members of the Legiſlature*; the Fact certainly was the direct contrary:—Our Anceſtors intended the Power of their Kings to be *real*, and they knew that without ſome Degree of Influence, that Power would be but *in Name*; -- their Idea was to ballance the *Popular* by the *Regal*; not, as it has manifeſtly been of late, to put all the Weights into the *Popular Scale:* To the People they gave the *ſole Power of granting Money*, and a *Title to Reſiſtance in Caſes of extraordinary and violent Extremity*; a nominal Power could not ballance theſe great Privileges; they therefore gave the Crown a great Revenue, the *ſole*

Management of the publick Money, the Diſpoſition of all Employments, in fine, *the Means of General Obligation to the Subject*; again, to ballance the Title of Reſiſtance in the People, they armed the Crown with *Powers of Confiſcation, and even ſome degree of Influence in the Trials* of thoſe, who ſhould raſhly or unjuſtly take up Arms againſt it; theſe Prerogatives became at length abuſed, and have therefore been wiſely and juſtly in many important Inſtances curtail'd, (while all the former Privileges of the People yet remain with very great Additions.) Among the reſt this great one, ariſing from the feodal Tenures, was totally aboliſhed in the Year 1661. By which one Act, the Spirit of this Conſtitution received ſo great an Alteration, that few are even yet ſenſible of all the Conſequences, that either have happened, or will unavoidably reſult from it, in favour of the popular Intereſt in this Country.

The next great Encreaſe of Privilege to the People, was from the Act of *Habeas Corpus*, which was paſſed in 1673-4; a Law of ineſtimable Security to the Liberty of the Subject.

By the Revolution in 1688, the whole Government was purged at once, of all Excreſcencies of Prerogative, that had been growing from its firſt Inſtitution: By the very Act of the Expulſion of King *James* II. and his Line, confirmed, as it afterwards was, by Law, the People acquired a Right, which had never been allowed in the Conſtitution of this Country. In the famous Charter of King *John*, the Barons never went ſo far, it was there decreed that in Caſes of the laſt Neceſſity, the Publick might diſtreſs the Crown, by all Manner of Means, *viz.* by the Seizure and Sequeſtration of its Caſtles, Lands, and Poſſeſſions, till the publick Grievances ſhould be redreſſed: *diſtringent & gravabunt nos modis omnibus quibus poterunt, ſcilicet per captionem caſtrorum, terrarum, poſſeſſionum, donec fuerit emendatum*, &c. But there was a ſtrict Exception to the Perſons of the *King*, the *Queen*, and the Iſſue of the Royal Family, *ſalvâ Perſonâ noſtrâ, & Reginæ noſtræ, & Liberorum noſtrorum*; there was an expreſs Condition to ſave the Rights of the Succeſſion; the Crown was not to forfeit for its exorbitant Proceedings, the People were to return to their Allegiance again, ſo ſoon as theſe Exorbitances were redreſſed, *cum fuerit emendatum intendent nobis ſicut prius fecerunt*. This Principle of an *indefeaſible Hereditary Right* (for it was no leſs) deſtroyed the Effect of all the ſtrong Proviſions of *Reſiſtance* preſcribed at the ſame time; the Law was ſeverely worded, but void of a ſufficient Penalty to enforce it; a temporary Suſpenſion of the Regal Authority was the only Penalty: The Crown ſoon found how to avail itſelf of this Defect; their Attempts upon the People were offenſive, the

Reſiſtance

Reſiſtance of the People defenſive only ; this was contending upon very unequal Terms ;—the Crown had never much to fear ; but whenever Publick Liberty was invaded the People run the Riſk of loſing all ;—the Crown, if unſucceſsful, ſuffered nothing but a Diſappointment, and had nothing to do, but to quit the Proſecution of its Views for that Time. It was then reſtored again to what it was before, with the ſame Means of renewing the Attempt upon the firſt favourable Opportunity. The People it is true, have formerly gone further, and were under the Neceſſity to do it, but when they did it, they acted not upon the Principles of the Law of *England*; they were obliged to have Recourſe to that grand Principle of the Law of Nations, [a] *Datâ facultate datur jus facultatem tuendi.* Yet this was but lamely underſtood by the Bulk of a People, ever tender of their Laws, and, like the Bulk of every other People, little able to reaſon upon higher Principles ; from hence the Crown derived ſo great an Advantage that for the greater Part of the laſt Century our Liberties were brought into continual Hazard ; it was the Revolution alone, and the Principles eſtabliſhed then, that could have poſſibly preſerved us. The Doctrine of *Hereditary Right* in this extravagant Extent was taken away ; ſome poſitive Caſes were enacted by Law where the Crown ſhall forfeit. This has given a Blow to Prerogative, which it can never recover.

And ſo far had we dwindled from the Virtue and Spirit of our Forefathers, that even that Proviſion of *Reſiſtance*, which had been formerly made to ballance this Prerogative of *indefeaſible Hereditary Right*, (inſufficient as we have ſhewn it to have been,) was actually wholly given up at the Reſtoration, by the Oath preſcribed to be taken in the [b] *Act for well Governing and Regulating of Corporations* ; which was in theſe Words : *I* A. B. *do declare and believe that it is not lawful, upon any Pretence whatſoever, to take Arms againſt the King, and that I do abhor that traitorous Poſition, of taking Arms, by his Authority, againſt his Perſon, or againſt thoſe that are commiſſioned by him. So help me God.*—It was further diſclaimed in the Preamble to the Act of Attainder, *Anno* 12 *Car.* II. cap. 30. in the following Words.—*And be it hereby declared, that by the Undoubted and Fundamental Laws of this Kingdom, neither the Peers of this Realm, nor the Commons, nor both together, in Parliament, or out of Parliament, nor the People collectively, nor repreſentatively, nor any other Perſons whatſoever, ever had, have, hath,*

[a] *Grotius de Jure Belli ac Pacis,* lib. II. [b] Anno 13. *Car.* II. Stat. 2. Cap. 1.

or ought to have any coerſive Power over the Perſons of the Kings of this Realm.

It was again diſclaimed, in the Preambles of different Acts relating to the Militia, about the ſame time, in theſe Words, *That both, nor either of the Houſes of Parliament, can, or may, lawfully raiſe or levy any War, Offenſive or Defenſive, againſt his Majeſty, his Heirs, or lawful Succeſſors.*

How far this Doctrine of *Non-Reſiſtance*, without any Reſerve, ſtruck at the Liberties of the People, is manifeſt enough; but how far the very Act of the Revolution has given Limitation to its Extravagance, we have already obſerved; and as to the Oath before mentioned, it was directly abrogated by the Act of the 1ſt of *William* and *Mary*, cap. 8.

Again, by two Acts, the one, *An Act for Safety and Preſervation of his Majeſty's Perſon and Government*, Anno 13 *Car.* II. cap. 1.---And another, *For preventing Abuſes in Printing*, &c. Anno 13 and 14 *Car.* II. cap. 33. the Liberty of the Preſs was totally reſtrained. Theſe Laws were ſuffer'd to expire.

By an Act againſt Tumults and Diſorders, *Anno* 13 *Car.* II. cap. 5. the Subject had been, in effect, deprived of that Right of Petitioning either the Crown or Parliament; for it was enacted --- *That, from and after the Firſt of* Auguſt 1661, *no Perſon or Perſons whatſoever, ſhall ſolicit, labour, or procure the* GETTING OF HANDS, *or* OTHER CONSENT *of any Perſons above the Number of* TWENTY OR MORE, *to any Petition, Complaint, Remonſtrance, Declaration, or other Addreſs to the King, or both or either Houſes of Parliament, for Alterations of Matters eſtabliſhed by Law, in Church or State, or accompanied, at any one time, with above the Number of* TEN PERSONS. *And that no Perſon or Perſons exceeding* TEN, *as aforeſaid, ſhall preſent any publick or private Grievance or Complaint, to any Member or Members of Parliament after his Election*, &c. *under Penalty of* 100 l. *in Money, and Impriſonment for three Months, without Bail or Mainprize.*

This was virtually repealed by the Act, declaring the Rights and Liberties of the Subject, *Anno* 1 *William* and *Mary*, Seſſ. 2. cap. 2. wherein it was Enacted, *That it is the Right of the Subject to petition, and all Commitments and Proſecutions for ſuch petitioning are illegal.*

By this Act the Conſtitution was farther reſtored in very many, and improved in other Inſtances as follow.

1. It was enacted, *That the pretended Power of ſuſpending Laws, or the Execution of Laws by regal Authority without Conſent of Parliament is illegal.*

2. *That*

2. *That the Commiſſion for erecting the late Court of Commiſſioners for Eccleſiaſtical Cauſes, and all other Commiſſioners and Courts of the like Nature are illegal and pernicious.*

3. *That levying Money for, or to the Uſe of the Crown by Pretence of Prerogative, without Grant of Parliament, for longer time, or in other Manner, than the ſame is, or ſhall be granted, is illegal and pernicious.*

4. *That the raiſing or keeping a Standing Army within the Kingdom (in Time of Peace) unleſs it be with Conſent of Parliament, is againſt Law.*

5. *That the Subjects, which are* Proteſtants *may have Arms for their Defence ſuitable to their Conditions, and as allowed by Law.*

6. *That Elections of Members of Parliament ought to be free.*

7. *That the Freedom of Speech and Debates or Proceedings in Parliament ought not to be impeached or queſtioned in any Court or Place out of Parliament.*

8. *That exceſſive Bail ought not to be required, nor exceſſive Fines impoſed, nor cruel and unuſual Puniſhments inflicted.*

9. *That Juries ought to be duly impannelled and returned, and Juries, which paſs upon Men in Trials for High Treaſon ought to be Freeholders.*

10. *That all Grants and Promiſes of Fines and Forfeitures of particular Perſons before Conviction are illegal and void.*

11. *That for Redreſs of all Grievances, and for the amending, ſtrengthening and preſerving of the Laws, Parliaments ought to be held frequently.*

12. *That all Diſpenſations paſſed by* non obſtante *to Acts of Parliament, except in Caſes provided for by Law, ſhall be void.*

13. *That every Perſon or Perſons, that is, are, or ſhall be reconciled to the Church of* Rome, *or ſhall marry a* Papiſt, *ſhall be excluded, and be for ever incapable to inherit, poſſeſs, or enjoy the Crown and Government of this Realm, and* Ireland, *and the Dominions thereunto belonging, or any Part of the ſame, or to have, uſe, or exerciſe any legal Power, Authority or Juriſdiction within the ſame, and in all and every ſuch Caſe or Caſes, the People of theſe Realms, ſhall be, and are hereby abſolved of their Allegiance, and the Crown ſhall deſcend to the next* Proteſtant *Heir.*

This was followed by another Law, *cap.* 10. which took away the Revenue ariſing from *Hearth-Money*, with all the Powers attendant on that Collection; which, as it was juſtly expreſſed in the Words of the Preamble, *was in itſelf not only a great Oppreſſion to the poorer Sort, but a Badge of Slavery upon the*

the whole People, expoſing every Man's houſe to be entered into and ſearched at Pleaſure by Perſons unknown to him.

In the ſame Seſſions of Parliament (*cap.* 27.) one very great and conſiderable Part of this Kingdom was entirely redeemed from a Juriſdiction utterly inconſiſtent with the Freedom of a *Britiſh* Subject, the Court of the Preſident and Council of the Marches in *Wales*, which had been eſtabliſhed in 34 and 35 of *Henry* VIII. and under which that Province had been governed till this Act paſſed, was totally abolished, and the People of that Country allowed to enjoy the common Benefit of the *Engliſh Law and Liberty*; *the Proceedings and Decrees of that Court, having been* (as it is recited in the Preamble) *an intolerable Burden to the Subject within the ſaid Principality contrary to the great Charter, the known Laws of the Land, and the Birth-right of the Subject*; *and the Means to introduce an arbitrary Power and Government.*

In the 2d of *William* and *Mary*, *cap.* 7. a very unconſtitutional Prerogative, (for ſo it was in effect, though not directly exerted under the Name of the Crown,) was repealed; and it was enacted, *That whereas the Election of Members to ſerve in Parliament ought to be free, and whereas the Wardens of the* Cinque Ports *pretended to, and claimed as of Right, a Power of nominating and recommending to each of the* Cinque Ports, *the two ancient Towns, and their reſpective Members, one Perſon whom they ought to elect, to ſerve as a Baron or Member of Parliament for ſuch Port*, &c. *all ſuch Nomination or Recommendation ſhall be void.*

In the ſame Year (*cap.* 8.) the Judgment of *Quo Warranto* againſt the City of *London*, was reverſed—its Liberties regranted, and made a Corporation.

By an Act in 1694, the 5th of *William* and *Mary*, cap. 7. *for Granting to their Majeſties certain Rates and Duties, upon* Salt, Beer, Ale, *and* other Liquors, *for the raiſing of One Million towards carrying on the War with* France. This Clauſe was obtained, *Provided always, and be it enacted*, &c. *That no Member of the Houſe of Commons ſhall, at any time, be concerned directly or indirectly, or any other in Truſt for him, in the* Farming, Collecting, *or* Managing *any of the Sums of* Money, Duties, *or* other Aids granted *to their Majeſties by this Act, or* that hereafter ſhall be granted by any other Acts of Parliament; *except the Commiſſioners of the Treaſury, Cuſtoms, and Exciſe, not exceeding the preſent Number in each Office, and the Commiſſioners of the Land-Tax.*—But the Cuſtoms and Exciſe were afterwards excluded, as we ſhall preſently come to ſhew, and continue ſo to be.

Again,

Again, by another Act the same Session, *cap.* 20. *for Granting several Rates and Duties upon Tonnage of Ships and Vessels, and upon Beer, Ale, and other Liquors, to raise One Million five hundred thousand Pounds*, &c. It was provided farther—*That no* Officer *or* Person *whatsoever concerned in any manner with the* Collection *or* Management *of the* Excise, *shall, by Word, Message, or Writing, or in any other manner, endeavour* to influence any Voter in Elections, *under Penalty of* 100 l. *and of Incapacity of holding any Office or Place of Trust under the Crown.*

In the 7th of *William* III. cap. 3. that famous Law was passed, which put the Lives, as well as Liberties of the Subject, upon so happy a Foundation, that no People upon the known Earth, can boast of such Security. I mean, the *Act for Regulating Trials in Cases of Treason and Misprision of Treason*; which contained the following Clauses.

1. *That the Persons accused should be intitled first to have a Copy of the Indictment five Days before the Trial.*

2. *To make their Defence by Council and Witnesses upon Oath, the Council to be chosen by themselves, and to have free Access to the Prisoner at all reasonable Hours.*

3. *Not to be indicted, tried, or attainted but by the Oath of two Witnesses, and one Witness to one Act of Treason, and another to another, not to be deemed two Witnesses.*

4. *Persons outlaw'd, upon their Return to stand Trial, to have the Benefit of this Act.*

5. *No Person to be indicted or prosecuted, unless within three Years of the Offence.*

6. *Persons tried, to have Copies of the* Pannel *two Days before Trial.*

7. *Such Persons to have Process of the Court where they shall be tried, to compel their Witnesses to appear for them at their Trials.*

8. *No Evidence to be admitted, or given of any Overt Act, not expressly laid in the Indictment, against any Person or Persons whatsoever.*

And whereas the Commons are to be tried by a Jury of Twelve, who must all agree in one Verdict to condemn any Man, and the Lords had till then lain under two great Disadvantages, *first* that one Major Vote was sufficient to condemn a Peer in Cases of this Nature; and *secondly*, that the Crown had the Power of nominating a select Number; appointing and excepting what Peers it pleased to sit in Judgment, it was then enacted, *that their Trials should be made for the future by the whole Body of the Peerage; and that every Peer should be duly summoned at least twenty Days before, to appear and vote at such Trial.*

In the ſame Year, *Seſſ.* 1. *cap.* 4. the Act was paſſed *For preventing Charge and Expence in Elections of Members to ſerve in Parliament*, providing *that Candidates after the Teſte of the Writ, or after any Seat in Parliament ſhould become vacant for any Country, City, Borough*, &c. *giving or promiſing any Preſent or Reward for being elected, to any Perſon having Right of Vote, ſhall be incapable to ſerve in Parliament for any ſuch Place as aforeſaid.*

This was ſoon after followed by another Act of the ſame Seſſions, *For preventing falſe and double Returns*, *cap.* 7. containing the following Clauſes, 1. *That in caſe of falſe and double Returns, the Party aggrieved may ſue in any Court of* Weſtminſter *againſt any Officers or Perſons, and every one of them, and recover double Damages, and full Coſts of Suit.* 2. *Whoſoever ſhall make, or give any Contract, Security, Promiſe, Bond, Gift or Reward to procure a falſe or double Return ſhall forfeit* 300 *l.* 3. *The Clerk of the Crown to make Entry of all Returns within ſix Days after their Receipt, under Penalty of* 500 *l. and Forfeiture of his Office.* 4. *All Returns contrary to the laſt Determination of the Houſe of Commons, to be void, and to be deemed falſe, and this Act to continue ſeven Years.*

By the Act in the 11th and 12th of *William*, *For granting an Aid to his Majeſty out of the forfeited Eſtates*, &c. it was enacted, *That no Member of Parliament ſhall after the* 24th *of* June, 1700, *be a* Commiſſioner *or* Farmer *of the* Exciſe, *or a* Commiſſioner *of* Appeals, *or* Controller *or* Auditor *of the ſaid* Duty.

In the ſame Year, *cap.* 7. an Act was paſſed *For preventing irregular Proceedings of Sheriffs and other Officers, in making Returns of Members*, provided, *That the Returns ſhall be made to the Clerk of the Crown, within fourteen Days after the Election*, &c. *under Penalty of* 500 *l.*

In the ſame Seſſions, *cap.* 12. an Act paſſed *to puniſh the Governors of Plantations, in this Kingdom, for Crimes committed by them in the Plantations*, by which the moſt remote Subjects of the *Britiſh* Empire obtained the Protection of the *Engliſh* Laws againſt Oppreſſions, which were before that time without a Remedy.

The next Addition of Privilege and Security to the People, and Diminution of Prerogative was obtained by the *Act for the farther Limitation of the Crown*, &c. *Anno* 12 *William* III. Seſſ. 1. cap. 2. which was then ſettled upon the Houſe of *Hanover*; in this it was provided farther,

1. *That whoſoever ſhall hereafter come to the Poſſeſſion of this Crown ſhall join in Communion with the Church of* England, *as by Law eſtabliſhed.* (The Act of 1 *William* and *Mary*, *Seſſ.* 2. *cap.*

cap. 2. before-mentioned, had provided againſt the Admiſſion of any *Papiſt*, it was now, for the abſolute Security of the Religion of this Country, provided, that no Diſſenter from that Religion of any Denomination whatſoever, ſhould be King of *England*.)

2. *That in caſe the Crown and imperial Dignity of this Realm ſhall hereafter come to any Perſon not being a Native of this Kingdom, this Nation be not obliged to engage in any War for the Defence of any Dominions or Territories, which do not belong to the Crown of* England, *without Conſent of Parliament.*

3. *That after the ſaid Limitation ſhall take effect as aforeſaid, no Perſons born out of the Kingdoms of* England, Scotland *or* Ireland, *or the Dominions thereunto belonging (although he be naturalized or made a Denizen, except ſuch as are born of* Engliſh *Parents) ſhall be capable to be of the Privy Council, or a Member of either Houſe of Parliament, or to enjoy any Office or Place of Profit or Truſt either Civil or Military, or to have any Grant of Lands, Tenements, or Hereditaments from the Crown to himſelf or to any other or others in Truſt for him.*

4. *That after the ſaid Limitation ſhall take Effect as aforeſaid, Judges-Commiſſioners ſhall be made* quamdiu ſe bene geſſerint, *and their Salaries aſcertained and eſtabliſhed; but that upon Addreſs of both Houſes of Parliament, it may be lawful to remove them.*

5. *That no* Pardon *under the Great Seal of* England *be pleadable to an* Impeachment *by the* Commons *in Parliament.*

6. *That all Laws and Statutes of this Realm for ſecuring the eſtabliſhed Religion, and the Rights and Liberties of the People, be ratified and confirmed.*

Another Improvement of our Conſtitution was made immediately after in that Act, *for preventing any Inconvenience, that may happen by Privilege of Parliament, Anno* 12 *Gul.* III. *cap.* 3. by which it was enacted, 1. *That Actions may be commenced againſt either Peer or Member of Parliament in the Interval of Parliament.* 2. *That after Prorogation the Court may give Judgment.* 3. *That Perſons may have Proceſs againſt Peer or Member of Parliament after the Diſſolution of Parliament, and may exhibit any Bill or Complaint againſt any Peer or Member of Parliament, and ſequeſter the Parties Eſtate.* 4. *Plaintiffs, who are prevented from Proſecution by any Privilege of Parliament, not to be barred by any Statute of Limitation.*

The next Act of the ſame Nature was for adding a farther Term to that formerly mentioned of 7 *Will.* III. *cap.* 7. *for preventing falſe and double Returns of Members to ſerve in Parlia-*

ment for seven Years, which was then continued for eleven Years longer.

The last that we shall mention of this Great and Happy Reign, is of the same Year 11 and 12 *Will.* III. *cap.* 10. *A. D.* 1700, entituled *An Act for granting an Aid to his Majesty for defraying the Expence of his Navy, Guards and Garrisons*, &c. in which it was provided, *That after the Dissolution of that Parliament, no Member of the House of Commons should be a* Commissioner *of the* Customs, *or capable of holding* any Office *in that* Branch *of the* Revenue, *nor any Person concerned therein should directly or indirectly* influence any Election, *under Penalty of being incapacitated to hold any Office or Place of Trust under the Crown.*

We now come to the Reign of Queen *Anne*, during which the Prerogative still declined, and the Liberties of the People were augmented and farther secured, for by *An Act for the better Support of her Majesty's Houshold, and of the Honour and Dignity of the Crown, Anno* 1 *Annæ Stat.* 1 *cap.* 7. it was decreed that for preserving the Revenues of the Crown, *all Grants of Mannors, Lands*, &c. *made by the Crown for more than thirty-one Years or three Lives, or all Tenements for more than fifty Years, should be void*, by which the Crown was for ever deprived of that great Means of Influence, and of burdening the Publick Revenues by Gratifications to their Favourites.

Anno 2 and 3 *Annæ, cap.* 18. it was enacted, *that any Action or Suit shall and may be commenced and prosecuted in any of her Majesty's Courts of* Westminster, *against any Officer of the Revenue, or any other Place of publick Trust, no such Action to be impeached or staid or delayed on Pretence of Privilege of Parliament either with Respect to a Peer or Member of the House of Commons*, and this was manifestly a great additional Security to the Subject against Power and Oppression.

In the Year 1704, 4 *Annæ, cap.* 8. *An Act* passed *for the better Security of her Majesty's Person and Government, and of the Succession to the Crown of* England *in the* Protestant *Line:* By which the Nation acquired the following Advantages.

1. *That the Parliament shall not be dissolved by the Death of any King or Queen of* England, *but that it shall continue six Months after; that it shall immediately convene, meet, and sit, whether adjourned or prorogued, and in case there should be no Parliament in being then the last preceding Parliament shall immediately convene, and sit, and be a Parliament, to continue, as aforesaid, to all Intents and Purposes.*—A Proviso which, if rightly consider'd, must appear to be infinitely wise, and may, in future Times, prove of the last Importance, to bring the Constitution back again,

again, if it ſhould ever be interrupted or unhinged in any Arbitrary Reign hereafter.

2. *The Privy Council, the Great Officers, and all Offices, Civil or Military, ſhall continue likewiſe for ſix Months.*

3. *The Privy Council, immediately after the Deceaſe of the King or Queen, to proclaim the next* Proteſtant Succeſſor, *under Penalty of High-Treaſon.*—The Benefit of which three Clauſes moſt manifeſtly appeared upon the Death of the late Queen *Anne.*

It may be expected of me to take Notice in this Place, that by this Act two Clauſes in the Act of the 12th and 13th of *William* III. cap. 2. the firſt, *Concerning the ſigning of Privy Counſellors to all Acts of State* ; and the ſecond, *Containing a general Excluſion of all Offices and Places of Profit, and all Perſons holding Penſions from the Crown, from ſitting in the Houſe of Commons,* were repealed ; becauſe upon this Repeal the Malecontents have taken their only plauſible Handle, to inſinuate, that our Conſtitution has been impaired.—But this will admit of a very eaſy Anſwer—for, in Fact, this never was the Conſtitution ; theſe two Proviſions were only made *in futuro,* had never actually taken Place, were repealed long before they were to be in Force, *viz.* in four Years after they were firſt made, and at a Period of Time, when that Government and Family they were intended to reſtrain, had no Power or Influence, in this Country, to procure their Repeal, and near ten Years before their Acceſſion to the Throne.—Nay farther, as to the ſecond Clauſe concerning Penſions, it has actually been reſtored ſince that Acceſſion, as we ſhall ſhew in its due Place.

4. *It was enacted by this Law, that from and after the Diſſolution, or ſooner Determination of that Parliament, no Perſon who ſhall have, in his own Name, or in the Name of any Perſon or Perſons in Truſt for him, or for his Benefit,* any new Office, *or* Place of Profit whatſoever *under the Crown, which, at any Time hereafter, ſhall be created or erected, nor any* Commiſſioner *or* Sub Commiſſioner *of* Prizes, *and* Secretary *or* Receiver *of the* Prizes, *any* Comptroller *of the Accounts of the* Army, *any* Commiſſioner *of* Tranſports, *any* Commiſſioner *of the* Sick *and* Wounded, *any* Agent *for* any Regiment, *nor any* Commiſſioner *for* Wine Licences, *nor any* Governor, *or* Deputy Governor *of any of the* Plantations, *nor any* Commiſſioners *of the* Navy *employed in any of the* Out-Ports, *nor any Perſon having any* Penſion *from the Crown* during Pleaſure, *ſhall be elected, ſit, or vote, as a Member of the Houſe of Commons.*

5. *No* Office to be ſplit into Commiſſion *farther than already done before the firſt Day of the Seſſions of Parliament* 1705.

6. *All Members of Parliament accepting any Place of Profit under the Crown, during the Time of their being Members, their Elections to become immediately void, but capable of being re-elected, if the People should think proper to chuse them again under that* Circumstance.---This Clause was enacted in the Place of that which we have already observed to have been repealed by this Act, whereby *Persons holding any Employments were totally excluded.*---This Provision being thought much more consistent with the Liberty of the Subject, both *Elected* and *Electors.*---And, in the Opinion of that Time, as great a Security as could be desired by any People, since it put it out of the Power of the Representatives to deceive their Constituents, and left it to their own Option, whether they would confide their Interests again in the Hands of the *same* Person, after that Change of his Condition.

7. *A Penalty of* 500 l. *to be recovered by any Person who shall sue any Member who shall sit contrary to this Act, and the Election of such Member to be void.*

Greatly as the Prerogative and Influence of the Crown was reduced by this Law, it is much to be questioned, whether its Benefits exceeded that which I shall next mention; *Viz. The Act of the 7th of* Anne, *cap.* 21. *for Improving the Union of the two Kingdoms.*---For by this Act, 1st, *That inestimable Law of Treasons before mentioned, was extended to that Part of* Great Britain *called* Scotland. 2dly, *It was enacted, That after the Death of the Person called the* Pretender, *when any Person shall be indicted for High Treason, or Misprision of Treason, a List of the Witnesses that shall be produced on the Trial for proving the said Indictment, and of the Jury, mentioning the Names, Professions, and Places of Abode of the said Witnesses and Jurors, shall be also given at the same Time that the Copy of the Indictment is delivered to the Party indicted, and that Copies of all the Indictments for the Offences aforesaid, with such Lists, shall be delivered to the Party indicted, ten Days before the Trial, and in Presence of two or more credible Witnesses. And* 3dly, *That after the Decease of the said* Pretender, *and at the End of the Term of three Years, (after the Succession of the House of* Hanover *to the Throne) no Attainder for Treason shall extend to the disinheriting of any Heir, nor to the Prejudice of the Right or Title of any Person or Persons, other than the Right or Title of the Offender or Offenders, during his, her or their natural Lives only, and that it shall and may be lawful to every Person or Persons, to whom the Right or Interest of any Lands, Tenements, Hereditaments, after the Death of any such Offender or Offenders should or might have appertained, if no such Attainder had been, to enter into the same:* Which noble Provision for the Lives and Property of the Subject,

ject, taken in all its Conſequences, is not to be found in any other Government upon Earth.

In 1710, 9 *Annæ, cap.* 5. the *Act* was paſſed *for ſecuring the Freedom of Parliaments, and the further qualifying the Members to ſit in the Houſe of Commons, appointing a Qualification of* 600 l. per Annum *for Counties, and* 300 l. *a Year for Cities and Boroughs.* A Proviſion wholly new in the Conſtitution of this Country.

In the ſame Seſſion, *cap.* 10. it was enacted, *That no* Poſt-maſter *or* Poſt-maſter-General, *or his or their* Deputy *or* Deputies, *or any Perſon employed by or under him or them, in the* receiving, collecting *or* managing *the* Revenue *of the* Poſt-Office, *ſhould in any Manner whatſoever perſuade or diſſuade any Voter for Members to ſerve in Parliament, under the Penalty of* 100 l. *and of Diſqualification, Diſability, and Incapacity of ever bearing, or executing any Office or Place of Truſt whatſoever under the Crown.*

In the 10th *Annæ, cap.* 23. an Act was paſſed *for the more effectual preventing fraudulent Conveyances, in order to multiply Votes for electing Knights of the Shire to ſerve in Parliament, providing againſt this Evil by an Oath, and inflicting the Penalty of Perjury upon the Perſon, either ſuborning or taking that Oath falſely.*

In the 12th of the ſame Reign, *cap.* 5. there was an Act of the ſame Nature, *for the better regulating the Elections in* Scotland.

And in the ſame Seſſion, *Stat.* 1. *cap.* 15. *the Act concerning double Returns,* (firſt made, *Anno* 7 and 8 *Gul.* III. *cap.* 4. for ſeven Years, then continued as we have obſerved for eleven Years more, in the 12 *William, cap.* 5.) *was made perpetual.*

In the Firſt of *George* I. 1714. cap. 4. *It was Enacted, that no Perſon ſhall be hereafter naturalized, unleſs in the Bill exhibited for that Purpoſe, there be a Clauſe or particular Words inſerted to declare, that ſuch Perſon ſhall not thereby be enabled to be of the Privy Council, or a Member of either Houſe of Parliament, or to take any Office or Place of Truſt, either Civil or Military, or to have any Grant of Lands, Tenements or Hereditaments from the Crown to himſelf, or any other Perſon in Truſt for him, and that no Bill of Naturalization ſhall be hereafter received, unleſs ſuch Clauſe or Words be firſt inſerted or contained therein.*

In the firſt of the ſame Reign 1715. Sect. 2. cap. 56. a farther Act was made, *to diſable any Perſon from being choſe a Member of ſitting or voting in the Houſe of Commons, who has any Penſion for any Number of Years from the Crown, and the Penalty of* 20 l. *for every Day that ſuch Member ſhall preſume to ſit or vote*

in

in that Houſe: By which Act, the one of the two Clauſes before mentioned in the Act of the 12th and 13th of *William*, which was repealed by the 4th of *Anne*, *cap.* 8. was rgain reſtored.

In the ſecond of the preſent King 1728-9, *the Bill for the more effectual preventing Bribery and Corruption in the Election of Members to ſerve in Parliament was paſſed into a Law.*

And in the *firſt* Seſſion of this *preſent* Parliament, an Act was paſſed *for the farther Excluſion of Placemen from being Members of the Houſe of Commons*, of which we have already had Occaſion to ſpeak, by which, *after the Expiration or ſooner Determination of this preſent Parliament, among others are excluded the* ſeven Commiſſioners *of the* Revenue *in* Ireland, *the* ſeven Commiſſioners *of the* Navy *and of the* Victualling Offices, *the* Clerk *of the* Pells, *and* all the Deputies, Inferior Officers *and* Clerks *of theſe* Commiſſions. *and of the* Treaſury, Exchequer, Pells, Admiralty, Secretaries of State, *and* Paymaſter *of the* Forces, *or of the* Salt, *or of* Appeals, *or of the* Wine Licences, *or of the* Stamps, *or of* Hackney Coaches, *or of* Hawkers *and* Pedlars, (two or three only excepted,) *together with the whole* Civil *and* major Part of the Military Eſtabliſhment of *Minorca* and *Gibraltar.*—This is that Act, for which the preſent Adminiſtration, inſtead of Thanks, have been repaid with the vileſt Reproaches of the *Faction*, and the moſt cruel Abuſe of their ungrateful Country.

In the ſame Seſſion paſſed that Clauſe in the Bill *for Mutiny and Deſertion, for taking the Power of* billetting of Soldiers *in the City and Liberty of* Weſtminſter, *out of the Hands of the* High Conſtable *of that City, and placing it with effectual Proviſions in the Hands of the petty Conſtables, by which a very great Abuſe and Means of Fraud and Influence were taken away.*

We now come in order of time to the *laſt Seſſion* of this *Parliament, when the* Pot-Act, (*which was, in effect, an arbitrary Tax, at the Will and under the Direction of the Exciſe,*) *was repealed.*

And laſtly an Act was paſſed *for the further Security of the Freedom of Election in that Part of* Great Britain *called* Scotland.—The four laſt Acts here mentioned have been gained ſince the Removal of the late Miniſter, and in little more than the Space of one Year; yet are the People taught to believe, that they have gained nothing.—*Quos Deus vult perdere, dementat.*

The Reader will pardon this long Deduction of popular Laws, which I have here inſerted; ſuch a Review can never be tedious to any Man, who ſincerely loves his Country; and I am certain that the Recapitulation of thoſe extraordinary Amendments of our Conſtitution, here preſented to their View, will greatly contribute to the Peace and Quiet of many honeſt Men, who in the Paſſion and Hurry of theſe Times, have too incon-

inconſiderately ſuffered themſelves to be impoſed upon by a groundleſs Clamour: without either giving themſelves time, or Opportunity to conſider ſeriouſly how unjuſt it is.

For whoever will take the Pains to look back upon the Condition of our former Government, and will reflect as he ought to do upon theſe Laws, and Acquiſitions (and many more there are, all tending in ſome Degree to the ſame Improvement) and any Man, who will weigh what we have already explained as to the Power of the Crown in its *Civil Liſt*, in its *Employments*, or in its *Prerogative*, if he really means nothing but to preſerve this Conſtitution, muſt confeſs that the Liberty and Property of this Nation, never ſtood in any Period of Time, upon ſo ſtrong a Baſis, repaired in every Breach that Time had made, fortified with additional Pillars of prodigious Security, and every Day encreaſing in Solidity by the Effect of Laws, which from the Courſe of Time and Nature muſt take Place in a few Years.

From theſe Reflections it does really appear, that Men betray their Ignorance in the moſt groſs Manner, when they talk in that unmeaning Cant, of the Neceſſity of bringing back our Conſtitution to its firſt Principles, ſo much the Faſhion in theſe Times; for I may defy the ableſt Man in *England* fairly to give the Inſtance of any Period in this Government, where the *Power* of the *Crown* ſtood upon *lower*, or the *Liberty* of the *Subject* upon *higher* Ground than it does at this Day.

Men cannot deny, that *Prerogative* was *reduced*, and the *Conſtitution reſtored* by the *Revolution*; they will not venture to do this, becauſe the Falſhood would be too glaring, but they have taught the People to think, that all theſe Amendments of the Letter of our Conſtitution (if I may ſo expreſs it) are rendered ineffectual by the Increaſe of Influence in the Crown, from *additional Revenues*, and *additional Employments*, ſince that Time. The Fact is totally the Reverſe, as we have ſeen.—Half the Guards and Proviſions for the Liberty of the Subject have been acquired long ſince that Period; every Reign, and almoſt every Parliament have made Additions to the Privileges of the People; inſomuch that the People would be manifeſt Loſers, were they to exchange their Conſtitution for what it was at any one Inſtant of Time, previous even to the laſt Seſſion of Parliament: And this would be more or leſs the Caſe, were they to go back from Year to Year, from this preſent Year 1743, to 1066 the Æra of the Conqueſt.

This Revenue of the Crown, which they magnify ſo much, is demonſtrated to be leſs capable in all Conſiderations to anſwer corrupt Purpoſes, than it was formerly; and we have al-

ready, as it ſhould ſeem, all the Laws, that the Wiſdom of Man can invent, to leſſen its Operation in that way.—If theſe Laws are not effectual, there is too much Reaſon to fear that the Remedy is beyond the Power of Law, and that the Evil muſt ariſe from the Ambition, which is incident to the Nature of all popular Governments, and to the Opulence of this Country, which Circumſtances, coveted by all Nations, and deſirable as they juſtly are upon the whole, were never free from Inconveniencies of this kind; have conſtantly debauched the Morals of every People; and introduced Corruption, in ſome degree, wherever they exiſted.

Thoſe Employments ſaid to be ſo much encreaſed ſince the Revolution, are actually cut off from their Influence upon the Conſtitution, as far as written Laws can do it, in innumerable Inſtances.—Since the 5th of *William* and *Mary*, 1694, no new Employment in the Revenue can be held by any Member of the Houſe of Commons; ſince the 4th of *Anne*, 1705, no new Employment whatſoever, excepting in the *Navy* or the *Army*. Some with very good Intentions wiſh theſe military Offices to be excluded too.—But this Opinion is full of Danger, for whoſoever lives to ſee them *totally* excepted likewiſe, can rationally expect nothing but a military Government.—We have therefore gained a Guard againſt any Encreaſe of this Evil in future, very near as far as it can be prudently deſired.—The *Cuſtoms*, *Exciſe*, *Poſt-Office*, and a Multitude of other Civil Officers, which exiſted long before the Revolution, (and not, as it is falſely conceived,) of later Inſtitution, have been alſo weeded out of Parliament.

It is therefore an abominable Impoſition upon Mankind to inſinuate this Doctrine, neither are the Means of Influence equal, nor do the Laws permit it to be exerted, though the Means did actually exiſt.

If any thing more or better can be deviſed to render our Conſtitution yet more pure, that Man would be very diſhoneſt, who would not endeavour to attain it,—but every Quack Receipt is not a Remedy. The Cure muſt be chiefly looked for in the Virtue of the People, and much Help it might receive from thoſe, who bellow loudeſt againſt Corruption, if they would refuſe to pay its Wages at their own Elections; the Woman once vitiated by one Man, will become an eaſy Proſtitute to any other; and the Countryman corrupted by the Bribe of a *Patriot*, will undoubtedly make no Scruple afterwards to ſell his Vote to any *Miniſterial Hireling*.

What I have ſaid upon theſe Heads, is not intended to deter any honeſt and well conſidered Attempts for any farther

Amend-

Amendments in our Conſtitution, if they can be made; but it is intended and ought juſtly to have its Effect ſo far as to convince the Publick, that they are deceived, that their Condition is (whatever Imperfections ſtill remain) in fact infinitely more ſecure than it ever was ſince we have been a Nation; and that therefore the Impatience expreſſed by ſuch Numbers is extravagant, and muſt appear altogether unaccountable to every thinking Man.—Nor is it for this Reaſon eaſy for any Man, the beſt intentioned to the People, to comply with the Humour of theſe Times, becauſe it is impoſſible to know what they would be at, what would content them, or what would be the Limits they would preſcribe to their Demands.—Nor can *this be known*, nor can *they be truſted*, ſo long as they found their Opinions upon falſe Facts, and Doctrines ſo erroneous, as ſo evidently theſe appear to be. I mean not to juſtify any Faults, that have been, or may be committed in the Conduct of our Affairs; but I mean to moderate that Paſſion, which miſguides them in their Reaſonings upon it, which hurries them into ſuch Expectations and Reſentments, as muſt deſtroy the very Bleſſings they enjoy, by graſping after more than it is their real Intereſt to have: It muſt be carried in Remembrance, *that our Conſtitution is a Monarchy, and though limited, yet that the Crown muſt be permitted a conſiderable Share of Power, without which our Government, whatever we may afterwards think fit to call it, will become of another Species, a Species which certainly we are not fitted for, which, as in former Times, we ſhould ſuffer all the Evils of Confuſion in attempting to procure; and which, when procured, we never ſhould be able to maintain.*

Sitting down therefore with Minds grateful and ſenſible of the very great Advantages we now enjoy beyond what our Forefathers ever knew, let us ſtill entertain all reaſonable Views or further Benefit, but without Prejudice or Paſſion; let us correct the Faults, or even amend the Defects of Government, in all Caſes where they are real, and not imaginary, where the Circumſtance of Time will ſuffer it, when we have the Power to do it, and when no worſe Inconveniencies would follow from it.—But let us not meaſure theſe Faults or Defects by the Clamours of a *Faction*; let us conſider, that the Eye of Oppoſition magnifies every Mite of Power, as much as the Eye of Power diminiſhes every Object of popular Complaint. Let us therefore, when we enter upon this Work, engage in it with Moderation, and with a candid and wiſe Reflection, that nothing human can be perfect, that Men will have their Faults as long as they are Men; that we muſt in Government, as well as in other Things, take the Evil with the Good; and that that Nation is happy

upon the whole, where the latter far exceeds the former; this we may safely pronounce of the State in which we live, [a] *Vitia erunt donec homines, sed neque hæc continua, & meliorum interventu penſantur:*--- In this State of things, in ſuch a critical Situation of Affairs abroad, in ſuch a Ferment of the People, as we have lately ſeen at home, there can be no Wonder, that Men of Senſe ſhould deſire time to conſider ſeriouſly what farther Alterations may be made with Safety; we may certainly reſt at preſent without any immediate Fear for Liberty, if not, it is difficult to comprehend how our Anceſtors, who fell ſo ſhort of us, as we have ſhewn in this reſpect, preſerved their own, or delivered any down to us.—From the Sketch, that has been offered of the laſt *Place Bill*, we ſee that we ſhall obtain in five Years, and perhaps much ſooner, a great additional Security. If there be Truth in the Suggeſtions of the *Faction*, that every Member of Parliament poſſeſſed of an Employment, is byaſſed by it, and would act differently if he had it not (however falſely they have repreſented that Law,) it will make a mighty Difference in our future Parliaments. Though this ſhort Period may be thought long, by the Members of a *Faction*, to wait for a Turn of Affairs, that may bring them into Office, it cannot be thought long, by any honeſt and diſintereſted Man, to wait for the Benefit of this Conſtitutional Alteration.—Such a Man will conſider, that *Exceſs* in Regulations of this kind, brings equal Danger on the one hand, as *Imperfection* might in Time produce upon the other.—Such a Man would be unwilling to act precipitately in a Matter of this Moment, would proceed by Degrees, would deſire to experience the Effect of every one Law of this Nature, before he ventured to promote another.— Such a Man will attach himſelf neither to the *Regal*, nor to the *Popular Power*.—He will fix his Attention ſolely to maintain the true Ballance of this Government.— He will be neither moved by Diſappointments from the Crown, nor by Abuſes from the People. — He will act reſolutely with *either*, when they are *right*.— He will oppoſe *both* vigorouſly, in their Turns, when they are *wrong*. — His ſole View in Power, or out of Power, will be the Good of his Country.—His Study will be, to ſupport the Crown, without flattering the Prince.—And he will conſider more the *real Service* of the People, than their *giddy Approbation*. — He will neither be fettered by general Maxims, nor tied to any chimerical Syſtem, but will be governed by Times and Circumſtances, of which he will endeavour faithfully to make the beſt Advantage for the Publick. — Such a Man is a true

[a] *Tacit. Hiſt. Lib. 4.*

true Patriot, whoſe Fate it will ſometimes be, to appear in the vulgar Apprehenſion unſteady, when he is moſt conſtant, and inconſiſtent when he is moſt conſiſtent. This muſt often be the Caſe in thoſe Countries, where Characters are won or loſt by *Party* rather than by *Principle:* And ſuch is undoubtedly the Caſe of this Country in which we live.

It is now time to think of drawing towards a Concluſion of this Paper, which has ſwelled to a greater Size than is common in Works of this kind, but which the Nature of the Thing, and the great Field of Matter I have been obliged to travel through have rendered unavoidable. Many Suggeſtions and fallacious Reaſonings have been paſſed upon the Publick in theſe confuſed Times, of which even yet I have taken no Notice.—But I have obſerved upon thoſe of moſt Importance, and it would be not only endleſs, but abſurd, to attempt an Anſwer to all thoſe Points, upon which the ſimple Part of the People have been lately entertained.—Perhaps I have rather gone too far in this Attempt already in ſome Reſpects; for it is very obvious, that the greater Part of the Arguments employed by the *Faction* againſt whom I write are of a Nature, which renders them of all others the moſt unanſwerable,--they have the Property which a great Author aſcribes to Nonſenſe,—*Nonſenſe*, ſays he, *ſtands upon its own Baſis, like a Rock of Adamant,—there is no Place about it weaker than another,--the Major and the Minor are of equal Strength.--Its Queſtions admit of no Reply, and its Aſſertions are not to be invalidated; if it affirms any thing you cannot lay hold of it; or if it denies, you cannot confute it:—In a word, there are greater Intricacies in an elaborate and well written Piece of Nonſenſe, than in the moſt profound Tract of School-Divinity.--* Such are the Productions of the *Faction* of this Time; and the ſame Author obſerves, that of this Nature have always been the Productions of the ſame Men; nor can we form by any more unerring Rule our firſt Suſpicions of the Nature of any *Faction* in this Country: a *Jacobite Faction*, or a *Tory Party* (which as we have fully ſhewn before, is by unavoidable Fatality always led by *Jacobites*, whether they know it or not) eternally *hath*, *doth*, *will*, and *muſt* fight in Entrenchments of this kind.

The preſent *Faction*, from hence at firſt naturally ſuſpected, has at length been fully detected, by all their Endeavours to preſerve *France*, to ſacrifice the Houſe of *Auſtria*, and to poiſon the Principles of the People to the Proteſtant Succeſſion, and to the Family now upon the Throne, by the Arts uſed to inflame the People, which have been the ſame that were ever uſed by the ſame *Faction*, and by the Tendency of every Point with which they goad the People on to Diſcontent and Diſſatisfaction; which

Points

Points incontrovertibly appear, when viewed in a true Light, to conſiſt in theſe three Heads; 1. *The Deſtruction of the* Whigs, *and the Elevation of the* Jacobite Intereſt *under the ſpecious Name of* Tories; 2. *The Expulſion of the preſent Royal Family*; 3. *The Change of the Conſtitution of this Kingdom.* As this is undeniably evinced by the *Deduction* of their *Conduct*, and the *Examination* of their *Principles*, and the *Evidence* of the *Facts* contained in the preceeding Pages, every Man of Honeſty will think me warranted in this Undertaking to maintain, and every Man of Senſe will know, that I have ſufficiently maintained that Propoſition, which I laid down in the Beginning of theſe Papers, as my principal Point to prove, *viz. That the Oppoſition of this Time is not an* Oppoſition, *but a* Faction; *and that of the moſt dangerous kind to this Nation.*

And now the Heads of the *Faction* for their laſt Reſource will ſeek to ſhelter, and will throw themſelves among that general Herd, whom they for a while have led, but they will find no Protection there, they are ſingled out; the Reſt will ſee whom we have marked, will ſeparate, and retire from the Society of thoſe, with whom they can aſſociate no longer, without the utmoſt Danger.

We make no Doubt, that they will labour to revive the falſe Opinion, that the Principles of their *Faction* are not to be apprehended; it is the conſtant publick Topic of Diſcourſe with *Jacobites*, that there is not a *Jacobite* in *England*. But they have opened themſelves too far, their Views have been too glaring, they have unmaſked too ſoon, and it avails nothing for a Man to deny *the Name*, while he purſues *the Thing*; it will be hard to convince a rational Being, that a Party, driving at this furious Rate, as we have ſeen, in ſuch a Road, can have any other View; were it for Preferment and Employments only, it is a villainous Purſuit when followed by theſe means, and without enquiring who are the Men, how many, that are actuated by the *firſt*, or that concur on Account of the *ſecond* View, it is fully ſufficient for the Publick, that the Conduct of the *Faction* manifeſtly leads to this fatal End.

But at the ſame time that we ſay this juſtly of the general Tendency of the preſent Oppoſition, it would be highly unjuſt to make no Diſtinction, or to charge the Bulk of thoſe Individuals, of which this *Faction* has been hitherto compoſed, with the *ſame Principles*.—We do it not;—we are very ſenſible that different Motives of Diſcontent, and even of miſtaken Honſty, have certainly drawn in many well-meaning Men to aſſociate with them. Yet I muſt freely ſay thus much even of theſe, and of all who are concerned with them, that though they may

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eſcape the Depth of Cenſure, which is due to thoſe by whom they are thus pitifully led, they are not wholly free from Blame, in tampering with Government, without taking any Pains to inform themſelves; and ſome of them are undoubtedly guilty of a Crime, ſtill much leſs to be excuſed, *viz.* that of reſigning their Judgments to other Men, (as it is too much the Caſe of all Parties) with a View one Time or other, to promote or advance their private Intereſts by it. The Corruption is equal, to abandon the Will to the *Proſpect* of Advantage, as to the *Poſſeſſion* of it; and it is conſequently as wicked to oppoſe for the *Expectation*, (though more popularly wicked) as to ſupport Government for the *preſent Profit* of Employments.—God and themſelves only know how many of the *Faction* are culpable in this.—But let them weigh it well, and whether the Danger to the Publick is not equal in both Caſes.—Others there are who, from want of Courage to ſtand againſt unjuſt Calumny, are dragged along, againſt their Wills, by the Fury of their Party,—of theſe no better can be ſaid, than that they are Cowards, and do not deſerve the Name of Men.—There is yet another Claſs, whoſe Intereſt in their Countries and their Boroughs, compel them to flatter the heated Imaginations, corrupt Principles, or fluctuating Humours of thoſe they repreſent; but this, if duly conſidered, is as great Corruption as the reſt, and the Bottom of it is nothing better than unwarrantable Vanity, or a Preference of their own private Intereſt to that of the Commonwealth.—And there is yet a fourth Set of Men, who by their Pride and Reſentments to the Crown, or to the Adminiſtration, for that want of Deference and Reſpect, which cannot be extended to all who deſerve it, and is often expected by thoſe who deſerve it not, are driven into this Extravagance.—Though this is indeed that Evil to which generous Spirits are the moſt expoſed, yet no conſiderate Man can think, that this, or any Motive in the World, can be a ſufficient Excuſe for any one to concur in the Deſtruction of his Country.

If the Bulk of thoſe who now aſſociate with this *Faction* reflect carefully upon theſe Things, and if all under theſe different Circumſtances, edify as they ought to do by theſe Reflections, I may venture to affirm, that it will, in a ſhort time, make that Figure, which it is the Wiſh of every honeſt Man to ſee it make. Leaving therefore theſe Gentlemen to their own Reflections, I ſhall now ſum up what I have chiefly endeavoured to inculcate in the preceding Pages, in a few Conſiderations, which I ſubmit to the general Maſs of Men.

1. Whether the Avowal of Principles, and the Purſuit of a Conduct directly tending to ſerve, ſave, and aggrandize, and

to divert the Attention of the People from the Danger of their Eternal and Implacable Enemy the *French*, obſtructing all Means for the Support, and giving up the Balance of Power, under Pretences either of Inability, Inutility, on any Plea whatever, labouring to deſtroy the Faith of our Treaties, and contending for the Deſertion of our Allies, ſuggeſting an abſurd, infamous and evidently diſproved Propoſition, that we fight only for the Service of a Foreign Territory, endeavouring to prejudice the People againſt the *Whigs*, and to poiſon the whole Affections of the Nation to their *preſent Prince*, and to the *Proteſtant Succeſſion*, was not the direct Conduct, in all its Parts, of a *Jacobite Faction*, under the deluſive Title of a *Tory Party*, in the Reigns of King *William* and Queen *Anne?*

2. Let them conſider, to what Point they were hurried by that *Faction*. Whether it did not end in the Preſervation of *France*, whom nothing elſe could have then ſaved, and in the Confuſion of their own Country, which nothing leſs than the Providence of God could have afterwards preſerved; Whether the Fruits of the Blood of 200,000 Men, and of 70 Millions of Money ſpent in that late long War, were not caſt away by this Conduct of that *Faction?* Whether the Reſtoration of *France*, has not created 30 *Millions* of unneceſſary Expence ſince that Time, a Rebellion which coſt *a Million* in the next Reign, the Neceſſity of double the Army in Times of Peace, that we ſhould otherwiſe have had Occaſion to maintain, and the vaſt Expences we muſt now incur anew, to reduce within due Bounds the exorbitant Power of the Houſe of *Bourbon?*

3. Whether there be any other Way to learn the Principles of Men, than by comparing their former with their preſent Conduct, or to judge of the future Effects of their preſent, but by the paſt Conſequences of their former Conduct? Whether the very individual Methods are not now purſued by the preſent Oppoſition, that were purſued by the *Jacobite Faction* of that Time? Whether therefore any Man who can reaſon at all, can conclude the preſent Oppoſition (whatever Pretences it may uſe, or whatever Title it may bear) to be any other than a direct and apparent Faction of the ſame kind?

4. Whether the ſame Tree muſt not, by all the Laws of Nature, conſtantly produce the ſame Fruit; the like Cauſes, the like Effects; and then what muſt be the Fruit and the Effect of the Meaſures of the preſent Faction?

5. Let the *Tories* in particular (I ſpeak not to thoſe *Jacobites* who aſſume the Name, but to thoſe who are really no more than honeſt and well-meaning Men, and ſuch in general they are, who have inherited that Appellation, becauſe their Parents

Parents were ſuch, or becauſe of their Intereſts in their Corporations, or the Company they keep) let theſe, I ſay, conſider, whether they ever got any Thing by joining with a *Jacobite Faction*, but Miſery to their Country, and Shame to themſelves? Whether they were ever led by a *Jacobite Faction*, but that they became their Dupes? Whether they were ever engaged with a *Jacobite Faction*, but they were brought to repent, and forced to recant at laſt? Whether they ever knew their Men, or ſaw their Danger, till it was almoſt too late to repent, and uſeleſs to recant? Whether they have not ever been carried away by *Names* inſtead of *Things?* And whether the Cry about *Hanover* now, is not what the Cry about the *Church* was formerly, raiſed and fomented with as little Reaſon, and for the ſame vile Purpoſe? Whether they have not too much Honeſty to ſupport an Alliance with a *Jacobite Faction*, to its End and Iſſue? Let them reflect, whether by acting as they now do, they put it not out of the Power of their beſt intentioned Friends to aboliſh thoſe unhappy Party-Diſtinctions, which every well-meaning Man ſincerely wiſhes to deſtroy? and which he will ſincerely labour to deſtroy (whenever their Moderation can make it ſafe or poſſible) by a juſt and equal Advancement of Merit, where-ever it is found in *Individuals* among them? But let them conſider fairly, how apt they have been on all Occaſions to aſſociate with, and to be guided by, Men of worſe Principles, and for this Reaſon, whether they can expect it, while they continue to unite with theſe Men, and while they claim it *as a Party*, which is their preſent Caſe.

6. Let the few *Republicans*, and *Whigs*, whoſe Heat, Paſſions and Diſappointments have *ſteeled* them into the Temper of *Republicans*, conſider, whether a *Republican*, and ſuch a *Whig*, when in Alliance with a *Jacobite Faction*, is any thing elſe, or better, than the *Jackall* to the *Lyon*, with whom he is, for a Time, allowed the Honour to hunt, but with whom he will never be permitted to divide the Prey? Let them analyſe that Philter, they have taken to ſtimulate this unnatural Affection, and reflect that ſuch a Copulation can engender nothing but a Monſter.

Quale Portentum neque Militaris
Daunia in latis alit Eſculetis;
Nec Jubæ Tellus generat.-------- Hor.

7. Let the honeſt *Whigs* conſider, how often their Firmneſs and good Senſe have ſaved their Country, and whether any thing but Union among themſelves can do it now? Whether particular Points, though moſt undeniably ſuited to the *Whig Principle*, ought to be purſued, nay may not even conſiſtently

be for a Time oppoſed by the *Whigs*, in a Conjuncture, when by a Chain of Circumſtances, that Purſuit would not be only vain in itſelf, but tend to deſtroy the *Whig Intereſt?*—Whether the Support of *that* ought not to be the primary Conſideration? And whether the gaining a few popular Laws (were this even certainly the Caſe) at the Expence of *that*, would be for the Benefit of this Country? Whether the popular Laws we now have, or thoſe we might perhaps acquire, could be long preſerved after the Ruin of that Intereſt? Whether therefore it is not below the Underſtanding of a *Whig*, to drop the *Subſtance* in this manner for the *Shadow?* Whether for this Reaſon it is not more prudent to content ourſelves awhile with what we have already, and to wait a ſafer Opportunity to exert ourſelves for the farther Improvement of our Conſtitution? Whether we ſhould not make a fooliſh Bargain for our Country, if while we were hunting after ſome ſeemingly convenient, but yet (after all) precarious Advantages at home, we ſhould ſuffer a Foreign Power inſenſibly to become our Maſter? Or while we were too paſſionately engaged in puſhing for the farther Advancement of our Liberty, we ſhould raſhly throw our Government into the Hands of a Family, who muſt in all Probability deſtroy it, or gradually wreſt the Scepter out of that Line, which is demonſtrably moſt likely to preſerve it?—Whether therefore it is not our Buſineſs, in our preſent Situation, to ſettle and conſolidate our Government, which has been not a little ſhaken in the Tempeſt of the late Times, than (before that is done) to run any new Riſque, in attempting to be *better* than *well?*

8. Let the Publick conſider fairly, whether every one of thoſe Points, upon which they have been of late ſo furiouſly inflamed, are not wilfully and wickedly miſrepreſented, and already proved, by the Event, to be notoriouſly falſe in every Inſtance?---As to the Refuſal of the *Heſſians* to march,---the Inability of the *Hanoverians* to act,---the Acceſſion of the *Dutch*,---the Infidelity of the King of *Sardinia*,---the unjuſt Reflections on the King, as not intending to aſſiſt in his Electoral Capacity,---the Veto of the King of *Pruſſia*,---the Impoſſibility of ſaving the Queen of *Hungary*, and of reſiſting *France*;---let them reflect, to what we ſhould have been reduced, if we had followed the Advice of the *Faction*, and then reſolve, whether they can follow them any longer, without Ignominy to themſelves, and Deſtruction to their Country?

9. Let the Popular Intereſt conſider, as to all their Popular Purſuits, what was their Original View in Oppoſition? with what they would have been contented, and for what they would have willingly compounded a little time ago? And if their Expectations

pectations are to grow with their Succeſs, how they can ever be contented? Whether they have not got the End? and if they have, whether it is not Folly to purſue the Means? Whether if the Power of the Crown, and of the Lords, were greatly leſs, the Commons could be long without engroſſing all? Let them examine, whether it is not their Nature, and that of every People, to riſe in their Demands for Power, as they encreaſe in it? Whether, if they had as much more, as ſome very honeſtly, though very inconſiderately, contend for, they could curb this Nature in themſelves? and whether if they had ſo much, and could not curb it, the whole Legiſlature could prevent their having all? Whether their having all would be truly for their Advantage? Whether in any one Period of our Government they had half ſo much? And finally (if they can be impartial and reaſon fairly) whether it is not evident, that their preſent Views and Diſcontents are not, in ſome meaſure, owing to what they have already? Whether thoſe Gentlemen, who quitted the late Oppoſition, at the Time they did it, inſtead of deſerting, have not ſaved their Country? Whether they have not acted the Part of a tender Phyſician to a ſick Patient? Whether, if they have deceived the People, (as it is called) they have not done it, becauſe there was no other way to bring them to do that which was neceſſary for their Health? And whether the *People* are not as unjuſt to theſe Men, after what has been done by their Means, as the *Patient* would be, who after he was cured of a dangerous Diſeaſe, ſhould quarrel with his Phyſician, for having given him too good an Opinion of his Medicine, during the Time of his Diſtemper, or abuſe him for deſiſting afterwards to preſcribe the farther Uſe of it for his daily Food.

10. Let them then conſider how they can anſwer, either to God or to their Country, that wicked and cruel Treatment they have given to thoſe true Patriots, who have ſtood their Ground, with equal Steadineſs, againſt the late Miniſter, and the preſent tempeſtuous *Faction*; and how they can ever make theſe Men amends, for the Inſults they have received, for the Loſs of their Intereſts in their reſpective Countries, and the Foundation they have laid of future Difficulties they muſt infallibly hereafter undergo, by the Revival of a *Faction*, which, when once raiſed, will never fail to perſecute and infeſt all honeſt Men? Or what Retaliation is it in their Power to give to thoſe, who thro' popular Credulity, Folly, Paſſion and Intemperance, have endured that Load of Infamy and Malice, which has been caſt upon them with ſuch unparalleled Injuſtice, and which a worthy Man would have ſooner ſubmit-

ted to Death, than have ſuffered an Hour, if the Safety of his Country and every thing, that was near, dear and valuable to it, had not depended upon this Sacrifice ?

11. Let the People conſider, (and they will conſider it, if they have any Remorſe in the Compoſition of their Souls,) how they ought to bluſh at the baſe Encouragement they have given to the perſonal Abuſe of his Majeſty; who inſtead of liſtning to the inſidious Offers of *France*, as ſome other great Electors of the Empire have done, and inſtead of projecting any Advantage to his Foreign Dominions, which he might have greatly encreaſed out of the Spoil of the Houſe of *Auſtria*, if he would have baſely concurred to its Deſtruction; and which, (notwithſtanding all the impudent Aſſertions of the *Faction*,) there is no Proſpect of his being able to encreaſe any other way, hath put himſelf to a very great Expence, from the very Commencement of the preſent Confuſions of *Europe*, and expoſed thoſe Dominions to the utmoſt Hazard with no other View, but to maintain the Cauſe of Juſtice, the Ballance of Power, and the Intereſt of *Great Britain*. Let them inform themſelves; let them examine the Situation of his Countries, the Power, Views, Titles and Intereſts of all his Neighbours; and let them point out one ſingle Spot of Ground, that it is poſſible for him, in the Nature of Things, to acquire in addition to his Electoral Dominions, by the Iſſue of this Conteſt.---And let them afterwards reflect how ſcandalous beyond all Meaſure, it has been to convert that very Hazard, and the Difficulties into which he and his Electorate have been lately brought, by his Attachment to the ſole Intereſt of this Country, into the wicked Pretence, that his Tenderneſs to thoſe Dominions, which he ſo freely ventured, has been the Cauſe of the War, and the Motive of his generous Conduct. Let them then generouſly and honeſtly acknowledge, how ungratefully and wickedly they have concurred, upon Grounds ſo utterly falſe, to alienate the Affection of the Nation, from the Perſon and Family of a Prince, who has ſacrificed every private Intereſt to the Intereſts of *Great Britain*,---who has ſupported his Ally with that Steadineſs, Sincerity, and good Faith, which would have rendered a private Man an Ornament to the Society in which he lived,---who, in this Juſt, and Neceſſary Cauſe, has expoſed his Perſon to the Dangers of War, as much as the meaneſt private Soldier in his Armies,---and is now at the Head of his Troops, in a Foreign Country, animating the Courage of the *Britiſh* Nation, and reſtoring the Antient Glory of the Royal Race of *Plantagenets*, from which he is deſcended, the braveſt Line of Princes that ever ſat upon the Throne of any Nation.

12.

12. Let them reflect upon their Ingratitude to Providence, and their more than *Jewiſh* Obſtinacy, and Hardneſs of Heart, in the Inſenſibility ſhewn by ſo many upon the great Deliverance they have lately had, in their Eſcape from the imminent Dangers threatned to the Liberties of the whole World, and in the miraculous Turn that has appeared in our Favour ſince the late Change of the Adminiſtration.

13. Let them conſider, that if we improve theſe Advantages as we ought, we have now a Confederacy formed (with farther Proſpects of additional Aid) conſiſting of above 300,000 of the beſt Troops in *Europe*; that we come freſh into the Quarrel; that *France*, by the entire Ruin of the Emperor, is left without Allies, reduced, by a Series of ill Succeſs, and unfortunate Events, to the loweſt Degree.—And that therefore, if we follow the Blow, we have the faireſt Expectation, not only to get out of the Difficulties, which we had lately ſo much Reaſon to think would prove our Ruin, but to reduce that enormous Power within due Limits for a long Time to come, and that nothing but our own Impatience, and the deluſive Practices of a *Jacobite Faction*, can hinder us now, from what they prevented once before by the ſame individual Arts, in a parallel Conjuncture.—In a word, let any Man lay his Hand upon his Heart, and ſay whether he thinks we are never to expect, or can always avoid a War with *France?* And when he has anſwered (for who can honeſtly or rationally anſwer otherwiſe) that the Growth and Ambition of that Power, her Breach of Treaties, our Rivalſhip in Trade, the natural Antipathy and Jealouſies of the two Nations, muſt bring it unavoidably upon us in a ſhort Time, though we ſhould decline it for the preſent; let him then ſay, whether there can be any Senſe left in the People of *England*, if they are not earneſtly deſirous to enter into it, and to puſh it with the utmoſt Vigour now? When we can do it with ſo manifeſt Advantage? When we ſtand in a Situation, in which we can hardly hope ever to find ourſelves again? At which we could not flatter ourſelves to arrive hereafter, even in three Campaigns, attended with the moſt miraculous Succeſs?—And in fine, as to the Method of the War, whether any thing is more chimerical than the modern Fancy, of engaging with *France*, by our Maritime Force only? Whether the Trade of *England* would not ſuffer, during the Continuance of ſuch a War, as much, if not more, than the Trade of *France?*—Whether *France* has not greater Reſources without Trade, or during a Suſpenſion of Trade, than *England?* Whether therefore any Diſtreſs that we might create to *France* by ſuch a War, would be more than temporary, or could be ſufficient to bring it to a

ſafe or ſound Concluſion? Whether we can imagine effectually or durably to reduce her, or to ſecure ourſelves for any long Continuance againſt her Power, by any other means, than by diſmembring ſome of her ill-gotten Provinces, and preventing any farther Encreaſe of her Dominions upon the Continent? Whether this *can be* done otherwiſe, than by joining with *her Enemies* and *our Allies* in a *Land War?* And if this *cannot be* done otherwiſe (whatever may be the Expence or Inconvenience of ſuch an *Undertaking*) whether it is not Madneſs, or ſomething worſe, to oppoſe its being *undertaken.*

Should theſe Conſiderations have no Effect upon the Publick we are a Nation doomed and devoted to Deſtruction: Our Government will be totally confounded by novel, falſe, captivating and deceitful Maxims; our Conſtitution overwhelmed and buried in the Ruins of *Faction.* What Fabrick the Enemies of this Country may rebuild, is neither yet known to themſelves or me; nor when this happy Form of Government, the venerable Work of ſo many Ages, ſhall be no more; will it be much worth the while of any Man among us to regard? Inſtead therefore of fomenting every Subject of Uneaſineſs, ungratefully repining at every Bleſſing and Advantage, which we ſo viſibly and abundantly enjoy, above all other Kingdoms of this habitable Earth, let us turn our Thoughts upon that immenſe Wealth, Power and Dominion, which is ſtill in the Train of Great Augmentation; upon that Conſtitutional Security, however wickedly miſrepreſented, which we ſtill, in a high degree, enjoy at home, and the Terror, which upon all juſt Occaſions, we are able to ſtrike through Foreign Nations. Inſtead of dwelling upon improbable and diſtant Dangers, which certainly never were ſo far removed from us, as at this very Time, let us reflect upon our uncommon, and almoſt unpreſidented Happineſs. Inſtead of alarming our Minds, and heating our Imaginations with the Stories of Evils that have attended the Loſs of Liberty in other Countries, in which, during the Courſe of the late Oppoſition, we have been ſufficiently inſtructed, let us for a while apply ourſelves to a Study more neceſſary at this Time, that of tracing the true Cauſes, which have brought this Loſs of Liberty, and thoſe Evils which attend it, upon every People, who once were, and are now no longer free. If we do this, we ſhall learn, that perfect Liberty and immenſe Riches, with its conſtant Attendants, Licentiouſneſs, Luxury, an unbounded Thirſt after Wealth, a Want of Morals, and an Impatience of all Government and Diſcipline, inflamed by the *Factions* of private Men, for their own private Ambition, cloaked under publick Pretences, have ripened and brought to Maturity all theſe Miſchiefs

chiefs in the World. Let us therefore, conſcious of our Proſperity, and ſenſible of the Dangers to which we naturally ſtand by that very Proſperity expoſed, fly the deluſive Arts of factious Men, who now endeavour to avail themſelves of theſe Circumſtances, and practiſe upon us in the Manner they have ever done in all former Ages: *Ut imperium evertant Libertatem præferunt, cum perverterunt ipſam aggrediuntur. Ceterum Libertas et ſpecioſa nomina prætexuntur. Nec quiſquam alienum ſervitium, et dominationem ſibi concupivit, ut non eadem iſta vocabula uſurparet.* Tacit. Hiſt. Lib. 4.

F I N I S.

E R R A T A.

Page 66. l. 32. inſtead of *hateful at home* read *and himſelf hateful at home*. p. 102. l. 13. inſtead of *fruitleſs* read *fruitful*. p. 132. l. 40. inſtead of *falſe* read *ſafe*. Ibid. l. 41. inſtead of *Pile* read *Plie*.

Bollan, William, d. 1776

THE

IMPORTANCE

AND

ADVANTAGE

OF

CAPE BRETON,

Truly Stated, and Impartially Conſidered.

With Proper MAPS.

——Si quid noviſti rectius iſtis
Candidus imperti: Si non, his utere mecum.
HOR. Ep. VI. Lib. I.

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THE

PREFACE.

THE proper handling of the following Subject is a Taſk of much greater Difficulty than I at firſt imagined.

I AM *ſenſible of many Defects in theſe Sheets; but, as I mean nothing more than to open the Eyes of the Publick on ſo important an Occaſion, ſo I have only furniſhed the ſeveral Hints that occur'd to me; and leave the World to improve upon them at their Leiſure, and according to their different Capacities.*

THE *Chief of my Care was, that Nothing had a Place herein, but inconteſtable Facts; which, the more they are*

enquired into, the clearer and brighter they will appear.

In *describing of* Cape Breton, *I chose to use the very Words of* Pere Charlevoix, *and his Authorities, least it might be objected that I had represented Places and Things more favourably than they are in Reality. The General Reputation of that Author, for Exactness and Veracity, adds no small Weight to that Part of this Discourse; at the same time that it indemnifies me of all Mistakes or Falsehoods advanced by him. I have only extracted such Parts of his History as were most necessary to my Purpose; and even omitted many, which might have enlarged and embellished this Performance, merely for the sake of bringing the Whole into as narrow a Compass as might be.*

I thought *it, however, necessary and proper to introduce the* Main Point, *by some Observations, leading more easily and naturally to it. For this Reason it is, that I have begun by shewing, in general, the Title which the* European *Nations have to their Possessions in* America: *And, as that Affair turns, or depends chiefly upon the*

the Treaty of Utrecht, *I found it neceſſary to make an Extract of ſuch Articles as relate to the Purpoſe; and to remark upon the ſaid Articles.*

THE *Maps are taken from* Bellin, *Engineer to the Marine of* France; *though they differ greatly from all others that have been hitherto laid down. But, as his Obſervations are altogether taken from* Charlevoix, *ſo, wherever there is any material Difference between his Maps and our own, it ariſes probably from an Intention in the Jeſuit, to aſcertain the Rights and Limits of the* French *Nation, whenever thoſe Affairs ſhall hereafter be debated, in Order to a Settlement of them.*

IT *will at firſt Sight appear, that the Stile is neither laboured nor ſtudied; I am rather appprehenſive it may not, in many Places, be correct: But the Validity of the Facts is what I chiefly inſiſt upon, and have endeavoured more at being clear and intelligible, than florid and diffuſe, in the Repreſentation of them.*

I AM

I AM *not half ſo ambitious of becoming an Author, as deſirous, upon all Occaſions, of bearing Teſtimony to the Truth, and being of ſome Uſe to my Country, and Friends: Yet I flatttr myſelf, that the Publick will not be diſpleaſed to find ſome Things herein collected, which have not hitherto been generally known, or attended to.*

IF *our Share of the World reaps any Benefit from this Eſſay, all the Ends propoſed in it by me, are fully anſwered; and the Faults which are found in it, may probably be the Occaſion of its being handled in a better and more correct Manner by ſome abler Pen. This would be ſo far from giving me the leaſt Uneaſineſs, that I ſhould truly rejoice in my having been the happy Inſtrument of ſo much Good to a Nation, whoſe real Intereſts I have at Heart, as much as any other Perſon, of my Rank and Station, in it.*

THE

THE

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THE Importance *and* Advantage OF *CAPE BRETON*, &c.

CHAP. I.

An Enquiry into the Title by Conqueſt, of the European *Nations, to their Poſſeſſions or Territories in* America.

IN treating of the *Importance and Advantages of* CAPE BRETON to the Crown of *England*, I thought it might not be diſagreeable to the Reader, firſt to enquire into the ſeveral *Titles by Conqueſt*, which each *European* Nation has to the Territories it poſſeſſes in *America*: And by ſearching CHAP. I.

CHAP. I.

into the Titles of that Nature, it appears, that very few of them deſerve the Name of *Conqueſts*. Moſt of them are founded upon bare Diſcoveries, and landing upon an unknown Coaſt, which was either quite uninhabited, or peopled with Savages, who upon the firſt Appearance of large Ships, and of Men of a different Complexion, in another kind of Dreſs, and armed in an unuſual manner, generally fled from the Shores, retired into the Mountains, and endeavoured to ſecure their Perſons. As ſoon as their Backs were turned, the Enterprizer immediately landed at this or that Cape, or in one or another Bay, Creek or River; there ſet up the Arms of his Country, or a Pillar with an Inſcription; or ſometimes both: And thence he claimed a Right to ſuch or ſuch a Part of thoſe Territories. But in many Caſes, nothing more was done; and ſeveral Years, perhaps, paſſed without following the firſt Diſcovery, or making any Settlement upon it. Nay, it frequently happened, that after a Settlement had been made, it came to be deſerted; either becauſe the Place firſt fix'd upon, was not proper for it; or becauſe ſome other *European* Na-

The Manner in which moſt of the Conqueſts in America were made.

tion drove the first out of it; or lastly, because the Savages would no longer bear the Encroachments of such troublesome, and generally cruel, Interlopers; but taking Courage, and entering into Alliances amongst themselves, they came down in Numbers, and frequently made dreadful Havock amongst the New-comers; thereby regaining all that these Conquerors had, at great Expence of Men and Money, got Possession of. But to put this Matter in as clear a Light as may be, I shall here add a short Chronological Account of all the material Discoveries or Conquests (which are to our Purpose) made of *America* by the different Nations now claiming a Right there. This Account is taken chiefly from a Book printed at *Paris* in the Year 1744, by *Pere Charlevoix*, a Jesuit, who was a Missionary in *New France*, the *Louisiane*, and along the Banks of the *Mississippi River*.

1492.

CHRISTOPHER COLUMBUS, a *Genoese*, discovered the first Land in *America*, and took Possession of it in the Name of the Crown of *Castile*. This Discovery consisted

America discovered by Columbus.

CHAP. I. sisted chiefly in the Islands *San Salvador*, *Cuba*, and *St. Domingo*.

1496.

Newfoundland, by Cabot, or Gabato.

HENRY VII. King of *England*, granted a Patent to *John Cabot*, or *Gabato*, a *Venetian*, and his three Sons, under certain Conditions, to go and make Discoveries in *America*. They accordingly discovered *Newfoundland*; a Part of the Continent of *Labrador*, or *Laborador*, as far as to 55 Degrees of Northern Latitude; and brought four Savages with them to *England*.

1501.

Gulph of Honduras and Porto Bello.

COLUMBUS discovered the Cape and Bay, or Gulph of *Honduras*, and the Harbour of *Porto-Bello*.

1509.

Jamaica, by Esquibel.

JOHN DE ESQUIBEL made a Settlement on the Island of *Jamaica*, by the Orders of *Don Diego Columbus* (Son and Heir of *Christopher Columbus*) at that Time Admiral of the *Indies*.

1511.

1511.

DIEGO VELASQUEZ took Poſſeſſion of the Iſland of *Cuba* in the Name of the above-mentioned Admiral. *Cuba, by Velaſquez.*

1523.

JOHN VERAZANI, a *Florentine*, in the Service of *Francis* I. King of *France*, made a Voyage to *North America*; and the following Year diſcovered *Florida*. *Florida, by Verazani.*

1527.

JOHN BERMUDEZ, a *Spaniard*, diſcovered an Iſland, to which he gave his Name, and which is now known by the Name of *Bermudas*. *Bermudas, by Bermudez.*

1535.

JOHN CARTIER of *St. Malo*, entered a great Gulph or Bay, which he named *St. Laurence*, it being the Saint's Day of that Name. He ſailed 180 Leagues up the River *St. Laurence*, to a Village of Savages, at the Foot of a Mountain, which he called *Mont-Royal*; and the whole Iſland is, at this Day, called *Montreal*. *Gulph of St. Laurence, by Cartier.*

1556.

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1556.

Streights of Weigatz, by Barroug.

STEPHEN BARROUG, an *Engliſhman*, in ſeeking a Paſſage by the North to *China*, diſcovered the *Streights* of *Weigatz*, which lye between *Nova Zembla*, and the Country of the *Samoides*.

1576.

Forbiſher's Streights, by Forbiſher.

SIR *Martin Forbiſher* diſcovered the *Streights* which lye between *Greenland*, and a large Iſland to the South of it. They are called *Forbiſher's Streights*.

1578.

Weſt-Friezeland by the ſame.

THE ſame Perſon diſcovered the Land of *Weſt-Friezeland*, and took Poſſeſſion of it in the Name of *Elizabeth*, Queen of *England*.

1579.

New Albion, by Drake.

FRANCIS DRAKE, an *Engliſhman*, diſcovered, to the North of *California*, a Land, to which he gave the Name of *New Albion*.

1583.

Newfoundland, by Humphrey.

SIR *Gilbert Humphrey* went, at the Inſtigation of Secretary *Walſingham* to *New-*

Newfoundland, and took Poſſeſſion of it, in the Name of Queen *Elizabeth*. He eſtabliſhed there a Cod-Fiſhery. It is probable that he alſo diſcovered Part of *Acadia*; having, as it is ſaid, loſt three of his Ships on the Iſland of *Sable*. CHAP. I.

1584, 1585.

ARTHUR BARLOW was ſent by Sir *Walter Raleigh* to make Diſcoveries; and landed at the Iſland *Roënoko*. At his Return he gave ſo favourable an Account of that Country, that Queen *Elizabeth* named it *Virginia*, in Honour of her Virginity. *Virginia, by Barlow.*

1587.

JOHN DAVIS, or *Davids*, diſcovered the *Streights* known at this Day, by his Name. They lye between *Greenland* and *Cumberland Iſland*, and are called *Davis's Streights*. *Davis's Streights, by Davis.*

1693.

SIR *Richard Hawkins* ſailed round the World, and diſcovered, to the South-weſt of the *Streights* of *Magellan*, a large Tract of Land, which extended on one Side beyond the *Streights de la Maire*; and *Diſcoveries, by Hawkins.*

CHAP. I.

and on the other, as far as over-againſt the *Cape of Good Hope*.

1598.

Iſle of Sable and Acadia, by la Roche.

THE Marquis *de la Roche* procured a Patent from *Henry* IV. of *France*, for continuing the Diſcoveries formerly made by *James Cartier*; and diſcovered the Iſle of *Sable*, and Part of the Coaſts of *Acadia*, now *Nova Scotia*.

1604.

Canada, by ſeveral.

PETER DE GUAST, Monſieur *des Monts*, and *Samuel de Champlain*, *Frenchmen*, compleated the Diſcovery of *Acadia*, and Part of the South Coaſt of *Canada*.

1607.

Cheſapeak-Bay, by Smith.

JOHN SMITH diſcovered *Cheſapeak Bay*, and the *Powatan River* which falls into it. He built upon the River a Fort, which is become a City, and the Capital of *Virginia*, by the Name of *James-town*, in Honour of *James* I. King of *England*.

1609.

New York, by Hudſon.

HENRY HUDSON, after ſailing along the Coaſts of *Virginia* and *New England*, diſcovered, in about 40 Degrees of North Latitude,

Latitude, a great Bay, into which a large River empties itſelf, which he called *Manhatte*, from the Name of the Savages he found there. This Captain was at that Time in the Service of the *Dutch*, who were for ſome Time in Poſſeſſion of that Country: For by them was built the Town of *Manhatte*, and the Fort of *Orange* on the ſame River. This Country now bears the Name of *New York*.

THE ſame *Hudſon*, and *William Baffins*, puſhed very far towards the North-Weſt; where they diſcovered, the following Year, thoſe Countries yet known by their Names; as *Hudſon's Bay*, and *Baffins's Bay*.

Hudſon's Bay, by Hudſon.

Baffins's Bay, by Baffins.

1611.

THOMAS BUTTON diſcovered to the North of *Canada* a large Country, which he called *New Wales*. He afterwards ſailed all over the Bay, which bears his Name.

New Wales and Button's Bay, by Button.

1612.

JAMES HALL diſcovered the *Streights* of *Cockin* to the North of *Canada*, and in 65 Degrees of North Latitude.

Cockin's Streights, by Hall.

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1631.

New South-Wales, &c. by James.

CAPTAIN *James* discovered several Lands to the North of *Hudson's Bay*. He called all the Lands at the Entrance of the Bay by the Name of *New South Wales*. He touched afterwards at *Cape Henrietta Maria*, Lord *Weston's Island*, Earl of *Bristol's Island*, Sir *Thomas Roe's Island*, Earl of *Danby's Island*, and the *Charleton Island*; which last, is in 52 Degrees, North Latitude.

1633.

Maryland.

CECIL CALVERT, Lord *Baltimore*, having obtained from King *Charles* I. of *England*, the Property of a large Extent of Country, lying to the North of *Chesapeak-Bay*, between *Virginia* and *Carolina*, sent thither his Son, who this Year began a Settlement there; which, in Honour of *Mary* of *France*, Queen of *England*, was called *Maryland*.

1656.

Hudson's Bay, by Bourdon.

BOURDON, an Inhabitant of *New France* (being sent by the Governor of the North) entered *Hudson's Bay*, and took Possession of it, in the Name of the King of *France*.

1660.

1660.

Carolina.

CHARLES II. King of *England*, granted to *George Monk*, Duke of *Albemarle*, and to five other *Engliſh* Lords, that Part of *Florida* which extends from *Virginia*, to that which is now called *New Georgia*. They divided amongſt them all that Country, and called it *Carolina*.

1667.

Rupert's River, by Ghillam.

ZACHARIAH GHILLAM, an *Engliſhman*, having gone through *Baffins's Bay* to the height of 75 Degrees, came back again, and ſailed to the Bottom of *Hudſon's Bay*, entered a River, which comes from *Canada*, and diſcharges its ſelf into the Bay: He called it *Rupert's River*. A few Years before, ſome *Engliſh* had gone up this River, as far as the Lake *Nemiſcau*.

1671.

Hudſon's Bay, by Albanel, &c.

CHARLES ALBANEL, a *French* Jeſuit, and Monſieur *Denis de St. Simon*, a Gentleman of *Canada*, were ſent by the Governor-General of *New France* to penetrate into *Hudſon's Bay* by a Way which had not yet been diſcovered: And they

CHAP. I. took Poſſeſſion of it, in the Name of the *French* King.

1680.

Barbadoes, by Sharp. CAPTAIN *Sharp*, after ſailing a great while in theſe Seas, diſcovered an Iſland, to which he gave the Name of *Barbadoes*.

1681.

Penſilvania. The foregoing Year *Charles* II. King of *England*, granted a Tract of Country to Sir *William Penn*; who, in this Year, carried a Number of Quakers thither, and made a Settlement; which was called *Penſilvania*, in Honour of its Founder.

1732.

New Georgia. GENERAL *Oglethorp* made a Settlement in the Name of his preſent Majeſty *George* II. King of *England*, between *Carolina* and *Spaniſh Florida*. This New Colony is bounded on the North, by the *Savanah* River, and on the South, by the River called *Alatamaha*. It's length, along the Coaſt, is not eſteemed more than 60 or 70 *Engliſh* Miles; but it grows larger, as it extends itſelf from the Sea. It is now called *New Georgia*.

To

To the above Chronological Account, I ſhall add the Copy of a Memorial preſented by *Jeremiah Dummer*, Eſq; to the Miniſtry of *England* in 1709. as the ſame has fallen into my Hands, without vouching for any of its Articles; *viz.*

A Memorial, ſhewing that the French *Poſſeſſions on the River of* Canada, *do originally and of Right belong to the Crown of* Great Britain; *and for other Important Reaſons ought to be reſtored to the Crown, on a Treaty of Peace.*

Mr. Dummer's Memorial in 1709.

THE whole Tract of Land (ſituate on the nether Side of the River of Canada) *called* Nova Scotia *and* Acadia, *was firſt diſcovered by* Cabot *and his Sons, in the Reign of* Henry VII. *King of* England. *Which Diſcovery was prior to that of* Verazani, *a* Florentine, *under* Francis I. *King of* France; *and accordingly was under the Power and Juriſdiction of the Crown of* England, *till the Year* 1600. *When ſome of the* French, *invited by the Traffick on the River of* St. Laurence, *ſeized firſt on the*

CHAP. I.

the North-side of the River, called Canada *, or* Nova Scotia ; *and afterwards, in* 1606. *did possess themselves of the South-side, called* Acadia.

IN *the Year* 1621. King James *looking upon their Possessions as an Invasion of his*

* THE *French* Maps, lately published by the Sieur *Bellin*, Engineer and Geographer of the Marine to the King of *France*, made *Canada* to commence from near the Source of the *Mississippi* River ; and extends it's self to that Part of the River of St. *Laurence*, which is at the Back of *New Scotland* ; placing *New France* to the Northward of *Canada*. Those of *Herman Moll* make *Canada* to begin at the great Fall of *St. Maria*, out of the *Upper Lake*, into the *Lake Huron* ; and terminate at the River of *St. Laurence*, as far above *Quebec*, as *Trois Rivieres* : And place *New France* as far to the Southward of *Canada*, as *Bellin* does to the Northward of it.

THE *French* Maps likewise call that *Isthmus*, or *Peninsula*, whereon stands *Annapolis-Royal*, by the Name of *Acadie* : Whereas *Moll*, and other Geographers, give that Name to the Land which lyes North of *Furdy Bay*.

FROM these two so widely differing Accounts of the Matter, it is hard to settle the just Limits either of our Pretensions or Possessions. It may probably suit the Purposes of *France*, to make the Difference wider than it really is, that they may make the better Terms, when a Peace shall be brought upon the Tapis.

Ter-

Territories, did by Letters Patent grant unto Sir William Alexander (*afterwards* Earl of Sterling) L'Acadie, *by the Name of* Nova Scotia : *Who in* 1622. *and* 1623. *ſubdued the* French *Inhabitants, carried them Priſoners to* Virginia, *planted a Colony there himſelf, and held Poſſeſſion of it for two Years; when, upon the Marriage of* King Charles I. *with the* Lady Henrietta Maria, *the ſaid* Nova Scotia *was, by order of the King, returned into the Hands of the* French. CHAP. I.

AFTERWARDS, *a War ariſing between the Kings of* England *and* France, * Sir David Kirk, *with his Friends did in* 1627. *and* 1628. (*by virtue of a Commiſſion obtained from his Majeſty*) *ſend to Sea at their own Charge, nine Ships fitted with warlike Stores, to expel the* French *from both Sides of the River* Canada †. *In which Enter-*

* CHARLEVOIX calls him *David Kertk*; ſays he was a Native and Refugee of *Dieppe*, but a *Calviniſt*. And in another Place he ſays, that *Kertk* was put upon this Expedition by one *James Michel*, a furious *Calviniſt*, who gave him Intelligence of the Weakneſs of the Garriſon of *Quebec*.

† BY the River of *Canada*, he muſt mean the River *St. Laurence*.

prize,

CHAP. I. *prize, they had ſuch Succeſs, that (after bringing off the* French *Inhabitants and Traders into* England) *they took Poſſeſſion of all* Nova Scotia, Canada, *and* l'Acadie: *The former of which fell to* Sir David Kirk, *who was Governor of* Quebec, *and ſet up the King of* England's *Arms in all Places of publick Reſort in the City. The latter fell to* Sir William Alexander.

IN 1632. *a Peace being concluded between the two Crowns, it was agreed that the Forts on the ſaid* French *Settlements, ſhould be delivered to the Subjects of* France: *The* French *King on his Part ſtipulating to pay in Lieu thereof to* Sir David Kirk * *Five Thouſand Pounds, Sterling; which Sum does nevertheleſs remain unpaid to this Day,*

* THE Treaty here referred to, is that made between *Charles* I. King of *England*, and *Lewis* XIII. King of *France*, *March* 29, 1632. I have examined it, and find that all the Places poſſeſſed by the *Britiſh* Subjects in *New France*, *Acadia*, and *Canada*, together with *Port-Royal*, *Quebec*, and *Cape Breton*, were to be reſtored to the *French* King. But I no where find in the Treaty, any mention of the *French* King's ſtipulating to pay a Sum to *Sir David Kirk*, by way of Indemnification.

although

although the Forts were delivered up according to Agreement. CHAP. I.

IN 1633. *King* Charles, *considering he had only surrendered the Forts, but had not debarred his Subjects from planting and trading there, did grant a Commission to* Sir Lewis Kirk, *and Company, to trade and settle there; which accordingly they did attempt, but were plundered and made Prisoners by the* French.

IN 1654. Cromwell *weighing the Premisses, and in Consideration that the Articles were not performed on the* French *King's Part, sent one* Ledgewick, *who assaulted and subdued the* French *on that Settlement, and restored the Country into the Hands of the* English *. *And although a Peace was*

* In the Treaty concluded at *Westminster*, *November* 3, 1655. between *Lewis* XIV. King of *France*, and *Oliver Cromwell*, Lord Protector, Article XXV. are the following Words, *viz.* "And whereas three Forts, *viz. Pentacoet*, *St.* "*John*, and *Port-Royal*, lately taken in *America*, "would be reclaimed by the above-mentioned "Lord, Ambassador of his said Majesty; and the "Lords Commissioners of his Highness would ar- "gue from certain Reasons, that they ought to be "detained; it is agreed, that such Controversy be "referred to the Arbitration of the Republick of "*Hamburgh*."

CHAP. I. *ſettled between the two Nations in* 1655. *and the* French *Ambaſſadors made preſſing Inſtances for the Reſtitution of that Country, yet it was not delivered up, but remained under the Juriſdiction of* England. *Yet after the Reſtauration (it is not eaſy to ſay how, or upon what Account) the* French *were permitted to re-enter, and do yet hold the unjuſt Poſſeſſion of it.*

FROM *the Premiſſes it is manifeſt that the* French *Territories on that Part of the Continent of* America, *do originally and of Right belong to the Crown of* Great Britain; *which is however, ſubmitted to better Judgements.*

IN *the mean time, it is humbly remonſtrated, that the* French *by their unwearied Induſtry, and many artful Methods, gain ground continually, by making new Alliances with the* Indian *Nations on the back of* New England, New York, *and* Virginia; *ſo that, in a little time, they will grow formidable to the* Engliſh *Settlements.*

THAT *by the intermarrying with the Natives, they have always a great Number of Jeſuits*

Jeſuits and Prieſts with them; and by inſtructing them that the Saviour of the World was a Frenchman, and murdered by the Engliſh, *they are excited to commit all manner of Cruelties upon the* Engliſh, *as meritorious: And particularly, about two Months ſince, the* French *and* Savages *made a Deſcent upon a conſiderable Town of the Province of the* Maſſachuſets, *and there barbarouſly killed an Officer of the Militia, and a Miniſter of the Town, with many others of leſs Note; notwithſtanding the Precautions which his Excellency Colonel* Dudley *took to prevent it.*

THAT *by means hereof, the beſt Part of* New England (*the Eaſtern Country*) *is entirely abandoned, and left deſolate.*

THAT *the Maſt Trade is endangered; many Perſons having been ſurprized and murdered whilſt cutting Maſts for the ſupply of the Crown. The whole Trade of* New England, *out and home, is very much awed and damp'd, eſpecially by* l'Acadie; *the Capital of that Place* (Port Royal) *being a Neſt of Privateers, and a* Dunkirk *to* New England.

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LASTLY; *That this Country is very proper and apt to yield all Naval Stores; and has the beſt of Fiſhing in the World, on it's Coaſts; ſo that, the* French *King may reſign up all* Newfoundland, *and we not obtain our End, whilſt* l'Acadie *is left their's, which will ſupply* France *and the* Streights *with Fiſh notwithſtanding.*

UPON *the whole, it is humbly moved that this Country may be demanded at the next Treaty of Peace; at leaſt, the South ſide of the River: Which, being* New Scotland, *and adjoining to* New England, *may be united to it by the Name of* New Britain, *after the great Example of* England *and* Scotland; *that ſo the Union may in all its Parts be compleat and entire, in her preſent Majeſty's moſt happy and glorious Reign.*

(*Signed*) JEREMIAH DUMMER.

FROM hence let every Reader judge and determine for himſelf, to whom *of Right* the Poſſeſſions in *America* originally belong. The *Spaniards*, it muſt be confeſſed,

confeſſed, made the Conqueſt of *Mexico* and *Peru*; and were guilty of ſuch Exceſſes of Cruelty and Barbarity, as out-did any thing ever heard of, or met with, even amongſt the Savages they conquered. But, Profit and Ambition apart, what Right had any *European* Nation to diſturb that People in the quiet and peaceable Poſſeſſion of their Country; which, in all probability, they were the Rightful Owners of, long before any of theſe mighty Conquerors had a Name? Had thoſe Nations been in a Situation, by their Numbers or their Strength, to have poured in upon any of the *Europeans*: And particularly, had they treated us when they had us in their Power, with the ſame Inhumanity wherewith we treated them; how ſhould we have branded ſuch an Undertaking with all the harſh Terms of Injuſtice, Cruelty, and Tyranny? We ſhould naturally have thought that the Hand of Heaven was heavy upon us; and that nothing leſs than enormous Crimes could have deſerved ſuch Puniſhments. We ſhould certainly have endeavoured, as ſoon as poſſible, to have freed ourſelves from a Band of Thieves, who had thus come from

CHAP. I. from afar to disturb our Quiet. We should have justified any the most artful and wicked Schemes, which could have brought this about; and have thought that we had the most undoubted Right to recover, by any means, that Liberty, and those Properties, which we had lost by the unjust Incursions of these Foreigners: And, if ever we had the good Fortune to over-power them, New Cruelties would have been invented to torture as many as remained in our Hands; partly, to satiate the Revenge of such as had suffered by them; and partly, to deter others from making a second Attempt of the like Nature. Let the most civilized Nation at this Day in *Europe* fairly ask itself the Question, whether this would not have been the Case; and, I am confident, the Answer must be in the Affirmative.

FROM the best Accounts we have of the first Discoveries of *America*, we learn, that the Discoverers met with no Resistance nor ill Treatment from the Inhabitants of that part of the World. Single Ships have gone, and a handful of Men have landed upon Islands and Continents crowded

crowded with People, without receiving any Marks of their Reſentment, ill Uſage, or Barbarity. They were at firſt ſurprized: But as ſoon as they were recovered out of their firſt Alarm, they (on many Occaſions) became extremely tractable and humane: Much more ſo, in all probability, than we ſhould have been, on the like occaſion. But we were not content to have diſcovered a Country, with which we might trade for many valuable and uſeful Commodities which we wanted, and which they were inclined to exchange with us againſt Trifles and Baubles: No; We muſt by Force or Art ſubdue the Original Poſſeſſors of that Country. To this end, large Fleets and Armaments were from time to time ſent out; and having gotten a ſmall footing, we could not reſt till we had enlarged it; and thus at length *Power* became *Right*. Having, by all Human, and Inhuman Inventions, made One Conqueſt; we proceeded to a Second: And having ſubdued a Part of the People; we cajoled or frightened them, by Arts or Threats into Alliances with us. We then furniſhed them with Fire Arms againſt their fellow Natives

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tives; and, what is worſe, introduced amongſt them thoſe intoxicating Spirits, which produced ſo much Fury and Cruelty amongſt them; and are at this Day the Cauſe of ſo much Irregularity amongſt Ourſelves. Nay, *Religion* itſelf was made uſe of as an Inſtrument put into their hands to deſtroy each other; and to carry into Execution, the moſt wicked and abominable Schemes and Practices. It appears, very evidently from the Accounts, which the Jeſuits themſelves give of their Miſſions, that, though ſeveral of them ſuffered great Hardſhips, and even Death itſelf in the moſt terrible and cruel manner at their firſt ſettling amongſt the Savages; yet *temporal Advantages* were the chief inducements to that Undertaking; and the Ties of Religion made uſe of, only becauſe none other were ſtrong enough to hold them*.

IN

* CHARLEVOIX Vol. IV. p. 152. *has the following remarkable Paſſage*, viz. "*The Governour adds* "*at the end of his Letter, that the* Engliſh *neglect* "*nothing to gain the* Abenaquis *Nation to their In-*"*tereſts. They make them Preſents, and offer them* "*Goods at a cheap rate, as well as Miniſters to in-*"*ſtruct*

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In turning over the Accounts given of the Conquests made in this part of the World, we frequently meet with noble Struggles made by the People we call *Savages*; and brave Efforts, to recover their ancient and primitive Liberties. These Liberties consisted in their being governed by their own Rulers, and the Laws enacted by them; In a right to make War against any neighbouring Nation, which had affronted, or used them ill; in the Power of changing their Habitations, as Occasion required; and of Hunting for their Winter Provision and Cloathing, wherever they thought proper. These Excursions and Removals seldom failed of creating Wars amongst them: And, if upon any of those Occasions, two different Nations not allied, met; the Conflict was generally desperate; and the Vanquished were treated inhumanly and barbarously. The Consequences of such a

" *struct them: But the Baron* de St. Castin, *and* " *the Missionaries do Wonders to persuade them from* " *it.* Father *de la Chasse* informs him that the " Grace of God often stands in need of the Assistance and Cooperation of Men; and that " Temporal Interests are frequently of Great Help " to Faith."

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Victory were great Triumph on the ſide of the Conquerors, and ſworn Revenge on that of the Conquered. Hence Wars were almoſt conſtantly kept on foot amongſt themſelves: Until, as one ſide got the better, and the other became too weak to withſtand its Enemy, this was either quite extirpated, or obliged to look out for a more diſtant and ſafer Settlement. This was no difficult matter amongſt that People, who had little to remove, but what they carried on their backs. Their whole Furniture or Baggage conſiſted in a few Skins, a Bow and Arrows, a kind of Hatchet, and their Wives and Children. They made Boats of the Bark of Trees, ſown together with roots, and bedaubed with Gums. Theſe they carried over the lands on their Shoulders; And when they came to Lakes or Rivers, they launched them, and embarked their whole Tribe.

THUS much for their Wars amongſt themſelves. But we have likewiſe ſeen them diſputing their Liberties with the *Europeans:* Offering to trade with them upon a fair footing; deſiring to keep a good Correſpondence with them; diſclaiming and renouncing all Enmity; but proteſting

proteſting againſt the Right which was pretended to a Sovereignty over them, their Lands, Poſſeſſions, Laws or Liberties. Nay we have ſeen them, from this ſingle Principle, engaged in long, bloody, and repeated Conflicts with the *Europeans:* And often maintain themſelves by Force and Perſeverance, againſt all the Strength and Stratagem their Enemies could at that time oppoſe to them. Bravery they are allowed to have, in the higheſt Degree; and, on many Occaſions, are not wanting in Conduct and Contrivance. But the Arts and Management of the *Europeans*, have put their Politicks upon quite another Footing at this Day. That Original Simplicity and Diſintereſtedneſs is now no more to be met with; but Cunning and Deceit have taken its place. Violence, Cruelty, Drunkenneſs, and all kinds of Debauchery have been cultivated and improved amongſt them, to an incredible and exceſſive Degree. The Popiſh Powers have made many of them *Nominal Chriſtians*, as it is eaſy to change one kind of Idolatry for another; and by their Lies, Legends, and Legerdemain, have bound them to their Intereſts. The Proteſtant Powers, *too regardleſs of all*

CHAP. I.

Religion, take very little Care or Pains about inſtructing theſe ignorant poor Creatures, but only endeavour to procure their Friendſhip, by trading with them at a lower rate for *European* Goods, than the *French* can afford to do; and giving a higher Price for their Commodities. This, together with the furniſhing them with Fire Arms, Powder and Ammunition, Tobacco, and Brandy, is the only Method I know of which the *Engliſh* employ to keep the Savages their Friends. Whereas the *French*, by having a conſtant and infinite Number of Jeſuits, Seminaries, Nunneries and Convents amongſt them, can and do, upon every Occaſion, excite the Savages to join with *them*, in annoying *Us*.

BUT though the above Account may poſſibly be entertaining enough to ſome Readers, yet it has led me a good deal wide of my Purpoſe; which is to ſhew in the next Place, what are the Rights of each Power, to what they claim in *America*, as founded upon Treaties. And herein, I ſhall on this Occaſion, conſider only ſuch Treaties as are between *England* and *France*.

CHAP.

CHAP. II.

An Extract of such Articles of the Treaty of Utrecht, *as respect the* English *Nation; particularly in regard to* America: *With Remarks upon each Article herein cited.*

UNDER the Article of Treaties, I imagined I should have Occasion to mention more than one: But having by way of Notes on Mr. *Dummer*'s Memorial, made such Remarks as were necessary on those of 1632. and 1655. I shall here confine myself to those parts of the *Treaty of Utrecht*, which relate to our Affairs with *France*. To which purpose, I shall transcribe all those Articles, or the Substance of them, which in any Shape respect *England:* and close this Chapter with some Remarks on each Article.

ART.

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ART. IV.

Extract of the Treaty of Utrecht.

THE King of *France* hereby ſolemnly and ſincerely acknowledges the Limitation of the Succeſſion of the Crown of *Great Britain* (as ſettled by the Laws made in the Reigns of *King William* and *Queen Mary*,) to the Iſſue of *Queen Anne*; and in default thereof, to the *Princeſs Sophia*, and her Heirs in the *Proteſtant Line of Hanover*. He, on the *Faith* and *Word* of a King, and on the Pledge of his *Own* and *Succeſſor's Honour*, accepts and approves the ſame *for Ever*: And that no Perſon, than according to the ſaid Limitation, ſhall ever by *Him*, his *Heirs*, or *Succeſſors* be acknowledged or reputed to be King or Queen of *Great Britain*.

The French King admits the Proteſtant Succeſſion.

ART. V.

THE ſaid King, in the ſame *ſolemn* Manner engages, that neither *He* nor his *Heirs* or *Succeſſors* ever will at any time hereafter diſturb the *Queen*, her *Heirs* or *Succeſſors*, deſcended from the aforeſaid *Proteſtant Line*, who poſſeſs the Crown of

of *Great Britain.* Nor will the ſaid King &c. give at any time any Succour, Aid, Favour or Counſel directly or indirectly, by Land or by Sea, in Money, Arms, Ammunition, Warlike Proviſions, Ships, Soldiers, Seamen, or any other way, to any Perſon or Perſons, whoſoever they be, who for any Cauſe, or under any Pretext whatſoever, ſhould hereafter oppoſe the ſaid Succeſſion, either by *Open War*, or by *fomenting Seditions*, or *forming Conſpiracies* againſt ſuch Prince or Princes who are in Poſſeſſion of the Throne of *Great Britain*, by virtue of the Acts of Parliament abovementioned.

CHAP. II.

Diſavows the Pretender, &c.

ART. VI.

CONTAINS Letters Patent by the King of *France*, for admitting the Renunciation of the King of *Spain* to the Crown of *France:* And thoſe of Monſieur the Duke of *Berry*, and Monſieur the Duke of *Orleans* to the Crown of *Spain.* As likewiſe the King of *Spain's* Renunciation; and thoſe of the Dukes of *Berry* and *Orleans.*

The King of Spain's Renunciation of the Crown of France.

ART.

CHAP. I.

ART IX.

Fortification &c. of Dunkirk to be demoliſhed.

THE King of *France* engages that the *Fortifications* of *Dunkirk*, ſhall be *razed*, the Harbour filled up, the Sluices or Moles which cleanſe the Harbour levelled, at the ſaid King's own Charge, and Expence, within five Months after the Signing of the Peace; on the *Expreſs Condition*, that they ſhall *never be repaired again.*

ART. X.

Reſtores Hudſon's Bay.

RESTORES to *Great Britain* the *Bay* and *Streights of Hudſon*, with all Lands, Seas, Sea Coaſts, Rivers and Places in the ſaid Bay and Streights; no Tracts of Land or Sea being excepted, which are at preſent poſſeſſed by the Subjects of *France.* All which, together with all Buildings, Fortreſſes, *&c.* erected there before or ſince the *French* ſeized the ſame, ſhall within ſix Months from the Ratification of this Treaty, or ſooner if poſſible be delivered to the *Britiſh* Subjects, entire and undemoliſhed, together with Cannon and

and Cannon Ball, Powder in proportion, and other warlike Stores belonging to Cannon. CHAP. II.

ART. XI.

PROVIDES that Satisfaction be made to the *Hudſon's Bay Company*, for all Damages and Spoils done to their Colonies and Ships, Perſons and Goods, by the *Hoſtile Incurſions* and *Depredations of the French in time of Peace*, to be ſettled by Commiſſaries, who ſhall alſo enquire into the Complaints of the *Britiſh* Subjects, of Ships taken by the *French* in time of Peace; and concerning Damages done and ſuſtained at *Montſerrat*. *Promiſes Satisfaction to the Hudſon's Bay Company.*

ART. XII.

THE King of *France* hereby engages that on the ſame Day the Ratifications of this Treaty ſhall be exchanged, *ſolemn* and authentick Letters and Inſtruments ſhall be delivered to the Queen of *Great Britain*; by virtue whereof it ſhall appear that the Iſland of *St. Chriſtopher's* is to be hereafter poſſeſſed alone by *Britiſh Sub-*

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jects; likewiſe all *Nova Scotia* or *Acadia* with its ancient Boundaries, as alſo the City of *Port-Royal*, now called *Annapolis Royal*; and all other things in thoſe Parts which depend on the ſaid Lands and Iſlands; with Dominion, Property and Poſſeſſion of the ſaid Iſlands, Lands and Places; and that the Subjects of the King of *France* ſhall be *excluded* from all kinds of *Fiſhing* in the ſaid Seas, Bays, and other Places on the Coaſt of *Nova Scotia*, which lie towards the Eaſt, within thirty Leagues from the Iſland called *Sable* incluſively, and thence ſtretching along towards the South-weſt.

ART. XIII.

Settles the Affairs of Newfoundland.

THE Iſland of * *Newfoundland*, with the *Adjacent Iſlands* ſhall from this time forward

* CHARLEVOIX Vol. IV. p. 152. ſays, "*As to* Newfoundland, *the* Engliſh *gained more by the Ceſſion of what we poſſeſſed there, than we loſt: For beſides, that Amends was amply made to us for* Placentia, *by getting* Cape Breton *(ſince the Inhabitants of the former, were all tranſported to* Lewiſbourg) *the People ſoon found themſelves more agreeably and advantagiouſly ſituated at* Cape Breton

forward belong *of Right wholly to Britain* : And to that End, the Town and Fortreſs of *Placentia*, and whatever other Places in the Iſland are in poſſeſſion of the *French*, ſhall be yielded and given up to the *Engliſh* within a time therein limited. Moreover, it ſhall not be lawful for the Subjects of *France* to fortify any Place in the ſaid Iſland of *Newfoundland*; or to erect *any Buildings* there, beſides Stages made of Boards, and Huts, neceſſary and uſual for drying *Fiſh*: Or to *reſort* to the Iſland beyond the time neceſſary for fiſhing and drying of *Fiſh*. But it ſhall be allowed to the Subjects of *France* to *catch Fiſh*, and *dry them* on Land, in that *part only*, and in *No other* but that, of the Iſland, which ſtretches from the Place called *Cape Bonaviſta*, to the Northern Point of the ſaid Iſland, and from thence running down to the Weſtern Side, reaches as far as the Place called the *Pointe Riche*. But the Iſland CHAP. II.

" ton *than they ever had been at* Newfoundland. " *Whereas the* Engliſh *ſaw indeed themſelves abſolute* " *Maſters of this Iſland*; but where they could " not aſſure themſelves of any thing, ſo long as " they had us for their Neighbours."

CHAP. II.

Claims Cape Breton, &c.

of *Cape Breton*, as alſo all others, both in the Mouth of the River of *St. Laurence*, and in the *Gulph* of the ſame Name, ſhall hereafter belong of Right to the *French King*; who ſhall have Liberty to fortify any Place or Places there.

ART. XV.

Settles the Subjects of each Crown.

PROVIDES, that the Subjects of *France* inhabiting *Canada*, ſhall not in any ſhape diſturb the five *Indian Nations*, or *Cantons*, which are ſubject to the Dominion of *Great Britain*; nor the other Natives of *America*, who are Friends to the ſame; Nor the *Britiſh Subjects* diſturb the *Americans*, who are Subjects or Friends to *France*. But it is to be exactly and diſtinctly ſettled by Commiſſaries, who are, and who ought to be accounted, the Subjects and Friends to *England*, or to *France*.

This Treaty was concluded at *Utrecht*, { *March* 31, / *April* 11, } 1713.

HAVING thus gone through the moſt material Articles of the *famous* Treaty of *Utrecht*; I ſhall mention One Particular more,

more, which certainly is an amazing One. The Peace being thus settled between *Great Britain* and *France*, there remained still a Negotiation to be carried on with *Spain*: In the Progress of which, Our Plenipotentiaries suffered a Clause to be inserted at the End of the 15th Article, the Words of which are as follows: *Whereas it is inserted on the Part of* Spain, *that certain Rights of* Fishing *at the Island of* Newfoundland, *belong to the* Guipuscoans, *or other Subjects of the Catholick King; Her Britannick Majesty consents and agrees, that all such Privileges as the* Guipuscoans, *and other People of* Spain *are able to make Claim to by Right, shall be allowed and preserved to them.*

A Clause in favour of the Spaniards, inserted in the Treaty of Utrecht.

We have said, that the *English* Plenipotentiaries suffered this Clause and Claim of the *Spaniards* to be inserted, although it was in direct Contradiction of a Treaty between the Crowns of *England* and *Spain*, concluded *July* $\frac{8}{19}$, 1670. The 7th and 8th Articles of which expressly declare; "*That the most Serene King of* "Great Britain, *his Heirs and Successors,* "*shall have, hold, keep, and enjoy for ever, with*

Observations on the said Clause.

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" *with Plenary Right of Sovereignty, Dominion, Poſſeſſion and Property, all thoſe Lands, Regions, Iſlands, Colonies, and Places whatſoever, being or ſituated in the* Weſt Indies, *or in any Part of* America, *which the ſaid King of* Great Britain *and his Subjects do at preſent hold and poſſeſs.*

" *And the Subjects,* &c. *of each Confederate reſpectively, ſhall abſtain and forbear to Sail and Trade in the Ports and Havens which have Fortifications, Caſtles, Magazines, or Ware-houſes, and in all other Places whatſoever, poſſeſſed by the other Party in the* Weſt Indies."

Order to the Board of Trade to enquire into the ſaid Claim.

Not long after the ſigning of the Peace, the Board of Trade was conſulted upon this Claim of the *Spaniards*; and returned the following Anſwer, dated *June* 13, 1713.

" *In Obedience to Her Majeſty's Commands of the 1ſt Inſtant, we have conſidered the Extract of a Memorial from the Marquis* De Monteleon, *relating to the Claim of the Inhabitants of the Province*

" *Province of* Guipuſcoa, *to fiſh on the* CHAP.
" *Coaſt of* Newfoundland; *and thereupon* II.
" *take leave to inform your Lordſhip** * *Lord*
" *that we have diſcourſed with ſuch Per-* *Dartmouth.*
" *ſons as are able to give us Information in*
" *that Matter: And we find that ſome* *Anſwer of*
" Spaniards *have come thither with Paſſes* *the Board.*
" *from Her Majeſty: And others may*
" *have fiſhed there privately; but never*
" *any, that we can learn, did do it as of*
" *Right belonging to them.*"

To bring this Matter nearer to our own Times, and to ſhew that the Miniſters or Plenipotentiaries could not be ignorant of the Excluſion of the *French*, as well as *Spaniards* from any Right of *fiſhing* at *Newfoundland*; by an Act paſſed in the 10th and 11th Years of the Reign of King *William*, to encourage the Trade to *Newfoundland*, it is enacted, " *That no* " *Alien or Stranger whatſoever, not re-* " *ſiding within the Kingdom of* England, " *Dominion of* Wales, *or Town of* Berwick " *upon* Tweed, *ſhall at any Time hereafter* " *take, bait, or uſe any ſort of Trade,* " *or Fiſhing whatſoever in* Nowfoundland, " *or in any of the adjacent Iſlands.*" And

An Act, debarring Foreigners from Fiſhing at Newfoundland.

in

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in pursuance of this Act it is, that Instructions were given every Year to the Commodore of the Convoys, to prevent Foreigners from coming thither.

Remarks on the 4th and 5th Article of the Treaty of Utrecht.

As to the IVth Article of the foregoing Treaty, it is to be observed, that the Queen was not acknowledged by *France*, nor designed to be so, till the Conclusion of a Peace; as *France* afterwards explained that Matter at the General Congress.

How far the *solemn* and *sincere Engagements* of such a King; His *Faith* and *Word*; or the *pledging his Own or his Successor's Honour* are to be depended on, the present Posture of Affairs sufficiently evinces; when not able, or not daring openly to invade us with his Troops, he makes use of that *Instrument* he so *solemnly disavows*, to annoy and disturb us; assisting him with Men, Money, Arms, Ammunition, and even Shipping, to land in His Majesty's Dominions, and raise a Rebellion amongst his Subjects. All which the Vth Article does *expressly*, and in the strongest Manner provide against.

THE

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Remark on the 9th Article.

THE IXth Article, by which the King of *France* engages to *deſtroy the Fortifications of Dunkirk*, &c. was not only never complied with, but inſtead thereof, an additional Fortreſs built in the Neighbourhood of the former, which, as I am informed, is much ſtronger and better contrived to annoy the *Britiſh* Channel-Trade; ſhould the Nation ever think proper to inſiſt upon a Compliance with this Article. This is moſt ſhameful Prevarication: But why it was not inſiſted on, ſoon after the Time fixed by the Treaty, cannot be collected from any thing better than from an Extract of a Memorial delivered by Monſieur *de Torcy* to the Lord *Bolingbroke* at *Paris*, in *Auguſt* 1712. wherein he ſays, "*It* "*is not our Buſineſs now to examine whe-*"*ther the Queen of* England, *and the* "Engliſh *Nation were in the Right to* "*demand the Demolition of the Fortifica-*"*tions, and the filling up the Harbour of* "Dunkirk: *That is a Thing reſolved and* "*agreed upon. It may perhaps come to* "*paſs in the Courſe of this Affair, for* "*Reaſons eaſily to be foreſeen, that* Eng-"land *ſhall repent having demanded, the*

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" *Demolition of a Place, and the Deſtruc-*
" *tion of a Harbour, which might be of*
" *great Uſe in Conjunctures, which perhaps*
" *are not very remote.*"

FROM hence it will eaſily and naturally occur to any Perſon, who conſiders the Circumſtances of thoſe Times, and the Diſpoſitions of the Perſons then at the Helm of the State, why the Time fixed was ſuffered to elapſe, without complying with one of the beſt Articles of the Peace: But why that Court has not (during the Adminiſtration of ſuch as were warmeſt in the Proſecution of their Predeceſſors) been obliged to fulfil the expreſs Terms of that Article, cannot, I think, be accounted for otherwiſe, than by ſaying, that as the *French* Court had been ſuffered to build the Fortifications of *Mardyke*, it availed nothing to inſiſt upon the Demolition of *Dunkirk*; and would only expoſe us to a Quarrel and perhaps a War with a Nation, with whom it ſeems, we were not on any Account to quarrel.

THE Event has ſufficiently juſtified the Marquis *de Torcy*'s Argument; for from hence

hence have been ſent all the Aſſiſtance the *French* have given the Pretender: And here, and at *Oſtend* have been collected the Troops and Shipping deſigned for an *Invaſion* of the *Britiſh Dominions*. Theſe Proceedings of the *French* Court have certainly opened our Eyes, as to the Importance of theſe two Ports: And it is to be hoped we ſhall not (as thoſe wiſe and worthy Patriots did) ſign any future Peace, till we ſee ſuch *eſſential Articles* either actually executed and performed to the Rigour, and utmoſt Extent of them; or good *Cautionary Places* given in the mean time, till they are ſo performed.

THE Xth Article reſtores to *Great-Britain* the *Bay and Streights of Hudſon*, &c. But in Lieu thereof, the Miniſtry of thoſe Times ſuffered themſelves to be ſo groſsly impoſed upon as (by the VIIIth Article of the Treaty of Commerce) to give to *France* all they wanted; namely, a Liberty of taking and drying their *Fiſh* upon *Newfoundland*.

Remark on the 10th Article.

THE XIth Article provides, that Satiſfaction be made to the *Hudſon's Bay Company*,

Remark on the 11th Article.

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pany, &c. But ſhews at the ſame Time, that in thoſe Days, as almoſt every Day ſince, the *French were making Hoſtile Incurſions and Depredations, as well as taking* Britiſh *Ships, in Time of Peace.*

Remark on the 12th Article.

THE XIIth Article engages, that the Iſland of *St. Chriſtoper's*, all *Nova Scotia*, or *Acadia*, as alſo *Port-Royal*, now called *Annapolis-Royal*, ſhall hereafter be poſſeſſed by *Britiſh Subjects only*. It excludes the Subjects of *France* from *fiſhing* in the ſaid Seas, *&c.* Whereas it is notorious that they have ever ſince, till the War was proclaimed, continued fiſhing all along thoſe Coaſts at their pleaſure.

THE XIIIth Article provides, that the Iſland of *Newfoundland*, &c. ſhall of Right belong *wholly* to the *Engliſh*; and *Placentia* be yielded up to them. The *French* ſhall not fortify any Place on that Iſland, nor build any thing, beſides Stages and Hutts, to catch and dry Fiſh, on a certain Part of the Iſland: But the Iſland of *Cape Breton* ſhall hereafter belong to the *French*.

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Remark on the 13th Article.

IN a Memorial delivered or ſent by Mr. *St. John* to Monſieur *de Torcy*, dated *May* 24, 1712, O. S. *Art.* IV. it was propoſed, *That the Iſlands in the Gulph of* St. Laurence, *and in the Mouth of the River of that Name, which are at preſent poſſeſſed by the* French, *may remain to His moſt Chriſtian Majeſty; but expreſsly on Condition that His ſaid Majeſty ſhall engage himſelf not to raiſe, or ſuffer to be raiſed, any Fortifications in theſe Iſlands, or thoſe of* Cape Breton. *The Queen likewiſe engages not to raiſe any Fortifications in the adjacent Iſlands, and thoſe of* Newfoundland, *nor in that of* Cape Breton: *For by the foregoing Article it was provided, that the Queen's Subjects, and His Majeſty's, ſhould enjoy the Iſland of* Cape Breton *in common.* This ſhews that the Miniſtry was aware of the Importance of that Iſland, yet gave it up by this XIIIth Article, in Exchange for *Newfoundland*; where, at the ſame Time, they allowed the *French* the Liberty of catching and drying Fiſh: That is, they gave up that *valuable* and *Important Iſland* for nothing

at

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at all; granting the *French* even more than they at firſt aſked. Nay, this Conceſſion was likewiſe in direct Contradiction of the foregoing Article: For in *an Abſolute Ceſſion of* Nova Scotia, *or* Acadia, (as the Queen calls it, in her Speech to the Parliament, on the 6th of *June*, 1712.) *Cape Breton* was always underſtood to be comprized; and was declared by the Queen's Inſtructions to the Duke of *Shrewsbury*, to be a Part of *Nova Scotia*. It was however given up, with the ſame Eaſe as every other Point which the *French* Miniſtry inſiſted on; and they were ſuffered to fortify themſelves there.

Remark on the 15th Article.

THE XVth Article provides that the Subjects of *Canada* ſhall not diſturb the *Indian* Nations, ſubject to *Great Britain*; nor we, on our Part, diſturb their *American* Subjects. I am of opinion, that this Article has been too often broke through on both Sides, to afford any great Right of Complaint to either.

HAVING thus gone through the Treaty of *Utrecht*, as far as it related to our Purpoſe;

poſe; and made ſuch Remarks upon the ſeveral Parts of it, as we imagined might be entertaining, at leaſt, to thoſe Readers who have not had Opportunity of enquiring into theſe Affairs; we ſhall now proceed to an Enquiry into the Situation, Climate, Produce, and Ports, of the Iſland of *Cape Breton*, lately conquered (I may ſay, *ſo glorioufly* conquered) by His Majeſty's Subjects; and wreſted, once more, out of the Hands of that haughty, perfidious, and inſulting Nation. All Treaties are now broke through; and, whenever Peace is reſtored, we muſt endeavour to remedy all the *Miſtakes* (to give them no worſe a Name) of former Adminiſtrations.

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CHAP. III.

A General Deſcription of the Iſland of Cape Breton ; *its Situation, Climate, Produce, Ports,* &c. *as collected from different Authors.*

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SALMON, in his *Modern Hiſtory of all Nations*, Vol. IIId. p. 645. of the *London* Edition, in 4*to.* 1739. gives the following Account of this Iſland.

Salmon's Deſcription of Cape Breton.

CAPE BRETON is ſituate between 45 ½ and 47 ½ Degrees of North Latitude ; and is ſeparated from *Acadia*, or *New Scotland*, by the *Narrow Streights* of *Canſo*, on the South-weſt ; and the other Streight or Paſſage of *Cape Rey* ſeparates it from *Newfoundland* on the North-eaſt. It is indented on every Side, by large Bays of the Sea, which cut almoſt through it in ſome Places, and form ſeveral commodious Harbours. The Iſland is about 120 Miles in length, and 50 Miles in breadth. It

is

is a barren, desart Land, affording scarce any Trees or Herbage; and has very few Rivers. It would probably never have been planted, if it had not lain *so convenient* for the *French* to preserve their Communication with the River of *St. Laurence* and *Canada*; and to protect their Fisheries, as well as to disturb the Trade and Fisheries of *Great Britain*, in Times of War.

Of St. John's Island.

THE Island of *St. John* lyes between *Cape Breton*, and the Coast of *New Scotland*; and is about 20 Leagues in Length.

Of Anticoste Island.

The Island of *Anticoste* is a much larger Island, lying just before the Mouth of *St. Laurence* River. These, and the lesser Islands in the *Bay of St. Laurence* do not seem to be of any other Use to the *French*, than to preserve their Communication with *Canada*. I do not find they have any Towns or Plantations upon them.

THUS far *Salmon*. But what will add great Weight to all we shall say upon this Subject, is, that it is chiefly collected from *French* Authors, and such as have lately been upon the Spot. *Charlevoix, in the Fourth Volume of his* History of France,

CHAP. III. *in 8vo. publiſhed at* Paris, 1744. *gives the following Deſcription of* Cape Breton.

Charlevoix's Deſcription of Cape Breton.

BY the Ceſſion of *Acadia* and *Placentia* to the *Engliſh*, there remained to *France* no other Place to carry on the Fiſhery of Cod-Fiſh, or at leaſt to dry their Fiſh in, but the Iſland of *Cape Breton*, which is now *only known* by the Name of *l'Iſle Royale*. This Iſland is ſituated between 45 and 47 Degrees of North Latitude; and forms, with the Iſland of *Newfoundland*, (from which it is diſtant but about 15 Leagues) the Entrance of the Gulph of *St. Laurence*. The *Streight* which ſeparates *Cape Breton* from *Acadia*, is about five common Leagues of *France* in length, and about one in breadth: It is called the *Paſſage of Fronſac*. The Length of the Iſland, from North-eaſt to South-weſt, is not quite fifty Leagues. Its Figure is irregular; and it is in ſuch a manner cut through by Lakes and Rivers, that the two principal Parts of it hold together, only by an *Iſthmus* of about eight hundred Paces in breadth: Which Neck of Land ſeparates the Bottom of *Port Toulouſe*, from ſeveral Lakes, which are called *Labrador*.

Paſſage of Fronſac.

brador. The Lakes empty themſelves into the Sea, to the Eaſt, by two Channels of unequal Breadth, which are formed by the Iſlands *Verderonne* and *la Boularderie*, which is from ſeven to eight Leagues long. CHAP. III.

THE Climate of this Iſland is pretty near the ſame with that of *Quebec* : And although Miſts and Fogs are more frequent here, yet no one complains that the Air is unwholeſome. All the Lands here are not good ; nevertheleſs they produce Trees of all Sorts. There are Oaks of a prodigious Size, Pines for Maſts, and all Sorts of Timber fit for Carpenter's Work. The moſt common Sorts, beſides the Oak, are the Cedar, Aſh, Maple, Plane-tree, and Aſpin. Fruits ; particularly Apples, Pulſe, Herbs and Roots, Wheat, and all other Grain, neceſſary for Suſtenance ; Hemp and Flax abound here leſs, but are every whit as good as in *Canada*. It has been obſerved, that the Mountains may be cultivated up to their Tops ; that the good Soil inclines always towards the South ; and that it is covered from the North and North-weſt Winds by the Mountains, *Climate of Cape Breton.* *Produce of Cape Breton.*

CHAP. III. which border upon the River of *St. Laurence.*

ALL the domeſtick Animals, ſuch as Horſes, horned Cattle, Hogs, Sheep, Goats, and Poultry, pick up a good Livelihood here. What is got by Hunting, Shooting, and Fiſhing, is able to maintain the Inhabitants a good Part of the Year. This Iſland abounds in Coal-pits, which are in the Mountains; conſequently, the Trouble and Expence of digging deep, and making Drains to carry off the Water, are greatly ſaved. Here is likewiſe Plaſter in great abundance. *It ſaid, that there is no Part of the World, where more Cod-fiſh is caught, nor where there is ſo good Conveniency for drying it.* Formerly this Iſland was full of Deer; they are now very ſcarce, particularly Elks. Partridges are here almoſt as large as Pheaſants; and, in their Feathers, not unlike them. In a word, the Fiſhery of Sea-pike, Porpoiſes, *&c.* is in great abundance here, and carried on with great Eaſe.

Its Ports, in general. ALL its Ports open to the Eaſt, turning a little to the South, and within the Space of

of fifty-five Leagues, beginning at *Port Dauphin*, and continuing to *Port Toulouſe*, which is almoſt at the Entrance of the *Paſſage of Fronſac*. In all other Parts of the Iſland, it is difficult to find Anchorage for ſmall Veſſels, in ſmall Creeks, or amongſt the Iſlands. All the Northern Coaſt is very high, and almoſt inacceſſible: And it is very difficult to land on the Weſtern Coaſt, till you come to the *Paſſage of Fronſac*, out of which you are no ſooner got, but you meet with the *Port Toulouſe*, known formerly by the Name of *St. Peter*. This Port is ſtrictly between a kind of Gulph (which is called *Little St. Peter's*) and the Iſlands *St. Peter*, over-againſt the *Iſlands Madame*, or *Maurepas*. From thence, aſcending towards the South-eaſt, you find the *Bay of Gaborie*, of which the Entrance (which is near twenty Leagues diſtant from *St. Peter's Iſlands*) is a League broad, between Iſlands and Rocks. It is very ſafe to come near theſe Iſlands, ſome of which advance a League and Half into the Sea. This Bay is two Leagues deep, and the Anchorage very good.

Port Toulouſe.

Gaborie Bay, or Caboroſe Bay.

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Lewisburg.

THE Harbour of *Lewisburg*, formerly called the *Engliſh Harbour*, is not above a large League from the above Bay; AND IS PEPHAPS ONE OF THE FINEST IN AMERICA. It is near four Leagues in Circumference; and every where there are ſix or ſeven Fathoms Water. The Anchorage is very good; and you may, without danger, run a Ship aground upon the Mud. The Entrance is not above two hundred Fathoms wide; and lies between two ſmall Iſlands. It is diſcovered at the diſtance of twelve Leagues, at Sea, by the Cape of *Lorembec*, which is but at a ſmall diſtance from it to the North-eaſt. Two Leagues further up, is the *Port de la Baleine*; the Entrance of which is very difficult, occaſioned by many Rocks, which the Sea covers, when it is agitated. No Ships of greater Burden than 300 Tons, can go into it; but they are quite ſafe there, when they are got in.

Port de la Baleine.

Bay of Penadou, or Menadou.

FROM thence, in leſs than the diſtance of two Leagues, you come to the *Bay* of *Penadou*, or *Menadou*; the Entrance of which

which is about a League broad, and the Bay itſelf is about two Leagues deep. Almoſt over-againſt this Bay, is the *Iſland Scatari* (formerly called *Little Cape Breton*) which is above two Leagues long. The *Bay of Mirè* is ſeparated from it by a very narrow Neck of Land. The Entrance of this Bay is likewiſe near two Leagues wide, and is at leaſt eight Leagues deep. It grows narrower, the further you go into it; and many ſmall Rivers and Rivulets empty themſelves into it. Large Ships may go up it, about ſix Leagues, and find there good Anchorage, under cover of the Hills. Beſides the Iſland of *Scatari*, there are many other ſmall ones, and Rocks, which the Sea never covers, but may be diſcovered a great way off. The largeſt of theſe Rocks, is called the *Forillon*. The *Bay of Morienne* is higher up, ſeparated from the Bay of *Mirè* by the Cape *Brulè*; and a little higher is *l'Iſle Plate*, or *l'Iſle à Pierre de fuſil*, directly in the Latitude of 46 Degrees 8 Minutes. There is between all theſe Iſlands and Rocks, very good Shelter, and you may go amongſt them, and near them, without Fear or Danger.

Iſland Scatari.

Bay of Mirè.

Bay of Morienne.

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l'Indiana Harbour. Bay des Eſpagnols.

FROM hence, proceeding for about three Leagues to the North-weſt, you find a very good Harbour, which is called *l'Indiane:* but it is fit only for ſmall Veſſels. From *l'Indiane*, to the *Bay des Eſpagnols*, there are two Leagues. This Bay is a very fine Harbour. Its Entrance is but about a thouſand paces wide; but it grows wider, and at the height of a League divides itſelf into two Branches, which may be ſailed up for three Leagues. Both theſe Branches are excellent Ports, which might be made better at a very ſmall Expence. From this Bay to the leſſer Entrance of * *Labrador* are two Leagues: and the Iſland which ſeparates the leſſer from the larger Entrance, is about two leagues long. *Labrador* is a Gulph above twenty Leagues long, and is about three or four wide, in its greateſt Breadth. It is counted a League and half

* THERE *is a large Continent, ſituated between the Gulph and River of* St. Laurence, *and* Hudſon's Bay, *which is called* Labrador, *and by the* Engliſh New Britain, *or* New Wales, *which muſt not be confounded with this, in the Iſland of* Cape Breton, *which is a Lake*

from

from the large Entrance of *Labrador*, to the *Port Dauphin* or *St Anne*; and you may come to an Anchor, almoſt any where, amongſt the Iſlands of *Cibou*. A Neck of Land almoſt entirely covers the Port, and leaves Room for no more than one Ship at a time to go in. The *Port Dauphin* is about two Leagues in Circumference; and Ships hardly feel the wind there, by reaſon of the Height of the Mountains which ſurround it: They may come as near the Shore as they pleaſe. All theſe Harbours and Ports being ſo near to each other, *it would be very eaſy to make Roads by Land from One to the other; and nothing could be more advantagious to the Inhabitants, than theſe Communications, which would ſave them the trouble in the Winter Seaſon, of going ſo far about, by Sea.* This is the Deſcription, given of this Iſland in general by the abovementioned Jeſuit, who has been a long time there, pretends to be very exact in his Enquiries, and publiſhed his Hiſtory a very little while before this *Important Iſland* was conquered by the *Engliſh* Nation.

CHAP. III. *Port Dauphin, or Port St. Anne.*

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HE afterwards proceeds to describe more particularly some of the above Ports, such as that of *Lewisburg*, and that of *St. Anne* or *Port Dauphin.*

AFTER the Cession of *Placentia* and *Acadia* to the Crown of *England*, it is certain that the *French* had no other Place where they could dry their Fish, or even fish in Safety, but the Island of *Cape Breton:* they were therefore drove by Necessity to settle an Establishment there, and to fortify it.

More particular Description of Port Lewisburg.

THEY began by changing its Name, and called it *l'Isle Royale.* They next deliberated upon the Choice of a proper place to settle the General Quarters in; and they were for a long time divided between *Lewisburg* and *Port Dauphin.* It has been already said that the former is one of the finest Harbours in all *America:* that it has near four Leagues in Circumference; that there is Anchorage all over it, in Six or Seven Fathoms Water; that the Anchorage is good, and that one may run a Ship aground in the Mud, with-

without Danger. It's Entrance is not two Hundred Fathoms wide, between two little Iſlands, which may eaſily defend it. *The Cod-Fiſhing is there very abundant, and one may fiſh there from the Month of April, to the End of December.* But then it was ſaid that the Land about this Port is barren; and that it would coſt immenſe Sums to fortify it; becauſe all the Materials muſt be brought a great way. Beſides which, it had, it ſeems, been remarked that there was no ſandy bottom in this Harbour, for more than about forty fiſhing Veſſels.

More particular Deſcription of Port Dauphin.

IT has likewiſe been obſerved that *the Port St. Anne*, or *Dauphin*, has a ſure and ſafe Road for Ships, at its Entrance, amongſt the Iſlands of *Cibou*; and that a Neck of Land almoſt entirely ſhuts up the Port, leaving a Paſſage for no more than one Veſſel at a time. This Port, thus ſhut up, has near two Leagues Circumference in an oval Form: Ships may here come as near as they pleaſe to the Land; and the Mountains which ſurround it, keep off the Winds in ſuch a manner, that they are hardly felt. They who

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were for chuſing this Port for the Chief Settlement, alledged that it might be rendered *impregnable* at an eaſy rate; that more might be done here for two thouſand Livres, than at *Lewiſburg* for two Hundred Thouſand; becauſe every thing neceſſary for building a large City, and fortifying it, was at hand. It is further certain that the ſandy Bottom is as extenſive here, as at *Placentia*; that the Fiſhing is very good; that there is a great Quantity of excellent Timber about this Place, ſuch as Maple, Beach, and wild Cherry tree, but above all Oaks of above thirty feet high, fit for building, *&c.* It is likewiſe true, that Marble is here very common; that the Lands are generally good; that about the great and ſmaller Entrances of *Labrador*, which are but at the Diſtance of a League and half, the Soil is very good. In a word, this Port is but four Leagues diſtant from the *Bay des Eſpagnols*, which is likewiſe a very good Harbour, where the Lands are excellent, and covered with Woods fit for almoſt all Uſes. It is true that here is no fiſhing in ſmall Boats, on account of the weſterly Winds, which generally blow here;

here; but one may fiſh here, as at *New-England* in large ones. CHAP. III.

THE only Inconveniency of *Port St. Anne*, is, that the Entrance is difficult: and this Inconveniency alone determined the Controverſy in Favour of *Lewiſburg*; *where neither Pains nor Expence have been ſpared to render it both convenient and impregnable.*

THE Iſland of *St. John*, which is near *Cape Breton* is the largeſt of all thoſe in the Gulph of *St. Laurence*. It has the Advantage, in this reſpect, even of *Cape Breton*, that all the Land is here good and fertile. It is about twenty-two Leagues long, and fifty in Circumference: It has a ſure and convenient Port, and was formerly covered with Timber of all kinds. *Deſcription of St John's Iſland.*

UNTIL a Settlement was made at *Cape Breton*, no body minded *St John's* Iſland; but the Neighbourhood of theſe two Iſlands, ſoon convinced the Settlers, that they might be of great Uſe to each other.

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The Advantages to the Engliſh *Nation, ariſing from the Conqueſt of* Cape Breton.

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IN the Courſe of this Chapter, I intend

FIRST, to collect the moſt authentick Accounts I can meet with, of the Uſe the *French* made, or intended to make, of this Iſland of *Cape Breton*; as well in promoting *their own* Trade and Benefit, as in curbing and diſtreſſing our's.

SECONDLY, to ſhew how much the Tables are turned upon them, by its being in the Poſſeſſion of the King of *Great Britain*, and his Subjects, if the *Greateſt Advantage* that may be, is made of this Acquiſition.

AS to the *Firſt*; it will beſt appear, from an Extract of a long Memorial preſented

ſented by Meſſrs. *Raudot*, to the *French* Miniſters, as early as the Year 1706, and their repeated Applications from that time to the Year 1713. Theſe Gentlemen never ceaſed repreſenting to the Court the indiſpenſable Neceſſity of making a ſolid Eſtabliſhment in the Iſland of *Cape Breton*; if it was intended that the Colonies of *New France* ſhould ever turn to any Account.

Memorial of Meſſ. Raudot.

THE Memorialiſts ſet out, by ſuppoſing and ſaying, that the Principal, and almoſt only View People had in ſettling at *Canada*, was the Fur-trade; eſpecially that of the Beaver: But, ſay they, it ought to have been foreſeen, that either the Beaver would, in time, be quite exhauſted; or, by its Quantity, it would become too common: And conſequently, a Colony of that Importance, could not long be ſupported by it. In effect, it has fallen into the latter of theſe Inconveniencies; and the Abundance of Beaver, has ruined the Trade of it. If, on the other hand, this had not happened; but there had always been a ſufficient Demand for thoſe Furs; then the other Inconveniency

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ency muſt have followed; namely, that the Species of Beaver had been quite deſtroyed. Beſides this Dilemma; the very hunting of thoſe Animals, and running about the Woods and Lakes after them, was the ruin of the Inhabitants; who thereby fell into a Vagabond, idle Courſe of Life; from which it is difficult ever to reclaim them, and bring them to the more laborious Taſk of clearing and cultivating the Lands.

IN the mean time, the King expends every Year in the Colony of *Canada* 100000 Crowns. The Furs amount to 280000 Livres; the Penſions, which the King gives to particular People, and the Revenues which the Biſhop and the Seminaries have in *France* amount to 50000 Livres; which, altogether, make a Fund of about 630000 Livres, upon which the whole Commerce of *New France* turns. It is evident, that ſuch an inſignificant Sum is not ſufficient to maintain from 20 to 25000 Souls; and to furniſh them with what they are obliged to have from *France*.

About 31500 *l. Sterling.*

FROM

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FROM hence, and from the Failure in Price of the Beaver, it has happened that all the ready Money of *Canada* has been ſent to *France* for Goods from thence: Inſomuch, that at a certain time, there was not, in all this Country, above a Thouſand Crowns in Money: Which Defect was ſupplied, though with many Inconveniencies, by Paper Money. To remedy theſe Evils, and to render the Colony more flouriſhing, the People here might enrich themſelves with the Product of the Country, if they were put into a proper Method. This Product might be made to conſiſt in Salt Meats, Maſts, Planks, Timber for building, Pitch and Tar, Oyl of Whales, Porpoiſes, *&c.* in Cod Fiſh, Hemp and Flax: To which might be added Iron and Copper. The Difficulty of doing this, conſiſts in two things; Firſt to find a Conſumption or Demand for theſe Commodities; and Secondly, to reduce the Wages of Work of all kinds. This latter Difficulty ariſes from the Idleneſs before mentioned of the Inhabitants, and from the Dearneſs of Goods in *France*. The Method, there-

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fore, is to employ every Individual according to his Trade or Capacity; and to enable every one to ſubſiſt, by lowering the Price of Goods. In order to this, it is neceſſary to find them a Place, whither they may conveniently, and at ſmall charges, carry the above mentioned Commodities, and take thoſe of *France*, which they want. By that means, they would ſave a Part of the Freight upon the One, as well as the other: And this Part of the Inhabitants, who either ſtarve in Idleneſs, or run about the Woods in queſt of Game, would be employed in Navigation. It may be objected, that this Method would take from *France* a Part of its Profit upon its Goods. But we anſwer, that it would by no means have that Effect; becauſe the Freight which the Inhabitants of *New France* would hereby ſave, would immediately be returned to the *Old*, by the greater Conſumption of its Goods. For Example; thoſe who are now idle, and have no other Covering but the Skins of wild Beaſts, would then wear the Manufactures of *France*. A fitter Place for the executing of this Deſign,

The French propoſe Cape Breton, as a Middle Place for depoſiting Goods between France, and their Colonies in America.

ſign, could not be found, than the Iſland of CAPE BRETON. CHAP. IV.

LET it not be ſaid, that if this Iſland is ſupplied from *Canada* with a Part of thoſe Goods, which it muſt otherwiſe have had from *France*, it is ſo much taken off from the latter: For, in the firſt place, the Anſwer made to the foregoing Objection, is likewiſe an Anſwer to this; ſince the Profit hereby made by *Canada*, will always return to the Kingdom of *France*: *For New France can never do, without many Sorts of Goods from the Old.* Secondly, It would be no Diſadvantage to *France*, if it did not export ſo much Corn, and other Proviſions; ſince the cheaper they are in the Country, the more Workmen it would have for its Manufactures.

THIS Iſland is ſituated in ſuch a manner, that it naturally forms a Magazine, or Staple, between the *Old* and *New France*. It can furniſh the *firſt* with Cod-Fiſh, Oils, Coals, Plaſter, Timber, *&c.* of its own Growth and Product. It will furniſh to *New France* the Goods of the *Old* at a much cheaper Rate, and ſave

CHAP. IV. the latter a conſiderable Part of the Freight upon her Goods, Beſides that the Navigation from *Quebec* to *Cape Breton* would make good Seamen of a Sett of Men, who are not only of no Uſe, but a dead Weight upon the Colony.

ANOTHER conſiderable Advantage, which this Eſtabliſhment would procure to *Canada*, is, that it would be eaſy to ſend ſmall Veſſels from thence, to fiſh for Cod (as well as Whales and Porpoiſes, from which Oils are extracted) at the Mouth of the River of *St. Laurence*, and in the Gulph. The Veſſels would be ſure of a Market at *Cape Breton*; and might there take in ſuch Goods from *France* as were wanted. Or elſe, a Veſſel going from *Quebec*, laden with the Produce of *Canada*, might go to *Cape Breton*, load Salt there, for curing Fiſh to be caught in the Gulph, return to *Cape Breton*, and ſell his Fiſh: And out of the Profits of theſe two Voyages, purchaſe *French* Goods there; which he would ſell again, to Advantage in *Canada*.

WHAT formerly hindered the *Canadians* from fiſhing in the Gulph, and at the Entrance of the River *St. Laurence*, was, that they were obliged to carry their Fiſh to *Quebec*; where they could not get Money enough for it, to pay their Charges. Or, if they were ſo lucky as to do that, the Profits were not large enough to engage many People in a Trade of that Nature.

THE two Colonies affording thus a mutual Aſſiſtance to each other, and the Merchants becoming rich by this continual Commerce and Intercourſe, they might aſſociate themſelves in Enterprizes, equally advantagious to the one and the other, and conſequently to the whole Kingdom; if it were nothing more than opening the *Iron Mines*, which are in ſo great abundance about the three Rivers. For, in that Caſe, one might give ſome Reſt to thoſe of *France*, as well as to its Woods: At leaſt, we ſhould be under no Neceſſity of fetching *Iron* from *Sweden* and *Biſcay*.

Iron Mines in the River St. Laurence.

MOREOVER,

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MOREOVER, the Ships which go from *France* to *Canada* always run a great Riſk in their Return, unleſs they make their Voyage in the Spring: Whereas, the ſmall Veſſels of *Quebec* would run no Riſk in going to *Cape Breton*, becauſe they would take their own Time to do it; and they would always have experienced Pilots. What ſhould hinder them from making two Voyages in a Year; and by that Means ſaving the *French* Ships the Trouble of aſcending the River of *St. Laurence*, which would ſhorten their Voyage by one half?

BUT further: The Conſumption in *Canada* of *French* Goods, is not the only Advantage which this Eſtabliſhment would afford to this Colony; *But it would have likewiſe an Opportunity of paſſing its Wines, Brandies, Linnens, Ribbons, Silks*, &c. *into the* Engliſh *Colonies.* This Commerce would become very advantagious: For the *Engliſh* would furniſh themſelves at *Cape Breton*, and in *Canada*, not only with all the Goods they wanted on the Continent, where their Colonies are extreamly peopled; but

but alſo for their Iſlands, and thoſe of the *Dutch*, with which they traffick. *By theſe Means we ſhould draw a great deal of Money out of thoſe Colonies, even though the Entry of our Goods ſhould not be openly permitted.* CHAP. IV.

IN a word, nothing would be more likely, than this Eſtabliſhment, to engage the Merchants of *France* to employ People in the Cod-Fiſhery: For, as *Cape Breton* would furniſh *Canada* with *French* Goods, thoſe Veſſels which were ſent thither for Fiſh, would take a Cargo, conſiſting half in Goods, and half in Salt; ſo that they would make a double Advantage; whereas, at preſent, the *French* Ships, which go out a Cod-fiſhing, load nothing but Salt. Add to this; *that the Augmentation of the Fiſhery would enable* France *to furniſh* Spain *and the* Levant *with Fiſh*; *which would be a Means of bringing immenſe Sums into the Kingdom.*

THE *Whale Fiſhery* (which is very abundant in the Gulph, and towards the Coaſts of *Labrador*, and even in the River of *St. Laurence*, as far as *Tadouſſac*) might *Whale-fiſhery in the River and Gulph of St. Laurence.*

alſo

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alſo be one of the moſt ſolid Advantages of this Settlement. Thoſe Ships which go on this Fiſhery, ſhould be loaden in *France* with Goods, which they ſhould ſell, or leave with the Merchants Correſpondent at *Cape Breton :* And from thence, they ſhould take in Caſks, and go a-fiſhing ; which, in this Place, is ſo much the eaſier, being performed in Summer, and not in the Winter, as in the North of *Europe*, where the Ships muſt lie amongſt the Flakes of Ice, in effect of which, the Whales are frequently loſt, after they are ſtruck. In this manner, the Fiſhing-Veſſels would gain upon their Merchandize brought to *Cape Breton,* and upon their Fiſh : And this double Profit would be made in leſs Time, and with leſs Riſk, than that of the Whale-Fiſhery of the North : And the Money, which is carried to the *Dutch* for this Commodity, would remain in *France.*

IT has been already remarked, that the Iſland of *Cape Breton* can furniſh of its own growth, Maſts and Building-Timber to the Kingdom of *France :* It might likewiſe fetch them from *Canada* ; which would

would much encreaſe the reciprocal Commerce of the two Colonies, and would eaſe the Kingdom greatly in the Expence of building Ships. This Timber would be fetched from the Iſland, without our being obliged to buy it from Strangers: And what ſhould hinder us from building Ships at *Cape Breton*, when every Thing neceſſary to it, may be had from *Canada?* The Materials would coſt there much leſs than in *France*; and enable us to furniſh other Nations with Shipping, inſtead of buying it from them.

Cape Breton a ſure Retreat for Ships from the Weſt-Indies.

IN ſhort, there is not in the World a *ſurer Retreat* for Ships, coming from whatever Part of *America*, than *Cape Breton*, in caſe of being chaſed, in caſe of bad Weather, or of want of Wood, Water, or Proviſions. *Beſides, that in Time of War, it would be a Place for* Cruiſing, *ſo as entirely to diſtreſs the Trade of all the* Britiſh *Settlements in* America: And if we had Force enough (which it would be very eaſy to have) we might make ourſelves Maſters of the Cod-Fiſhery, by the means of a few ſmall Frigates,

And very proper for eſtabliſhing a Cruiſe.

CHAP. IV. which ſhould be always ready to ſally out of, and return into the Ports.

BUT then, theſe Things are not to be done by Companies; who generally ſet their Minds wholly upon getting rich in a little time; and abandon, or neglect every thing which does not immediately return large Profits. They give themſelves very little Trouble about making ſolid and laſting Settlements, or conſidering the Advantage of the Inhabitants; *for whom it is not poſſible to have too great a Regard, if we would engage them to eſtabliſh themſelves in a new Colony, and promote their Intereſts therein.*

THE above Memorial has pointed out to us ſo many of the Advantages, which this Nation may reap from this Important Conqueſt, that it has in a great meaſure cut ſhort our Work in enumerating them. For we have little elſe to do, but to conſider what Uſes they made of this Iſland; and by turning their own Weapons againſt them, we may employ them with double Force; inaſmuch as *they* are greatly weak-

ened, *we* immenſely encreaſed in Strength by this Acquiſition. CHAP. IV.

IT is pretty remarkable, that the *French* Jeſuit begins his Deſcription of *Cape Breton* by averring, that after the Ceſſion of *Placentia* and *Acadia* to the Crown of *England*, *The* French *had no other Place, where they could dry their Fiſh in Safety, but the Iſland of* Cape Breton: Wherefore they were driven by Neceſſity to make a Settlement there, and to fortify it.

THIS Axiom he repeats more than once in the Courſe of his Hiſtory of *New France:* And, if it be a true one, it neceſſarily follows, that the *French* have now loſt all the Advantages they had, or could propoſe to themſelves, by the Poſſeſſion of that Iſland.

SINCE the Declaration of War, the *French* (it is preſumed) have been debarred from fiſhing on the Banks of *Newfoundland*; as well as from drying and curing their Fiſh upon that Iſland. Whenever a Peace between the two Crowns ſhall be negotiated, it is not doubted but

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proper Meaſures will be taken to remove all poſſibility of abuſing, as they have done, the Privileges granted them by the Treaty of *Utrecht*.

NOTHING could poſſibly have contributed ſo much to the ſecuring this Important Branch of our Trade, as our being Maſters of *Cape Breton*; which is ſo ſituated, as to be either of *ineſtimable Value*, or *inconceivable Detriment* to the *Engliſh Nation*. It lies between 45 and 47 Degrees of Northern Latitude; and is ſeparated from *Acadia*, or *New Scotland*, only by the *Narrow Streights* of *Canſo*. It ſhuts up, as it were, the Entrance into the Gulph, and conſequently the River of *St. Laurence*. It is nearer the Great Fiſhing-Banks of *Newfoundland*, than any of the *Engliſh* Colonies, except the Iſland of *Newfoundland* itſelf; conſequently, muſt effectually intercept or protect all Intercourſe between our Colonies, and that Iſland. In a word, it is, in all Reſpects, ſo ſituated, as if Providence intended it ſhould make a Part of the *Britiſh Dominions*, as it really and in Fact is the Key to all the reſt.

IF

IF this be the Caſe, (and I believe no *true* Subject of *Great Britain* will deny it to be the Caſe) can any Care be employed, any Money expended, that is too great, or too conſiderable for the Preſervation of it? But we have many other Inducements to the taking early and effectual Meaſures for the ſecuring of *Cape Breton* to the Dominion of the Crown of *England*, as well from whatever *Open Force* may be brought againſt it, as from all the Arts and Intrigues of *French Miniſters*. We have ſuffered once already by their Tricks; and that in the *very Point* now before us. Let us, therefore be aware of their playing the ſame Game over again: And in order to it, let every one who is Maſter of the Subject, add to theſe few Hints all that is wanting to ſhew Our King, Our Miniſters, Our Legiſlature and Our People, how immenſely valuable this late Acquiſition is; and how well it deſerves to be nouriſhed, protected and preſerved.

MESS. RAUDOT have alledged, that *Cape Breton* can furniſh of its own Growth, Codfiſh, Oyls, Coals, Plaſter, Timber,

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Timber, &c. to the Kingdom of *France*. If that be true (and as I am informed, it is ſtrictly ſo) then this is not a barren deſart Land, affording ſcarce any Trees or Herbage, as repreſented by *Salmon*.

CHARLEVOIX ſays it has many Lakes and Rivers: That there is a competent Number of Domeſtick Animals, which ſubſiſt very well upon it: That Fruits and Grain grow well there: That Hemp and Flax are cultivated with Succeſs; and that fiſhing and hunting are able to maintain the Inhabitants a good Part of the Year. This can never, ſurely, be called a Deſart Place; nor can there be any Danger of ſtarving upon an Iſland where there are ſo many Reſources. The Climate is in general reputed Healthy, notwithſtanding the Frequency of Fogs there to be met with. Coals abound in the Iſland; and are procured at a ſmall Expence. Timber, Stones, Marble and Plaſter are every where to be had; ſo that good Habitations may not only be built, but kept warm, when built. Laſtly, Proviſions cannot be ſaid to be ſcarce, where there is Fiſh in abundance; and Beef, Veal, Mutton,

Mutton, Lamb, Kid, Goat's Fleſh, wild and tame Fowl, Corn, Herbs, Roots, Fruit, *&c.* in tolerable Plenty. The Place, therefore, as to the Neceſſaries of Life, is not only habitable, but in ſome Degree comfortable: let us now ſee how it may be rendered more ſo.

MESS. RAUDOT (about thirty two Years ago) ſhewed the *French* Court the Expediency and Advantage of eſtabliſhing a Staple or Magazine upon the Iſland of *Cape Breton*, for all Goods, *&c.* paſſing between *Old* and *New France*. Whether that Uſe was ever made of the Place, I am not informed: But, from the Arguments and Reaſons given by them for ſuch an Eſtabliſhment, it is very evident that nothing could turn to greater Account. Hence, therefore we are furniſhed with a Hint, how to render this Iſland not only immediately uſeful, but alſo how to people, fortify, and enrich it in a ſhort time, beyond all Poſſibility of loſing it again by Force. For where a *Staple* or *Mart* is eſtabliſhed, thither, of Courſe, will reſort great Numbers of Merchants, and Traders. Theſe bring Money,

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Money, and Money produces Induſtry: By Money, Induſtry, Numbers of People, and Encouragement, what is too difficult to be effected? The moſt barren and deſart Spot of Ground in the Univerſe, would in theſe Circumſtances, be rendered fertile, as is evident in the Inſtance of the Iſland of *Malta*. Every Difficulty would be turned into ſome ſort of Advantage; and what is now a Horrour, would be converted into a Beauty. As ſoon as the Country became rich, it would become better worth the preſerving: Fortifications (if needful) would be added to thoſe already made; and each Individual would contribute to its Preſervation and Safety, with ſo much the greater Care and Zeal, as his own Intereſt therein would be of greater Concern. To me, therefore, it does not occur, that there is any material Objection againſt *our erecting this Iſland into a Staple or Mart for all Goods and Traffick carried on between* England *and its* American *Colonies:* But as I do not pretend to be ſo far Maſter of that Subject, as to foreſee and obviate all the Objections that may lie againſt ſuch a Scheme; ſo I ſhall

Cape Breton propoſed as a Mart between England and America.

ſhall content myſelf with barely giving the Hint; and ſubmit the more particular Enquiry into it, to ſuch as are better Judges of the Arguments for, and againſt it.

LET us now proceed to conſider, in what manner, and to how great a Degree our Trade may be enlarged, protected, and promoted by the Addition of *Cape Breton* to the Dominions of the Crown of *England*.

WE have above given a very particular Deſcription of all the Ports and Harbours of this Iſland, and many of them appear (upon the Teſtimony of my *French* Author) to be ſome of the beſt in *America*. From hence it muſt follow, that if any of our Ships of War, or trading Veſſels are under any Difficulties in their Voyage to or from our Colonies, or any other part of the *Weſt Indies*, *here is a ſure and ſafe Retreat*. Whereas, we had not only the Dangers of the Seas to eſcape, but the Hazard of being taken at the Beginning, or End of a Voyage, as long as *Cape Breton* continued in the

Cape Breton a ſure Retreat for our Ships.

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Hands of our Enemies. For as I have before obſerved, it lies ſo, that it is next to impoſſible to ſail to or from *Nova Scotia*, *New England*, *New York*, *Penſilvania*, *Maryland*, *Virginia*, *Carolina* and *Georgia*, without approaching very near to this Iſland, in the way to or from *England*. Meſſrs. *Raudot* have obſerved, that a few Frigates ſtationed here, would be ſufficient to interrupt our Commerce with the Colonies *. What then ſhould hinder *us* from ſtationing here as many Ships of War, as may be neceſſary, not only to protect *our Trade*, but to prevent any *Danger of an Attack?*

* SALMON, Vol. III. p. 645. ſays; *Here are ſeveral Harbours, where the* French *Cruiſers or Privateers may lie ſecurely, and from hence interrupt the* Britiſh Trade and Fiſheries of New England, New Scotland, *and* Newfoundland, *at their Pleaſure. Nor do I ſee how it is poſſible for an* Engliſh *Squadron to protect them entirely upon ſuch extenſive Coaſts. All that can be done in time of War, is to make Repriſals on the* French *by our Cruiſers and Privateers, and as our Merchantmen and Fiſhermen are by much the moſt numerous; we muſt expect to be the greateſt Sufferers, as we always were, in the late War; the* French *taking three Prizes, for one we took from them.*

HERE

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HERE then are good *Ports* and *Harbours:* But not only ſo, for Safety and Security from Winds and Enemies; but alſo fit for careening and refitting of Ships on any Occaſion. Nay, it has been with Credibility affirmed, that Ships of all Dimenſions and Force may be built here. For, whatever the Iſland itſelf does not afford, may, with great Eaſe, be ſupplied from ſome one of our own Colonies. The Streight of *Canſo* or *Paſſage of Fronſac* is but a League over between *Acadia* and *Cape Breton:* And from the Bay of *St Laurence*, the *Engliſh* Colonies run in a Chain to the South-weſt, as far as to the Gulph of *Florida.*

Ships of all Dimenſions, may be built here.

BUT Ships may not only be built here, but much cheaper built, than in *Europe.* Artificers, it is certain, may in ſome meaſure be wanting for a time, but will ſoon be ſupplied, if ever the Work is ſet about in good Earneſt. And why it ſhould not, I do not perceive, when all the Materials are upon the Spot, and it is much eaſier, and leſs expenſive

And cheaper than in Europe.

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to carry Workmen thither, than to bring these lumbering Goods to the Workmen.

The Engliſh hereby become Maſters of all the Cod-fiſhery.

BY the Poſſeſſion of *Cape Breton* we are become, or have it in our Power to become, entire Maſters of all the *Cod-fiſhery*, which, as *Charlevoix* aſſerts, *is of more value than the Mines of Peru.*

Computation of the French Fiſhery before the War.

HAVING in my Poſſeſſion a *Computation of the French Fiſhery as it was managed before the preſent War*, which is allowed by all good Judges of that Matter to be a Judicious, exact, and well calculated Piece; I ſhould have inſerted it here at full length, if I had not met with it in a Pamphlet lately printed at *Exeter*, entitled, *An Accurate Journal and Account of the Proceedings of the New England Land Forces, during the late Expedition againſt the French Settlements in Cape Breton.*

IN that Pamphlet, the Reader may ſee the whole Calculation; from whence it appears, that the *French* made the Sum of 949192 *l.* 10 *s. Sterling* Advantage from the ſingle Article of the *Fiſhery:* And employed

employed 564 Sail of Ships; and 27500 Men *per Annum.*

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WHETHER the *French* ever attempted the *Whale Fiſhery* in the Bay and River of *St. Laurence*, I am not informed: But it does not appear to have any Place in this Calculation, and conſequently remains to be added to it. For, whether they made any Advantage of it, or not, it is evident, from all the Accounts given of thoſe Parts of the World, that Whales not only abound in the Gulph, *&c.* but that the Fiſhing is performed there to much greater Advantage, and in a ſafer Manner and Seaſon, than in *Greenland*. I ſhall not here pretend to ſet a Value upon this Branch of *Whale Fiſhing*; but only obſerve, that the Bay is now open to us, and that the Trade of *Whale Fiſhing* may be carried on here with great Safety, and with incredible Gains. The *French* Trade up the River of *St. Laurence*, to *Tadouſſac*, *Quebec*, *Montreal*, and their other Settlements upon that River, is hereby, in a great meaſure, if not totally obſtructed, or may be ſo, if proper and vigorous Means are made uſe of.

Whale-fiſhing in the Bay and River of St. Laurence.

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SALMON, at the 646th Page of his IIId Volume, has theſe remarkable words: " *As to the* French *King's yielding up* " Cape Breton, *and the other Iſlands in the* " *Bay of* St. Laurence, *it muſt be conſider-* " *ed, that if he had parted with theſe at* " *the Treaty of* Utrecht, *he could no longer* " *have had any other Communication with* " Canada, *and* New France, *than what* " *we ſaw fit: And it could ſcarce be ex-* " *pected he ſhould exclude himſelf from all* " *Commerce with his Colonies of* New " America."

IN the King of *France*'s Anſwer to a Memorial ſent from *England* in *June*, 1712. N. S. *Art.* 3d. are the following Words; *viz.*

" AS *the perfect Underſtanding that* " *the King propoſes to eſtabliſh between his* " *Subjects, and thoſe of the Queen of* Great " Britain *will, if it pleaſe God, be one of* " *the principal Advantages of the Peace*; " *We muſt remove all Propoſitions capable* " *of diſturbing this happy Union. And, as* " *Experience has made it too viſible, that it*

" *was*

" *was impoſſible to preſerve it, in the Places poſſeſſed in common by the* French *and* Engliſh *Nations; So, this Reaſon alone will ſuffice to hinder His Majeſty from conſenting to the Propoſition of leaving the* Engliſh *to poſſeſs the Iſland of* Cape Breton, *in common with the* French. " *But there is ſtill a ſtronger Reaſon againſt this Propoſition: As it is but too often ſeen, that the moſt amicable Nations many times become Enemies, it is Prudence in the King to preſerve to himſelf the Poſſeſſion of the* only Iſle, *which will hereafter open an Entrance into the River of* St. Laurence; *which* would be abſolutely ſhut *to the Ships of His Majeſty, if the* Engliſh *(Maſters of Acadia and* Newfoundland) *ſtill poſſeſſed the Iſland of* Cape Breton *in common with the* French. " And Canada would be loſt to France, " as ſoon as the War ſhould be renewed " between the Two Nations; *which God forbid: But the moſt ſecure Means to prevent it, is often to think that it may happen.*"

HERE it is to be obſerved, that His Moſt Chriſtian Majeſty is extremely ſcrupulous

CHAP. IV. pulous on this Occaſion, and apprehenſive of joining the Subjects of *England* and *France* in the ſame Iſland, leaſt they ſhould quarrel. And I believe he was right in his Notion, that the natural Antipathy between the two Nations is ſuch, they cannot long agree together in the ſame Place. But it is to be obſerved, *that when it ſuited the Circumſtances of* France *to require a Part of* Newfoundland *along with the* Engliſh, *all theſe Scruples immediately vaniſhed.*

HERE then, is the concurrent Teſtimony of *French* and *Engliſh*, Friends and Foes, *that* Cape Breton *cuts off all Communication between* Old France, *and* Canada *or* New France: *And* that *it is the* only Iſland *which opens an Entrance into the River of* St. Laurence; *and* Canada *would be loſt to* France, *whenever the War ſhould be renewed if this Iſland was either taken, or given up.*

Computation of the Engliſh Fiſhery.

MR. ASHLEY, in treating on the *American* Trade, Part I. p. 18. tells us, that from *Newfoundland*, *New England* and *Nova Scotia*, there are about Three Hundred

Hundred Sail of Ships, great and ſmall, or about Thirty Thouſand Tons of Shipping employed annually in carrying Fiſh to *Portugal*, *Spain*, and *Italy*. Theſe Ships employ about 2700 Seamen, and may by a Circulation of Trade, return to *Great Britain* about 260000 *l. Sterling*, *per Annum*, in this Article of Fiſh, beſides *Train-Oil* and *Whalebone*; of which there may be imported into *Great Britain* to the Value of 40000 *l. Sterling*, *per Annum*, and upwards. And it is computed, that about two Thirds of theſe Advantages ariſe from the Fiſhery of *Newfoundland* only.

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BUT this Computation is confined to the *Fiſhery* of *Newfoundland* chiefly; to the Trade to *Portugal*, *Spain*, and *Italy*, and to the Men employed on board the Ships only. Whereas I have ſeen another kind of Computation, which takes in the whole *Britiſh Fiſhery* in *America*; and extends to the Men employed in catching, curing, and drying the Fiſh aſhore, as well as to the Seamen employed to carry it afterwards to different Ports. This Computation runs thus; that the whole Quantity of Fiſh caught by the *Engliſh*, may, at

A ſecond Computation of the Britiſh Fiſhery in America.

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IT need not be here obſerved how much this *Trade* of the *Fiſhery* has been the Object of the Attention of the Nation, on all Occaſions. It was one of the principal Points upon which the Treaty of *Utrecht* ought to have turned; though by the Management of Men at that Time in Power, it was rather turned againſt us, than to our Advantage. We look upon it as the chief Nurſery for Seamen; and are ſo much intereſted in the other Benefits of it, that we annually ſend one or more of His Majeſty's Ships of War, to protect our Subjects, and their Veſſels, during the fiſhing Seaſon.

Compariſon between the French and Engliſh Fiſheries.

BUT how inconſiderable is this, in every Branch of it, when compared with what we have lately deprived the *French* of, and gotten into our own Hands! *Their Fiſhery* amounted (within a Trifle) to *a Million, Sterling: Our's* not to *one Third* of that Sum.

Sum. They employed 27500 Men: *We*, at moſt, 14 or 15000. *They*, 564 Sail of Ships: We about 300, great and ſmall. CHAP. IV.

THE Difference is extremely great: But the Advantage far exceeds it, when we come to conſider, that this is ſo much taken out of the Hands of our Enemies, and added to our own Trade; and ought therefore, to be accounted in a duplicate Proportion of the real Sum. *Several Advantages ariſing from our being in poſſeſſion of the French Fiſhery.*

BUT *even this Advantage* is inconſiderable, when conſidered abſtractedly, and ſeparate from the other Advantages it brings along with it. Let every Reader weigh within himſelf the Value of a Trade, which affords a Nurſery for near 30,000 additional Seamen. The providing for, or maintaining ſuch a Number of good and uſeful Subjects, not only at no Expence, but to the immenſe Intereſt and Profit of the Nation, muſt, *at leaſt*, give Pleaſure to every well-diſpoſed Mind; even though he is not immediately concerned in any other Benefit ariſing from that Branch of Trade. The having that Fund of Seamen to ſupply our Fleets upon *A Nurſery for 30000 additional Seamen.*

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any Emergency, must evidently appear to be a very great Advantage to all those who have either the Trade, the Religion, the Liberty, or the Safety of their Country at Heart. The Circulation of such an additional Sum annually, must produce such Effects, as will be felt by all Ranks and Degrees of Men, from the Throne to the Plow. And the depriving our Enemies of all the Advantages they reaped from this Branch of Trade must be such a Curb to their Ambition, and cast such a Damp upon all their Projects, that we cannot have any thing to fear from them, so long as we continue to cut this *Main Sinew of War.*

Encrease of of the Woollen Manufacture

ADD to this the great Encrease which this Acquisition must bring, to the *Woollen Manufactures.* The Climate of *Cape Breton* is, for a great Part of the Year, extremely cold: And the Business of Fishing is such, as exposes the People employed in it, to the damp, rainy, foggy, or frosty Air: Wherefore they must of necessity be well cloathed; which, consequently, makes a large Demand for our coarse Cloths, Flannels, Yarn and Worsted Hose, Caps, Mittens,

Mittens, *&c.* Whereby great Numbers of poor, but induſtrious Families, now ſtarving in the North and Weſt of *England*, will be comfortably maintained, and enabled to pay their Rents, as well as rear their Children, and qualify them for ſome Branch or other of this Trade. Whereas, they are at this Inſtant, at a loſs how to feed them, or what to do with them: To bring them up in Idleneſs, does not ſuit the Temper of the *Engliſh*: To teach them a declining Trade, affords very little Proſpect of Succeſs: And in theſe Countries, they are not able to teach them any other, having been educated univerſally in one or other Branch of it. Wherefore, ſome have been almoſt tempted to put in execution Dean *Swift*'s Scheme for providing for their Children. But by the Conqueſt of *Cape Breton*, there ariſes a Demand for all Kinds of Woollen Goods, ſufficient to cloath and keep warm 30000, at leaſt, additional Subjects, concerned in the Fiſhery. And how many will be required to inhabit the Iſland, and to garriſon the Fortifications, I leave others to compute: But be they more, or be they leſs, they muſt likewiſe be cloathed, and

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and add to the Demand for our Woollen Manufactures.

Building many more Ships.

THE building, and employing of 564 additional Ships, will prove the Maintenance of ſeveral Thouſands of Families.

Conſumption of Iron, Timber, Sail-Cloth, and Cordage.

What a Conſumption muſt this make of Timber, Iron, Sail-Cloth Cordage, and other Materials? How many poor People muſt live by the Manufacture of theſe ſeveral Articles; for ſome of which there will be a repeated Demand every Voyage?

WE ſhall ſhew hereafter, when we come to treat of the Affairs of *Canada*, that each of theſe Advantages may, and and muſt be greatly improved by encreaſing our Commerce and Intercourſe with the *Indians* and Savages, who have hitherto dealt with the *French* for many Commodities, which they will now find it difficult to furniſh them withal.

Letter from the London Courant.

I SHALL cloſe this Chapter with a Paragraph or two, out of the *London Courant* of *September* the 4th, 1745. Wherein after ſpeaking of the Conqueſt of *Cape Breton*, he ſays; "The next Step

" Step to be taken in order to make CHAP.
" our Conqueſt laſting, ſecure, and IV.
" valuable, is to drive the *French* from
" *Canada*; which may now with great
" Eaſe be effected. That done; they
" would have no Pretence for coming in-
" to thoſe Seas; and the *Fiſhing* Coaſt
" would be left entirely to ourſelves, from
" the Bank of *Newfoundland*, to the South-
" ermoſt Part of *Georgia*; which reaches
" near five hundred Leagues, *Bays* ex-
" cepted; and includes the Cod, Her-
" ring, and Mackarel, two Seaſons, with
" Whale and Salmon Fiſhing. Beſides,
" if *Canada*, ſhould come into our hands,
" all the *Fur-Trade* falls in, of Courſe.
" This would be a Means of living in
" perpetual Amity with all the Tribes of
" *Indians*; and greatly diſtreſs the *French*
" *Sugar Colonies*, by preventing them
" from Neceſſaries; ſuch as Proviſions,
" Lumber, &c. which are ſent in great
" Quantities from hence. This would
" alſo infallibly put a Stop to their Build-
" ing any more Ships there; either for
" the King's or the Merchants Service;
" and hinder many Maſts and other Na-
" val

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" val Stores from being ſent from thence " to *France*, for the *Future*.

" THE ſeveral Articles, laſt mention- " ed, added to the great Increaſe of our " Trade from theſe Acquiſitions, would " be infinitely more valuable to US, than " either *Mexico* or *Peru:* eſpecially, if " we conſider, how many thouſand Hands " will be employed, how many Families " will be maintained, how many large " Fortunes will be acquired, and how " much our Navigation will be aug- " mented hereby.

" THE Increaſe of our *Fiſhery* alone, " (if no further Advantages were to ariſe " from the taking of *Cape Breton*) is ſuf- " ficient to recommend the Preſervation of " it, to our Care and Conſideration : As it " will, in a ſhort ſpace of time, prove a " certain Method to improve our Com- " merce; to enlarge our Navigation; to " ſtrengthen our Navy; and thereby, to " ſecure our own Coaſts, from all *pre-* " *tending Invaders.*"

ONE Paragraph more. I cannot help inſerting, which is taken from His Majeſty's

jesty's Speech to his Parliament on the 14th of *January*, 174$\frac{5}{6}$. CHAP. IV.

" *The great Advantages which we have* Extract of
" *received from our* Naval Strength, *in* His Majesty's
" *protecting the Commerce of my Subjects,* Speech to his
" *and intercepting and distressing that of* Parliament.
" *our Enemies, have been happily experien-*
" *ced by the former, and severely felt by*
" *the latter. I am, therefore, determined*
" *to be particularly attentive to this im-*
" *portant Service; and to have such a*
" *Fleet at Sea, early in the Spring, as may*
" *be sufficient to defend ourselves, and ef-*
" *fectually to annoy our Enemies.*

So Gracious a Declaration of so Glo- *Effects of*
rious a Resolution, cannot but warmly af- *that Speech.*
fect the Heart of every true *Briton*, and Well-wisher to his Country. The proper, and most natural Protection and Defence of these Kingdoms, and the Dominions subject to the *British* Crown, are (beyond a Doubt) to be sought, and found in a sufficient Fleet; which may answer all the Purposes of protecting our Coasts, and Dominions; of securing our own Trade; and of annoying and di-

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ſturbing, if not deſtroying the Trade of our Neighbours, and Rivals, as well as Enemies. Let this be extended to whatever the National Exigencies may require; the Money, paid on this Occaſion, ſtill remains amongſt us: And as it circulates through the Hands of every Individual; may rather deſerve the Name of a Benefit, than a Detriment to the Subject. Many other Advantages, ariſing from this manner of carrying on a War, particularly a War with *France* and *Spain*, might here be enumerated and enlarged upon: But as this is in ſome Meaſure, foreign to my Purpoſe; I ſhall only add that nothing could ſo effectually enable His Majeſty, to put in practice the Reſolution above quoted, in an eaſier and leſs expenſive Way, and to the Great Joy of his Subjects, than the keeping Poſſeſſion of, and by all means ſtrengthening and improving, *Cape Breton*.

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Some Accounts of Canada, *and the Affairs of the* Engliſh *Colonies, in its Neighbourhood*; *particularly of* Nova Scotia.

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THE *London Courant* quoted above, propoſes (as the next Step to the *Conqueſt of Cape Breton*) the driving the *French* out of *Canada*, which, he ſays, may with great Eaſe, be done. Under the Name of *Canada*, the *French* comprehend all that Extent of Territory, which they otherwiſe call *New France*. Thus *Canada* in their Maps, is very differently laid down, from what it is in ours. For they call that *Canada*, which we call *Acadia*; and that, *Acadia*, which we call *Nova Scotia*. But it is obvious, that they have on all Occaſions, changed not only the Names of Places, but even their Boundaries and Limits; juſt as it beſt ſuited their preſent Conveniency, or

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future Views. They, of late Years, greatly enlarged their Limits preſcribed and ſetled by the Treaty of *Utrecht*, for their fiſhing, and drying Fiſh at *Newfoundland*. And in the Year 1700, they pretended that *New France* extended itſelf along the Coaſt of *New England*, as far as the River *Kinibequi*. If (as no doubt they intend) any Streſs is to be laid upon the Maps lately publiſhed by *Bellin*, and annext to *Charlevoix*'s Hiſtory, there is ſcarce any Part of *America*, excepting *Mexico* and *Peru*, which they do not in one Shape or another lay claim to. But as all Titles but that of Conqueſt, are, for the preſent at leaſt annihilated; let us enquire, Firſt, how far ſuch a thing as the reducing of *Canada* to the Obedience of the Crown of *England*, is, in itſelf, practicable. And ſecondly, what would be the Advantages, ariſing to the Crown of *Great Britain*, in caſe that Reduction were happily effected.

The Conqueſt of Cape Breton, a leading Step to the Reduction of Canada.

IT is evident, from the foregoing Account of the Situation of *Cape Breton*, that the taking that Iſland out of the Hands of the *French*, has or may, in a great

great Meaſure, cut off the Communication between *Old France*, and its Poſſeſſions in and about the Bay and River of *St. Laurence*. It may likewiſe be added, that the *French* Trade to the *Miſſiſſipi* may be greatly curbed, if we eſtabliſh a Cruiſe at *Cape Breton* ſufficient to protect our own Trade in thoſe Parts, and to annoy *that* of our Enemies. For though that River empties itſelf into the Gulph of *Mexico*, yet their Ships, in going thither and returning from thence, muſt run the riſk of falling in with ſome of our Cruiſers. We have above repreſented, that this may not only eaſily be done, but that it would, in many Reſpects, be for the Advantage of *Great Britain* to build Ships there, and equip them with every thing neceſſary for their going to Sea. For as to Cannon, Cordage, and Sail Cloth, if they cannot be eaſily had *at Cape Breton*, or if it be judged improper that they ſhould, they may, with great Eaſe, and to good Account, be ſent from hence.

MESS. RAUDOT have, in their Memorial to the Court of *France*, laid it down

as

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as a Maxim not to be conteſted, that *New France* cannot long ſubſiſt, without Supplies and Support from the *Old*. And by blocking up this Paſſage, we effectually cut off all thoſe *Neceſſary Supplies*: which muſt not only reduce them to great Extremities, but be the *probable Cauſe* of the Defection of the *Indians* from *them* to *Us*. For as they cannot any longer ſupply them with Goods, take theirs off their Hands, nor make them the uſual, and expected Preſents; theſe People will not, they cannot long depend upon a Nation, which can neither trade with them, gratify them, nor contribute to their Support. Wherefore I look upon the Reduction of *Canada* * as the

* THIS *is not ſo very difficult a Task as it may at firſt Sight ſeem to be, if the the following* French *Author is to be credited. He quotes a Letter from Monſieur* de Vaudreuil *Chief Governour of* New *France, to Monſieur* de Pontchartrain *Premier Miniſter, in the Year* 1714. "Canada *(ſays the former) has actually in it but* 4480 *Inhabitants, capable of bearing Arms; and the* 28 *Companies, which the King maintains there amount to no more than* 628 *Men. This handful of Men is ſcattered throughout an Extent of* 100 *Leagues of Country. The* Engliſh

the Natural (I had almoſt ſaid neceſſary) effect of reducing *Cape Breton*. Provided always, that we keep ſuch a Force of Ships of War there, as may be able to protect the Place itſelf; and at the ſame time to furniſh a Number of Cruiſers ſufficient to preſerve the Dominion of thoſe Seas, and to intercept the *French Trade*. CHAP. V.

THE better to induce us to attempt the Reduction of *Canada*, let us now ſee how ſome of our own Colonies (particularly that of *Nova Scotia*) are endangered by this Neighbourhood, or for want of taking proper Meaſures for peopling and protecting that Colony.

NOVA SCOTIA lies Weſt of *Cape Breton*; from which this Province is divided, only *Situation of Nova Scotia.*

" Engliſh *Colonies, have, at leaſt*, 60000 *Men ca-*
" *pable of bearing Arms: And it cannot be doubted,*
" *but on the firſt Occaſion of Rupture, they will make*
" *an Effort to poſſeſs themſelves of* Canada; *eſpecially,*
" *if we reflect, that the City of* London (*amongſt the*
" *Articles of Inſtructions given to its Repreſentatives*)
" *inſiſts upon it, that Enquiry be made, why pre-*
" *ceding Miniſters yielded to* France Canada, *and the*
" *Iſland of* Cape Breton." *Vide* Charlevoix, Vol. IV.
" p. 150.

by

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by the *Narrow Streights* (or as the Seamen call it) *Gut of Canſo*. It is ſituated between the Latitudes 44 and 50; and ſtretches from *Canſo* to *Cape Sable*, near an hundred Leagues from Eaſt to Weſt. It is reputed the fineſt Province in all *North America* for its Harbours; one of which is to be met with on the South Coaſt, at almoſt every two Leagues diſtance; and are, many of them, fine, large, navigable Rivers for Ships of Burden. Its Coaſts abound with Variety of Fiſh, ſuch as Cod, Mackarel, and Herrings, &c. Its Rivers with Salmon, Trouts, Eels, *&c.* The Land is covered with Aſh, Oak, Pines, and Elm, fit for Naval Stores, and for Building-timber, or any other Uſes. The Woods are ſtock'd with Wild-Fowl of different Sorts; and with Deer, Beaver, and other Furs. The Earth is here full of Coal, Lime, Stone, and Plaſter; and, where it is cleared, is very fit for Agriculture and Paſture. From ſuch an Account of this Province, it is natural to imagine it is well peopled, and properly encouraged: But, if I am rightly informed, there is not ſo much as one *Engliſh* Family ſettled there, beyond the Walls of the

Its Produce.

This Province not peopled.

the only Garriſon in this extenſive Country; though it has been upwards of thirty Years in the Poſſeſſion of the Crown of *Great Britain*. *Annapolis Royal* is, as we have ſaid, the only Garriſon in all this Province; and has only one Regiment, or rather Part of one in it. It is quite by itſelf, and very remote from all Aſſiſtance, in caſe of any Emergency. This Garriſon, ſmall as it is, is nevertheleſs, a conſtant, large and dead Expence to the Crown; which Expence might be greatly eaſed, if not totally taken off, were proper Meaſures taken to render this Province populous and flouriſhing. It muſt ſurely be allowed, that no Part of this New World is more capable of being eaſily and ſoon put into a thriving Condition, than this. I am told, that it would ſubſiſt, and provide well for 200000 Families and upwards. And, if ſuitable, though ſmall Encouragement were given, it is not doubted but ſuch a Number of Proteſtants from abroad might be procured, and brought to ſettle there, as would ſet the Work a-going; and, in a ſhort Time, anſwer the Ends propoſed. Inſtead of that, the Inhabitants of this Province are now made up of *French* and

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Annapolis-Royal, the only Garriſon in this Province.

Scheme for peopling it.

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Savages only. The former finding the Sweets of ſuch a Settlement, choſe to ſtay there, when, at the Peace of *Utrecht*, *Nova Scotia* was yielded to the *Engliſh*. They are ſince greatly multiplied and encreaſed; and call themſelves *Neutral French*. They have, ever ſince the Peace, had a conſtant Intercourſe of Trade and Marriages, *&c.* with the Inhabitants of *Cape Breton*; and, as well on Account of the Affinity with *them*, as on Account of their Religion, they muſt be ſuppoſed to be more in *their* Intereſts, than in *Our's*. It is computed, that there are not leſs than 10000 Men, capable of bearing Arms in this Province; who, at the Inſtigation of their Prieſts, will at any time be ready to join in a Confederacy to ſtrip us of it. Theſe *Neutral French* trade with the *Savages* in the Eaſtern Parts of *New England*, for Furs, Caſtors, Feathers, *&c.* to a great Value. They export Beef, Pork, Butter, Grain, Furs, Fiſh, *&c.* to a conſiderable Value: Whereas, were this Province rightly managed, by filling it with Proteſtants from abroad, or wherever elſe they might be had by Encouragement, it would, at leaſt, bear the Expence of its own

Danger of its not being peopled.

own Garriſons, if not bring in a hand- CHAP. V.
ſome Revenue to the Crown, or ſome of its Dependants. Let us ſuppoſe for a while, that theſe *Neutral French* (ſpirited up by their Prieſts, or excited by Revenge for the late Loſſes and Diſappointments of their Kindred and Countrymen at *Cape Breton*) ſhould join with the *Savages* to poſſeſs themſelves of this large and rich Province, what Force have we there to oppoſe them, conſidering the Extent of Territory to be defended? Or ſhould *France* ſend thither three or four thouſand Men; what ſhould hinder them (being once joined by the preſent Inhabitants) from making themſelves entire Maſters of the Country? Perhaps it may be anſwered; that a good Fleet at Sea, would prevent their landing: But where there are ſo many Creeks and Bays, beſides the Rivers and Harbours above-mentioned (each of which, the late Poſſeſſors of *Cape Breton* are well-acquainted with) this is a Thing much eaſier ſaid, than done. We have found by fatal Experience at home, how impoſſible it is effectually to guard a Coaſt, and hinder an Enemy from landing. And we are at this Day (to our Sorrow) con-

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vinced, how difficult a thing it is, to drive an Enemy out of a Country, when it has once got Footing in it. The *French*, when they quitted *Cape Breton*, were bold enough to declare, that as ſoon as the Year of Capitulation was out, they would return, and get Poſſeſſion again of the Lands they had loſt, or of ſome other, as good, in Lieu of them. Some may, perhaps, ſay, that if it be ſo eaſy a thing to take this Province, it muſt be as eaſy to retake it: But the Caſe is widely different; for, in the firſt place, it is a leſs expenſive, and leſs hazardous Meaſure, to keep a Poſſeſſion, than to recover it. Secondly; whenever the *French* come, *they* are ſure to be ſupported by their Kindred, Countrymen, and Aſſociates in Religion: Whereas, *we* are equally ſure of being abandoned by them. But if *Canada* were once reduced to the Subjection of the Crown of *England*, the Caſe would then be quite altered. The Power we ſhould then have in that Part of the World, would ſtrike a Dread into our Enemies, as well *French* as *Savages*: And without it, the Difficulty of preſerving *Nova Scotia*, will, I am afraid, be greater than is at preſent imagined. The Neceſſity

Neceſſity of preſerving this Province will appear the greater, when we conſider that the *French* would in the other Caſe become not only very near Neighbours to our other Colonies, but, whenever a War breaks out, put us as it were between two Fires. Add to this, that the Timber for all Naval Uſes, begins to fail in the Eaſtern Parts of *New England*; which cannot be ſo well ſupplied (if ſupplied at all) by any other Province than that of *Nova Scotia*, or by *Canada*, if we keep the former, and reduce the latter. We have before remarked, that along theſe Coaſts the greateſt Fiſhery in the known World is carried on: And, without being in poſſeſſion of the Country, it would be next to impoſſible to continue the Fiſhery; as the Enemy would be conſtantly annoying us from their Ports. Whereas, by the Reduction of *Canada*, not only this Province of *Nova Scotia*, but alſo all the *Engliſh* Settlements in *America*, would be enlarged and protected: For the *French* Settlements, and the *Indian* Nations run all along the Back of *ours*, and ſubject us to daily Incurſions from thence, into *New England*, CHAP. V.

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England, *New York*, *Penſilvania*, *Maryland* and *Virginia*, juſt as it beſt ſuits their Opportunity and Advantage.

BUT, whilſt we are contriving Schemes for annoying our common Enemies, I am extreamly ſorry to find there is a Set of Men among us, who by their Greedineſs after Profit (for I will not put it upon any worſe Principle) contrive it ſo, that the greateſt Part of *their* Loſſes falls upon *ourſelves*. This is a Management ſo deſtructive of every Project for diſtreſſing the Enemy, that I think it proper to inſert in this Place a Letter printed in the *General Evening Poſt*, of *Tueſday*, *January* 21, 1745-6. This Letter puts the Buſineſs of inſuring in *London* of *French* Ships, and their Commodities, in ſo ſtrong a Light, that I think it is a pity it ſhould not have more Chances than one, of being univerſally read and conſidered. I ſhall therefore tranſcribe it word for word, as all Abbreviations muſt be an Injury done it.

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" *To the Printer*, &c.

" SIR,

" I AM extremely concerned that the Publick Joy for so Important an Event as the taking and destroying such a Number of *Martinico* Ships, should have any Allay. I am told, that the Benefit arising from it to *England*, will, in a great measure, be lost; and the Mischief it would have done to *France*, will, in some degree, be repaired, by the Ships being insured on *our Exchange* to almost their full Value. I shall not enter into the Consideration, how *mean*, how *scandalous* it is to carry on an *under-hand Traffick* with those who are declared the *open*, and who appear the *inveterate* Enemies of our Country; but will view this Practice, as a Point of Interest; and, whether it is beneficial to the Community, or not.

Letter from the General Evening Post, concerning the Insurance of French Ships on the Exchange of London.

" BEFORE the Commencement of the War, our Complaints were loud and general, that the *French* Trade, espe-

" cially

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" cially the *Weſt-India*, was grown to " ſuch an Heighth, as not only to hurt, " but endanger our Own. The great " Number of their Ships taken, is a ſuf- " ficient Evidence, if there were no other, " of the Juſtice of thoſe Complaints. " What then was our Buſineſs at entering " into the War ? Not to interrupt, not to " weaken only, but to deſtroy as effec- " tually as poſſible the very Being of their " Trade. We have given them ſeveral " Blows, under which they have ſtag- " gered ; under which they muſt have " fallen, if they had not been held up by " our Inſurance. So many Captures muſt " have occaſioned ſuch *Bankruptcies* among " their Merchants in *France*, that theſe " could not have ſent ſo many Ships to " *America* ; and the Planters there could " not have been ſupported.

" THE only Argument for inſuring " the Enemy's Property is, that the Mo- " ney paid here for it, is ſo much *clear* " *Gain :* But then it muſt be ſuppoſed " that their Ships are not taken ; if they " are, inſtead of *Gaining*, we *loſe* by it. " But whether they are, or not, their

" Trade

" Trade is ſtill kept alive by our means.
" It is evident that *France*, notwithſtand-
" ing her bluſtering, has not ſufficient
" Funds to promote her Schemes upon
" the Continent, and protect her Trade
" at the ſame time. Is it not natural
" then for her King to ſay, *I will purſue*
" *the* firſt, *and let the* Engliſh *themſelves*
" *take Care of the* laſt. *Whilſt this is in-*
" *ſured; whilſt this is nurſed up by them,*
" *it may languiſh, but it will never be de-*
" *ſtroyed.* To corroborate what I have
" advanced, I ſhall offer two Matters of
" Fact to the ſerious Conſideration of eve-
" ry *Briton.* 1. The *French* in order to
" prop their ſinking Trade, and for want
" of Ships and Seamen, have lately per-
" mitted the *Dutch* to load in their Su-
" gar Colonies. 2. Theſe *Dutch* Bottoms,
" with *French* Property, have had a
" great deal of Inſurance paid upon
" them in LONDON.

" NO Man can have a greater Regard
" for the Character of a fair Merchant,
" than I have; I think him one of the
" moſt uſeful Members of Society; but
" I cannot help making an Obſervation

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" or two, *viz.* that no One can carry " on ſuch a Traffick, without holding " directly or indirectly, a Correſpondence, " with the Enemies of his Country. " That it is natural for any Man to wiſh, " the Ships which he inſures may purſue " their Voyage with Safety, and to take " proper Meaſures that they may. That " it is eaſy then for him, by his Correſ- " pondence, to convey Intelligence of " the Deſtination of our Fleets, the time " of their Sailing; and whatever elſe may " be neceſſary for the Enemy to know.— " No *Gains* can counterballance ſuch a " Miſchief: All the Efforts which our " Government can make to deſtroy their " Trade, may hereby be rendered ineff- " fectual.—I am far from thinking that " every Man who ſubſcribes to ſuch *Inſu-* " *rance*, would be guilty of conveying *Intel-* " *ligence* to the Enemy: But as the Temp- " tation is great; it is probable ſome of " them may and it is ſurely wiſe, to pro- " vide againſt ſuch a Probability.

" IT will perhaps be ſaid, that if the " *Engliſh* do not ſecure to themſelves the " Profits ariſing from the Inſurance of the " *French* Ships, the *Dutch* will. In An-

" ſwer

" ſwer to this, I ask if the Profits are certain, and Great, why are the *French* " ſo willing to *give*, and the *Dutch* ſo " ready to part with them to *Us?* The " only Reaſons why *France* applies to " *England* for it, muſt be, becauſe ſhe " cannot procure the whole Inſurance " which ſhe wants from *Holland*; be- " cauſe ſhe gets it here on cheaper " Terms; or becauſe ſhe ſecures more " effectually the Navigation of her Ships. " In either of the former Inſtances, we " give her Advantages, which it is impo- " litick to give: In the laſt, we lend her " Aſſiſtance to deſtroy Ourſelves.—How- " ever, though the Profits may be great, " this is the ſingle Queſtion. Is inſuring " the Enemy's Property, *upon the whole*, " for the Publick Intereſt? This is the " Center, to which every Branch of Trade " ſhould point: And every Line which " does not lead to it, ſhould be thrown " out of the Compaſs.

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" To view the whole then, in this " ſingle Light, I will endeavour clearly " and ſhortly to ſtate the Caſe, abſtract- " ing even the Conſideration of our keep-

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" ing their Trade alive. The *French*, " by insuring leave no more with us than " the Profit of the Insurer; after he has " made up his Account of Loss and " Gain: Whereas, on the other hand, " if we suppose that all Insurance of the " Enemy's Property had ceased from the " Beginning of the War, the Nation had " gained what we have taken from " them, over and above what they have " taken from us; exclusive of what we " might have further taken, if no Intel- " ligence had been conveyed to them: " But Thanks to the Insurers! *Our Ene-* " *mies will tell the rest with Pleasure.* " As I think this a Matter of the highest " Importance, I don't doubt but our Le- " gislature will give the earliest Attention " to it.

" SINCE we are in Possession of " CAPE BRETON, *this is the favourable* " *Crisis, if there can be one, for ruining* " *the* French Trade, *and establishing* our " own; if we will but put a total Stop " to our Insuring of their Property; and " if we will continue pushing them, " where we find they are so weak."

THOUGH

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THOUGH this Letter is ſomewhat foreign to my Purpoſe; yet I could not help inſerting it, as it ſeems to be written by a Perſon of Temper, Good Manners, and ſound Judgment; By One who is converſant in Trade, and a Well-wiſher to his Country. It is great Pity he did not deliver his Sentiments ſooner; for I have heard the Practice often, and long ago complained of. The laſt Article or Paragraph however, ſufficiently evinces what we have been labouring to eſtabliſh, *viz.* that the Poſſeſſion of *Cape Breton* is the thing, and *the only thing* that can enable us effectually to deſtroy the Power of *France*, and turn it to our own Benefit. I am not one of thoſe who are for enlarging our Territories abroad; for the fewer we have, the better we ſhall be able to attend to their Encouragement and Protection. But as this Nation is not ſuppoſed to ſubſiſt without Trade, ſo it is neceſſary to take all Meaſures to increaſe and defend it; eſpecially, when that may be done, at the Expence of our Enemies. Wherefore I again repeat it, that the Conqueſt of *Cape Breton is by far the greateſt*

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eſt Advantage we have hitherto gained by the War, and it is to be hoped we ſhall not loſe any Opportunity of improving that Advantage.

BEFORE I finiſh this Chapter, it may not be amiſs to add in this Place ſome of the Miſchiefs or Diſadvantages attending the Iſland of *Cape Breton*, whilſt it was poſſeſſed by the *French*; which are now entirely obviated, and may for the future be prevented, or rather will naturally ceaſe, as long as we keep Poſſeſſion thereof. Theſe Diſadvantages ariſe from a *deſtructive Clandeſtine Trade* carried on between our Settlements on the Continent of *America*, and the *French* at *Cape Breton*, to the great Detriment of Trade in general, and to the Support of our common Enemy.

A Clandeſtine Trade formerly carried on between our Settlements and Cape Breton.

THIS *Clandeſtine Trade*, carried on from moſt of the *Engliſh* Settlements between *Virginia*, and *Nova Scotia*, conſiſted in the furniſhing of *Cape Breton* with *Warlike Stores* and *Proviſions* of the *Plantation Produce*. For this Purpoſe, near an Hundred Sail of decked Veſſels were

were every Summer employed in tranſporting Tar, Pitch, Turpentine, Roſin, Timber, Plank and Boards: As alſo Beef, Pork, Butter, Cheeſe, Bread, Flower, Cyder, Apples, Onyons, Corn, Horſes, live Cattle of all Kinds, and great Quantities of Cabinet Makers Goods, to our Rivals in Trade. By theſe means the *French* not only conſtantly ſupplied their Fiſhery in this Neighbourhood, but alſo had ſuch a Surpluſſage, that from hence they ſupplied their *Weſt Indian* Iſlands with theſe Articles. Nay the *Engliſh* many times ſo glutted the Markets, that they were frequently obliged to ſell at *Cape Breton*, at a Price under what the Goods had coſt them at home: And in this Caſe their Advantage was to be made on their Smuggling Goods into our Colonies at their Return. For theſe People were chiefly paid in Brandy, Wine, Oyl, Sail-cloth, Cordage, Iron, Rum, Molaſſes, Sugar, Coffee, Indigo, Drugs, *Eaſt India* Goods, *&c.* the Manufactures, Product, or Trade of *Old* and *New France*; which they ſold again clandeſtinely among our own Colonies at their Return. This double Advantage was ſo great to the *French*, that though

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though the Traffick between the two Nations was ſeemingly prohibited; yet they not only winked at, but encouraged it; as they have always done the *Exportation of Wool* from hence. Hereby is fully verified (by the Event) that Part of the Memorial preſented by Meſſrs *Raudot*, wherein they alledge, *That by theſe means we ſhould draw a great deal of Money out of thoſe Colonies, even though the Entry of our Goods ſhould not be openly permitted.* * It has been affirmed that our *Clandeſtine Traders* went ſo far, as to Barter *Warlike Stores* and *Proviſions*, and even Veſſels and Ships of all Dimenſions, from 50 to 400 Tons, againſt the Commodities abovementioned, which they had from the *French*; ſeveral of which Articles, *viz.* the meaneſt of their Rum, Molaſſes, and Sugar, the *French* would have found no other Vent for, had not our People thus taken them off their Hands: they muſt otherwiſe have been let out to run down their Streets; as has been (if I am rightly informed) fully proved at the Bar of the Houſe of Commons. Now from this Practice, it is evident, that the *French* were ſupplied with Proviſions,

* *Vide p.* 71.

visions, *&c.* for carrying on their *Fishery*, at a much cheaper, easier, and more certain Rate, than they otherwise could be: By which means, they were enabled to undersell us in that Commodity, wherever they came. CHAP. V.

THIS Island was likewise the Place of Rendezvous for all the *French* Ships that passed to and from *Old France*; and the *East* as well as *West Indies*, the *South Seas*, or on any occasion crossing the Western Ocean. Their Ships in like manner, coming home from any of their Sugar Islands, and being obliged to stand to the North-west, for the Benefit of the Gulph Stream and North Shore Winds, could venture to leave their Ports with little or no Provisions, being assured of finding Abundance at *Cape Breton*, thus clandestinely brought thither from our Colonies as above mentioned.

CHAP. VI.

A Summary Relation of the Siege of Lewisburg: *With a ſhort Account of Mr.* William Vaughan's *particular Behaviour in the Expedition of* Cape Breton.

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I HAD here deſigned to have given the Publick the beſt Accounts I could have picked up, of the Siege of *Lewisburg*, and the taking the Iſland of *Cape Breton:* But, having met with the Pamphlet before quoted, containing a Journal of thoſe Tranſactions, I ſhall not here trouble the Reader with a literal Repetition of what therein ſeems to be pretty exactly done, and by Authority; but only give a Summary Account of the Whole, and add ſome Circumſtances, which, though not totally omitted, are there but lightly touched upon.

The ſhort time taken for putting the Enterprize in execution.

IT is obſervable, from the beforementioned Journal, that never was an Enterprize of ſo much Difficulty, Danger, and

and Expence, carried on with so great Zeal, Expedition, and Intrepidity. They took but seven Weeks to execute this Important Undertaking: And in eleven Days more the whole Armament was assembled at *Canso*, which is but 20 Leagues from the Fortress of *Lewisburg*.

THEY would have lost no Time at *Canso*, had not the Enemy's Shores been covered with Ice, which made the approaching them impracticable: And which Accident gave Time for their being joined by *Commodore Warren*'s Squadron, which happened on the 22d and 23d of *April*; that is, eighteen or nineteen Days after the *New England* Fleet, *&c.* had arrived at *Canso*. During this Interval, the *New England* armed Sloops cruised about *Cape Breton*, to prevent Intelligence or Provisions being carried to the Enemy: And had the good Fortune to meet with, attack, and drive back to *France*, a *French* Man of War of thirty Guns, with three hundred Seamen, fifty Marines and publick Dispatches on board. Had this Ship got into *Lewisburg*, she would have thrown a strong Reinforcement into the Garrison.

Detained at Canso by Ice on the Coasts of Cape Breton.

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THE Difficulties which attended the Landing of the Troops on a rough, rocky Shore, with a great Surf continually beating upon it, can ſcarce be conceived by ſuch as are not converſant in Affairs of this Nature. And when the Hardſhips they were expoſed to after landing, come to be conſidered, the Behaviour of theſe Men will hardly gain credit. They went a-ſhore wet; had no Cloaths to cover them; were expoſed in this Condition to cold, foggy Nights; and yet chearfully underwent theſe Difficulties for the ſake of executing a Project they had voluntaily undertaken.

Difficulties the Troops underwent,

NOTWITHSTANDING theſe Diſadvantages, great Numbers were employed as Scouts to ſcour the Country, and prevent Surprizes of any Sort. But the moſt difficult Taſk of all others, and what moſt ſurprized the *French* Garriſon, was the drawing the Cannon and Mortars for two Miles through deep Moraſſes and Bogs, and over rough, craggy Rocks. Horſes, or Oxen, could not be employed here; nor Wheel-carriages of any Sort. The Buſineſs,

particularly in drawing Cannon, &c. through deep Moraſſes.

Buſineſs, therefore, was all done by the indefatigable and incredible Labour and Fatigue of theſe poor Men; who, after the Sweats occaſioned by their Day's Work, were ſcarcely protected from the Injuries of the cold, foggy Nights; as they had but few Tents, and thoſe very bad ones, to cover them. Theſe Fatigues threw the Men into Fluxes; of which, and other occaſional Diſorders, there were above one Thouſand five Hundred ſick at a time; by which means the Duty fell the harder on thoſe that were well; and theſe, without murmuring, nay, with Joy and Chearfulneſs, betook themſelves to every laborious and hazardous Diſcharge of their Duty. The Cannon and Mortars therefore were hawled by Strength of Arms on Sledges over theſe Bogs, Moraſſes, and rocky Hills: The Proviſions and Ammunition, *&c.* were carried over them by the Men, on their Backs; both which Methods were attended with ſuch incredible Labour and Difficulty, that Men of leſs Reſolution, or leſs Experience in removing Weights, would ſcarce have attempted the Thing; never have executed it.

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IT appears, by the Journal before-mentioned, that the whole Number of Troops engaged in this Expedition, did not exceed four Thouſand. Of theſe one Thouſand five Hundred were ſick at one time: Many Parties were ſent out as Scouts, to oppoſe the Enemy aſſembled in the Country: Numbers were neceſſarily employed in erecting Batteries in Places very difficult of Acceſs, particularly a Battery near the *Light-Houſe*: Yet, notwithſtanding all theſe Drains and weakening Reductions of the Troops, it was reſolved to have made a general Attack, both by Sea and Land; and all neceſſary Preparations for executing this Reſolution were made: When, on the 16th of *June*, the Enemy, finding the *New England* Troops determined to conquer, or die, and perceiving the many Advantages they had already gained, ſent out a Flag of Truce, deſiring Time to conſider upon Articles of Capitulation. Time was granted till the next Morning, and Articles were agreed, Hoſtages exchanged, and on the 17th of *June* the City and Fortreſſes were ſurrendered; which was juſt forty-eight Days

Days from the firſt landing of Troops on the Iſland of *Cape Breton.* CHAP. VI.

IT is ſcarce to be credited, that in all theſe difficult, hazardous, and deſperate Labours, Fatigues, Attacks, Skirmiſhes, *&c.* the *New England* Troops loſt no more than about an hundred of their Men; whilſt the Enemy, who fought a great deal more to Advantage, being frequently under Cover, all ways leſs expoſed, loſt about three hundred Men.

THE Journal printed at *Exeter* is exact, as to the Days and Times of every particular Circumſtance, during the Siege; and (to give it the greater Weight) is ſigned by the General, one Brigadier, one Colonel, and two Lieutenant-Colonels; all which were preſent on this Occaſion: The Truth therefore of the Relation cannot, I think, be called in queſtion, as far as it goes. But ſome Particulars are (as I have ſaid above) omitted; which, without derogating from any other Perſon's Merit, may, I hope, be mentioned here, in Juſtice to the Conduct and Behaviour of a Perſon hitherto unknown to, conſequently not taken

CHAP. VI. taken Notice of by the Publick: I mean Mr. *William Vaughan*, a Gentleman of *Damariſcotta*, in the Province of the *Maſſachuſets Bay*, *New England*; with whom, I am perſuaded, neither the Governors, nor any other Perſon will diſpute the Honour of having revived, at leaſt, if not of being the original Mover and Projector of this grand and ſucceſsful Enterprize. I think, I am not wrong in aſſerting, that this Gentleman was one of the firſt Movers of it to *William Shirley*, Eſq; Governor of the Chief Province of *New England*, viz. that of *Maſſachuſets*. But, if he was not the original Mover of the Scheme, I can with great Aſſurance affirm, that through his indefatigable Zeal and Labour in the Cauſe, and by the Intelligence he gave the Government of *New England*, that the *French* were defenceleſs at *Cape Breton*; that the People of *New England* were diſpoſed to undertake any thing for the Good and Honour of *the Crown of England*; and by verifying theſe Aſſertions, by Memorials and Teſtimonials, ſigned by People of the greateſt Rank and beſt Repute in thoſe Provinces: He, I ſay, by theſe Means revived a Project, which the

General Assembly had absolutely rejected as hazardous and impracticable: And, when he had brought it through the Two Houses there, omitted nothing that might in any Shape conduce to the providing of Men, Money, or any other Thing necessary for carrying the Scheme into Execution. CHAP. VI.

MR. VAUGHAN was the Man who conducted the first Column of the *New England* Troops, at their first landing, through the Woods, to within a Mile of the City, and to a fair View of it. He would have persuaded the Officers and Men to have marched up directly to a Place where they would have been covered by a Rising-gound, and not have been above two hundred Yards from the Town: But whilst this Proposal was debating, the Enemy, perceiving the approach of our Troops, set fire to about forty Houses and Magazines; which might not only have been saved, but have formed a Lodgement for our Men; for some time, at least.

THIS Gentleman was the Person who proposed to General *Pepperel* the sending

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of four hundred Men to the North-eaſt of the Harbour, to ſeize the Enemy's Houſes and Stores, at about a Mile's diſtance from the *Grand Battery*. He not only propoſed this Expedient, but offered himſelf to conduct that Party. The Propoſal was accepted, and the Buſineſs effected according to the Scheme laid. *Vide Journal, p.* 12. *May* 2*d.*

THIS Gentleman was the Perſon that took Poſſeſſion of the Enemy's *Grand Battery*, deſerted (as is ſuppoſed) by them, on the Surprize they were in at ſeeing the neighbouring Houſes and Stores ſet on fire by the Troops.

HE it was who headed that ſmall Party, which beat off ſeven large Boats full of Men, ſent from the Town to retake that *Battery*. And he effected this brave, though dangerous Undertaking, notwithſtanding that the Cannon of the Town, within point-blank-ſhot, fired continually upon him and his Party, which conſiſted only of eleven or twelve Men; though in the Journal fifteen or ſixteen are mentioned; but

but he had left four Men in the Battery. *Vide Journal ibidem, May 3d.* CHAP. VI.

THIS Gentleman was assisting in every Duty of Fatigue, or Honour, during the whole Siege. And that he might be the more at liberty to animate the Men by his personal Appearance, and manual Assistance and Encouragement, wherever the Cause might require it, he refused to accept of any Military Honours or Preferment which was offered him; and only answered, That if the Undertaking was attended with Success, he did not doubt of being honourably considered.

THAT Mr. *Vaughan* therefore first set the Expedition on foot; nay, that he revived it, when absolutely rejected by the General Assembly: That he behaved with all the Gallantry and Bravery, as well as Zeal for the Service, whilst it was going on, that could be expected from a Person in a much higher Rank; are Facts, which stand in need of no Proof, at least, not with me, who have seen the original Letters written to him, and the Certificates

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given him by the Governors, General, and others, concerned in this Expedition. Mr. *Vaughan* has too much Modeſty to give them to the Publick; but many of his Friends, beſides myſelf, have ſeen them. And as he does not doubt of a Reward equal to his Merits and Services on this Occaſion, he chuſes rather *that* Pleaſure and Satisfaction, which ariſe from a ſecret Conſciouſneſs of having done his Duty, than to ſeem to court publick Applauſe. And it was with the greateſt Difficulty he was prevailed on, to ſuffer thus much of the Truth to appear in his Favour.

I HAVE already told the Reader, that I had prepared the beſt Journal I could pick up, of all the moſt material Tranſactions which paſſed during this memorable Siege: But, having ſeen the Journal printed at *Exeter*, I found myſelf obliged to expunge what I had collected on that Subject; which might have been, on many Occaſions, more circumſtantial, and, in the main, pretty exact; but would have wanted the Advantage of being ſub-

ſcribed by the General, and other Officers preſent on the Occaſion. This Accident is the Cauſe of a kind of Chaſm in this Narrative; which the Publick will, I dare ſay, rather bear with Pleaſure, than be troubled with a Repetition of what appears ſo well juſtified.

I SHALL now proceed, in the laſt Place, to give ſome Account of *New England*, in Regard to its Power and Strength; which, probably, many People here have miſtaken Notions of.

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A True State of New England, *in regard to its Power and Riches, as well as Affection to the* preſent happy Eſtabliſhment in Church and State.

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TO recount all the Advantages, which the Poſſeſſion of *Cape Breton* may bring (in proceſs of time, and with due Encouragement) to the *Crown of Great Britain*, would require more Space than the Nature of this Narrative would admit of. But it appears from ſeveral Judicious Tracts lately publiſhed, that the *French* have for ſeveral Years paſt not only enlarged *their* Trade, and outdone *us* in every Branch of it; but have alſo incroached upon *Our's*, either through Skill, Application, or Management. It is therefore high time that we ſeriouſly enquire into what are the real Cauſes

The French have encroached upon our Trade.

Cauſes of the Decay of Trade *on our Side*; and what has contributed ſo much to the vaſt Increaſe of *their's*. CHAP. VII.

A LATE Pamphlet entitled, *The Preſent State of the Britiſh and French Trade to Africa and America conſidered*; And a Letter printed in the *Tradeſman*'s *Journal*; have compared the Condition of the two Nations in regard to Trade; and have ſet that Matter in a ſtrong and important Light.

AFTER what has been ſaid there; it can never, ſurely, be a Matter of Indifference to the Nation in general, or the Legiſlature in particular, whether the *French* or *We* are to *thrive* or be *undone*. And I take it to be a Matter of no leſs Concern, to have our Eyes open at this Critical Juncture.

WE have it now in our Power not only to prevent the Abuſe they have made of Priviledges formerly granted them: but even to reſtrain at leaſt, if not entirely cut off ſome of the moſt valuable Branches of *their* Trade. It is but very lately

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The War with France a lucky Incident.

lately that this Nation in general is convinced, that the *French* had any Trade worth mentioning: And, in this Reſpect, the War has been the luckieſt Incident that could have befallen us, to undeceive the moſt quick ſighted amongſt us. Had not ſo many of their Ships been taken with rich Cargoes; and ſome of them laden with Manufactures which we never ſuſpected them capable of; We ſhould probably have continued our Courſe in a thick Cloud of Inattention and Security; 'till we had run upon the Rocks, without perceiving our Danger. We may now perhaps; it is pretty evident we ought to enquire into the Meaſures and Means whereby they have brought Traffick of all kinds from a very languiſhing, to a moſt flouriſhing Condition. It is no Reproach to learn, even from our Enemies, whatever may conduce to our Safety, or Aggrandizement. Nay, our Trade will be abſolutely loſt, and, with it, all our Power and Weight, if we do not ſpeedily ſet about the Work. The Poſſeſſion of *Cape Breton* furniſhes us with the moſt Natural; with the only Means of effectually depreſſing the *French* in their Commerce.

merce. And, if we add to this moſt for- CHAP. tunate Circumſtance, our Endeavours and Reſolutions to encourage in all Shapes our own Colonies, their Product, our Manufactures, and Induſtry of every kind, to the utmoſt of our Power; it may not yet be too late, to recover what we had almoſt imperceptibly loſt. VII.

THE *French*, the more effectually to extend and carry on their Trade, erected a Council of Commerce in the Year 1700, conſiſting of ſome of the Principal Officers of State; and twelve of the Principal Merchants, or Perſons who have been a long time engaged in Buſineſs. Two of theſe were of *Paris*; the other Ten deputed by the Chief Trading Towns of *France*. How far ſuch an Eſtabliſhment may be expedient, or even practicable under our Form of Government, I will not take upon me to determine. But if this cannot be done, ſurely ſomething elſe may, to ſecure us againſt the Arts, Skill, Application, and Induſtry of our aſpiring Neighbours. Let any One, who has the leaſt Concern for the Welfare of his Country, but run over the above mention- *The French erect a Council of Commerce.*

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ed Pamphlet; and I am much miſtaken if he is not ſufficiently alarmed, at ſeeing how near the Brink of the Precipice we were arrived. In the Courſe of about thirty five Years the *French* have converted the the Iſland of *Cape Breton* from a Deſart into a fruitful, comfortable Settlement. Within the Bounds of the late *French* Governor's Commiſſion were, beſides the Iſland of *Cape Breton*, ſeveral others in the Gulph of *St. Laurence*. On the Iſland of *Cape Breton*, they had twelve Settlements, *viz.* Four on the South Side, and Eight on the Eaſt. They have built many Fiſh Rooms and Stages for the Uſe of the Fiſhery; and ſeveral Houſes and Barns, *&c.* They laid out incredible Sums on theſe Improvements; and the Fortifications of *Lewiſburg* have exceeded all Imagination in Expence, ſince that Iſland has been in the Poſſeſſion of the *French*. I have been told, and from good Authority, that thoſe two Articles, in the Courſe of thirty five Years, cannot have coſt them far ſhort of three Millions Sterling. But this I do not take upon me to vouch; only would from hence draw this Inference, *viz.* that the *French* thought it well

French Improvements of the Iſland of Cape Breton.

The immenſe Sums it hath coſt them.

well worth their while to beſtow immenſe Sums upon the Improvement and Security of theſe Iſlands, *merely on Account of their Trade.* It muſt therefore be well worth our while to preſerve ſo valuable an Acquiſition, which has not coſt us the 150th part of the Money; and has every thing done at it, which may facilitate its Preſervation: An Acquiſition, which at the ſame time, that it curbs and annoys *their* Trade, contributes ſo vaſtly to the Encreaſe and Security of *Our Own:* An Acquiſition which in the Opinion of a very good Judge, exceeds every thing that was ever gained to, or by, the Crown of *England* for many Generations.

THE Situation of *Cape Breton* in general, and of *Lewiſburg* in particular, is ſuch, as makes it the moſt commodious Place that could be found for the Security of Trade from the *Weſt Indies*, and *North America.* The Diſtance from thence to *Newfoundland* is but one Day's Sail. To the *Streights* of *Belliſle*, on the North of *Newfoundland*, about four Days Sail: From thence, to *Hudſon's Streights*, about Six Days Sail. From *Lewiſburg*

Diſtances of Cape Breton from moſt of the Engliſh Colonies, &c.

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to *Canſo*, half a Day's Sail. To the back Side of *Nova Scotia* through the Gut of *Canſo* to *Cape Vert*, two Days Sail. To *Boſton* in *New England*, and to *Annapolis Royal* in *Nova Scotia*, four Days Sail. To *Bermudas* (near which Iſland, all the Trade from the *Weſt Indies* returns to *Europe*) about ſeven Days Sail. And from *Lewiſburg* to *Quebec*, the Capital of the *French* Settlements on the River *St. Laurence*, it is about ſeven Days Sail. And by reaſon of the *Gulph Stream* ſetting to the North-eaſt, every Ship from the Sugar Iſlands, and all other Parts of the *Weſt Indies*, are neceſſarily obliged to approach very near this Iſland, in their Return to *Europe*.

THIS Iſland is therefore a kind of Center-point to all the reſt, as well *Engliſh* as *French* Settlements. And as it is a Place of Strength, and lies amidſt the fiſhing Countries; as it may be a Mart or Staple for all Commodities paſſing between *England* and its Colonies in *America*; laſtly as it lies moſt conveniently for protecting all our Trade, and annoying that of the Enemy; no Care or Expence

pence can be thought too great for the Preſervation of it; nor any Equivalent ſufficient for the Loſs of it. CHAP. VII.

IT ſeems to be a prevailing Notion among many of different Ranks in *Great Britain*, that the Province of *New England* is in a very flouriſhing Condition; and that it might by Encouragement, become ſo powerful, as to excite ſome Jealouſies at leaſt, if not Apprehenſions of its aſſuming, one Day or other, an Independency very prejudicial to theſe Realms. But when the true State of that Caſe comes to be duly weighed and conſidered, it will be found that it is neither in their Inclination, nor in their Power to ſhake off their Subjection, and Obedience to the Crown of *Great Britain*. It is not agreeable to their Inclination, as Proteſtants, and Subjects more zealouſly affected to their National Church, as well as to the preſent Royal Family, than perhaps any others under His Majeſty's moſt Gracious and Mild Government. It is not in their Power; for whatever Pretence there may be for a contrary Opinion, they are certainly not in a Condition to raiſe Rebellions, *General State of New England.*

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lions, and ſupport an Independency; as will ſufficiently be demonſtrated in the Sequel of this Fact. But if they actually were, who muſt they give themſelves to? They could not long ſubſiſt, without the Protection of ſome Power more potent than themſelves. That Power muſt be a neighbouring one, or he could not ſupport and protect them: That Neighbour muſt be the *French*; for they have none other. And can it be ſuppoſed that a People ſo utterly deteſting Popery, Slavery and Arbitrary Power, would ſubject themſelves to a Government, under which they can expect, and are ſenſible, would find nothing but the Loſs of their Religion, Liberty, and Property? It may perhaps be ſaid, that the *French* are more attentive to the general Proſperity of their Colonies, than the *Engliſh* are; and this may prove an Inducement. But whoever ſays it, reproaches us moſt ſeverely for our Want of Attention, and Regard to ſo material a Branch of our Wealth and Power. This Aſſertion ought to excite in us a ſteady and firm Reſolution to encourage and promote the Welfare of theſe *American Colonies*, to the utmoſt

utmoſt of our Power; not only becauſe our Neighbours and Rivals do it, but becauſe it is abſolutely neceſſary for the Support of our Commerce, and to enable us once more to equal at leaſt, if not to ſurpaſs thoſe, who are diligent and expert in all the Arts of undermining and excelling us. CHAP. VII.

BUT really, and in Fact, the People of *New England* are far from being in a Condition to affect an Independency. They have impoveriſhed themſelves to a great Degree, in the Support of their Liberties and Poſſeſſions againſt the common Enemy; and have chearfully engaged in every Scheme or Expedition for enlarging the Power and Dominion of the Crown of *Great Britain*; but have never once made the leaſt Attempt towards throwing off their Subjection to it. To ſet this Matter in a clearer Light, we ſhall take it a good deal higher than the preſent times, and ſhew that the People of *New England* have been almoſt conſtantly expoſed to great Difficulties, and put to continual large Expences in the Defence of their Country, and in the Aſ-

ſiſtance

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sistance they have given the Crown of *Great Britain*, whenever the Circumstances of the Times required their Concurrence.

First Settlement in New England.

THE first Settlement that took Place in *New England* was begun at *New Plymouth* in 1620. And (as it is easy to imagine) they underwent great Hardships and Difficulties, before they could bring their Affairs into a tolerable Condition. They sustained many Wars with the *Savages*, and lost a great Number of their People, in endeavouring to fix themselves in a convenient and comfortable manner. But in 1675. an *Indian King* of great Credit amongst the *Savages*; and no less famed for his Cruelty and Subtlety, than for his Courage and Conduct, drew all the Neighbouring Nations into an Alliance with him; built a strong Fortress; and determined a War against the *English*, who had now been about fifty Years in Possession of that Part of the Country. This naturally gave the Alarm to the New Settlers, who thereupon mustered all their Strength, and selecting a Body of their bravest Men, resolved to

War between the first Setlers there and the Indians.

prevent this powerful Enemy. They marched accordingly through deep Snows, exceſſive Cold, and numberleſs Difficulties to the *Indian*'s Fortreſs; attacked him there with great Bravery, and had the good Fortune to deſtroy the King himſelf, and many of his People, though Numbers of them eſcaped. This could not be done, without a very conſiderable loſs on the Side of the Aſſailants; but they comforted themſelves with the pleaſing Proſpect of Liberty and Eaſe for the future. They were however deceived: For ſuch as had eſcaped, ſoon ſpread themſelves through the different Tribes of the *Savages* bordering upon their Settlements, and with the Aſſiſtance of the Jeſuits, privately entered into a general Confederacy to wage War againſt the *Engliſh*. This War in 1676. broke out at an appointed time, in different Places: And they carried Murder and Deſtruction along with them wherever they went. Multitudes of the *Engliſh*, as well as their Plantations, Settlements, and Stocks of Cattle were, on this Occaſion, utterly deſtroyed. None eſcaped but ſuch as had the good Fortune to be near the Sea,

Second War, &c.

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and by that means, fled to *New York*, *New Jersey*, *Pensilvania*, *Maryland*, *Virginia*, *Carolina*, and the *Sugar Islands*: In which different Places there are thousands of the Posterity of these ruined Families, at this Day.

FROM that time, to the present, the hardy brave Remains of this People have been struggling under Difficulties; opposing the *French* in *Canada*, and *Nova Scotia*; sustaining Wars with the *Savages*, who are now entirely in the *French* Interests; and endeavouring to put their Country into the same good Posture and Condition it was in near seventy Years ago. They had no sooner begun to think themselves in quiet Possession of their Settlements; but a fresh Irruption of *French* or *Savages*, or both together, poured in upon them, and in a few Days destroyed the Fruits of several Years Labour.

New England maintains many Garrisons for the Defence of its Frontiers.

THUS have these People been under a constant Course of Calamities and Devastation; and thereby put to great and incessant Expence in guarding a Frontier of

of near two hundred Miles Extent, beſides being obliged to defend their Coaſts in time of War. They are under a Neceſſity therefore of keeping many Garriſons of Soldiers all along their Frontiers: And the ſingle Province of the *Maſſachuſet's Bay* now actually maintains ſeven of theſe Capital Garriſons. They are alſo obliged to keep Parties or ſmall Armies on Foot, as Scouts in time of War, or when Danger is apprehended. This Province is alſo at a large Expence in ſupporting a Number of Men, to guard and protect thoſe employed in the Maſt-Trade for the Service of the Crown. They are likewiſe forced to maintain a Number of armed Veſſels to defend their Coaſts and protect the Intercourſe (by Sea) between them and their Neighbours.

BESIDES all theſe Difficulties at home, they have been engaged in many very expenſive and hazardous Expeditions, for the Honour and Advantage of the Crown of *Great Britain*.

THE Expedition to *Canada*, in 1690, though a fruitleſs one, proved ſo expenſive *The Neceſſity of iſſuing Paper Bills.*

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five to the People of *New England*, that they were then obliged to iſſue *Paper Bills*, in lieu of Money, on the Faith of the Government for Payment of the ſame. This firſt introduced that fatal Practice; and by perſiſting in that Method upon any great Emergency ever ſince, they are in a fair Way of being utterly ruined, unleſs timely ſupported by the Government of *England*.

The ſeveral Expeditions in which the People of New England joined.

THESE People carried on two Expeditions at their own Expence, againſt the *French* in *Nova Scotia*, before it was conquered by General *Nicholſon*: In one of which they conquered the Country. In the Reign of *Queen Anne*, they again joined her Armaments againſt *Canada*; but as the Fleet did not leave *England* till the 8th of *May*, nor arrive in the River of St. *Laurence* till the 23d of *Auguſt*; through theſe and other Pieces of Miſmanagement, eight of the Ships were loſt in the Gulph of *St. Laurence*, and the whole Expedition failed.

THE People of *New England* alſo joined General *Nicholſon* in the Reduction of *Nova Scotia*. And depending upon

that Country's being guarded and defended by the Queen's Troops, they were in hopes that their Colony would be eaſed of the Burden of furniſhing Garriſons for the Defence of *New England*, on that Side, at leaſt. But, inſtead of that, the only Garriſon in *Nova Scotia*, is at *Annapolis Royal*; and that ſcarce able to defend itſelf, much leſs in any Condition to lend Aſſiſtance to its Neighbours.

BY theſe Means therefore, and for want of an Opportunity of redeeming their Credit, ſo often, and ſo deeply engaged by the frequent iſſuing of this *Paper Money*, they became largely indebted to the Publick. Yet, notwithſtanding all that has been ſaid, when a Scheme was ſet on foot for the Reduction of *Cape Breton*, they, with their uſual Chearfulneſs and Alacrity for promoting the Honour and Intereſts of the Crown, immediately entered into the Scheme; and, in order to put it in Practice, had Recourſe to their old Method of iſſuing an additional Number of Bills, without which the Project had been altogether impracticable. The Expence, indeed, of this

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this Expedition was far beyond what this and the adjoining Provinces were able to bear, without being utterly ruined, even in caſe of Succeſs. But they confidently relied on His Majeſty and the *Engliſh* Nation for a Reimburſement; and they will, no doubt, be amply indemnified for all their Expences, Fatigues, and Dangers. Theſe Bills are now, as I am told, ſo much depretiated in Value, that they bear a Diſcount or Loſs of 200 *per Cent.* and, unleſs the Government of *England* finds ſome Expedient for redeeming, or calling them in, theſe Provinces muſt be entirely ruined *for their Zeal*; and all Commerce between them and *Great Britain* will ceaſe of courſe.

The great Diſcount of the Paper Money.

THEY formerly ſent all their Gold and Silver to *England* for ſuch Goods as they wanted from thence; and made uſe of the above-mentioned Paper-Credit, for all Buſineſs and Tranſactions amongſt themſelves. But now, that the Currency is quite exhauſted, and there is no real Money left amongſt them, they cannot any longer pay for ſuch Goods as they want; but, inſtead of taking them from *England*,

England, must be driven to the Necessity of making themselves Cloaths of Skins, and such Things as their Country affords; which must occasion a great Decrease in the Demand and Consumption of our Woollen and other Manufactures. How far this Nation will find its Account in this Alteration of Affairs, let others determine: But if no other Consideration were of Weight sufficient to plead for them, surely that of their having on all Occasions assisted us with their Persons and Money; their having *on this particular Occasion* struck so noble a Stroke for the Advantage of these Realms; and their having involved themselves in so many and great Difficulties for our sakes, are sufficient Inducements for protecting, rewarding and saving so generous, so faithful, and so brave a People.

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The Necessity of indemnifying this People for their Expences.

IT is easy to foresee, that if the Inhabitants have not Money to purchase the Goods they want, in a cold Climate, the Merchant will not let them have his Goods for nothing, or for Paper, which is worth nothing. How are they then to be cloathed? Why, they will naturally run into the Manufacturing of Linnen, and

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and what Wool they have; and ſo cover themſelves with theſe, with Leather and Furs, inſtead of taking off our Woollen Goods.

IF the *Engliſh* Nation ſhould judge it proper (and it is not doubted but it will) to pay off the Expence of this Expedition in Money, this will introduce a Currency amongſt them, which will make the calling in and burning of their Bills, or a great Number of them, practicable. Then, for the future, let it be enacted, or otherwiſe provided, that all the *Engliſh Colonies* or Settlements in *North America* do bear a proportionable Expence of all Expeditions in Favour of the Crown; and that the whole Burden be not left, as it has been, upon that of *New England*, to its utter Ruin and Deſtruction.

A Method propoſed for calling in their Paper Money.

I AM told, that in Mr. *Aſhley*'s Treatiſe on Trade, there is an infallible Method for reſtoring the Currency of Money into *New England*; but I have not that Book by me; and, if I had, it would be too troubleſome to the Reader to inſert it here. I refer him therefore to it; and ſhall only add, that if ſome Expedient be not

not thought of, and ſpeedily put in Execution, this Province cannot long ſubſiſt; and that the Diſadvantage to Trade in general, as well as the Diſcouragement to all Undertakings of this Nature in particular, will be ſo great, that it is no great Preſumption to aſſert the Loſs in both Caſes to be abſolutely irretrievable. CHAP. VII.

THE Caſe therefore is widely different from the Notion which has in ſome Places prevailed: And *New England* is not, and I am ſorry it is not, the powerful, flouriſhing Colony it has been repreſented to be; but on the contrary, the Country is very poor, largely in debt, has no Currency or real Value in it, and, unleſs ſpeedily relieved from hence, has no future Proſpect, but that of utter and irrecoverable Ruin.

IT is not diſpoſed to throw off its Dependency on the Crown of *England*; but may, with Juſtice, vie with *England* itſelf for Demonſtrations of Loyalty, Zeal, and Affection to His preſent Majeſty, the Proteſtant Cauſe, and *Engliſh* Liberty.

THIS Narrative (which is already much longer than I intended it ſhould be) would

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have ended here, if a Letter from a Gentleman in *New England* to his Friend in *London*, had not been juſt now put into my Hands. It contains ſome Arguments, and a Method of Reaſoning, which I confeſs I dare not make myſelf a Judge of; but, at the Requeſt of ſome Friends, have inſerted ſuch Parts of it, as in general relate to my Subject.

Letter from a Gentleman in New England to his Friend in London.

" IT were to be wiſhed, that a *Civil* " *Government* was eſtabliſhed at *Cape Bre-* " *ton*, and the Iſland irrevocably annexed " to the Crown of *Great Britain*, as well " as *Canſo* well fortified. They would " thus become not only a Nurſery for " twenty Thouſand Seamen a Year; but " would command all the Fiſhery of " *North America*, and conſequently the " Treaſure of *France* and *Spain*; by " which Means the King of *Great Britain* " would ſoon become the Greateſt Prince " in *Europe*, and His People have the " moſt extenſive and enriching Trade.

" IT is now, I think, in the Power " of the King and Parliament to make a " Chain of Towns from *Lewisburg* to " *Canſo*; from thence to *Annapolis Royal*; " and

" and so on, to *Casco :* which would be " perfected in less than a Century. Oh ! " that they could but comprehend without seeing, what we on the Spot see with " our Eyes, *viz.* the vast Encrease of Fifty " poor Families on their Arrival in *New* " *England*; which are now multiplied into " an incredible Number of Inhabitants, " and dispersed into a proportionate Number of Regular Towns : And all this " in about an Hundred and Twenty " Years. From *New York* to *South Caro-* " *lina* there is still a greater Encrease of " People, Trade, and Towns ; to the " amazing Enlargement of the *British* " *Dominions.*

" I HEARTILY wish a due Consideration may be had of the Case of those " worthy Men, both Officers and Soldiers, " who left their Families, Farms, Ease, " Plenty, and Peace at Home, to expose " themselves to all their Contraries, in the " Service of their King and Country. " Should they be detained there as a Garrison of Common Soldiers, and have " Officers put over them, I fear they " may, in their Grief, Shame, and Rage,

" become

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" become as desperate as they were in " their Toils, Courage and Assaults of the " Enemy, who said, *They were Devils in* " *Human Shape.*

" I AM glad to see the Just Sense the " Ministry and Kingdom seem to have " of the Reduction of *Cape Breton* to " the Dominion of *England.* And we " read, with Pleasure, the Intimation " which the *Lord Mayor* and *City of* " *London* make in their Address to His " Majesty, of their Hope, that it may " never be given back to the *French.* " *The Mines of* Peru *are no Price for it.*

Conclusion. THIS Letter, and the foregoing Narrative, sufficiently evince the general Notion of the *Importance and Advantages of* Cape Breton *to the* English *Nation :* And, it is to be hoped, that no Power, no Arts of *French Politicians*, nor any *plausible Proposal of Equivalents*, will ever be able to wrest it out of the Hands of a People, who have so gloriously recovered the rightful Possession thereof.

F I N I S.


Laurence
Road
Ild St Paul
North Cape
47
Daſpè Harbour

A MAP of NORTH AMERICA as far as relates to the English Settlements, taken from the Sieur BELLIN 1746
HUDSON'S BAY
HUDSON'S STREIGTS
LABRADOR or NEW BRITAIN
Str. of Belt Isle
Anticost
Gulf of St Laurence
New Found land
The Great Bank
St John
Cape Breton I.
B. of Placentia
CANADA OR NEW FRANCE
River of St Laurence
ACADIA
New Scotland
New England
Canso
I. Sable
B. de Chibouctou
Port de la Heve
C. Sable
Ontario Lake
New York
Pensil vania
Long Island
New Jersey
Maryland
Chesapeak Bay
Virginia
WESTERN OCEAN
Mississippi River
LOUISIANA
Carolina
Georgia
FLORIDA
LUCAYOS ISLANDS
GULF OF MEXICO
NEW SPAIN
Tropick of Cancer
Guardaloup
Dominico
Martinico
Barbadoes
Sta Lucia
Grenada I.
Trinity I.
TERRA FIRMA
A Scale of 20 Leagues to a Degree.
20 40 60 80 100 200 300 400
West Longitude from Paris.

MAP
of the ISLAND of
CAPE BRETON
as laid down by
the Sieur BELLIN
1746.
SCALE
of 20 Leagues at 2853 Fathoms to a League.
5
10
15
20
CAPE BRETON
PART of ACADIA
Isld St Paul
Cape St Laurence
St Laurence Road
Lambach
North Cape
Daspe Harbour
Salmon River
Quak River
Manatopchick R.
Sea Pike Islands
Niganiche Isld
Niganiche Bay
Malabouach R.
Port Dauphin
Large Entrance of Labrador
St Anne
Small Entrance of Labrador
Small Lake
Verderone Isld
Coal Road
Spanish Bay
Wastcoat Islands
Round I.
Flat Island
Scatari Isld
Tramblade Isld
LABRADOR
call'd by ye Savages
Bideauboch
Lake of Miray
Portenove
LEWISBOURG
Gabarose Bay
Isld à Guyon
Forked Harbour
Heron Islands
Rigaud Harbour
Isld St Esprit
Michaux Islands
St Peter's Isld
Port Toulouse
Red Head
Green Isld
Iron Head
Port St Mary
Red Head
La Boulaye Road
Passage of Fronsac
Milford Haven
Fox Island
Salmon River
Great Isld of Canso
The Admiral
Gut of Canso
Port of Canso
Cape Canso
47
46
63
62
61
Scale sculp.

THINGS

AS THEY

ARE.

Quæ Tempora! Quæ Potentiæ ludibria!

ERYC. PUTEAN.

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E. E. K.
5/10/32

THINGS as they ARE.

THE Spirit of the Public, and eſpecially of a Britiſh Public, has been always ſo favorable to thoſe who venture to lay before it their ſentiments on the ſtate of its affairs, as might alone be a ſufficient inducement, even without taking into the account the honor itſelf of the taſk.

Truth, or but the aim at truth, unadulterated with ſelfiſhneſs, partiality, or factious views, of which that Public has too piercing a diſcernment, for mere pretence to eſcape, is ſure to find not only approbation but even protection from it. Nor is this its diſpoſition, entirely undeſerved. Flattery itſelf cannot, with all its art, aſſume a more delicate ſhape than that of the repreſentation of truths foreknown not to be agreeable to thoſe to whom they are repreſented, and yet for all that offered or even obtruded upon them. This ſuppoſes in them not only the rare juſtice of a candid acceptance, but the yet rarer good ſenſe of profiting by truth, when made

appear to them, even though themſelves had not been the firſt to diſcover it, through thoſe clouds of paſſions or of artful deſign, which ſo often obſcure it.

Even where ſuch repreſentations fail of immediate conviction, they cannot be entirely without a good effect, if they no more than raiſe a ſalutary doubt. He who never doubts, never examines. At leaſt they can offend none but the paſſive ſlaves of prejudice, who prefer the implicitneſs of credulity or ignorance to the active reſearch of their own reaſon; and would rather continue ruinouſly miſtaken, than be unpleaſingly undeceived. To underſtandings of this ſtamp, Truth would, in vain and even dangerouſly, hold out her torch, ſure, for her reward, to have it daſhed in her face. It is not for ſuch as theſe, that either reaſon or experience were made. The opinion of millions of them, cannot outweigh even but the hope of pleaſing or enlightening one man of ſenſe and, in courſe, of candor. And ſure no time ever called more powerfully for a fair and juſt diſquiſition into things than the preſent one, when the moſt pernicious falſities are careſſed

careſſed as friends, and the moſt wholeſome truths voted enemies to this country, of which whatever may be its inclination, its intereſt it can never be to remain ignorant or even in doubt. Public miſtakes are always public misfortunes, and like misfortunes too rarely come alone; error follows upon error, *ut unda ſupervenit undam.* But the danger is ſtill greater, and the leſs apt to be diſcerned or retrieved, when ſuch miſtakes are built upon the moſt laudable and moſt virtuous of all foundations, the love of country; and are more-over induſtriouſly fomented by ſuch men of Power as are eſteemed its friends. Some of them are perhaps ſincerely ſo, and deſerve therefore no reproach, but that of incapacity or want of penetration. Such too are admirable tools to thoſe who knowing better, have views diſtinct from that of the national intereſt, and draw much better ſervice from them, than if theſe their co-operators were in the ſecret of what they the more ſucceſsfully employ themſelves in perſuading others, from themſelves being perſuaded.

The following ſheets then are not impudently meant to ſet up a private opinion

in oppoſition to the public authority of thoſe great and wiſe ſtateſmen, at preſent ſo happily and ſo glorioufly in charge with the conduct of the Britiſh ſyſtem, if any ſuch ſyſtem there exiſts; but purely to ſtate matters of fact, ſo as to put every one into a way of exerciſing his own judgment upon them, with a requeſt to every reader, which ſurely will not appear a very immodeſt one, of his not preferring any man's reaſon to his own, nor any prejudices he may have imbibed, to his own convictions of truth.

But as it is abſolutely neceſſary to the aſcertainment of things as they are, to know what they have been; a ſummary recapitulation of precedent tranſactions will not improperly, nor, is it to be hoped, tedioufly clear the way.

Nothing is more ſuſceptible of the moſt evident demonſtration than that Britain was in her own moſt juſt defence forced into the preſent war with France. Stabbed at in her vitals in America, ſhe was either obliged to acquieſce ſupinely in the French manifold invaſions there, or to put a ſtop to them, by repelling the aggreſſion with a com-

a commencement of hoſtilities. An immediate declaration of war would perhaps have been more conſonant to the eſtabliſhed forms of practice; but ſince the French themſelves had not paid any reſpect to them in their own procedure, they could at leaſt with the worſe grace complain of our having followed the bad example they had ſet us, and which was not the leſs real for its being the leſs manifeſt to the reſt of Europe, from the remoteneſs and obſcurity of the parts where they inconteſtably began their aggreſſion.

In this imminent and actual ſtate of war, it was but natural for our court to look out for allies, and to look out for them eſpecially amongſt thoſe powers the moſt united to us by the ties of mutual intereſt or good offices. At the head of theſe, doubtleſs appeared to ſtand, the queen of Hungary, naturally the enemy to France, and in courſe, a friend to Britain. Unhappily her poſition was too critical with reſpect both to France and to Pruſſia, for her to declare for us. Nay, her direct declaration in our favor at that time, muſt have been not only pregnant with the utmoſt danger to herſelf,

herſelf, but have been the very worſt office ſhe could do us. It was even highly impolitic to deſire it: the reaſon is obvious. No one can doubt, but from the inſtant of ſuch a declaration, France would have eaſily engaged Pruſſia to join with her, which would have produced a more formidable union, than even that of Auſtria with France, of which we ſo bitterly complain; with what reaſon will ſoon be ſeen. It was ſaid beſides, that on our firſt overture, ſhe had acquired too exorbitant a conſideration for her joining with us. This is far from improbable: the houſe of Auſtria was never celebrated for its moderation towards us on that head.

Our court however ſenſible of the delicacy of the queen of Hungary's ſituation, reſpectively to Pruſſia, was, or ſeemed ſatisfied with her excuſe. It proceeded next to negotiate the march of a Ruſſian army into Germany. The propoſal was no ſooner made to Ruſſia, than eagerly accepted. Nothing could more co-incide with her actual views. That court had not only for a fixt object, the getting a footing in the empire, but the Czarina herſelf had entertained

tertained a perſonal animoſity againſt the king of Pruſſia. She was then to be enabled and paid with our own money, for doing the very thing on which her heart was moſt ſet. This march was concerted to anſwer two intentions; that of covering Hanover from the threatned invaſion of the French, and of taking away, or at leaſt of leſſening the queen of Hungary's apprehenſions from the king of Pruſſia, who might be ſaid to be encamped on her frontiers with a formidable army ready for action. Encamped is no improper term here, ſince his dominions were all over one incampment, of which his own court of Potſdam, was the general quarters.

This Prince however, with his uſual penetration, ſoon got notice of the treaty, and of the terms of it; which plainly ſhewed its being levelled againſt himſelf. If it may be ſaid of him that he dreaded any power, it was that of Ruſſia. He knew how ill he ſtood at that court, he knew its views upon Germany, or rather upon thoſe of his dominions that lay the moſt convenient for its invaſion. He knew that its ſtanding maxim is to TAKE and HOLD.

Alarmed

Alarmed then, he could think of no better expedient for defeating the Ruſſian intentions, than offering his alliance to his Britannic Majeſty, the principal condition of which was to keep out all foreign troops from entering the empire, in which the French were principally meant, though out of remains of tenderneſs to them, not ſpecifically named.

There exiſted two preponderant reaſons for accepting this offer, built on two very powerful motives with mankind, hope and fear. Hope, that lying ſo much nearer and more convenient for covering Hanover, with ſo great a ſtrength as he commanded, that that great and capital point would be better provided for, than by the alliance with Ruſſia: Fear, that on a rejection of his propoſal, Hanover might ſuffer from him, as he was very capable of ſerving it in the ſame manner, as he has done Saxony ſince. Power he undoubtedly had, and no-one can think, that he would have wanted pretences.

Our court came accordingly into his propoſals. This implicitly annulled the material part to Ruſſia of the treaty ſo recently made with it. The Czarina could not but think herſelf

herſelf groſly trifled with, and reſented it accordingly. The alienation of that government from our nation may be dated from that time, and is not perhaps one of the leaſt diſadvantages incurred for the ſake of the ſafety of Hanover.

But the Britiſh intereſt was ſacrificed in vain. That no regard for this nation had any the leaſt ſhare in that firſt famous treaty of February 1756, with Pruſſia, not the conſequences alone have ſhewn; but the expreſs declaration of his Pruſſian Majeſty made to the French king, through his miniſter the duke de Nivernois, juſt after the ſignature of it. " * That he *flattered* him-

* Qu'il ſe flatoit de lui avoir rendu un ſervice très diſtingué, en ſeparant, comme il avoit fait, l'Autriche de l'alliance de l'Angleterre; que loin d'avoir gêné ſes operations contres les anglois, il lui avoit donné plus de facilitè de les pouſſer avec vigueur; qu'il avoit arrêté les Ruſſes alors leurs ennemis communs, et extrêment fortifiè par là la ligue des princes de l'empire, qu'il ne s'agiſſoit plus que de reformer le projet de porter la guerre dans l'electorat d'Hanover, changement dans le plan d'operations militaires d'autant plus facile, que la guarantie des Païs bans n'étoit pas compriſe dans celle de cet electorat. (*Etat Actuel des affaires de l'Allemagne.*)

" ſelf with having done him (the French
" king) a *moſt diſtinguiſhed ſervice*, in de-
" taching, as he had done, *Auſtria* from
" the *alliance* of *England*; that ſo far from
" cramping his operations *againſt* the *Eng-*
" *liſh*, he had procured him a greater *fa-*
" *cility* to *puſh them with* vigor: that he
" had ſtopped the *Ruſſians*, their *then* com-
" mon enemies, and thereby extremely for-
" tified the league of the princes of the
" empire: that he (the French king) had
" now nothing to do but to alter his pro-
" ject of carrying the war into the electo-
" rate of Hanover, a change in the plan
" of military operations ſo much the more
" eaſy, for that the *guarantee* of the *Low-*
" *Countries*, was not included in that of the
" electorate."

This extract from a Pamphlet, entitled, *The Actual State of Affairs in Germany*, publiſhed about that time, though never yet refuted, and then univerſally believed, and even in England, would not perhaps of itſelf now deſerve any credit, if the ſubſequent conduct of his Pruſſian majeſty had not perfectly corroborated it. One inconteſtable

teſtable truth in it is, that the Low-Countries were, at the ſpecial inſtance of one of the contracting parties, which could not be England, omitted *. If reports too founded on the utmoſt probability, and on the known ſentiments of his Pruſſian majeſty towards the French court, may be credited; he was extremely blanked, not to ſay confounded at its not biting at the bait he had thrown out to it. He would not perhaps have been extreamly ſurprized at encountering the French as enemies to Britain, or to Hanover, but had never dreamt of encountering them as the friends of Auſtria. But in this he was diſappointed.

France, whom he had twice left in the lurch, could have no great confidence in him, and imagined ſhe ſhould make her market better with Auſtria, now not only thoroughly indiſpoſed towards this nation, but frightened at once at our deſertion,

* The word *Germany* was ſubſtituted to that of *Empire*, which in a more extenſive ſenſe comprehends the Low-Countries, Bohemia, and other dominions.

and at the deſigns of Pruſſia againſt her. She was moreover greatly exaſperated at our renewal of the guarantee of Sileſia to the king of Pruſſia; a renewal which becauſe perfectly unneceſſary, ſhe conſtrued into an intention of noſing her with it.

In this ill-humor, and what was more powerful yet with her, in this her terror, can there be any wonder that ſhe ſhould ſtrike in with France, that opened her arms to receive her, and courted her with every motive of revenge, of ſafety, and of apparent intereſt, circumſtanced as ſhe then was; the ſword of Pruſſia evidently whetted againſt her throat, and herſelf not even very decently treated by us, was there ſo much as an alternative at her option? Have we any right to reproach her with a ſtep to which ourſelves had driven her, and evidently made a neceſſity to her? Truth is not the leaſt truth for being unpopular. Much has been ſaid of her ingratitude to this nation for all the ſervices done to her family; but waving the plea of their having been conſtantly and obviouſly done, either for the intereſt of Britain, and perhaps of-

teneſt

teneſt for that of Hanover; is the famous and never-to-be forgotten peace of Utrecht, by which the crown of Spain and all its appendages, (that would indeed have formed a ſo neceſſary counter-ballance to France; the want of which has coſt us ſo many millions,) were transferred from the houſe of Auſtria to the houſe of Bourbon, to be ranked among thoſe ſervices for which ſhe is charged with ſo black a crime as that of ingratitude? Does ſhe owe us any great thanks for the part our court had in obliging her to part with Sileſia; which the whole Britiſh nation once thought ſo cruelly and unjuſtly wreſted from her? The times indeed are changed, but the right of things does not change with them. And for what did ſhe part with a province of near a million ſterling yearly revenue, to a mortal enemy, and once not eſteemed by us the moſt generous one? But for a poor half million adjuſted and paid by us. It may be ſaid this unvoluntary ceſſion was at that time impoſed on her by the deſperateneſs of her circumſtances, conſequently not imputable to us. Granted that were true; granted that ſhe was purely influenced by them, and

not

not by our menaces of abandoning her, if ſhe did not comply with the terms preſcribed by Pruſſia; is not the ſame plea of neceſſity receivable in the caſe of her embracing the alliance of France? No one in his ſenſes can imagine it was her choice. She muſt know too well for that, not only the incompatibility of their intereſts, but the depth of deſign, and conſtitutional perfidy of that court.

The embroiling us then with Ruſſia, with the Empreſs Queen, and in its conſequences with almoſt all Europe, was evidently the reſult of that treaty of ours with Pruſſia in February 1756. We ſhall now ſee what benefit accrued to Britain, and to Hanover from his Pruſſian majeſty's diſpoſitions to obſerve it.

The main intent of it was doubtleſs to defeat the French deſigns of penetrating into the electorate of Hanover. Weſel, a place ſtrongly fortified by the king of Pruſſia's father, who tendered it as the apple of his eye; Weſel, that important barrier, that could have ſtopped the French, at leaſt ſix weeks, was ungarriſoned, and left the way clear for the French to enter into the heart of the Empire. Every one knows what fol-

followed: they advanced into Hanover, had barely the advantage at the affair of Haſtenbeck, and yet reduced the Hanoverians and Heſſians to a pacific convention at Cloſter-ſeven, to which Richelieu was ſo weak as to truſt, without inſiſting on their laying down their arms.

It has been ſaid, that that ſagacious prince, the King of Pruſſia, had ſtrong reaſons for with-drawing that garriſon. No doubt he had. But whatever they were, they baulked, in a great meaſure, the very firſt and capital intention of the treaty he had not long before ſigned, and which brought on that of Verſailles between the Empreſs-Queen and the French King of the firſt of May following.

In September, of that year, his Pruſſian Majeſty made his irruption into the proteſtant electorate of Saxony; of which, by a new, and till then, unheard of diſtinction, he took poſſeſſion, in the form of a *depoſite*. There is no need of characterizing this ſtep here. What the opinion of his Electoral Highneſs of Hanover was, may be ſeen in the memorial delivered in by his Comitial miniſter at Ratiſbon, where he ſolemnly

lemnly diſavowed, and even deteſted it. His Britannic Majeſty was however of a contray way of thinking, ſince the very ſame prince who had taken that, at leaſt, irregular ſtep, was ſolemnly recommended by him to the nation as its *natural ally!* Common-ſenſe is however at a loſs to reconcile ſuch contradictions.

The war was hotly carried on in Germany; a war that ſeems to have been a conteſt for which ſide ſhould commit the greateſt blunders. Thoſe of Pruſſia were unhappily for him the feweſt. Unhappily for him, it may without a paradox be ſaid, ſince all his great and ſhining victories, obtained by his ſuperiority in general-ſhip, and in his forces over the greateſt blunderers that ever pretended to know any thing in war, have brought him no nearer an iſſue, whilſt they muſt weaken him in proportion as they have exaſperated, thoſe enemies of his, who ſurely had not before wanted the inclination, and are now thereby reduced to the neceſſity of cruſhing him, or of periſhing themſelves. Berlin the King of Pruſſia's own capital had been laid under contribution, and two ſuch victories as would

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in former times have probably transferred the whole Roman Empire to the gainer of them, have not as yet produced to him the recovery of a part even of his own dominions, which is to this inſtant in the hands of his enemies. But this is far from all that is againſt him. A capacity ſo great, an activity ſo indefatigable as his, ſeconded by the beſt troops and generals in Europe, have hitherto enabled him to withſtand the united force of thoſe great powers that are confederated againſt him; and may he long continue to maintain his deſerved ſuperiority over them! But when he ſhall have reduced, and even deſtroyed the empreſs queen; ſuppoſe her hunted out of Vienna, and forced to fly to Hungary, or elſewhere, from before the face of his victorious armies; ſuppoſe even the reſt of his enemies diſcouraged, and out of condition to aſſiſt her effectually in her diſtreſs; there ſtill remains for him to ſurmount, an obſtacle not the leſs invincible, for its preſent appearance of being the very weakeſt; the laws of the empire. Againſt this rock he muſt ultimately ſplit, becauſe, humanly ſpeaking, though it may be ſhaken, it cannot

be ſubverted without dragging after it a general ruin. Will not, or at leaſt ought not all Germany to arm to a man in defence of a conſtitution thus threatened to be overturned, and which cannot be annihilated without a violent and entire change of the ſyſtem of Europe? Will other powers, now neutral, ſtand by and ſee their own ſafety endangered by ſuch a revolution? It may be ſaid, that peace will be the iſſue of ſuch a reduction of the empreſs queen; but is ſhe not too much exaſperated? can ſhe make it without her allies? and ſhould ſhe even ſubmit to her conqueror with their conſent, what reliance can ſhe have on the ſtability of any treaty with him? "She muſt be cruſhed "then: the king of Pruſſia will effectal-"ly eradicate her power." Granted. But who is to be ſubſtituted in the room of that Houſe, which has for ſo many ages preſided over Germany, and which Germany cannot help reſpecting and ſupporting, even though ſhe has ſo many juſt reaſons to complain of it? Will it be anſwered that the king of Pruſſia will fill up that void? Every true Engliſhman who looks on him in his preſent light of popularity, would and ought

to

to wiſh it; but no one that knows any thing of the ſtate of Europe, or of the empire, can entertain ſo frantic a hope. Nothing is, it is true, above the perſonal-merit of ſo great a prince. But is he immortal? will his ſucceſſors have the ſame claim? will Germany, on ſo frail a tenure as that of his life, exchange an old eſtabliſhed family for a very new one? Will ſhe tamely ſacrifice her liberty, privileges, and every thing that is ſacred, to a maſter thus impoſed on her by force of arms, and from whom as a maſter, ſhe can hardly expect more reſpect to her laws, than he has ſhewn them as a ſubject and member of the empire? Has he even, at this very hour, after all his amazing ſucceſſes, acquired one conſiderable ally, except Britain? The French he has already beat and driven back; and admit the Empreſs-queen ſhould be forc'd to take refuge in her wilds in Hungary, will theſe events, probably, deliver him from one of thoſe enemies that now keep the ſword in his hand, and compel him to fight for his very exiſtence, not only with them, but with the ſeaſons themſelves? Will his advantages not rather multiply his

adverſaries? Even ſuch proſperous events as might, in the uſual courſe of things, have gained friends to a bad cauſe, have however won none over to his, and only ſerved to draw the cloſer the ties of alliance between the powers combined againſt him. Some of them are not only proteſtant powers, but even near relations to him; yet there have not been wanting ſome, or mad, or ſilly, or deſigning enough to treat this war he is carrying on as a religious one. Can ſuch a condition then as his, with all the glare his victories have diffuſed over it, blind one man of ſenſe or reflection to the hollowneſs of it? Is it not rather ſo truly deplorable that his ſword the more ſucceſsful it is, is but digging the deeper and the more inevitable a precipice for him? Even now the prodigious pitch to which he has carried his power betrays its weakneſs, ſince nothing can be plainer than its being of the nature of a large ſtructure, that wanting proportionable foundations, and cement, the higher it ſhould be raiſed would but be the nearer coming to the ground. Let him take Olmutz, let him win battle upon battle, let him

plant,

plant, if he will, his victorious ſtandards on the ramparts of Vienna; he is not a jot the more advanced, if Germany and the reſt of Europe are but the more provoked, and reſolutely bent againſt his aggrandizement. They have but too much felt, and can hardly not reſent the airs of deſpotiſm he has already given himſelf to his co-eſtates; his preſcribing to his equals rules of conduct in the moſt imperious ſtrain; his threatening thoſe his fellow-members of the empire, who armed againſt him only in obedience to its laws, and to whom he has ſcarce imputed it as leſs than the crime of high-treaſon againſt his own majeſty. But his procedure eſpecially towards Saxony, has made him enemies of all thoſe powers, who may not care to have the eſtabliſhed law of nations give place to a new *Code-Frederic* crammed down their throats, by which the ſtrange expedient of ſeizing and taking a neighbouring ſtate, *in depoſite*, may grow into practice, under its propagation, like that of the Alcoran by the ſword. Even then, in a political, to ſay nothing of a ſentimental light, for that is unqueſtionable, the fortune of the

poor,

poor, fugitive, diſtreſt, but faithful king of Poland, ſeems leſs to be pitied than that of the Pruſſian hero in all his glory, hurried as he has been by fears, real or imaginary, out of the character of a benefactor to mankind into that of its deſtroyer.

But whether his cauſe be as juſt as it is ſo generally imagined here, or as unjuſt as the reſt of Europe, looks on it to be, and has already given judgment againſt him, it is much to be doubted whether Britain as his ally, can do him much effectual ſervice, whilſt in the attempt ſhe may do infinite miſchief to herſelf. Nor ought the unpopularity of this doubt to deter any one, to whom Pruſſia is leſs dear than his own country, from urging what he conceives to be the truth, though ſure of offending where he does not convince. The daring to diſpleaſe is often not the leaſt of ſervices, though it rarely meets with the acknowledgment it deſerves. But to liquidate this queſtion, and to form juſt concluſions, ſome retroſpect is neceſſary into the actual ſtate of Britain, from the breaking out of the war with France to this preſent time.

Minorca infamouſly loſt, the unproſperous events in America, and indeed the general miſmanagement of affairs, without order, without ſyſtem, without dignity, naturally alarmed the nation for the conſequences. The inſolence of the French had ſwelled in proportion to our weakneſs; and they who, not long before, had not ſcrupled to compare us to the antient Romans, now began to hold us as cheap as the modern ones. Our natural friends were grown cold and indifferent towards us. A miſerable neglect, or at beſt a faint perfunctory management of the national intereſt, always ſubordinate to a foreign one, ruinouſly for itſelf preferred, and ardently purſued, could not well tempt other powers to connect with us. In ſhort, the balance of the public opinion, both at home and abroad, was compleatly againſt us.

Such a ſituation could not but awaken Britain. Her firſt emotions were thoſe of ſo violent an indignation againſt the authors of it, as to ſuſpend even her exertion towards providing a remedy. This ſtate of aſtoniſhment or ſtupor the French miſtook for fear or deſpondence. At firſt, indeed

indeed, the nation imagined herſelf weak, only becauſe her power had been weakly adminiſtered, and that ſhe had not for a long time ſeen ſo much as an attempt at a juſt diſpenſation of her ſtrength. She had very reaſonably indeed loſt her patience, but nothing of her courage, even though numbers had labored to induce a total deſpair, and by dint of telling the public that it was already ruined, had almoſt perſuaded it that it was ſo. To the nation then under her preſent irkſome ſenſations of ſhame for the paſt, and of apprehenſions for the future, it was a kind of relief from them to hope better things from a change of adminiſtration: all ranks, all conditions groaned for it, not even excepting the underlings in offices, all uncurious as they generally are about who occupy the places above them, ſo they do but hold theirs; the dogs in the ſtreet ſcarce more indifferent about what hand throws a bone to them, or about the dirt in the midſt of which they find it. Nothing could more invincibly prove the uniform ſenſe of the nation. In its hurry, however, for a choice of new protectors, it was contented to take the readieſt and the firſt that preſented themſelves

ſelves. Theſe were thoſe who had once before riſen by the "ſpeech-trade" in this ſpeech-making age, and who had the moſt recently galled and fatigued, by popular harangues, eſpecially againſt continental connections, thoſe very miniſters with whom they had for years continued very quietly and tamely co-operating, in conſequence of that wretched bargain they had once before made of the popularity they had obtained by abuſing them. But whether the ſweet-meat gag that had ſo long ſtopped their mouths was melted down their throats, and given them an appetite for a new and a larger one, whether from a native reſtleſſneſs, or whether they could not reſiſt the tempting occaſion from the actual face of things, to try if the confidence of the people could not be once more captivated and made ſubſervient to their private views by their appearance in an oppoſition; they ſet up a freſh one. They ſucceeded. The dull nauſeating farce of concerted, temporizing, inſignificant reſignations and to the full as inſignificant acceptances, was now played and, by amuſing, ſatisfied the bulk of the public. Every thing was hoped for from the new elect. It would, at this time, be a tedious and needleſs taſk to enter into particulars here of all that ferment precedent to its ſubſiding at length into the triple alliance of thoſe three heads of parties, whoſe extream difference from

one another in a number of points did not promiſe a very kind or effectual mixture. Nor, in truth, could it be accounted for otherwiſe than by ſuppoſing them uniformly of the ſame principle and diſpoſition, at bottom, to hold power on its old and only tenure, an implicit and practical aſſentation to ſuch continental meaſures as ſhould be dictated to them. For any thing elſe, they might be the maſters. Nor, that ſpecial point once well pre-aſſured, was it but matter of great indifference which of the chiefs of party ſhould take the lead: or all of them together for the better grace of the thing, were welcome to club their faces to it. The abſurdities however, the ridicule, the meanneſſes which all of them ſubſcribed to the public, in that period of conteſt, can hardly be ſo ſoon forgot, unleſs indeed on the foot of their not being intrinſically worth remembrance. Nothing was, in fact, leſs ſerious nor more immemorable, unleſs for the damage it occaſioned, whilſt all the public councils were at a ſtand, and all our military operations languiſhed. All Europe ſtood amazed at ſeeing nothing attempted by us, either in arms or negotiations, in ſo momentous a criſis. No matter. Britain was overpaid for its delays, ſince they at length iſſued in that happy compromiſe of all the claimants of power by which that miniſtry

niſtry was eſtabliſhed, which has already done ſuch prodigious things, and promiſes to do ſo many more, if the holding together of characters ſo diſcordant, could flatter us with the hopes of its long duration. This is however that co-alition of parties which has been by ſo many well-meaning people miſtaken for the ſo much wanted, and the ſo deſirable national union, as if in thoſe parties the nation itſelf had conſiſted, or could be extreamly honored in being repreſented by them.

In the mean time our misfortunes, our diſgraces had preciſely a contrary effect to what the miſſionaries of timidity and deſpair had expected, or to what the like would have probably operated on our good neighbours the French. Whoever knows that nation, muſt know that even the ſmalleſt reverſes of fortune ſoon damp and deject them; but a Britiſh ſpirit the greateſt rather animate. It is with Britons in politics, as it is in the field, their courage encreaſes with their wounds.

To this acknowledged, and it may be ſaid, almoſt peculiar characteriſtic of the Britiſh people, the new miniſters will hardly be aſhamed of confeſſing that they have

the higheſt obligation; ſince they not only owe to it their ſupport, but their being enabled to make the very beſt figure their capacities or talents would allow them to make. They will doubtleſs then ſpurn that nauſeous flattery, from which it has been ſo falſely and injuriouſly ſaid that, ſince their acceſſion to power, they had infuſed into the nation that ſpirit, which the very truth is, that they themſelves had received from it. Without it could one of them have been ſo elated as to vent that ſilly gaſconnade? "That before his entrance "into power he had imagined the Engliſh "were ruined, but, that he had not been "three weeks IN, before" *I gad!* he found that *the French, it was, who were at the laſt gaſp.*

In ſhort, the pretention of the fly on the wheel, could not be more ridiculous than their aſſuming any merit for the great and noble ſpirit now evidently raiſed, and of which it is to be hoped that the French, who are originally the occaſion, will ſeverely feel the conſequences, whenever it ſhall be put under a proper and effectual direction.

But

But this was not the only obligation the miniſters had to the people; even their beſt counſels, their wiſeſt meaſures were dictated to them by the common ſenſe of the nation. They will hardly deny that the care of the American colonies, and namely the attack of Cape-Breton, the effectual protection indiſpenſably due to trade and navigation, the keeping up the navy, were all points long before ſtrenuouſly recommended by the voice of the public. Not to have paid attention to it, would have been indeed the height of ſtupidity. It would not only have robbed them of the honorable title of *miniſters of the people*, and of the life and vigor the public confidence gives to all their acts and procedure, ſuch as they are, but of the power of continuing in their places, as well as of carrying collaterally other points neceſſary to their being endured in that cloſet, into which the popular acclamation had uſhered them. Points only fit to cancell all the merit of attending to thoſe ſuggeſted by the people, whoſe effect they muſt blank, and which were, by this means, only made their ſtales; points in which they could have no hard taſk to ſucceed, ſince they happened to co-incide

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with a public paſſion, that was riſen to a degree of enthuſiaſm, not to ſay infatuation, in favor of a hero, who had done ſo much to deſerve our grateful good wiſhes to his cauſe, and every thing in ſhort from us, but abſolutely joining with him, which it may be eaſily demonſtrated could be for the advantage of neither.

That period was now come of itſelf, in which thoſe orators who had, in a great meaſure, gained their popularity by fulminating againſt all continental connexions, indiſcriminately, which was certainly an exceſs, had the greateſt room in the world for pluming themſelves on their opinion. The defection of Auſtria, the convention of Cloſter-ſeven, and above all the irregularity of the K. of P——'s procedure ſolemnly diſowned and deteſted by even the electoral miniſters of Hanover, formed an inexhauſtible fund for eloquence to diſplay itſelf victoriouſly, and with the beſt grace imaginable, for ſuch eſpecially as had before oppoſed the vain and endleſs waſte of ſubſidies upon Germany. Nothing could have withſtood the arguments that ſo obviouſly occurred againſt once more entangling the nation

nation in alliance with the powers of the continent. Inſtead of which, the moment of their triumph was the moment of their deſertion, and what poſterity will hardly believe if ſuch ſilly inconſiſtences are worth the tranſmiſſion to it; from having ſucceeded in decrying continental connections, they were at that very juncture once more whiffled round into advocates for them, with the ſuperaddition of perhaps the moſt exceptionable and dangerous one of all.

To examine this poſition with candor, no Engliſhman is deſired to diſtruſt his own judgment; what he has to be in guard againſt, is his inclination, which too often impoſes on it: eſpecially where his prejudice is bred by laudable motives, in which caſe his opinion takes the lead of his reaſon, inſtead of being guided by it; than which inverſion there cannot be a greater nor more common inducement both to error, and to obſtinacy in error.

Auſtria, though driven into the arms of France by a momentary and very pardonable fit of ill-humor and terror, could not, in all good policy, be conſidered or treated as an irreconcileable enemy. This alliance

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was by the higheſt authority, even in a ſpeech from the throne, ſtyled an *unnatural* one: and the truth is, that it was too much ſo, to be, humanly ſpeaking, preſumed a durable one. There could be no fear neither of the French king's not puniſhing her more than we perhaps ought to wiſh, for her folly in truſting a court, that hitherto was never truſted but it betrayed. We might then, with more propriety, have condoled with her on her acquiſition of a maſter in the ſhape of an ally. Here the prudence would have been to have ſtopped, and not to widen deſperately the breach, by openly aiding or abetting one whom ſhe had ſo much reaſon to look on as her mortal enemy. A few remonſtrances and a little time for the experience of the ſincerity of France, would in all probability have brought her back to a ſenſe of her own ſafety and intereſt. At leaſt, this was the conduct to which the French dreaded the moſt our adherence and its conſequences. Their beſt politicians expreſſed themſelves clearly to this effect, whilſt the reconciliation of the courts of London and Vienna was not yet ſet at an impracticable diſtance,

diſtance, by our ſubſequent meaſures, which diſſipated thoſe apprehenſions of France, the very keeping up of which was ſo obvious an advantage to us.

In the mean time, Auſtria might indeed well be ſurprized, if the ſtrangeneſs of our politics had left any room for the being ſurprized at any turn they ſhould take, to ſee us run headlong into ſuch cloſe engagements with her enemy, and one who never had been over-celebrated for his ſentiments of friendſhip or eſteem for this nation. We never, in fact, had the honor to be much in his good graces. But ſurely if he had owed us even a grudge, he could not have more effectually ſatisfied it, than by involving us, in a cauſe ſo deſperate and ſo foreign to us as his. Auſtria however could not forget, though we ſo perfectly had, his treatment of us in the affair of the Sileſia-loan. She as well as the whole world knew that his predilection had been entirely for France. Her faſhions, the deſpotiſm of her government had been long his model, and even her language was become his own language and that of his court, in contempt of his native German. In ſhort, all the reaſons that appeared to Auſtria ſo ſtrong againſt this new alliance, could only aggravate her reſent-

ment at its having been made, in wrong of our antient and eſtabliſhed one with her.

Neither has Hanover itſelf any great reaſon to boaſt of its reliance on the treaty made with him purpoſely for its ſecurity. One of the firſt ſteps after it, was the evacuation of Weſel, which diſabled him from effectuating his engagements, and laid the road to Hanover open to the French. They penetrated into it, as if in defiance of the Pruſſian guarantee, who gave the troops aſſembled to oppoſe the invaſion little or no aſſiſtance. It may be ſaid, that he could ſpare none; that his attention was engroſſed, that all the forces he took with him, not to mention thoſe he oppoſed to the Swedes and Ruſſians, were little enough to make head againſt the combined armies of France and the Empire: that in ſhort, the glorious account he gave of thoſe enemies againſt whom he had choſen immediately to march, amply abſolve him. It certainly does ſo, but not with reſpect to Hanover. The treaty either meant his covering that electorate, or it meant nothing. His oppoſing the foreign troops that had made their way into another part of the empire, was nothing to Hanover, which thereby ſuffered as much as no ſuch treaty had exiſted. The letter of it was,

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it is true, fulfilled, but the ſpirit of it eluded, in a manner ſpecious indeed, but which could not ſtill be very ſatisfactory to Hanover, that ſaw itſelf uncovered by him, and reduced to make that treaty of neutrality, ſo ill received here, but of which none could evidently have ſo little reaſon to complain as his Pruſſian majeſty.

Of all the injuries however done to that illuſtrious Prince, not one can be a greater, from the ridicule of it, than the ranking amongſt his motives, the protection of the Proteſtant Religion. Yet ignorance, always credulous, and always furious to maintain the abſurdities it has once ſwallowed, has found him among enthuſiaſts and methodiſts here, panegyriſts of a principle that, on this occaſion, evidently never once entered his thoughts. His cruſhing a coeſtate, which the firſt in Europe embraced the light of proteſtaniſm from Luther, its firſt miſſionary, and had moreover the double merit of remaining firmly attached to that religion, under a Roman-catholic ſovereign, and of its retaining its allegiance to that ſovereign, though of that faith, can be no proof of his over-tenderneſs for any pro-

teſtants that ſhould ſtand in the light of his political views. It may be ſuperfluous to name here the other proteſtant powers actually in arms againſt him, which ſhews, at leaſt, that they do not conſider this war in a religious light. To ſay the truth, few of the Princes on either ſide ſeem overloaded with religion, which, at beſt, is oftener their pretext, than their real motive. Even that eternally bigotted houſe, the houſe of Auſtria, enſlaved as it is, to this hour, to the jeſuits, has however begun to relax much of its cruel and perſecuting fervor againſt its proteſtant vaſſals. Experience has convinced it, as well as the houſe of Bourbon, that even their numberleſs oppreſſions and acts of ingratitude to their innocent ſubjects of that perſuaſion, are not able to ſhake that fidelity of theirs to their lawful ſovereigns, which they place amongſt their articles of doctrine, and is not amongſt the leaſt proofs of its purity and goodneſs. Even then the obduracy of ſuperſtition itſelf has been in ſome meaſure ſoftened and diſarmed by the uniform tenor of conduct in the followers of a religion, more conformable to the meekneſs of the goſpel,

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breathing, as it evidently does, the ſpirit of toleration and good-will to all mankind.

But as to his Pruſſian Majeſty, eſpecially, no man in his ſenſes will ſuſpect him of ſo falſe a zeal, as that of kindling a war in favor of the proteſtant religion, when there was not the ſhadow of a proof, either of its being attacked by any Romiſh power, or of any intention of its being attacked. No. He took a much better and more effectual way of ſerving it, and of ſhewing his ſenſe of the weakneſs of the Roman-catholic religion in the permiſſion he gave to the famous Mecenati, ſaid to be the ſame man who ſome years ago appeared in England, under the aſſumed title of count Ughi, to build a magnificent Roman church in the heart of his dominions, in his capital, in Berlin itſelf. In that conceſſion too a begging brief for contributions to it was included, and authorized under the ſeal of his own chancery. The firſt ſtone of it was laid in his name by the count de Haake, the thirteenth of July 1746. A medal was ſtruck on this occaſion with the following inſcription, FAUTORI *ſuo Religio Romano-Catholica.* Superſtition is always blind, and did not ſee in this

his indulgence that profound contempt of it, which it ſo evidently implied. Even the court of Rome, that has made ſo many bubbles, was on this occaſion the bubble of that prince. The Pope himſelf expreſſed his grateful ſenſe of that grant. But had he known the ſuperior genius of the King of Pruſſia better, had he done him in ſhort juſtice, he could not but be ſenſible that that monarch muſt look on the Court of Rome in its true light, of a Court of Conſervancy of ſome of the moſt blaſphemous and abſurd fictions that ever diſhonored the human underſtanding for ſwallowing them; a Court that has put the ſacred truths of the goſpel to a not leſs vile uſe than that of making, under favor of them, its ſpurious ingraftment of thoſe impoſtures go down, on which it has erected its whole ſyſtem of lucre and tyranny; whilſt what it has the ſupream impudence to call the *only* Church, in which the ſalvation of mankind can be obtained, is palpably nothing but a ſtrong hold of pillage and oppreſſion, manned by knaves, and maintained at the expence of prejudice-ridden fools.

On the occaſion however of the preſent

ſent war in Germany, the Roman-catholic powers have aſcribed to his Pruſſian majeſty one motive, amongſt others, that does him infinitely more honor, than that aſſign'd him by ſome of his fellow-proteſtants, and with nearer approaches to truth, at leaſt than theirs. The papiſts then impute to him as matter of offence, a project of ſecularizing ſome of the great ſpiritual ſtates of Germany, and of even forming a league amongſt the proteſtant princes to that effect. As great a public benefit however as ſuch an immutation would be, and in courſe worthy of his Pruſſian Majeſty's undertaking it, the wonder would be if the Roman catholic powers did not, as ſuch, oppoſe it, if but for being the propoſal of a proteſtant one; though it may be believed, that even ſome of them are not ſo ſcrupulous, but they would conſent to it, on the condition of coming in for a ſhare. But however that may be, religion itſelf muſt ſtill be abſolutely out of the queſtion: the perfect purity of it diſdains and diſclaims all mixture with temporal concerns.

To thoſe then who are not groveling in the dirt of ignorance or of low prejudice, beneath

beneath the reach of the influence of truth, nothing can be more clear than that lugging into the quarrel the proteſtant religion is in fact the greateſt injury that can be done to it, or to that great prince, in whoſe favor they imagine ſo falſe and exploded a pretence is of a nature to paſs for a reaſon for our union with him, however emphatically it has been founded as ſuch.

But if religion was evidently not even a pretext for Britain to make a common cauſe with his Pruſſian majeſty in this quarrel, it may be ſafely averred that good policy can, in the nature of things, as little find reaſon to conſider this alliance as a very great bargain.

The German empire, that very empire, in the delivery of which from the oppreſſion of the houſe of Auſtria his P— M— declared he had taken arms, was not, it ſeems, in the leaſt diſpoſed to receive him in that light. His great exploits in Saxony had met with quite another interpretation than he had given it in his voluminous manifeſts. No laurels could cover the baldneſs of his apology. The princes of Germany imagined they had reaſon, in the fate of that electorate, to fear their own, whenever

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they ſhould unhappily become obnoxious to the dread diſpleaſure of his P— M—. They had ſeen him proceed, without other form of trial than that of military execution, to drive an aged king out of his hereditary dominions, with circumſtances of the deepeſt diſtreſs and indignity to himſelf and to his royal family: they had ſeen others of the princes of Germany over-awed with threats of the ſame uſage, ſome of which were actually executed: they had ſeen him, in ſhort, with all the brow of deſpotiſm, give his fellow-ſubjects of the empire, his will and pleaſure for a law, his ſuſpicions for proofs, his armies for pleaders, and his power for a reaſon.

If the laws of the empire, then, were not a mere jeſt, of neither uſe nor ſignificance, the Diet could not poſſibly help, on the formal requiſition of the parties aggrieved, to put his P— M— to the ban of the empire, and to appoint an army to carry it into execution.

At leaſt, in all this, there was nothing but what was ſtrictly authoriſed, nay, enjoined by the conſtitution of Germany. Even thoſe who condemn this treatment of his P— M— have nothing better to ſay, than that the Diet was under the undue influence of the houſe of Auſtria. But of this they do not furniſh the leaſt proof; and beſides,

that railing at one's judges is not of itſelf one of the moſt favorable ſigns of the goodneſs of a cauſe; it is certainly no more receivable, without proofs, before the great tribunal of the public, than it is before any other human one whatever. But even this undue influence muſt be a mere chimæra. It muſt proceed either from fear or corruption.

As to fear; Pruſſia was palpably much more capable of inſpiring it than Auſtria; beſides, that his power gave the princes laboring under it a fair opportunity of ſhaking it off, by joining with him.

As to corruption, nothing can be clearer, than that Auſtria has not of a long time been, but rather in circumſtances to ſell herſelf than to purchaſe others. Beſides that ſhe might, with ſome ſhew of reaſon, retort, that his P— M— cannot himſelf name many German princes amongſt his allies that are not very exactly in the pay of Britain for being ſo.

Till the contrary then can be ſhown, and, as yet, it has not been ſo much as attempted to be ſhown, the ſentence of the Diet ſtands valid and unexceptionable, and not the leſs ſo for the want of ſtrength in the empire to reduce to a ſubmiſſion that potent prince, who is fallen under it. If ſome princes, either by their own intrinſic power, or thro' that

that of their foreign allies, have on falling under the ban, eſcaped the execution of it; ſuch an eſcape was never conſidered as an abrogation of thoſe laws from which that ban was an emanation. They were ſtill underſtood to remain in full force; and the electorate of Saxony itſelf transferred from the elder to the younger branch, where it actually now reſts, ſtands a proof of their not being always eluded. The caſe too of the elector of Bavaria allied to France, whilſt under the ban, was a very different one from that of Pruſſia's connexion with Great Britain. The elector of Bavaria had taken no neighbouring co-eſtate into *depoſite*, nor by an unheard-of procedure compelled its ſubjects to break their oath of allegiance to their lawful ſovereign, by taking one to himſelf.

But whether this ſentence againſt his P— M— was juſt or not, or whether the Germanic conſtitution admits or not of an Elector's availing himſelf of the alliance of a foreign power in his defence againſt the effects of a ban, at leaſt it muſt be owned, that whatever power openly aids or abets him, cannot, for the time, be but conſidered as an enemy to the empire. Let Auſtria, let France, let Ruſſia, let Sweden thus combined be conſidered by us, only as a cowardly overmatch to that great prince, who has thus

gallantly ſtruggled with them all; let it conſequently rather invite than deter us from ſuccouring him againſt ſuch a confederacy: but ſurely, the declaration of the empire, totally changes the nature of the war, now become a domeſtic affair, in which the interfering ſeems not only beneath the majeſty of the Britiſh people, but unbecoming its character of at leaſt a well-wiſher to the laws and liberties of other nations as well as to its own.

If France has pragmatically intermeddled, and poured her troops into Germany, under the triple character of Guarantee to the treaty of Weſtphalia, of auxiliary to Auſtria, and of an enemy to Britain, determined to wound her through the ſides of Hanover; her example was rather a warning not to follow it, than an invitation. She has hitherto, thank God! made as miſerable a figure there as we could wiſh. But it muſt be acknowledged, that the part ſhe left this nation to play, if this nation would have embraced it, was a much more wiſe and great one, than what herſelf had choſen. It was that of a contingent mediator, and a powerful, becauſe an armed one. This character by the taking ſide with Pruſſia, became evidently forfeited. He cannot be a Judge, who has made himſelf a Party. But, beſides that as a mediator, Britain might

might have eventually been in paſs to ſerve the king of Pruſſia much more effectually than as an open ally; ſhe needed not have confined her good offices to ſuch a mediation. Amongſt all the powers leagued againſt him, France alone was our common enemy: the others were, if not friends, at leaſt indifferent towards us. A prince then ſo thoroughly governed by his greateſt advantage as he is, and who had only in one point, and that purely by chance, a common intereſt with us, could not well take it ill, that we ſhould conſult our own in all the reſt. Nay, in that very conſulting our own, we ſhould in fact have conſulted his.

Auſtria, on ſeeing that his B— M— gave no aſſiſtance to Pruſſia, would have in courſe ſeen, that his firſt treaty with that court had no other object than what he had ſo ſolemnly profeſſed, the covering of Hanover, and the maintaining the tranquillity of the empire. This conduct would have been not only of a nature to calm her animoſity, but to re-invite her confidence. Our influence then might have been reſtored, and made ſerviceable to his P—

M—,

M——, at the iſſue of the war. Ruſſia and Sweden too, would have had no pretext of enmity to us as auxiliaries to the prince againſt whom they had declared war, and would have been the readier to receive our pacific repreſentations.

It may be ſaid, " what! ſhould we have " tamely ſtood ſpectators of the brave king " of Pruſſia's ſtruggles with his adverſaries? " would that have been a grateful retribu- " tion for the great and ſucceſsful diver- " ſion he has created, in our favor, of the " French forces? could it be for our in- " tereſt to have that diverſion abridged either " by his ruin, or by the ſeparate peace he " might have been obliged to make, and " of which we could, in ſuch caſe, have " no ſort of reaſon to complain?"

To all theſe queſtions there is an obvious, and a rational anſwer. We were undoubtedly bound by all the ties of honor, of intereſt, of gratitude, to ſerve him: and to ſerve him even with more good will than he had ſerved us, ſince that ſervice was not only indirect and accidental, but even unvoluntary. France, it is perfectly well known,

known, he rather wiſhed a friend than an enemy. But ſince, againſt both his deſire and his expectation, ſhe had taken a hoſtile turn towards him, and received from him thoſe checks and defeats for which Britain ſtands indebted to him; to have proceeded with correct juſtice, her manner of acknowledgment might ſurely have been as undirect as his ſervice, without his having the leaſt room to complain. Since France was now happily our common enemy, the bending our whole force of war againſt that nation, could not but have proportionably diſabled it from hurting him: and this might have been done effectually for his ſervice, without our appearing to know there was ſuch a perſon in exiſtence as him, and conſequently without entangling ourſelves in a cauſe, of which we could not, for many reaſons, keep too clear. The money, and men required by him, might, under a good direction, and employed effectually againſt France, have anſwered as valuable purpoſes to ourſelves and to him, without our unneceſſarily giving offence to powers with whom we had no quarrel, by openly ſending them over to him; thus ſubminiſtring ſupplies to

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feed the war with them, and engaging ourſelves in a manner for him to wiredraw us into a chaos of embroils, of falſe meaſures, and expences without bottom or end. No power, however at war with Pruſſia, or however ſenſible of the advantage to him from our operations againſt France, could have reſented them. She, and not they, was our natural enemy, and in acting againſt her we could have exceeded no bounds. All the powers of Europe would then have applauded our ſpirit when they ſaw it ſo evidently under the controul of our juſtice.

Germany, in that caſe, would not have had occaſion to liſten to the infamouſly falſe charge broached by the French againſt his Britannic M—, of his having fomented, nay kindled the war in the empire, for views as foreign to it as they are in fact to Britain itſelf. Yes! France, of whom it may be ſo juſtly averred that there has ſcarce been a drop of human blood ſpilt in war, in the remoteſt corner of Europe, but what was directly or indirectly owing to her cabals; France, I ſay, has dared to impute to one of the moſt pacific, humane and beſt intentioned monarchs

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that ever graced a throne, the guilt of lighting up that flame, in which Germany is at preſent involved, and in which his own dominions have ſo ſeverely ſuffered. The truth is, that it were to be wiſhed that the rightful Britiſh cauſe had been pleaded before the Public of Europe, and at all the courts of it by able negotiators, with the ſame eagerneſs and induſtry as the French have pleaded their moſt wrongful one. We might then have had ſome of her Princes for auxiliaries that are now at beſt cool towards us, and their ſubjects for our partizans.

But above all, the keeping aloof from the cauſe of Pruſſia would have abſolved us from any concern in the preſent deep and deplorable misfortunes of Germany, waſted, plundered and deſolated as it is, and by the moſt ſolemn authentic act of which her Conſtitution is capable, formally imputing all this to our ally, no matter how unjuſtly; ſince as to the conſequences, they are exactly the ſame from her opinion of our ſupporting and enabling him to continue what Germany calls her oppreſſion.

Yet to do his Pruſſian Majeſty juſtice, it does not at all appear that he had the oppreſſion of that country in view. His alarms for Sileſia, which were certainly not groundleſs, though perhaps not ſufficient to juſtify, at leaſt, to the immediate ſufferers, the extremities to which matters have been carried, were, moſt probably, the only motive that precipitated him into the appearances of aggreſſion. Himſelf knowing that his intentions went no farther than preventively to defeat the deſigns he had reaſon to think his enemies were hatching to wreſt that province out of his hands, might poſſibly not ſee, in the remoter conſequences, the tendency of his haſty appeal to the ſword. Perhaps, even at this inſtant, he wiſhes that Rubicon, the invaſion of Saxony, unpaſſed: at leaſt, he has given undoubted proofs of his not being animated by the ſpirit of conqueſt or oppreſſion, ſince even after his victories, he has of himſelf offered terms of peace, but terms of which the lengths he had gone, and the acrimony he had raiſed, oppoſed the acceptance.

He cannot but now ſee that the levelling the houſe of Auſtria to the duſt is a taſk more

more dangerous than he might at firſt apprehend. It is a Coloſſus that, ſhould it even fall by his efforts, muſt fall upon himſelf, and cruſh him with its weight. All Europe ſhaken to her foundations, and particularly Germany enraged to ſee her ſyſtem overturned, her laws trampled upon or derided, could not but unite for revenge on the author of all this ruin, and eſpecially to obſtruct the advantages he might preſume from it. The conteſt would become deſperate, and the iſſue of it, humanly ſpeaking, cannot be ſuppoſed favorable to his Pruſſian M—.

But were it even to happen that he could, without theſe dreadful conſequences, carry the point of deſtroying the houſe of Auſtria, is it very clear that Britain could be any gainer by it? Is there any reaſon to think that he would prove an ally to us, more to be depended upon, more tractable, leſs intereſted, or leſs burthenſome than the houſe of Auſtria has been? Who knows how ſoon we ſhould be embarked in another war, and with more plauſibility, to reſtore it?

Nothing then can be more evident than that the benefit we reap from the continuance of the diverſion Pruſſia occaſions to

the arms of France, is much over-ballanced by the diſadvantages that muſt attend our conjunction with him. Nor is one of the leaſt of them that enmity, which we excite by it amongſt ſo many powers, with whom both our political and mercantile intereſt preſcribes to us rather a cultivation of friendſhip.

Our war with France has a determinate object. Pruſſia has by its procedure put it out of his own power to have one. Our cauſe is a clear, a fair one. What his is, there is no ſaying. He is in a labyrinth, of which neither himſelf nor any one elſe have the clue. The difficulties he has to encounter are Hydra-headed: even his favorable iſſue out of thoſe he has now before him, only preſents the proſpect of new and greater ones emerging *ad infinitum*. Peace is to him a horizon that flies before him; every advance his victories ſeem to gain him towards it, ſets him, in fact, at the greater diſtance from it. Should even the Empreſs-Queen compelled by the preſſure of circumſtances conſent to a ſeparate peace with him, which is not however very probable, it will hardly deſerve the name of peace,

ſince

ſince neither of the parties can reaſonably truſt to it. If peace then is, as it is always underſtood to be, the object of all wars, can it be for the intereſt of this nation miſerably to pin its fair cauſe on a Prince ſo perfectly by chance on our ſide, granting even his cauſe was not a dubious one, and to whom peace has, humanly ſpeaking, all the appearances of an impoſſibility? Should it be ſaid that this union will terminate in forcing a peace on all the parties at war with it: not our greateſt enemies can impute to us a more invidious undertaking. To ſay nothing of its improbability, it is directly contrary to the reſpect and tenderneſs Britain has ever manifeſted for the liberties of Europe, to the giving law to which ſhe ſtands as averſe as to the receiving law from it, or from any powers in it. Yet without ſuch a ſuppoſition, what proſpect is there of peace for us, if inextricably involved with a power, who himſelf plunged into a bottomleſs abyſs of war, ſees us fond of being dragged after him into it, and of ſupporting him, which is no very good office, in his ruinous purſuit of it, and all becauſe one of the enemies he has ſo wantonly and ſurely undeſignedly made, happens to be ours?

Whoever then will give the whiſper of truth fair play againſt the roar of popular prejudice, may eaſily ſatisfy himſelf that France, yes France alone, ought to be pleaſed with our taking ſuch a part. Nothing can more effectually anſwer her ends. The ſending money and men to the continent, is ſure to weaken us in proportion at home. The ſucceſs is uncertain. France may however flatter herſelf with dealing to a much greater advantage with any oppoſition from us there, than if purely conducted on the foot of our inſular ſituation. In the mean time ſhe takes advantage of the general obnoxiouſneſs of the cauſe to which we have thought proper to connect ours, and putting both undiſtinctly under one cover and ſuperſcription, would make both paſs for having one and the ſame merit. But this is not all. Even our aſſiſtance to Pruſſia cannot but be at bottom agreeable to the politics of France, whoſe work it does, whilſt we are ſaddled at once with the expence and the odium of it. No one can think that France was ever in earneſt to cruſh Pruſſia. That court knows its intereſt too well to harbour ſuch a thought. It knows that keeping up the ballance in Germany, is of infinite impor-

tance to it: and that Pruſſia is the only power in it, that oppoſed to Auſtria can anſwer that end. The game of France is undoubtedly the reduction of both, not the deſtruction of either. This laſt is a work of which ſhe leaves the preparation to them; the conſummation of it, in due time, ſhe reſerves to herſelf. For this purpoſe it is that ſhe cannot but be pleaſed to ſee Germans cutting one another's throats, to which ſhe graciouſly lends her hand, on either ſide, as either ſide requires her trimming the ſcales to that effect. Both Auſtria and Pruſſia are fully ſatisfied of this, and yet their private paſſions are ſo violent and ſo much preferred by them to the public good of Germany, and indeed of Europe, that both of them occaſionally court and accept her baneful interpoſition.

What part had Britain then to play? What part? Once more it is averred, a great, an honorable, and a wiſe one, a part, in ſhort, of which the conſiderateneſs and reſerve would have been pregnant with ſuperior dignity, weight and advantage. The war puſhed againſt France, *totis viribus*, and puſhed upon purely a Britiſh footing unclogged with con-

nexions

nexions abſolutely foreign to it, would ſoon have bid fair to have ſickened her. It may be ſaid that in ſuch an event, ſhe would have renounced her projects in Germany, and turned her whole force immediately againſt us. So much the better. Pruſſia would then have been relieved, and in the only manner that we, or he either, ought to have wiſhed him to be relieved, For ourſelves we had nothing to fear, or at leaſt much leſs than France. Her ridiculous phantom of flat bottomed boats had, like other phantoms, ceaſed to exiſt the inſtant it was denied, or vaniſhed on the firſt dawn of light. It was ſoon diſcovered that we had been the ſport of a falſe alarm, and that we never had a real occaſion for thoſe Dutch troops, the aſking of which, though the refuſal of them was fore-known, paved the way for thoſe troops being aſked, where it was as well foreknwon they would be graciouſly granted, on convenient terms of hire. In ſhort, Britain began of itſelf to find out that deep ſecret to it, that France alone is not an over-match for it. The trade of that nation ruined, her navigation controuled in ſuch manner that her naval ſquadrons can only get in and out by ſtealth, the chan-

nel ſcoured, her colonies, at length, threatened with effectual attacks, not to mention how much more might probably have been done by a juſter diſpenſation of our ſtrength; all concur to prove that againſt France, at leaſt, we are of ourſelves ſufficient, and ſtand in need of no ally, whom we are to pay for fighting his own battles, and for whoſe ſake we muſt create ſo many more enemies, without the leaſt proſpect of where, when, or how *his* war with them will end.

In the mean time few who do juſtice to the depth of penetration, and to the ſolid way of thinking of his P— M——, can ſuppoſe him the bubble of all the popular acclamations and enthuſiaſm of admiration for him here. He has reaſon indeed to imagine they ſerve his own preſent point with us; but beyond that, he knows how to value them at no more than they are worth. He cannot but ſee with contempt Engliſhmen pluming themſelves upon victories not won by Engliſhmen, and the public attention lacqueying all his motions, as if the fate of Britain was to turn upon them. He well knows, that if inſtead of being, as he is, by mere accident on our ſide, he had been as he had rather wiſhed, on

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that of France, the multitude here would have ſeen all his actions and procedure in a very different light, and have abuſed him as much beyond meaſure as it now extolls him. It would have been as compleatly blind to his virtues as it is at preſent to any defects that may be thought to tarniſh the luſtre of them, and from ſome, in the natural ſtate of human imperfection, he can hardly be ſuppoſed exempt. Neither would this be any thing new to him. Whilſt he was making a diverſion in Bohemia, favorable to the French arms againſt the Queen of Hungary, at that time the idol of the public here; what encomiums, what fulſome adulation did not that people laviſh upon him? Panegyrics, poems, pindarics in his praiſe, were poured out with profuſion. *Ah le grand Roi! ah l'invincible Hero!* was the cry of the French public. No ſooner had he deſerted the cauſe of France, but the torrent ran inſtantly the contrary way: he was at once diſplumed of all that applauſe: ſatirs, indecent libels, the rankeſt ſcandal took place of it: the *Pont neuf* rang with the bittereſt ballads againſt him: then it was, *Quel Roi! il n'a ni foi ni loi.*

Even

Even his courage was become problematical. —The mob is the mob every where.

There was probably too another co-operating cauſe to all that eagerneſs with which the public here embraced any ſucceſſes of that monarch, and hailed them as thoſe of the nation. A cauſe that may be now mentioned with the leſs repugnance, for that having ceaſed in a great meaſure, the reproach it conveyed ceaſes with it; and that is the prodigious indolence which not long ſince ſeemed the epidemical diſeaſe of the times, with which all orders and conditions were infected and which was but too much flattered, at ſeeing the work of the nation doing by others to its hand. Perhaps even this ſight contributed at length to raiſe a ſpirit of emulation. If ſo, it cannot be ranked amongſt the leaſt obligations of this country to his P—— M——. May that ſpirit fall under a direction equal to its merit; nor be evaporated and conſumed in waſte upon crude, undigeſted, uneffectual operations, or unnational meaſures!

Parva ſunt foris arma, niſi eſt conſilium domi.

TULL.

But if miſtaken ſelfiſhneſs, or impetuous ignorance, were excluded all judgment on a prince intrinſically too eſtimable to be much honored by their eſtimate; cooler common-ſenſe would not perhaps repreſent in vain, that nothing ſo tranſitory as the greatneſs of his perſonal character ought to influence that political conduct of ours, which ſhould have more permanent objects and that the glare of his ſucceſſes ought not to dazzle us to the point of not ſeeing that they are miſleading him, or to the point of our being miſled by them ourſelves. As things are, he is one of thoſe very rare princes that reflect more honor to a crown than they receive from it. But even himſelf would probably now ſubſcribe to the truth of what is here advanced, that, ſo far as conjecture can approach to probability, he would have ſtill been much greater, and much more ſecure in that greatneſs, if with thoſe excellent troops of which he was at the head, he had waited events tranquilly in his own dominions; if untempted by the conveniency Saxony offered him of laying her under contribution to the war he was meditating, he had abſtained

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from giving his enemies the advantage of having thoſe laws of the empire on their ſide, which it is either ſuch profound ignorance or ſo falſe reaſoning to ſuppoſe only a vain name.

He has been compared to Ceſar. The compariſon is juſt in many points; but well examined has more in it of an invidious admonition, than of the delicacy of true praiſe. Ceſar found the conſtitution of his country ſhaken by civil diſſentions. The laws of it were like a fair tree, by ſtorms bent towards the earth. Inſtead of applying his admirable parts to the ſetting it upright, and making it floriſh again, he felled it, and by felling it, deprived himſelf of that ſhelter, under the ſhade of which his country, himſelf, and family, might have long ſat happy, their contrary fate, who does not know? or who can call his ſucceſs a deſirable one?

In the mean time, how truly deplorable is the dilemma to which ſo many of the princes of Germany are reduced! If when ſummoned in form by the laws of the empire, they refuſe to ſend their contingent towards forming an army of execution, they incur a ſevere

ſevere penalty. If they furniſh that contingent, his Pruſſian Majeſty ſends them a cavalier meſſage, that he ſhall treat them as Hanover and Heſſe have been, as if their caſe, as to him, was not eſſentially different.

But if this continental connexion carries with it that great merit for which its advocates contend, at leaſt they muſt allow no ſmall ſhare of it to Hanover, without which, it is not very probable, that Great Britain would have ſo eagerly ſued for an alliance to a power, of which not many years ago it ſcarce knew the name, till the Germaniſm of our politics had made it ſo familiar to us.

This naturally leads to a diſcuſſion of the preſent ſtate with reſpect to Britain, of that electorate now ſo cloſely united to it, in virtue of the identity of their ſovereign.

There have been, and perhaps ſtill are, two opinions concerning it, both oppoſite, and both falſe, in their different extream.

The one excluded all conſideration of Hanover; all ſufferance of its entering into our councils for any thing, or for ſcarce more than if, as to us, is had diſappeared from the face of the earth. It was, in ſhort

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to be treated as a dominion, that was purely a province of Germany, abſolutely foreign to Britain, and with which all political connexion was induſtriouſly to be avoided. But it muſt be confeſſed that much the greater number of thoſe who affected this opinion, affected it from party-views, from the captiouſneſs of diſaffection, or as a text for factious declamation, rather than from the ſuggeſtions of ſound policy, or clear-ſpirited patriotiſm. This being penetrated by the public, weakened to it the influence of a doctrine, that if ſomewhat moderated, for its tendency to the good of both dominions, not the Hanoverians themſelves could have too ſtrenuouſly urged.

The other opinion, and the muſt ruinous one, ſince it aſſigned to Hanover the part that belonged more properly to Britain, was the opinion that unhappily prevailed in practice, ſometimes ſo inſenſible that even thoſe with whom it did prevail, did not perhaps ſo much as know it. To this opinion however, but for the obviouſly perpoſterous policy of it, even the name of virtue might be granted in a native of that electorate.

But

But what name ſhall be given to it in a Briton? What name can be given to thoſe perſonages here, who regardleſs of their own dignity, to ſay nothing of that of the nation, regardleſs of their own welfare ſo intimately connected with that of their country, ſupmitted to make their court by adopting and co-operating to the ſyſtems built on ſo falſe a foundation? Who did not, in ſhort, feel that power held by ſuch a tenure was beneath acceptance? To ſay that they did not foreſee the conſequences ſuch or nearly ſuch as they have come out, would do too little honor to their reach of penetration not to be conſidered rather as an affront than as an apology.

After all, what could be a clearer rule of judgment than the knowledge of the true ſtate of thoſe foreign dominions? They had been lately indeed raiſed to the dignity of an electorate, but had been long ſo inconſiderable, that till within theſe few years hiſtory had hardly deigned to take charge of the name of them. Nor had they ſo much weight as to claim the leaſt ſhare in the ſyſtem of Europe, but remained involved and undiſtinguiſhed amongſt the other little ſtates of the empire.

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every court in it reſound with complaints of the perfidiouſneſs of this breach, and with inſinuations that no thing was ſacred to this nation that ſhould ſtand in competition with a point of intereſt. This was one more conſequence of our interfering with Hanoverian councils.

Many indeed here thought this reſumption of arms a maſter-ſtroke of policy in whoever were the authors of it. If they were Engliſhmen, it is to be ſuppoſed they were thoroughly ſatisfied of the fairneſs of that procedure, without which they could have ſo little right to be vain of their ſhare in it, ſince nothing on earth can be more certain than the ruin of that nation which ſhould prefer its intereſt to its honor. Allowing then the juſtice of this meaſure to be out of the queſtion, it ſtill admits of a doubt, whether there even exiſted that intereſt to which that honor was ſo falſely ſaid to have been ſacrificed; whether any thing could be more indifferent to Britain than this breach of the convention; whether, in ſhort, the faireſt of occaſions was not miſſed of her untwiſting with a country, the connexion with which had never but coſt her more than it was worth.

The army of obſervation might, with ſome ſhew of plauſibility, be in the pay of Britain to defend a ſtate attacked purely on her account, and in conſequence of that entanglement to which ſhe is ſo fatally obnoxious from their unity of ſubjection to the ſame ſovereign. But when that convention was made, which it will be confeſt by all parties was better never to have been made, or never to have been broken, on which ever ſide it was broken, it was notoriouſly made without the approbation of the Britiſh government. At leaſt the regency of Hanover took that ſtep entirely upon itſelf; and ſince it had ſo, the conſequences were all its own. Britain had no farther to do with it; and notwithſtanding all the mighty merit pleaded of engaging thoſe troops to reſume their arms, and accept the ſweets of Britiſh pay; the advantages redounding purely to Britain from that meaſure, are not perhaps ſo prodigious as they have been ſounded or believed.

This point the more requires examination, for that nothing is more common, than for little ſuperficical ſtateſmen to be caught by the bait of a preſent ſeeming advantage; their

their eagerneſs to ſeize which blinds them to the inſidiouſneſs of it. In their hurry to enjoy a falſe reputation of vigilance and activity, they ruſh headlong into the tempting error, and it is much if their power and popularity do not make it the error, as well as the misfortune of the nation.

Facts will beſt explain how far this obſervation is applicable or not in the preſent caſe.

Whilſt the convention remained yet in force, if the Hanoverians, &c. inſtead of being excited by us, as it is to be hoped they were not, to break it, had of themſelves conſulted our miniſters on what they had to do; might not an anſwer have been given them with great juſtice and propriety to the following effect? "That ſince "they had made the convention without "our participation, though even in our pay, "they might juſt keep it or break it, as "they pleaſed: that whatever they did was, "and ought to be, perfectly indifferent to "this nation." If it ſhould be replied, that in fact it was not indifferent, but that the breach of the convention was uſeful to us. So much the worſe. The honor of

the nation, ſo ſuperior to every other conſideration, muſt proportionably incur ſuſpicion. Europe might then impute the breach not to its juſtice, but to the advantage of it to us; and that advantage, alas! how queſtionable?

Juſt at the time the convention was on the point of being broke, the French were, it is true, in a condition to invite that breach. Nature, which ſeems to have ſet thoſe bounds to the ambition of the French, which their reſtleſſneſs of ſpirit has refuſed them, had upon them her uſual effect, whenever they attempt enterprizes at any remote diſtance from their frontiers. There they have often had the climate to conquer, when they had conquered every thing elſe. Italy and Germay, as all hiſtory atteſts, are in poſſeſſion of the title of French burying-grounds. Hanover had, on this occaſion, proved no exception to this general rule. Diſeaſes had already thinned their army there, more than the ſword had done before, or ſince its expulſion. The uſual conſequences too of licentiouſneſs and indiſcipline had rendered uneffective thoſe ſoldiers that remained. The Hanoverian ſubjects,

jects, who had begun with dreading them, were from a nearer inſpection and familiarity with theſe diſorderly rag-a-muffin gueſts, grown to deſpiſe them. This riſing ſpirit, they naturally communicated to thoſe of their countrymen, who had only grounded their arms, but were ſtill maſters of them, and who were too brave to continue any longer tame ſpectators of the ſufferings and groans of their country. Had the French even not broke the convention, ſuch a toleration could not well be expected from men of courage. The common ſoldiers eſpecially, carried away by their feelings for their families and friends, could not but be in a mood to break alike through the reſtraint of treaties or of officers. The fault then, if any, was Richelieu's, who ought either to have held a better conduct, or not have left them their arms in their hands.

Thus the Hanoverians ſcarcely needed the ſuper-inducement of Britiſh pay to take the advantage of their enemy's actual condition, and to drive him out of the heart of their own country. But as to Britain, where was the advantage, unleſs the pleaſure

ſure of ſeeing Hanover get rid of ſuch irkſome inmates? otherwiſe the beſt office that could poſſibly be done that army was to haſten its retreat, and that retreat particularly to its own country. For no army, could it have joined, but it muſt have weakened, or even endangered it, by the double contagion of its maladies and licentiouſneſs. To recruit, to recover it, to reſtore its diſcipline, it was abſolutely neceſſary for it to fall back upon the French frontiers. Aſk the French then of that army, they will tell you they would not have ſtaid in Hanover, had they been paid as much for ſtaying there, as the Hanoverians were paid for driving them out: and in this they may for once be believed, becauſe it could not be otherwiſe. They had exhauſted all thoſe parts, of themſelves not the moſt fruitful, to a point that they could no longer furniſh ſubſiſtence to them, or even to the poor plundered inhabitants, who were reduced to ſtreights ſcarce ſhort of famine. As to the haraſſment they met with in their retreat, it was no more than they could well lay their account with from a prince ſo gallant, and ſo active as the prince Ferdinand

dinand at the head of troops actuated by all the incentives of revenge, of honor, and of juſtice to the Britiſh nation, for the pay they received from it. In their way home, however, they took care to drop a ſtrong garriſon into Weſel, that place ſo dangerouſly ſlighted by Pruſſia. But in all this, what was there done, that could affect us? The retreat of the French was evidently matter of courſe, nor could the quickening their march and ſeeing them ſafe home be of much diſſervice to France; the ridding the electorate of them might be a merit to Hanover; but in what could Britain benefit by the return of thoſe forces ſo much nearer home, where their recollecting their ſtrength muſt be ſo much more convenient than at that diſtance, that they were rotting and mouldering away of themſelves, in a manner to ſpare the ſword the trouble of exterminating them?

The diverſion, however, cauſed to the French by this army of Hanoverians, Heſſions, &c. has doubtleſs ſome weight; but whether that weight over-ballances the expence to Britain of them, and whether that expence might not be appropriated to more direct, more neceſſary, and more effectual

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plans of operation, is well worth a fair and impartial conſideration. Even the tenderneſs due to the Hanoverians, requires a diſcuſſion, whether their preſent ſubſerviency to the Britiſh, or perhaps rather to the Pruſſian meaſures, can anſwer any valuable end to themſelves; eſpecially ſince their country is out of all condition to invite the renewal of an invaſion, unleſs a ſpirit of revenge ſhould prevail over every other conſideration. But againſt any future attempt, it would be perhaps better defended by our doing, with more honor to ourſelves, any thing elſe to divert and diſable the French, than by an oppoſition in the very part where they ought to wiſh an oppoſition to be made, ſince it muſt be made with the leaſt effect, and at the greateſt coſt to us.

The authority of the greateſt generals, ſupported withal by common ſenſe and experience, invincibly atteſts, that any attack on the French at home, or on their frontiers, cannot but be fruitleſs, without ſuch a paramount force as may at once face all the demands of war for battles and for ſieges. Any force inferior to that point of ſtrength, is only a force thrown away, without

out any rational proſpect of ſucceſs. It is the very game the French deſire, who can then wage the war at all advantages. Always the braveſt on their own dnghill; they can fight, or let it alone, juſt as they pleaſe, or as they ſpy the favorable moment. The ſupplies for their forces are as eaſy, as they are difficult for their enemy. In caſe of a defeat, they have not only re-inforcements ready at hand, but a ſecure retreat under the number of fortified places with which their frontiers are briſtled. In ſhort, for baffling, for tiring out, for deſtroying an enemy, they deſire no better than to have him come home to them, and ſpare them the fatigue, the expence, and the riſk of ſeeking him, at a diſtance from their frontiers, when they rarely but make the worſt of figures.

One would imagine that the retroſpect of the enterprizes made of late years, on thoſe frontiers might ſufficiently eſtabliſh the improbability of making any conſiderable impreſſion on the French territories. Even two or three battles won by the Hanoverians, &c. could but weaken themſelves, and bring them no nearer any point worth their hav-

ing in view, whilſt their own loſs, however leſs than that of the French, muſt hurt themſelves more, and be more irreparable. The ſum of things would, at the ſame time, be little or nothing affected by it.

There is no-one can deny that the advantage gained by the gallant Prince Ferdinand, at the affair of Crevelt, was great enough to deſerve the proclamation of it by the mouths of the Tower-guns, and by a ſolemn thanſkgiving. Otherwiſe it would have been mocking both God and man, and that palpably to no purpoſe, but to make the ſending of troops from here to Germany go down the more glib, with the ſoldiery and the people, under all the ſmoke and flaſh of that recent ſucceſs. Be it then granted that it really was as great as ſo great a celebration requires it to be thought, and that no ſtateſman could deſcend to ſo poor a ſtate-trick, as the exageration of it would have been. But even our moſt authentic gazette gives permiſſion for not thinking that action any ways a deciſive one. This allowed, the conſequence proceeds unſhaken, at leaſt, by that inſtance, in favor of the eſtabliſhed maxim of declining war with the French,

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on their own frontiers, unleſs with ſuch a force as amounts to much more than what is already employed there, or can be ſent from hence to join it, and which could therefore be only unneceſſarily thrown away.

Such at leaſt was the well-known ſenſe of the great Duke of Marlborough, than whom no man, ſince the days of Henry the fifth, had done more than himſelf to level the power of France in the duſt. Happy would it have been for this nation and for Europe, if a little, dirty, jealous, power-hunting Court-cabal had not ſnatched the ſword out of his hands juſt as he was on the point of giving that nation the finiſhing blow. France was then exhauſted by a long war, and an humble ſupplicant for a peace that ought never to have been granted her but on the original terms of the grand alliance; and yet the Duke did not conceive it practicable to overwhelm her without the whole force of it. He was much too great a man to give into gaſconades, or into crude viſionary projects, and yet leſs capable of deſpiſing an enemy, or of diſhonoring himſelf and his nation, by acting a ſubaltern part under the greateſt power in Europe. And

here let an Engliſhman ſtop but for an inſtant, and compare the ſtate of things as they *then* were, to what *they now are*. Our nation was then plainly at the head of the greateſt powers in Europe combined againſt the ambition of France: her cauſe was no leſs than the liberties of mankind: ſhe was the life, the ſupport of the whole confederacy, as it evidently appeared from that inſtant ſhe, fatally for herſelf, and for the cauſe ſhe had ſo nearly brought to the wiſhed for iſſue, withdrew her aid and influence. At preſent, behold her renounced or at leaſt cooly regarded by all her ancient allies, and glad to throw her alliance at the head of a prince, never over-favorable to her, and actually under the ban of the Empire, to whom ſhe thinks herſelf obliged humbly to ſue for his gracious acceptance of her ſubſidies and troops, not without all the appearances of being content to act a ſubaltern part. This diſpoſition of things was reſerved for theſe honorable times. Nay, ſome here have ſo thoroughly forgot the dignity of their own nation, as to contend for its being no degradation for a Britiſh commander, not to be commander in chief, as if it was

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poſſible to find one ſo loſt to all ſenſe of his own honor, or of that of the nation, as to ſtoop to ſub-general it even to ſo renowned and great an officer as the gallant Prince Ferdinand. Many nations have indeed employed foreign generals: with the Venetians it is even a ſtanding ſtate-maxim to employ none but them. But for a nation ſo great, ſo powerful as ours, a nation that may diſpute rank with the firſt in Europe, to pay ſuch a deference to another as to ſuffer her generals to receive directions of operation, or orders from any but their own immediate ſovereign, would be, perhaps, without example. It is not therefore credible. Even the Prince who ſhould avail himſelf of ſo wretched a complaiſance, could not but, in the courſe of things, and with his excellent ſenſe, repay it with the moſt cool and determinate contempt. It cannot then be but ſuppoſed that ſome expedient, ſome ſalvo has been found out for the adjuſtment of rank and precedence: but granting what it muſt be ſo grating to grant, that Britain no longer breeds generals capable of ſupporting the honor of her arms abroad, which ſhe muſt therefore give into keeping to a fo-

foreign one, the queſtion will but occur the ſtronger, whether there is any abſolute neceſſity for thus ſhowing her nakedneſs, or for ſending any forces at all to the continent? It may ſtill be aſked, if it is ſo very eligible a meaſure, in forfeiture of the advantages of our inſular ſituation, to ſneak over our countrymen in ſo diſgraceful a manner, and in ſo incompetent a number, to encounter the French, preciſely where it is ſo convenient for the French to encounter them? where their preferable wiſh muſt be, that we ſhould ſend and ſacrifice as many more to them as ſhould be juſt not ſufficient to do any thing material for the honor or advantage of the nation. The moſt ſenſible alternative would perhaps be either to ſend a royal army fit to command ſucceſs, or if that is neither convenient nor practicable, not to ſend a ſingle troop of horſe, even though the Hanoverians, &c. ſhould be deficient in cavalry, and require ours to ſupply that deficiency, ſince, humanly ſpeaking, it would only ſerve to ſhew, what one would imagine had been already but too much ſhown, how wrong we can take our meaſures. Nor will it hardly be otherwiſe, till all our Germa-

niſm is happily eradicated out of our politics, or at leaſt ſuffered to retain no more ſhare in them than it ought to have.

In the mean time what muſt all Europe think of our cheapneſs and conduct? What muſt the Dutch eſpecially? And can we be ſurprized at their not being forward to connect with us? Can they be ſuppoſed to have forgot the peace of Utrecht? or have our politics been ſo admirable ſince as to tempt them to embark once more on ſo crazy a bottom as ours? Is it any wonder that the French party ſhould prevail there, when it has ſo many popular topics of declamation againſt us? The reſtoration imputed to us of the Stadholderate, ſo ſolemnly abjured by the Burgomaſters, on whoſe authority it ſo ſenſibly intrenches; the uſage of their merchantmen by our privateers, who, if not encouraged, are perhaps not enough controuled; and above all that doubtleſs falſe charge againſt this Government of ſtirring up a ſedition in their dreadfull mob againſt the magiſtrates, are points in which the French have all the ſcope they could wiſh to diſplay their inſidious rhetoric and diſreſpect to truth. The people there are but too apt to liſten to any

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ſuggeſtions againſt a nation that muſt have long appeared to them in ſo contemptible, ſo ridiculous a light. If we would have them or others do juſtice to us, we ſhould begin by doing juſtice ourſelves.

But how little has that ſpirit in general prevailed amongſt us! How cruel an injuſtice have Britons done to themſelves in triumphing when they had ſo little occaſion! For, after all, what has been done, or great or material by them ſince the commencement of the war? A few ſtraggling French men of war, the captures of ſquadrons, or what is near the ſame thing, in the ſight of ſquadrons: the ſucceſs in Bengall, to which we muſt wait for its epithet of favorable or unfavorable, according to the turn it may take in that unſettled country; the taking a ſmall fort in Africa; the damage done to the French trade by our cruizers; the burning of the ſhips before St. Maloes; are all objects, which however detrimental to our enemy, a true Briton would diſdain to lay a ſtreſs on, much more to exagerate, ſince they are all, from the nature of them, infinitely beneath the juſt pretentions of this nation to

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valor and ſtrength. At leaſt, ſuch ſentiments can be no offence to the nation.

To ſay the truth, the loſs of Minorca alone is perhaps a more than counterballance to all our gains hitherto: to ſay nothing of Braddocks defeat, or of the ſcurvy figure we have made in America, notwithſtanding our ſo incomparable a ſuperiority of forces there to thoſe of the French. May the taking of Cape-Briton, which is hardly to be miſſed, if the attack ſhould be, as no doubt it is, in hands equal to the ſervice, give us a real occaſion for ſaying *ſomething* has been done! May the people of this nation have that opportunity of congratulating themſelves on the ſucceſs of a meaſure that is all their own! and may it never again become a ſacrifice to continental reſpects!

But in pleading for juſtice to ourſelves, let not that owing to our enemies be forgot, even for our own ſakes! Nothing, in fact, can be more pernicious to our intereſt, than the taking falſe meaſures of the ſtate of France; and nothing has been oftener the caſe. To compleat all the ridicule and nonſenſe of the times, it was, till lately,

wanting that the very ſame perſonages, who not long ſince, from the uſual effect of fear to magnify objects, had exagerated the power of France beyond all meaſure of truth, and repreſented her as a tremendous over-match for Britain, ſhould on the flattering gleam to us of a few events unfavorable to France, and thoſe more owing to herſelf than to Britain, all of a ſudden change their note, and depreciate the force of France with as little reaſon as they had before exalted it.

The truth is, that at her higheſt, whilſt we preſerve our naval ſuperiority, keep a competent army, and eſpecially an effectual militia, Britain, if ſhe but knows her own ſtrength, and is happy enough to have it ably directed and adminiſtered, has leſs to dread from France, than France has from her. Much has been ſaid of her populouſneſs, and of the eaſe with which France can raiſe numerous armies. But this was ever much exagerated, and is at this time entirely falſe. She is greatly deficient in able men for the military ſervice. The Generalities on whom the levies are repartitioned have long complained of their incapacity to furniſh

furniſh them. In this, her weakneſs may be averred. But whilſt juſt notions are formed of that weakneſs, nothing can be more ridiculous, nor even more dangerous, than to under rate her actual ſtrength. In the firſt place, if the very natute of her arbitrary government, ſo unfavorable to public credit; if the late checks ſhe has met with in Germany; if her trade overwhelmed by our captures, have created her difficulties in raiſing money, ſhe has ſtill great reſources, and is not at leaſt crouching under a burthen of near a hundred millions of debt: a burthen which though it ſits ſo light and eaſy on our ſhoulders, would probably ſink her. That interruption to her trade too is not ſo deadly a blow as it would have been, had ſhe not been too wiſe to leave herſelf nothing but her commerce to truſt to, and to let her military ſpirit be entirely ſacrificed to a mercantile one. Her government ſaw the great advantage of bringing trade into the kingdom, and ſteddily purſued it; but not to ſuch a pernicious exceſs as to throw the whole kingdom into trade. So far from affecting or ſounding emphatically the title of a trading nation,

ſhe appears to deſpiſe it as much as ſhe would that of a nation without trade. Money has all the weight with her that it ought to have, but is not preferred to every thing, that is great, noble, and ſacred. It is not made the common meaſure of every thing, and even of thoſe things with which it never can but ruinouſly and infamouſly be ſuffered to mix: ſuch as honor, perſonal merit, talents, patriotiſm. In ſhort, that nation is not yet degenerated into a vile collection of mercenaries, jobbers, and idlers, as uncapable of honoring as of defending their country. Her military ſpirit ſtill preſerved will probably preſerve her. Her politics, dangerous as they are to the liberties of Europe, are not only maſked under that art of fair appearances, in which ſhe excels, but the ſpirit of them ſteddily proceeds even where the blunders and follies of her court ſometimes counter-act, and defeat its ſuggeſtions. Even in that land of ſlaves they have found a better way of manning their navy, than the infamous manner of preſſing, in practice upon free-born men here: men who muſt conſequently carry on board with them all that diſguſt to the ſervice, all that refractorineſs natural

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for them to feel, on being obliged to defend the liberties of thoſe who have robbed them of their own, and to fight for a country it would be but a virtue in them to look on no longer as their country, ſince as to them, it is abſolutely not a free one: whilſt it muſt gall them but the more to find themſelves the only ſlaves in it; they who from their ſuperior uſefulneſs ſo little deſerve ſuch treatment. Of that, to us, invaluable iſland of Minorca, France is already in poſſeſſion. She has two cautionary places in the Auſtrian Netherlands, of which ſhe will hardly diſſeize herſelf without an ample conſideration. With all our vigilance and ſuperiority at ſea, ſhe has found means to ſmuggle ſupplies into Canada and Cape-Breton, it is to be hoped, much in vain. She has not neglected even ſo remote, but ſo infinitely important a concern as that of the Eaſt-Indies, where ſhe has ſent Lally (ſaid to be dead) with three thouſand choice men, not the ſweepings of ſtreets and jails, with ſhips in proportion, before that force ſent from hence could well arrive in time to defeat their effect. Is the force too we have oppoſed to them there ſufficient? She is

repairing,

repairing, with her uſual activity, her loſſes in Germany, and may perhaps not imitate us in diſdaining to be the wiſer for the blunders ſhe has committed there, and of which we have loſt the advantage by the part which we have taken. Theſe truths may be ill received, or even rejected by thoſe who would have every thing to be falſe, that is not true to their liking. But the ſeeing them fairly ſtated, cannot but be acceptable to all, who prefer the charm and ſafety of truth to the dangerous illuſions of error, eſpecially where the taking juſt meaſures againſt a mortal enemy depends on the undeception. And ſurely nothing ought to be more execrable to a Briton, than the lulling him to ſleep with flattering or ſoothing impoſitions; not only as they imply a mean opinion of his underſtanding, and as they affect his welfare ſo intimately connected with that of the nation, but as they tend to make even himſelf ſo unnaturally inſtrumental to the ruin of both. For the opinion of no Briton is abſolutely indifferent to the conduct of things, ſince every Briton, by the happy conſtitution of his country, enjoys, by himſelf or his repre-

repreſentatives, ſome ſhare in the public authority; to the ſupport of which he muſt pay with ſo much the more chearfulneſs, if he has reaſon to be ſatisfied with its adminiſtration. To ſay the truth too the bulk of the people is always well-intentioned, as having none of the by-views, and pitifully falſe diſtinct intereſts that influence the men of power, to drive it off its natural inſtinct of ſelf-preſervation, and paſſion for the maintenance of the national honor, in which the meaneſt individual in the nation ſo juſtly claims a ſhare. In ſhort, it is rarely wrong, but when it is artfully miſ-guided; or miſ-informed: and even then it ſtill retains a ſmothered ſpark of juſtce and common ſenſe that is ſure to break out again, and does not ſuffer it long to continue under the illuſion.

But of all the opinions that have prevailed in practice concering France, not one perhaps more obviouſly admits, at leaſt, of a doubt of its juſtneſs, or more deſerves examination, then that on which the late expeditions againſt her have been founded.

Of the one againſt Rochfort, it would be vain and ſuperfluous to ſay any thing here. Thoſe who ſtill admire the plan of it,

it, will hardly change their minds for any thing that can be ſaid of it now, which could only be repetition. Thoſe who heartily deſpiſed it, can as little be liable to alter their opinion, eſpecially with ſo much reaſon to be confirmed in it, by the return of the forces on the laſt expedition, after doing no more than what forms ſo admirable an apology for the commanders on the firſt one. For as to the burning of the veſſels before St. Maloes, let all the merit be granted to that exploit that it can juſtly claim. It may have done a conſiderable, and not eaſily reparable damage to the enemy. It was cutting the very ſinews of their power to annoy our trade. If it may be ſaid that it was purely an accident of over-caution in the French that threw thoſe veſſels into the way of our forces, and that being moſtly private property, the conſequence was driving a number of hands into the French navy; let ſuch an obſervation be treated as a merely invidious detraction. Still it may be averred, and averred rather as a juſt compliment, than injuriouſly to the firſt lord of the admiralty, and to one of our greateſt *names* in war, that ſuch an operation, not being

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of an over-heroic or indeed very military nature, could not, alone, do either the nation or them any honor proportionable to the expectation raiſed by their being employed in it, eſpecially in thoſe who did not know how little it was poſſible for them to do.

But there has been one objection made againſt this kind of expeditions, which certainly deſerves for its falſity to be exploded, even by thoſe who do not admire them. For truth is above every thing. That objection is the expence. But thoſe who make fair eſtimates of things, muſt allow that of all the expences incurred in the purſuit of the war; this is not the leaſt plauſible one, ſince the whole of it may be ſaid to be kept in the nation, where it becomes a general benefit, diffuſes life and ſpirit through the land, encourages a number of valuable trades; and ultimately in a great meaſure re-circulates, in form of taxes, into the treaſury from whence it iſſued. At leaſt, how preferable is this diſpoſal of the public money, to its being, abſolutely for not one valuable or ſenſible purpoſe ingulphed in a country "from whoſe bourn no travelling "guinea ever returns!"

O No!

No! the true objection to theſe expeditions, is much ſuperior and quite of another nature. It is their utter inſignificance, and the ridicule that always attends the employing of means, or diſproportioned, or foreign to the ends apparently propoſed.

If the point of view was making a diverſion in favor of our dear friends and allies in Germany, one body of whom, perhaps, it would be ſtill better to wiſh well re-paſſed the Rhine again; there could not be a more unjudicious one. Though ſome here might be ignorant of the French coaſt; or be carried away by the impetuoſity of that vulgar ſpirit of perſiſtence in meaſures, of which themſelves were the fond fathers, it cannot be ſuppoſed that he French themſelves did not know all that they had to fear from all the force they knew we had to employ on that miſſion. They could not but know, that penetrating into the interior of the kingdom, was no part of our plan, and that as to the ſea-coaſt, which could alone be the object of our operations, thoſe fortified places of theirs worth attacking, were all proof againſt what we are pleaſed to call here a vigorous impreſſion,

preſſion; that their harbours are even from their badneſs inacceſſible to our naval force, and that as to our land-one, it could not be but too inconſiderable to attempt ſieges. What then was there in ſuch an armament, that could alarm or deter them from ſending a ſingle file of muſqueteers leſs to Germany, than they originally intended? Even their militia might be ſufficient to guard their coaſt, as much as it was neceſſary to be guarded againſt thoſe, whoſe object could not be an invaſion, or but at moſt, a deſcent, the tranſient damage of which could not have the leaſt effect on the more permanent and greater points of their political ſyſtem. When our troops were actually landed, and the burning of the ſhips at St. Maloes, could not but be in view; the duke d'Aiguillon wrote to court, that it might be perfectly eaſy on that account, for he would anſwer for it they would ſoon re-imbark again. They did ſo, very happy, not only in the enemy not treading on their heels, but in that the generals, who had not let the troops have above two or three days proviſions with them, had not truſted in vain to the weather, which had it proved too

boiſterous, or contrary for boats to have been ſent aſhore, they muſt have eaten one another, or ſurrendered at diſcretion, rather as the priſoners of famine, than of the ſword. " But what then? muſt not " ſome riſks be run?" ſays one with a fighting face. Even that little place, Cherbourg was afterwards, at firſt, attempted in vain by them. In ſhort, whatever terrors ſome were ſo weak or ſo miſ-informed here, as to attribute to the French, on the occaſion of theſe " formidable" armaments, nothing is more certain, than that they knew the utmoſt they could do, too well not even to take the liberty of laughing at them. And after all what could our forces do, or be expected to do? Every one knew before, that withal the fortifications, along one of the fouleſt coaſts in the world, there are ſtill many ſpots on it, where our troops may eaſily land, if landing was all. But when landed, what then? They may frighten a few peaſants along the ſea-ſide, from their brown bread and onions, or deſtroy their ſallad, and the hopes of their ſoupe-maigre: they may even take ſome ſorry village, or hen-coop-fortification, whoſe name was before ſcarce known, *in depoſite* for half an hour. But when they have

done that, what remains for them, but on the firſt alarm of the national forces coming down, to ſcamper back on board a ſhip again? a circumſtance fitter to teach our ſoldiers the art of running away, than the art of war. As to any harraſſment the alarm of an impending deſcent may cauſe along the coaſt, the French have rather to thank us for it. They are wiſe enough to have a militia on foot, and it is very kind in us, at our own expence to keep the forces of it in breath, to find them them in exerciſe, to inure them in ſome meaſure to fatigue. They will not make the worſe ſoldiers for recruiting their armies. But after all, is not this literally, incurring the ridicule of what M. de Mirabeau, not without reaſon and humor calls " pretending " to frighten mankind by packing up men " in wooden boxes and ſending them to ſpit " upon an enemy's ſhore?"

But if this plan of deſcents is ſo excellent as its admirers are ſo thoroughly welcome to pronounce it, it muſt be owned withal, that the beauty and advantages of them, eſcaped thoſe poltroons, your Edwards and your Henry's. They were afraid to venture Engliſhmen over to France, but

in ſuch a body as might ſtand, not run away, at the approach of the enemy, whoſe ſuperiority of numbers in thoſe rude times, they never ſtood to calculate very nicely. They were not content with having the flower of the nobility give grace and animation to the enterprize, but went over in perſon, and ſhared the danger. In ſhort, their object was an effectual invaſion, not a ſcampering ſcheme of deſcents that could anſwer no one purpoſe of honor or advantage. At leaſt, no Prince was in thoſe times, ſent barely attended and *expoſed*, by way of giving grace to ſuch nothing-meaning adventures. Yet France was then an open country to what it now is. Moſt of their fortified places were rather refuges againſt the oppreſſion of their own kings, than intended to repel a foreign enemy. Conſequently the leſs force might have ſerved to penetrate more ſafely into the interior of the country, or to make a vigorous impreſſion. So much greater men are we than our anceſtors, in ſpite of all that has been ſaid of our degeneracy.

But if France well-conſidered offers, at leaſt, to this nation in its preſent circumſtances, no hold, no promiſing overture of attack, either on her inland frontiers, or on her

her ſea-coaſt; the following queſtion, may poſſibly occur to well-meaning people. "What! would you then have nothing "done againſt France? Would you return "to the former ſcandalous times of ſloth "and inaction, when our navy ſeemed "maintained more for parade than for uſe; "when our land-forces were rather a ridi-"culous burthen to the nation, than of any "ſervice to it, either in point of defence "or offence? When the poſt of a military "officer, was big with no more danger or "fatigue, than that of a prebendary loung-"ing in his ſtall? When the whole nation, "in ſhort, appeared to have loſt that mar-"tial ſpirit for which it once out-vied all Eu-"rope; and when even ſordid intereſt itſelf, "with all its keenneſs, ſeemed to have loſt "ſight of that maxim ſo eſſential to it, "that neither trade nor wealth are valua-"ble, but in proportion to the means and "ſpirit of defending them?"

To thoſe queſtions, the anſwer is however not very difficult, nor can be thought a very irrational one. The objection to improper attacks, does not moſt certainly exclude the recourſe to proper ones. On the contrary, it implies the recommendation of them

them. In ſingle combat no one chooſes to aim at thoſe parts of his enemy's body, that are defended by proof-armour: he rather feels out for the weak or unguarded places, where his ſword may beſt enter and wound to moſt effect. The ſame rule holds exactly between nation and nation, when once they enter the liſts of war. The diſtreſſing of the trade and navigation of France, is a blow that cannot be too cloſely followed. It might of itſelf almoſt ſoon make her ſick of the conteſt. But there are ſo many points beſides, where ſhe lies open to wounds, that it muſt be inexcuſable to conſume that ſtrength which might be ſo effectually employed in inflicting them on her, upon others, not only impoſſible, but ridiculous.

Both Indies, America, and even ſome of her Iſlands in Europe, Minorca yet unretaken, afford ſo large a field for action, that, ſo far from ſloth or indolence, being neceſſarily the alternative, on dropping the wind-mill ſchemes of deſcents, or inland attacks, there remain draughts upon the nation for funds and men, for ſolid and eſſential enterprizes, to the full as great as it can well anſwer. No, not even the millions ſunk

upon

upon foreign connexions would be more than a ſufficient ſupplement to our own exigencies for thoſe purpoſes on which they could hardly be expended to leſs effect, than on the continent, as the actual ſtate of things there ſo clearly atteſts. Our troops would then act with the more ſpirit from their being aſſured of the quarrel being purely that of their own country, and not a mere diverſion, and that diverſion an unavailing one, in favor of another. The ſuperiority of our navy, palpably enables us to tranſport our land-forces to any part of the world, in which the French may be oppoſed to advantage. A competent number of regulars, left at home, when ſeconded as they ſoon might be by an effective, general, and conſtitutional militia may, whilſt the reſt would be uſefully employed abroad, might ſmile defiance at the power of France to hurt us by any invaſion, even ſhould our fleets by ſome of thoſe accidents, againſt which all human providence is ſo defective and unavailing, not be at hand to bar them the way. At leaſt, all that would be neceſſary of our army might well be ſpared on diſtant ſervice. It might then, without a gaſconnade, be ſaid, that the

exiſtence of the French in Canada, muſt take an end as ſoon as it ſhould be vigorouſly undertaken. The cutting off the ſupplies to St. Domingo, to Martinico, and to their other iſlands, from their mother-country, could not but have the effect on them, that a ſtrong ligature has on any member of the body, cauſing it to wither from the intercepted circulation. At leaſt, it would greatly facilitate any attempt of ours upon the moſt convenient of them for us to attempt. Would it not too be a great and ſhameful reproach to the nation, if, from its remiſsneſs, or miſcalculate of time, or of the enemy's force, the French ſhould in the Eaſt-indies have obtained ſuch an actual ſuperiority as muſt infallibly, in that caſe, give a deep, and perhaps incurable wound to the honor of our flag in thoſe parts, as well as to our national intereſts? How can it ſound to Europe and poſterity that in the face of ſo much greater a maritime ſtrenth than theirs, they ſhould unmoleſted, or unoppoſed in time, provide for the tranſportation of their troops by ſea to parts ſo remote; and thus multiply, as it were, their naval forces, by their ſuperor art of employing them? In ſhort, can it be ſaid, with the leaſt ſhadow

of

of foundation, that there is not enough for Britain to do, not to be obliged, for want of occupation, to relapſe into that ſtate of ſupineneſs and inactivity which is ſo juſtly exploded, and to which however all the bluſter and parade of an abſurd and inſignificant activity are hardly preferable? What great difference does it make to the intereſt or the honor of the nation, whether the character of the Fribble or the Flaſh predominates in her Councils? The latter is, perhaps, the moſt dangerous and aſſuredly the moſt ridiculous of the two.

Indolence and luxury may for a while, and always dangerouſly, ſoften and enervate thoſe who are plunged in them. The greateſt conquerors, the moſt martial ſpirits, have occaſionally felt their banefull influence and many of them ſeverely ſuffered for it. But there is ſuch a thing as flouncing out of the ſlough; the languor of them is not always proof againſt the calls of duty and the excitements of honor, where there is conſtitutional courage at bottom. Whereas it is the nature of diſappointments from ſilly or inglorious enterprizes to ſtrike a deadly damp to the heart, and to deſtroy in future the neceſſary confidence in the propoſal of thoſe

effectual ones, for which the lives ſo often wretchedly thrown away upon the others, might be ſo much better reſerved. The officers emplyed in them are loſt to the public who takes a prejudice to them, the more difficult to retract, from that retractation imploying the confeſſion of a miſtake: and how few are there capable of that greatneſs, that even heroiſm of the mind, of which there cannot perhaps be a ſtronger proof than ſuch a confeſſion! Thus the ſervice of many a gallant man periſhes to his country without his being the leaſt in fault to it: or at leaſt his reputation is ſunk by having been employed in the execution of meaſures, of which the obvious nature, as well as foreſight of the event, left no room either to arraign fortune, or to excuſe any fondneſs for the commiſſion.

But thus it cannot but be when men of flaſhy parts carry into power the weakneſſes of their perſonal character, with influence enough to make them the national ones: when giddy with thoſe ſucceſſes of their nothingneſs, that only prove the littleneſs of the times, and without the leaſt ſpirit of buſineſs, or but the common knowledge of it, they preſume themſelves equal to the ma-

nagement of every thing; and cannot be long admitted to it, before they furniſh the proof of their being infinitely beneath any confidence placed in them. In the mean time the enemies of a nation, where ſuch men ſhould bear ſway, would have the fineſt opportunity imaginable, for puſhing their projects againſt it, ſure of not being very materially counter-acted, by thoſe their plans and execution, which muſt be rather matter of mirth than of terror to them. What would they have better to wiſh than long life to ſuch perſonages, and their continuance in power to the end of it?

That this however is not the preſent condition of this nation any one may eaſily ſatisfy himſelf from a candid review of the preſent ſmiling, and not in the leaſt hollow aſpect of things. He may, from his own knowledge and obſervation, feel that the great days of Britain are bidding fair to return under the auſpicious influence of the preſent depoſitaries of the power, honor and welfare of the nation. The delightful harmony in the conduct of the ſtate-machine, between characters imagined ſo jarring and ſo oppoſite, reminds one of the poetical golden age when

when the wolf and the lamb drank promiſcuouſly and peaceably together at the ſame clear unpolluted ſtream.

Corruption no longer rears her hated head, but hides it in the lap of Patriot-purity, that ſeeks, by lovingly foſtering and ſuckling her, to change her foul complexion, and aſſimilate it to her own ſo fair one.

No longer are to be ſeen thoſe eye-ſores, the non-expletives of poſts who, if they robbed the nation of no more then the ſervice of abler men in their room, would rob it of a great deal.

Merit, in arts and arms, after ſo long a neglect, begins, under all the encouragement ſo ſenſibly beſtowed on it, and ſo diſcerningly diſtributed, to refloriſh in the land of which it can never but be the ornament and defence,

Our men of power, have, at length, found out that profound ſecret to their predeceſſors, that ideots and triflers could not be the beſt of ſervants to the puplic, nor even to themſelves, though congenially choſen by them for being ſuch. The preſent Great more wiſely, and even in honor to their taſte and diſcernment, call in men of abilities

to

to their aſſiſtence, nay, ſue to them for it, as is their duty and moſt certainly their intereſt.

We have now ſuch able negotiators at all the courts of Europe, as are an ample overmatch to the French ones, and are, literally ſpeaking, the repreſentatives of the miniſtry.

The due, the much wanted care is actually and evidently taken, to form great men for the ſervice of the nation, before the immediate need of them ſhall make it too late to think of forming them; and to remove that wretched excuſe for not employing proper ſubjects, there being no better to employ; to take away from our enemies, in ſhort, the encouragement they might have, from ſeeing councils without ſtateſmen, and armies without generals.

The ſtale over-acted farce of reſignations ſeems ſuſpended, and will, it is to be hoped, never again come into play, in the ſhape of a recoil, only to come on the ſurer; or to give the public no other ſatisfaction than the ſilly one of ſeeing rather other men than other meaſures take place; or what is ſillier yet, the ſame men, with the ſame meaſures, dancing the political hays; ſometimes eclipſing, ſometimes eclipſed by one another.

The ſenſe of the enlightened and impartial multitude begins to look with an equal eye on the veterans of corruption, and the pretenders to patriotiſm, on the worn out tool of a court, and the muſhroom of a much abuſed popularity, ridiculouſly ſhot up to a cedar-height. It now judges of both, by the tenor and tendency of their conduct; and does not paſs its opinion on them without firſt aſking itſelf that moſt eſſential queſtion, " *What have they actually done*, " *or what are they capable of doing?* " To which the fair obvious anſwer would ſo often be " *Nothing*, or *worſe than no-* " *thing*."

In ſhort, if this is not the true repreſentation of our preſent condition or of *Things as they are*, it may, at leaſt, be hoped that to no Briton will it be imputed as a very high crime or miſdemeanour, that he ſhould devoutly wiſh that *they were ſo*.

POST-

POSTCRIPT.

THE reader will be pleaſed to obſerve that the ſheets relative to the K— of P——, were printed long before the news arrived of the check his arms are ſaid to have received. Nothing could indeed be more mean, more unmanly than any reaſoning againſt his conduct or our union with him, from that event. But ſurely thoſe who were never dazzled with his ſucceſſes at their height, and even argued on a preſumption of his continuing to puſh his victories beyond the walls of Vienna, can little be ſuppoſed capable of that wretched vulgariſm of judging him by his fortune and not by the nature and truth of things. So far too from their exulting in any calamities that may befall him, none would perhaps be more ſincerely afflicted for them than they would be, and that on the very Britiſh principle for which they differed ſo widely from the popular opinion for connecting the cauſe of Britain with his. To fear a bad ſucceſs and to wiſh it are certainly ſentiments that far from imply one another.

FINIS.

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